State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World

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State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World

Coty J. Martin

Dissertation submitted to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences at West Virginia University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in Political Science

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What are the most influential factors to the rise of terrorist groups in the developing world? From Nigeria to Indonesia, various groups have conducted devastating attacks, against fellow citizens and international visitors. Hendrix and Young (2014) find military capacity may encourage the use of terrorism while bureaucratic measures depress them. Further investigation into underlying catalysts for mobilization is required before we can explain the rise in activity of terrorist organizations in these regions. I expect as measures of military capacity increase that terrorism increases while increases in administrative capacity reduce terrorist activity. I also expect indirect factors such as repressive activity by the state increases terrorism while corrupt and clientelistic behavior in the state has a more complex, suppressing effect on terrorist activity. To test these assumptions I first use a cross-national quantitative analysis to identify significant factors in the relationship between terrorism and state capacity in sixty-five states across Africa and Southeast Asia using several sources of data including the Global Terrorism Database. I then examine four of these significant factors, military capacity, administrative capacity, repression, and corruption in two case study chapters that consider policy changes made after the rise of terrorist activity in West Africa and Southeast Asia. The results are mixed, finding as states increase military and administrative capacity terrorist activity increases which suggests with advances in legal and military capacity in the state comes the potential for repressive tactics and abuse that increases terrorist activity in response.
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Chapter 1: The Puzzle of Terrorism in the Developing World

In recent decades devastating terrorist attacks have occurred from Nigeria to Indonesia with several organizations having established footholds in several locations. There are several theoretical explanations for why terrorism occurs in places as diverse as the densely populated cities of North Africa, the desert and jungle regions of the Saharan and Sub-Saharan countries, and the island nation-states of Southeast Asia. Why are there numerous terrorist incidents along the Lake Chad border region in small villages whereas incidents in the city-state of Singapore are few and far between? Why have some groups or movements carried out hundreds or thousands of attacks in a given year while comparable groups or movements have proven less active?

In short, this dissertation examines what factors are most influential to the rise of terrorist groups carrying out attacks in the developing world. The proposed answer is to consider the state’s capacity to counter extremist groups using terrorism to try to achieve their political or ideological goals. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, rates of economic development and regime type offer no clear pattern to explain the phenomenon. Nor do individual-level understandings of ideological motivations among those that become terrorists. Instead, considering how effective the state is at carrying out its duties as an organized body to respond to the needs of a population offers us an alternative explanation for why terrorist organizations thrive in certain countries and not in others.

Variations in state capacity can increase or decrease the potential for extremist organizations to implement terrorist activity. In terms of the capacity of the state, I refer to the opportunity for a non-state actor such as Boko Haram or Jemaah Islamiyah to rise up against the state. This opportunity comes from the state’s ability to maintain its influence throughout its entire territory with its military and bureaucratic resources. Increased military capacity has been
found to initiate more terrorist activity while increased administrative capacity has been found to decrease the number of terrorist attacks (Hendrix & Young 2014). When openings develop bureaucratically, through the rule of law for example, groups can challenge the state’s authority (Choi 2010). At the same time however, when the state’s capacity increases in terms of both military and administrative capacity states are better able to target pockets of dissent. In turn, this in fact may make groups more prone to carry out terrorist attacks against the state. Other indirect factors must be considered as well. Repressive tactics used by more authoritarian states or those transitioning to democratic regimes and clientelistic practices within the state’s institutions that creates discontent among the citizens of the state can likely impact terrorist activity as well.

To better understand terrorism as a tactic for achieving political objectives requires a better understanding of the power dynamics between the state and terrorist organizations and when a tipping point is reached. This point occurs when organizations are able to challenge the state through terrorism and at least believe that the state is vulnerable in some manner. Francisco’s (1995) predator-prey model can serve as an apt analogy when we consider how to observe this tipping point. As Francisco notes in his inverted-U hypothesis, strong discouragement of protest is the result of coercion by the state, including repressive reactions to public protests. Meanwhile, strong encouragement of coercion follows protest behavior. However, extremely harsh forms of coercion by the state can also accelerate protest. In short, how those dissatisfied with some aspect of their community react to the influence of the state is at the crux of finding when individuals are willing to risk personal harm to take up a cause against an authority figure.

A similar relationship would seem to exist when we consider the interaction of terrorist organizations and states. However, one might contemplate specifically the capacity of the state to
counter antagonistic groups if this predator-prey relationship can be flipped. The state itself, if incapable of deterring dissent and political violence, may fall victim to a particular terrorist movement or organization that finds itself at a strategic advantage. This advantage may be limited to a particular geographic territory or a broader region where non-state actors can find an opportunity to operate and target the state at its weakest points.

Using the case of Boko Haram as an example to illustrate this analogy, early iterations of the movement were met with harsh crackdowns by the regime which then led to a turn to political violence. The group focused its operations specifically in the northeastern region of the country and succeeded at carrying out thousands of attacks over several years in an area of the country the state has been yet able to fully recapture in a military or bureaucratic sense, as well as in bordering regions of other states. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the distribution of terrorist attacks by Boko Haram across Nigeria and surrounding states. A glance at the map shows a concentration of attacks far from the capital and not concentrated in any particular city.
Yet in contrast a group such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Southeast Asia existed several years prior to the first activities of Boko Haram. While JI existed prior to the September 11th attacks, the group’s notoriety as a violent terrorist movement comes afterwards first with the 2002 bombing of a nightclub on the island of Bali. Yet as depicted in Figure 1.2 there have been comparatively fewer terrorist attacks attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah from 2000 to 2015. JI overall is responsible for far less attacks than groups in Southeast Asia and beyond such as Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region despite a longer period of existence as a terrorist organization and in far less of a geographically-concentrated area than Boko Haram. In short, why the variation in the level of activity?

Returning to the central questions of this dissertation, why has terrorism so far been more prevalent in some states but less so in other countries in the developing world? A clear consensus on the primary factors driving terrorist organizations does not exist amongst scholars. I also find through interviews with those in the policy and think tank communities that no consensus on the driving factors for terrorism in the developing world exists in that community either. Therefore,
with consideration of both what has been written previously on terrorism as well as the factors noted by policymakers and other experts, my theoretical focus on explaining terrorist activity in the developing world centers on the concept of state capacity. The strength or weakness of state capacity may increase or decrease the potential for extremist organizations to implement terrorist activity. Relating back to the predator-prey analogy, the state’s weaknesses can lead to a reversal in the relationship, potentially at the sub-state level, where the state becomes the prey to an active terrorist organization. This leads to the growth of terrorist movements that challenge the state’s authority to rule and the ability to recruit members not satisfied with the status quo in their lives in the state.

Over the next several chapters I provide a discussion of the relationship between state capacity and terrorism in the developing world. Chapter Two provides a look at the status of the literature on terrorism and state capacity. I look first at the debates regarding how the legal and scholarly communities define terrorism and distinguish it from other forms of political violence. I then review the literature on several elements of the capacity of the state including regime type, territorial issues, military capacity, and administrative capacity. I conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of the different regions of the developing world that will be analyzed in this dissertation and discuss how the modern wave of terrorism has affected Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Southeast Asia.

Chapter Three provides an in-depth discussion of what those in the policy community deem as the most critical elements of how to explain the rise of terrorism in the developing world. I conducted these interviews with various members of the policy community and think tanks that work on the issues related to counterterrorism both in the US and around the world. I then provide a discussion of my theory and the assumptions driving my argument that terrorist
activity and the growth of terrorist organizations are affected by the capacity of the state. I also list and discuss hypotheses regarding the capacity of the state and weaknesses in capacity including territorial control and clientelism. Finally, this chapter concludes with a general overview of the research design that will be used to test my theoretical assumptions and the potential concerns regarding endogeneity between terrorism and state capacity.

Chapter Four takes a broad look at the regions considered in this dissertation and offers a cross-national analysis of terrorism in the developing world between 1985 and 2012 through zero-inflated negative binomial analysis to test the relationships between several aspects of state capacity and the number of terrorist attacks in Sub-Saharan, North African, and Southeast Asian nation-states. I find that military capacity as well as repression are strong explanatory factors for increases in terrorist activity and consistently lead to higher rates of terrorism as states engage in increased military spending and repressive behaviors against their citizens, consistent with existing literature. In contrast the results of the cross-national analysis in Chapter Four find some support for the argument that while the quality of bureaucracy and administration in the state affects terrorism, the relationship is not entirely in line with the theory presented in Chapter Three and requires further consideration in the next chapters. Other measures such as a proxy for infrastructural development in the state and the proxy for clientelism via corruption do show consistent negative relationships with the number of terrorist attacks in the developing world.

In Chapters Five and Six I delve deeper into several of the significant relationships identified in the cross-national results on state capacity and terrorism presented in Chapter Four. In particular I focus on four of these factors: bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military capacity, repression, and clientelism. Chapter Five and Chapter Six consider two of the regions analyzed in Chapter Four: Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia respectively. In Chapter Five I
focus on the aforementioned case of Boko Haram and its impact on four states in the West Sub-Saharan African region: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. All four are concentrated around the Lake Chad region as is a majority of the activity of Boko Haram which in the last several years transcended international borders in its attacks on civilians and those that represent the states in the region. I find all four states, in response to the rise of Boko Haram as a local and then regional threat to security, adopt new legal administrative and military re-organization policies in their efforts to respond to existing weaknesses in state capacity in the region.

I then move on to consider the same group of factors in four geographically-concentrated states in Southeast Asia impacted by the other aforementioned case, Jemaah Islamiyah. In Chapter Six I follow a similar pattern of analysis and consider the case of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and others affecting four geographically-concentrated states in the region: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. All four of these nation-states are situated across multiple islands and experience far different challenges with state capacity in terms of terrorists traveling between territories. Both chapters consider the period when each respective group of states began to face the challenge of countering terrorist movements in their territory and how each state responded to improve administrative and military capacity as well as the capacity-compromising issues of repression, clientelism, and corruption. I offer a brief discussion of the similarities and differences between the two regions and my overall findings in Chapter Seven, the conclusion.
Chapter 2: A Literature Review of the Relationship between Terrorism and State Capacity

The literature on the study of terrorism is both broad in its discussion of the phenomenon both as a form of political violence as well as a tactic implemented by non-state actors to achieve their goals. The following chapter will first discuss the issues with defining what specifically falls into the realm of terrorism. Scholars as well as legal practitioners have long debated the concept. Therefore, the initial section begins with variations in defining terrorism across the international spectrum. The discussion will then turn to the scholarly debate, highlighting the conceptual issues that have been raised regarding three particular elements of how we can consider terrorism as a phenomenon: targets of the acts, tactics used, and the motivations and goals behind terrorism.

The second section will provide an in depth look at how the capacity of the state, in other words the state’s ability to govern its territory and counter challenges to its authority. I first discuss how regimes and territorial issues factor into the success or failure of terrorist movements. This section is followed by discussion of literature regarding military and administrative capacity of the state and how clientelism within the state and repressive tactics by the state impacts terrorist movements. The third and final section will delve into the regions of interest in this dissertation. Brief discussions of the literature regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Southeast Asia provide insight into the case selection for later chapters.

Defining Terrorism and the Rise of Terrorist Organizations

Before any discussion of how concepts of the capacity of the state impacts the rise of terrorist organizations, the use of terrorist tactics against the state and its population, and how states use their resources to counter threats from within its territory, we must first begin with some conceptual foundations. The term terrorism evolved over time and space. Originally
conceptualized in the eighteenth century, it was used to describe violent behavior by the state or, as Nacos (2012) frames it, terrorism was meant to describe “political violence ‘from above’ as exercised during the Reign of Terrorism in the wake of the French Revolution, when terrorism meant the mass guillotining of the aristocracy and other real or perceived enemies of the state” (p. 19). Not until a century later was the term began used to describe violent actions taken by those not in power against those that are in control of a state or government, expanding the definition to include violence ‘from below.’

By the early twentieth century anarchists utilizing bombings and assassinations of political leaders across the world led to the term taking on an anti-state connotation. No longer was terrorism associated with those in power, but instead associated with those out of power trying to take it from the state. Usage today still varies on several factors. A debate continues regarding whether a small group of terrorists that grows into a challenger to the state is then a guerilla or revolutionary movement. Groups such as the IRA of the twentieth century and ISIS in the twenty-first come to mind. Therefore, to understand how power dynamics between the state and the discontent results in terrorism, we must define what is and is not considered terrorism in the contemporary sense.

*Legal Debates on Defining Terrorism*

Even prior to the September 11th attacks a debate over defining terrorism had developed. The earliest efforts at an international level to provide a working definition of terrorism occurred in the era between world wars. Written in 1937, the following definition established under the League of Nations Convention (Nacos 2012, p. 25) describes:

“[a]ll criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.”
It is worth noting here that, as will be discussed in later sections, the League definition does not limit terrorism to politically-motivated acts of violence. While other efforts at defining the practice occurred later in the twentieth century such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings in 1997, the next significant definition of terrorism was not established at an international level until 1999 through a UN resolution that defines terrorism as:

“criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons, or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them.”

The most significant change from the League and UN definitions is the specificity of terrorism being used as an action to achieve politically racially, or religiously-motivated goals. In 2005 the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was unanimously passed by the General Assembly and is the last treaty regarding terrorism to be ratified by the membership of the UN.

Within the United States a debate between agencies also existed, even in the years after the 9/11 attacks and the “Global War on Terror” initiated by the Bush administration. To illustrate this debate, we can turn to the definitions of terrorism provided by several US and international organizations that work to counter the activities of terrorist organizations around the world. First, Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as:

“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”

Meanwhile, the Federal Bureau of Investigation also uses its own definition of the phenomenon:

[Terrorism is] “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”
Both definitions contain more or less similar elements regarding the purpose and the target of terrorist acts but legal definitions of what constitutes terrorism vary in some cases from agency to agency and often from country to country.

The Country Reports on Terrorism from the US Department of State also highlight variations across the world in their efforts to define and counter terrorism. In the case of Russia, its agencies do not share a single definition of what constitutes terrorism while France has a system of non-jury courts for terrorist acts and has a broad definition for terrorist offenses known as the “association of wrongdoers” offense. Malaysia’s most recent legal reform to laws regarding terrorism expands its definition to include support given to terrorist organizations and the use of social media to promote terrorism and terrorist organizations. In contrast, Nigeria’s 2014 Law for the Fight against Terrorism has been criticized by some of the country’s political leaders for being too broad and potentially creating a slippery slope for using the law for political repression against opponents of those in power (BCCVE 2016).

In short, such variation across the legal spectrum within and between states demonstrates the vagueness of the concept nearly two decades after the initiation of the “Global War on Terror.” The variation in defining terrorism as a phenomenon may have consequences for how states approach the issue of developing and adapting capacity to meet terrorist threats. Legal variance on the judicial systems that hear terrorist-related charges for example could lead to shorter trial periods or the consideration of charges not available to state or local courts such as the death penalty in some countries. Additionally, the rise of al-Qaeda’s incorporation of franchises across the developing world, the emergence of ISIS versus its current status, and cyberterrorism are fitting examples of the gray areas within this debate as well. Therefore, this dissertation relies upon the more scholarly conceptualizations of terrorism as a phenomenon but
consider these variations in definitions particularly in the case study chapters regarding terrorism in Sub-Saharan and North Africa as well as Southeast Asia.

Scholarly Debates on Defining Terrorism

One suggestion regarding the debate over defining terrorism is that an effort requires new approaches to the study of the phenomenon because there are more varieties of political violence being identified so new terms have been established for new varieties of terrorism (Laquer 1999). The purpose of terrorism is one element. Any discussion of terrorist organizations carrying out acts of violence across the world requires consideration of the purpose behind these acts. A factor common to many but not all definitions of terrorism, both legal and scholarly, is political motivation (Hussain 1988; Hoffman 1998; Post 2007; Cox et al 2009; Enders et al 2011; Nacos 2012; Krause 2013; Crenshaw 1981, 2014).

Three categorizations of terrorism have been established, with political terrorism being the first. Within this categorization are both religious and secular motivations for carrying out acts of terrorism. Criminal terrorism, the second, has no political motive and is more mercenary in nature. Finally, personal or pathological terrorism seeks to eliminate specific opponents, in some instances where elites are involved, utilizing the state and its coercive forces (Hussain 1988; Post 2007). There is some ambiguity between these three categorizations however. In some instances personal goals could logically be sought under the auspices of political motivations for example. The general focus in this dissertation though will be on those cases that are politically driven and both of a secular or religious nature.

Targets

As noted as well in the legalistic definitions, terrorism for political purposes is carried out in order to send a message to an audience consisting of the state and the civilian population that
makes up that particular community. The act of terrorism seeks to systemically induce fear and anxiety or create sympathy amongst the population to influence the behavior and actions of the government (Crenshaw 1981, 2014; Nacos 2012). Political terrorism is often symbolic in nature and the victims of terrorist attacks represent the larger audience the group seeks to affect (Post 2007; Crenshaw 2014). From attacks on the financial and military symbols of the US in 2001 to the 2017 incident outside of Parliament in London, terrorist groups continue to utilize symbolic structures to convey their positions.

This practice is certainly not a twenty-first century development when one considers attacks by other organizations. Examples include the IRA bombings in London in the 1970s and 1980s, Puerto Rican nationalists attacking the US Capitol building in 1954, and the bombing of the US Capitol by the Weather Underground in 1971. There are also numerous examples of less prestigious but still symbolic attacks on abortion clinics and more recently night clubs and university campuses as well. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia there are numerous examples of shopping malls, schools, and embassies being targeted as more generalized symbols of the ideals terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and al-Qaeda claim to be against in society.

Beyond the symbolism of the physical target, there is also a discussion about the target in terms of civilians and noncombatants versus representatives of the authority in a state. While political elites and the media may paint a broad picture on what should and should not be considered terrorism when an act of violence occurs, there has been some discussion on differentiating between terrorism and insurgency based on whom an attack targets. One position that has been taken is that terrorism is “any premeditated violent act perpetrated against civilian noncombatants” and “when actors perpetrate violent acts against military forces, no matter how
heinous or unconventional the act, these acts must be classified as something other than terrorism,” (Cox et al 2009, p. 21-22) such as insurgency or guerilla warfare.

Others have also suggested that acts of politically-motivated violence can only be categorized as terrorism if they are against civilian noncombatants (Post 2007; Enders et al 2011; Nacos 2012). Yet this strict distinction is not as clear cut as it may sound. The September 11th attacks as well as more recent attacks by Boko Haram across northeast Nigeria, in which terrorists targeted civilian, military, and political targets are notable examples of this definitional issue. Terrorism, as described by Crenshaw (1981) is a “direct attack on the regime aimed at the insecurity and demoralization of government officials, independent of any impact on public opinion” (p. 387). Some have also suggested that experts have mistakenly argued terrorism and guerilla warfare are not related when in fact political terrorism is a tactic in the strategies of guerilla warfare (Hussain 1988). In short, while it may be efficient to distinguish between the targets of terrorism and insurgency, these efforts can also create other difficulties as both can be considered as affecting the state as the prey, in the predator-prey analogy.

Other issues in defining terrorism include differentiating between domestic and international terrorism as well as non-state actors versus state-sponsored terrorism. The FBI’s working definition for domestic terrorism notes that attacks that occur in the US or its territories are done “without foreign direction” whereas international terrorism are acts that “transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they are intended to intimidate, or the locale in which perpetrators operate” (Nacos 2012, p. 21). Sageman (2004) argues that distinguishing between the domestic and the international in sampling is important to avoid obscuring important factors that explain the difference between the two manifestations.
At the same time, scholars have also highlighted the difference between terrorist organizations that function in cooperation with the state versus those that are seeking to bring radical change to the existing regime. Maogato (2003) notes that, like terrorism, there is no universal definition for state-sponsored terrorism. State sponsorship of terrorism can include a state directly supporting terror attacks or indirectly supporting groups through training, financing, and other forms of support such as tolerating a terrorist group acting within its territory. One such example is the Indian government’s support to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the 1970s and 1980s. The Indian government sought to indirectly influence events in Sri Lanka while denying involvement in the violence by the Tamils to gain independence (Byman & Kreps 2010). In this sense, the state is acting as a predator indirectly against another state, via a terrorist organization.

State-sponsorship of terrorism has been on the decline however. The phenomenon of states supporting terrorist organizations peaked in the 1970s and 1980s but has rapidly declined since 2001 (Collins 2014). A more recent example where state-sponsored terrorism still occurs is with Hezbollah. The organization has become a well-trained and effective organization with support from Iran as well as Syria in their efforts to undermine countries such as Israel without becoming directly involved (Levitt 2007; Norton 2014). In short, terrorist organizations can exist as domestic-level movements or transnational threats to multiple states and may also have the support of a state or be acting alone in achieving its own political objectives.

Tactics

In addition to the debate over the targets of terrorism, scholars have long discussed the tactics that such groups employ to achieve their stated goals. While Norris et al (2003) list destructive riots, arson, and sabotage as tactics used by terrorist organizations these categories
are not used by others for example. In general, scholars have identified several categories of tactics used by terrorist organizations:

- Bombings
- Suicide Bombings
- Assasinations
- Armed Attacks/Assaults
- Unarmed Assaults
- Missile Attacks
- Hijackings
- Kidnappings/Hostage Taking
- Facility/Infrastructure Attacks
- Mass Destruction

Of these categories, Nacos (2012) notes that bombings are by far the most often used terrorist tactic with suicide bombings a close second (p. 141). Such attacks she argues are most common in territories where non-state actors have gained some control and where police or security forces have minimal control or have some support amongst the population. Suicide bombings are also common and while there is some evidence that religious terrorists undertake suicide attacks with the belief that they will be rewarded in the afterlife (Nacos 2012), others have argued that instead suicide bombing as are used for more strategic reasons. Instead of being a tactic used solely by religiously-motivated individuals, it is used as an inexpensive and effective tactic that is less complicated than other sorts of operations and receive significant media coverage (Hoffman 2003) and has been found to actually achieve political gains (Pape 2003).

Assassinations, as previously noted, has long been a tactic utilized by terrorist groups dating back to the nineteenth century. The method is typically used to kill one or more prominent individuals that are symbolic in some way to the cause and are differentiated from randomized attacks on civilians (START 2016). The risk associated with assassinations is higher in comparison to other tactics. For example, “shooting a target from close range is riskier” and in the case of “Yigal Amir, the young Israeli who killed Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in order to
stop the Middle East Peace process[, he was] immediately subdued and arrested by security forces” (Nacos 2012, p. 143).

Terrorist tactics such as bombings, suicide bombings, and assassinations are typically short, one-off events whereas hijackings and armed assaults can be extended events. Armed assaults are categorized as attacks with the intention of physical harm via firearms, incendiary devices, or sharp instruments whereas unarmed assaults involve fists, rocks, or other less-than-lethal weapons (START 2016). Similarly to straight-forward assaults, hijackings involve the targeting of civilians but may not involve physical arm but still involve the use of weapons. Beginning in the 1960s, plane hijackings became a common tactic of terrorist groups but “whatever the particular circumstances, only sophisticated groups can pull off a skyjacking with the prospect of success because this tactic demands patience on the art of the operatives and an ability to handle a duration operation.” (Miller and Russell 1979 in Nacos 2012 p. 157).

**Motivating Factors and Goals**

While a clear and concise understanding of terrorism in terms of who is targeted and the tactics used to carry out attacks has been explained, the underlying motivations and goals of why individuals and groups turn to terrorism must also be addressed. Scholars typically categorize the goals of terrorist organizations as short-term and long-term. Norris et al (2003) describe the immediate or short-term goals of groups as spreading anxiety and fear among the population, eliminating as well as destroying symbolic targets. Long-term goals, typically the primary motivation for a movement or group, includes publicizing issues that they are interested in, airing grievances to influence the government and policy agendas, gain concessions, mobilize support and promote their cause and. The end goal of course is to gain political power and legitimacy
though terrorism is also used at times to just shock and demoralize the enemy or enemies of the group (p. 8).

The origins of the political goals of terrorist organizations in democratic societies have their roots in larger disputes between actors and reflect the political beliefs of larger segments of society than just the terrorist organization itself (Gurr 1998). Gurr describes two routes or paths through which groups come to accept extreme action or violence as the most viable option. However, these two routes also reflect the goal formation of terrorist groups themselves. First, Gurr defines radicalization as a process in which the group is mobilized behind a political goal but has not made progress toward its achievement through non-violent forms of activism.

The Front de Liberation du Quebec for example formed after French-Canadian separatists became discontent with progress of achieving policy change among policymakers in Ottawa. After a decade or so of non-violent action, the group began carrying out bombings against infrastructure targets in the 1960s. Similarly, a sect of the membership of the group Students for a Democratic Society in the 1960s broke off after the US increased its involvement in Vietnam and soon formed what became known as the Weather Underground. They conducted a campaign of attacks and bombings over a four year period. Gurr uses these two cases to illustrate how larger movements had subsets of their membership form into violent terrorist organizations still attempting to achieve the same goals.

The other route that Gurr outlines is reactionary formation of groups. Members of regional or communal groups resort to terrorism in response to threats of social change or intervention in society by the state. While radicalization is about future goals, Gurr argues reactionary groups are about the defense of what the group perceives is a threat to their status in society. The prime example is the Ku Klux Klan, formed by Civil War veterans in 1867 that
carried out acts of coercion and violence against supporters of Reconstruction. Later in the twentieth century the group’s activity increased during the Civil Rights era (p. 89) and again during the Obama and Trump administrations including the events at Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017. Some groups are also representative of specific regional minorities. German-speaking Italians of the Alto Adige in northern Italy in the 1960s and the long-active but recently dispersed Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain demonstrate this type of groups.

Scholars have also debated the success rate of groups achieving their short- and long-term political goals using terrorism. Jenkins (2003) suggests that several movements have transitioned from terrorist organizations to respected political entities. The African National Congress used terrorist actions at points in its struggle against Apartheid South Africa but became the governing party in 1993. The IRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein, has largely been accepted into the political structure of Northern Ireland with former leaders of the paramilitary wing such as Gerry Adams playing prominent roles in Parliament. Pape (2005) also points out that groups using campaigns of suicide terrorism that seek to expel foreign occupiers do so because others that have utilized this approach have succeeded as well. In short, the rate of success by some groups achieving “their ultimate goals in the past continues to encourage contemporary terrorists’ beliefs that they, too, may become exceptions to the rule” (Nacos 2012, p. 138).

Others disagree. Abrahams (2006; 2007; 2012), as summarized by Crenshaw (2014), argues that terrorism rarely succeeds in achieving political objectives and are not an effective form of coercion because, under pressure, governments targeted by terrorist organizations harden their positions and are less likely to accept the demands of such groups (p. 559). Krause (2013) argues that there is a degree of ambiguity in describing the goals and successes of terrorism,
suggesting that we need to not assume that groups adopt terrorism exclusively to influence policymakers. To summarize, terrorism does not work unless the target responds how the terrorists want them to respond (Fromkin 1975).

**Ideological Terrorism**

While several of preceding examples have highlighted nationalist or institutional goals, Kellen (1998) argues that ideological terrorism must be distinguished from terrorism of the nationalist sort. Terrorist organizations in the 1980s such as the Army of God and The Covenant, The Sword, and The Arm of the Lord in the United States were motivated by their interpretation of Christianity to prepare for and carry out attacks against targets such as abortion clinics. Better known today are militant Islamist groups with extremist ideological interpretations of the Qu’ran that have carried out attacks in many of countries of the developing world as well as in the US and Europe. One approach to understanding this rise of ideological extremist-motivated terrorism examines the phenomenon on an international level that evolved in waves of terrorist violence deeply rooted in modern cultural shifts. Each wave consists of a period of terrorist activity that is characterized by expansion and contraction phases, is “international in character,” with activity occurring in several countries and shares a common ideological perspective or philosophical goal (Rapoport 2004).

Rapoport defines the first wave as the ‘Anarchist Wave’ at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Anarchists and social revolutionaries such as Karl Heintzen and John Most in Germany and the US and Sergey Nechaev, Nikolai Morozov, and Pyotr Kropotkin in Russia justified the practice of terrorism in their philosophical writings to allow for revolution to occur. Political assassinations were carried out in Russia, France, Spain, Italy, and the US with attempts in Germany and other European states. Czar Alexander II of
Russia, French President Sadi Carnot, King Umberto of Italy, and American Presidents James Garfield and William McKinley were notable casualties of this particular wave of terrorism. Interestingly in today’s context, Nacos (2012) notes that “sometimes, anarchists aborted their assassination plans because they did not want to harm innocent bystanders” (p. 38).

The second wave grew out of the anti-colonial movement after World War II. As European powers, devastated by the war, began to shed overseas territories in light of terrorist movements in Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, and Algeria as well as international pressure to end colonial rule (Rapoport 2004). Rapoport also notes this particular wave was most identifiable in territories where local political problems made total withdraw difficult for colonial powers. Lastly, groups of this era adopted new language to make their existence seem more legitimate as the word terrorist took on an increasingly negative stereotype. Menachem Begin who led the Irgun, a Jewish paramilitary organization that existed during the British mandate-era of Palestine (and later was absorbed into the Israeli military) began to refer to his people as ‘freedom fighters’ struggling against an oppressor (p. 54). The language has since been adopted by numerous terrorist organizations with both nationalist and ideology-driven goals.

By the time of the US entrance into the conflict in Vietnam a third wave had begun to develop. According to Rapoport, in this wave groups saw the US struggle to combat the Viet Cong despite technological and military superiority as an inspiration that non-state actors could continue to fight against larger and better-funded state apparatuses. The Palestinian Liberation Organization served as inspiration after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 (p. 58). Groups in this wave, such as the West German Red Army Faction, the Weather Underground in the US, and the Italian Red Brigades, with support from the Soviet state, rose to challenge the existing domestic and international political systems.
The current wave is based in extremist ideological interpretations of major religions and at the heart of modern terrorism, with its origins in the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and tensions in the Middle East. Christian-motivated terrorist groups are a minor part of this wave as well with the “Christian Identity” movement forming rural communes waiting for the Second Coming and a racial war (p. 62). Jewish terrorists carrying out assassination campaigns in Palestine and the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Buddhist-Hindu-Christian inspired Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo also characterize this wave.

Other groups have also grown in the US context since the beginning of the modern wave. Nacos notes that in the wake of the election of President Barack Obama, the Aryan Nations Revival proclaimed “to admire ‘the Islamic Jihad with a jealousy, they enforce the rules of Islam without question and without hesitation, they have become examples of righteousness to Allah, the deity of the Koran,’” suggesting the ethno-religious movement may someday mimic their militant Islamist counterparts. While Rapoport’s prediction is that this wave would end by 2025, there is no evidence that this will be the case.

Extremist ideological groups using religious texts as a foundation have also been found to have a close relationship with nationalism. When shared feelings of fundamentalism and nationalism become strong enough there is a higher proclivity to use violence because such movements often have to function through clandestine organization, often employing terrorism, to overturn the dominant national and religious structures (Armstrong 1997). Religion in general can serve as an independent cultural force in society and has the ability, through activist groups, to challenge other cultural or political powers such as the secular systems of democracy, particularly in the post-Cold War era (Wellman & Tokuno 2004). Religion has been suggested as
an ‘anchor’ to those experiencing societal tensions between secularist societies and religious rule (Juergensmeyer 2003). When a vacuum develops because of political instability, Juergensmeyer suggests the void is filled with extremist militants creating moral order through terror.

Organization

Finally in defining and discussing what makes terrorism a unique phenomenon, a look at how terrorist organizations are structured provides us with an understanding of how such movements are differentiated from rebel groups or criminal organizations. A caveat here is that there are admittedly gray areas. There are certain cases where terrorism and other forms of political violence overlap. The Southeast Asian terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf at one point fit the terrorist organization category well but morphed into a predominantly criminal organization focused on kidnapping individuals for ransom purposes only and was condemned by other terrorist organizations (Sageman 2004, p. 44). Organizations such as ISIS originated as a terrorist offshoot but became a quasi-state actor ruling over a territory whereas Boko Haram’s origins lie in an initially peaceful anti-Western movement that turned violent over time.

As Nacos (2012) notes, terrorist organizations until the 1990s were structured hierarchically with one leader or a small group that were at the top of a pyramid of members that served as lieutenants and rank-and-file members respectively. The IRA, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) are examples. However, in response to counterterrorist efforts and technological developments, this traditional structure has been in decline. Enders and Jindapon argue “although highly connected networks are best able to conduct logistically sophisticated attacks, they can be quite vulnerable to government infiltration” (p. 264). Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999) as well as Zanini (1999) point out the advantages provided to terrorist organizations, criminal syndicates, and businesses in general by
the information technology revolution of the 1990s and 2000s. Therefore as the cost of being interconnected increases in terms of operations and vulnerabilities and technological developments allow for alternative coordination, groups become ‘flatter’ as well (Enders and Su 2007).

This ‘flattening’ of terrorist organizations has resulted in the rise of the cell-structure approach. Nacos provides a succinct summary of one of the first initiators of the cell approach through which everyone that is part of the ‘organization’ operates independently of a central command. Louis Beam, former Grand Dragon of the Texas Nights of the Ku Klux Klan led the organization in the 1980s but was an easy target of the federal government. He soon left for another white supremacist organization, the Aryan Brotherhood and implemented the cell concept. Beam noted that independent cells still needed some degree of information coordination but that small, “patriotic,” cells could act successfully against the state because they would be more difficult to track and maintain information on by authorities. As Nacos also notes, secular terrorist organizations as well as religious groups and single-issue movements all have utilized the cell approach prior to and after the promotion of the structure by Beam in the early 1990s. US militia movements as well as the Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front, al Qaeda, and ISIS have all implemented the structure (p. 161).

Leadership remains a vital component to terrorist organizations nonetheless. As Nacos argues, “without leaders taking up a cause, formulating a philosophy, and convincing others to embrace what they preach, there will be neither hierarchical movements nor independently operating cells” (p. 162). While decision-making and the planning of operations may be decentralized due to the lack of a hierarchical structure, centralized leaders, or a definable headquarters, the network of cells still have a shared set of principles. These goals or an
overarching philosophy might be personified in a figurehead or symbol of authority but in
general power is decentralized (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999).

As an example, two disparate groups that adopted cell structures in different eras
succeeded for years using this approach. First, the IRA eventually adapted a cell approach to
specific operations after British intelligence officers infiltrated its ranks but still maintained a
powerful hierarchy of leadership that overlapped with its political wing, Sinn Fein. Second, al
Qaeda was able to continue to function for several years after the US invasion of Afghanistan, its
main hub, in 2001 via affiliates in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Western Europe. Even prior to the
loss of the Afghanistan hub, a cell of nine upper-middle-class expatriate students formed around
Mohammad Belfas, a migrant from Southeast Asia, and planned the operational details of the
9/11 attacks in the US (Sageman 2004). As Nacos summarizes, al Qaeda’s expansion “resembles
the organizational model of those multinational corporations that grow through mergers and
acquisitions in different parts of the world and leave most, if not all decision-making to the
various national or regional affiliates” (p. 166).

In the latter example, a major game changer for the ‘flattening’ of terrorist organizations
in the twenty-first century has been the internet. Not only have social network platforms allowed
for terrorist organizations to facilitate connections between affiliates and cells around the world
but it has also allowed organizations to wage informational warfare against the targets of their
organizations have long been based on face-to-face interactions between recruits and insiders.
These meetings still take place early on in order to transform an outsider recruit into a devoted
member of the organization. Once established though, these groups can now use communication
technologies to maintain the intensity of members’ fanaticism and enthusiasm for the cause.
Merging with Others and Nodes. However, “too great a reliance on this new technology leaves the jihad vulnerable to sophisticated monitoring of communication and triangulation of its source” and the tracking of cell phone communications have been important to the capture or targeting of several prominent leaders including Osama bin Laden (p. 159-160).

**The Capacity of the State to Combat Terrorism in the Developing World**

In addition to understanding the debates on how we differentiate terrorism from other forms of political violence, how the state can counter extremist organizations through its military and bureaucracy must be considered as well. In terms of the capacity of the state, I refer to the opportunity argument of the state. I consider opportunity to be the ability of an internal entity to rise up against the state itself. A state has to be able to maintain its influence throughout the entirety of its territory, via military and bureaucratic resources controlled by the governing body. The following section highlights general elements of state capacity, though there is no consensus on which element matters most in the countering and deterrence of terrorism.

*Regime Type and Stability*

A great deal of literature has examined the relationship between democracy and terrorism. Whether states are purely democratic, authoritarian, or anocracies, accountability and restraint of the executive, regime stability, clientelism, and neopatrimonialism all have challenged democratization and affect the state’s capability to prevent terrorist activity or other threats to the regime (Bratton & van de Walle 1994; Chabal & Daloz 1993; Cox et al 2009; Tripp 2010; Harbeson & Rothchild 2013; Chenoweth 2013). How a democracy can impose its will on the actions and behavior of individuals, the respect a state maintains for civil liberties and due process, and what alternatives and resources democracy provides to citizens in order to deter
participation in terrorism affect the level of activity and support for terrorist movements (Burgoon 2006; Crenshaw 1981; Foster, Braithwaite, & Sobek 2012; Schmid 1992; Tilly 2003).

Others have argued that terrorism has been more prevalent in the world’s most stable democracies. Two competing perspectives then emerge. The first suggests democratic governments are more susceptible to violent conflict, which allows for the rise of long-simmering ethnic and religious grievances. The second perspective suggests that democratic systems provide a framework for non-violent resolution of ethnic and religious issues (Eubank & Weinberg 2001, p.156). Terrorism in stable democracies, these authors suggest, may be the manifestation of the views of an excluded minority whose preferences are not included in the formation of public policy.

Yet consideration of democratic rule has not had a uniform effect on terrorism, with some democracies being more prone to being victims of terrorism than others. Regime age has been found to be crucial to whether terrorism occurs in democracies along with military intervention or occupations (Eyerman 1998; Chenoweth 2013). Eyerman argues that young democracies who fall victim to transnational terrorism fail to convey their ability to defend their territory and institutions, that the newly available non-violent mechanisms to address grievances do not have instantaneous effects, and that new democracies have no ‘track record’ developed for democratic rule or peaceful political participation. Chenoweth similarly suggests that economically-poor democracies experiencing territorial conflict and transitioning democracies with inconsistent institutions suffer from domestic terrorism. Additionally, ‘regime immaturity’ has a significant effect. In contrast, dictatorships of any age are capable of reducing terrorist activity, suppressing it more so than new or older democracies, at least until late stages of a regime’s lifespan (Piazza
In sum, older democracies and authoritarian regimes fall victim to terrorism less on average than new or ‘immature’ democracies.

In connection to regime stability, internal conflicts can exacerbate issues faced by transitioning states or ‘immature democracies,’ common through the developing regions of the world. Chenoweth suggests unresolved territorial disputes can increase terrorist violence against democracies but likely no more than authoritarian regimes that struggle to maintain control over separatist territories. Political instability in general has been argued as a likely factor contributing to cross-border terrorism (Goldstone et. al 2010). Among ‘failed’ states, those in the midst of war or experiencing political collapse are more likely to produce terror (Coggins 2015). Further, regimes facing multiple, violent political challengers have been found to be more susceptible to terrorism, though the endogenous effects of civil war has to be considered and must be isolated to best understand the relationship between internal conflict, state failure, and terrorism.

**Territory and Population**

First, the state’s ability to impose the rule of law upon those within its territory will ultimately be shaped by the size of that territory and the distribution of a state’s population. States whose political geographies make power consolidation difficult, ‘hinterland’ countries which do not have dispersed areas of high population density, and states where most of the power in the state can and is concentrated in one region, typically the state’s capital (Herbst 2000, p. 145-159), all have different experiences in combatting terrorism. Low population densities can make governing a territory more expensive and difficult compared to Europe or other densely settled areas according to Herbst.

As the recent successes of the Islamic State or ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, or the more long-term example of al-Shabaab in Somalia have shown, non-state
actors in areas where the presence of the state is less felt have found success in remaining a threat to the regime. Distance from the capital and the reach of the state has been found to both aid and inhibit the success of internal uprisings (Buhaug 2006; Buhaug & Red 2006; Raleigh & Hegre 2009) such as terrorist movements. Others have studied the effect of population density on conflicts and how this affects a state’s response to conflict (Tir & Diehl 1998; Straus 2006). Environmental factors such as terrain qualities, forest coverage, rurality of border zones, and rainfall variability have been studied for their effects on conflict (Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala 2009; Hendrix & Salehyan 2012).

Sociopolitical fault lines in non-democracies that attract a dissatisfied citizenry (Entelis 2005; Pokalova 2012), uncontrolled internal stability or ‘stateless areas’ without much regime oversight (Kaplan 1994; King 2001; Piazza 2007) and inter-group competition for influence (Chenoweth 2010; Nemeth 2014) can lead to conflict such as the rise of terrorism in the developing world. Regime type aside, several have challenged the argument that state failure increases terrorism (Abrahms 2004; Bloom 2005; Horowitz 2010). Patrick (2011) finds transnational terrorist threats, such as al-Qaeda, emerge in wealthier and more stable, but not necessarily democratic, countries. Such groups then take advantage of conflict-ridden areas experiencing political vacuums which become victims to terrorism, but are not necessarily more likely to be originators of it (Coggins 2015).

*The Military Capacity of the State*

The state’s monopoly over the use of violence to deter or repel challenges to its authority is inherently challenged by terrorism (Weber 1919; Hendrix 2010). The state’s national military has a direct impact on the dimensions of conflict within a state (Mason, Weingarten & Fett 1999; Derouen & Sobek 2004; Hendrix 2010; Shelton, Stojek & Sullivan 2013). Issues with excess
military spending, clientelism, and inability to quickly reach and end internal conflicts or combat several at once can hinder the state’s military capacity (Henderson & Singer 2000; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Thomas 2014). Ethnic and religious divisions reflected in the state’s military apparatus can exacerbate conflicts with terrorist movements (Horowitz 2000; Blanton, Mason, Athow 2001).

Indiscriminate violence by the state has been found to increase terrorist violence by some (Kalyvas 2006) but not others (Lyall 2009). A third argument suggests a reliance on superior military capability can drive terrorist groups toward alternative tactics (Gilli & Gilli 2014) including targeting civilians (Wood 2010), carrying out suicide bombings or using new combatants such as women who may not initially be considered as active combatants in terrorist organizations driven by terrorist movements (Sjoberg & Gentry 2007; Cunningham 2007; Alison 2009; Parashar 2009; Stone & Patillo 2009; Gentry 2009; Bloom 2011). The Taliban for example have demonstrated how a state responds to how a group adapts to military pressure determines the life span and success of movements (Abbas 2014). In short, while there is a logical argument for the state being able to fight against terrorism militarily, at the same time repressive behavior has been found to also antagonize more violence as well. Therefore groups seeking to build support for their cause likely benefit from repressive tactics by the state’s military an domestic security forces but the capacity of the military in general likely shapes where and how groups are active within the state.

The Bureaucratic or Distributive Capacity of the State

The ability of states to both govern and distribute the resources of the state to its population is an important factor to consider as well. The establishment of well-run administrative structures at the local, regional, and national levels to extract revenue and support
from the population, collect information on the masses, and provide for its citizens is also
important to understanding the capacity of the state and the opportunities available to terrorist
movements (Tilly 1992; Hendrix 2010) and has been found in some cases to be more effective
than advanced military capabilities (Hendrix & Young 2014).

The quality of the administrative capabilities of the state and knowing who may dissent
can help inhibit terrorism and other contentious groups before military might is needed (Fearon
& Laitin 2003; DeRouen & Sobek 2004) and likely serves as a counter-propaganda tool when
the state can provide resources to citizens a fledgling organization cannot. As with the military
apparatus though, bureaucratic corruption and mismanagement of resources, weak control of
natural resources that can finance the opposition, and ethnic divisions in the civil service as well
as unbalanced enforcement of rules and regulations or outright persecution or exclusion of
certain sects of the population can all serve as spatial openings in the state for terrorism to take
hold (Horowitz 2000; Blanton, Mason, Athrow 2001; Fearon 2004; Thies 2010). When openings
develop bureaucratically, through the rule of law for example, groups can challenge the state’s
authority (Choi 2010). While different authors focus on different components of capacity, there
does not seem to be a clear cut hierarchy among the two in the literature. Logically though, while
military capacity may serve to immediately react to terrorist threats and as a symbol of
deterrence, administrative capacity plays a longer game in terms of minimizing some of the
grievances terrorist organizations rely upon for recruitment of the non-ideologues.

Clientelism, Population Density, and Territorial Control

In both military and administrative capacity, there is a potential for corruption to impact
the effectiveness of the state’s ability to govern. What may be a more appropriate concept to
consider in relation to the proclivity of individuals to participate in terrorist organizations is the
existence and degree of clientelism being practiced in developing states. Clapham (1985), as summarized by Adebani and Obadare (2011), defines patron-client relations as “a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative systems...[and] officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers...as a form...of private property” (p. 48).

Various scholars offer explanations of how clientelistic behavior indirectly influences terrorism through other factors. Keefer (2007) argues that younger democracies tend to underprovide non-targeted goods such as education and property rights in order to overprovide targeted goods such as jobs and public works projects which leads to clientelistic behavior and satisfies the demands of those with grievances against the state that could alternatively be provided by terrorist organizations. Weinberg (1991) finds that political parties that foster terrorist movements share two common features. First, the presence of “grandiose goals” that may or may not be achieved through the democratic process to the degree that makes supporters content. Second, parties or factions turn to terrorist acts when the party doctrine or platform focuses on the idea that the existing regime is illegitimate and does not address the goals of the movement and instead meets their demands with repression (p. 436-437). Finally, Piazza (2013) finds that rapid fluctuations in food prices that result in higher costs is associated with increases in terrorist activity, particularly in developing and middle income states with nondemocratic political regimes (p. 826). This relationship appears in Sudan in the late 1980s, Turkey, China, Mexico, and Russia in the 1990s, and Thailand and the Philippines in the late 2000s.

As summarized by Teets and Chenoweth (2009), two potential explanations for the relationship between terrorism and clientelism (though the authors refer predominantly to corruption in their terminology) exist in the literature. The motivational explanation for terrorism
suggests that terrorists attack corrupt governments to exploit public distrust in the system by portraying themselves as an alternative to the clientelistic actors in the regime. Hamas in Palestine serves as a telling example. In a similar vein, Felbab-Brown’s (2010) political capital model argues that belligerent groups not only benefit financially from illicit activity but also gain legitimacy and support from the local population so that they are actually strengthened by clientelism in their struggle against the state.

The other explanation, which Teets and Chenoweth find support for in their study, suggests a facilitation reasoning for why clientelistic behavior increases terrorist activity. As they note, rather than corruption directly causing terrorism, it “creates opportunities for terrorist organizations because of an inability or unwillingness to enforce the rule of law, which reduces the operating costs within such territories” and “allows for the creation of a criminal infrastructure” terrorist groups use to fund their activities. However, they also find that the presence of illegal drug trades reduce terrorist groups in a given state and argue that the interests of drug traffickers and terrorists are in opposition so the stronger side can discourage its counterpart from forming (p. 169).

Several case studies provide further insight into this relationship. Adebanwi and Obadare (2011) note that the majority of Nigerians support anti-corruption efforts but many are “politically or economically connected to the corruption complex” (p. 195) via clientelistic acts by state officials. Rotberg (2009) as well notes that while patronage is a accepted as a common practice in the country by Nigerians, “they feel powerless to reduce corruption levels even as they seek to benefit from particular personal flows of clientelism” (p. 16).

Tuastad (2010) through field research examines “how clientelism is not only a Middle Eastern means for power-incumbents to preserve power” but “clientelism also has an
international dimension” (p. 792) in the case of Palestine as well. Specifically, Tuastad finds the Gaza strip between 2004 and 2007 experienced internecine violence applied by groups protected by allies within the Palestinian Authority and upcoming elections threatened the local power of warlords dependent on these relationships, thus the violence served both the interests of the warlords and factions within the Palestinian Authority. In short, “democratic elections might make the mutually beneficial clientelist wasta system of the [Palestinian Authority] collapse, and would therefore, predictably, lead to opposition from the militants” (p. 796). And in studying patron-client relations in Nepal with a focus on the provision of public goods and land tenure Joshi and Mason (2011) argue that the Maoist insurgency succeeded in recruiting supporters from areas where strong patterns of patron-client dependency exist and those more dependent upon elites were more likely to join the insurgency (p. 172). Thus they argue when governments fail to deliver public goods some segments of the population are susceptible to joining armed insurgencies as an alternative.

Finally, Mousseau (2011) finds among the world’s Muslim population that those supportive of Islamist-based terrorist organizations are not associated with religiosity, education levels, or income inequality and instead support is associated with urban poverty. In short states can inhibit terrorist recruitment by creating new economic opportunities for the urban poor and provide services such as healthcare and education that can alternatively be provided by Islamist groups (p. 35). Weltz-Shapiro (2011) disagrees and finds that “weak markets are not a sufficient condition for inter-group and anti-state violence because ruling group coalitions based on patron-clientelist ties can sometimes manage stability with various combinations of severe repression and economic redistribution” and instead “violence in nations with weak markets is associated with change” (p. 40). Thus Weltz-Shapiro argues when older groups entrenched in power
become weaker and new groups rise the latter demonstrate their power through violent acts. Thus there is reason to explore how clientelistic practices in the state impact terrorist activity.

Additionally, the state’s ability to impose the rule of law upon those within its territory will ultimately be shaped by the size of that territory and the distribution of a state’s population. One example is a state whose political geographies make power consolidation difficult. ‘Hinterland’ countries which do not have dispersed areas of high population density and states where most of the power in the state can and is concentrated in one region, typically the capital (Herbst 2000, p. 145-159) have different experiences in combatting terrorism. Low population densities make governing a territory more expensive and difficult compared to densely settled areas as noted by Herbst. As the recent success of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, or the more long-term example of al-Shabaab in Somalia has shown, non-state actors in areas where the presence of the state is less felt have found success in remaining a threat to the regime. Distance from the capital and the reach of the state has been found to both aid and inhibit the success of internal uprisings (Buhaug 2006; Buhaug & Red 2006; Raleigh & Hegre 2009) such as terrorist movements.¹

In short, none of the factors of state capacity described above can explain the rise of terrorism alone. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that for nascent insurgencies to succeed, the government’s policing capabilities of its territory matters most. Recognition must also be given to the state’s ability to govern and implement the institutional duties of the state in an impartial and dedicated manner that also does not lead to a backlash by discontent groups. The challenge of governing expansive, lowly populated regions also factors into how effective the state can be...

¹ Others have studied the effect of population density on conflicts and how this affects a state’s response to conflict (Tir & Diehl 1998; Straus 2006). Environmental factors such as terrain qualities, forest coverage, rurality of border zones, and rainfall variability have been studied for their effects on conflict (Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala 2009; Hendrix & Salehyan 2012).
in countering challengers especially when considering issues associated with corrupt behavior amongst state actors.

**Terrorism in the Developing World**

Having discussed the phenomenon of terrorism and the state’s ability to counter it through its institutions and bureaucratic as well as military capacity, I now turn to a brief discussion of the regions that will be analyzed as part of this dissertation. The following section will provide a brief discussion of Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Southeast Asia through existing literature on the region’s political histories as well as their experiences with terrorism. Both have a long and difficult history with terrorist movements during several of Rapoport’s waves of terrorism. In one particular study, Elu (2012) identified approximately thirty unique terrorist groups in Africa and over one hundred distinct groups in Asia over a twenty-five year time span, though this may have to do with how groups and movements are defined. While other regions of the world such as Western Europe and Latin America have a long history of terrorism, this dissertation will focus on the aforementioned three regions that have been at the forefront of the ideological extremist wave of Rapoport’s chronology.

**A Brief Geopolitical Outline of the Regions**

Sub-Saharan Africa along with the North African region which will be discussed separately make up the second-largest continental landmass and has environmental conditions that range between tropical rainforests, expansive deserts, and mountainous terrains. The region of Sub-Saharan Africa has nearly one billion residents and the forty-eight countries in the region has nearly 1,000 language groups and countless ethnic divisions within across states. According to one estimate, the Sub-Saharan region along with North Africa will be home to one of every four people on the planet by 2050 (Krabacher et al 2011). While Africa’s GDP has risen 33
percent between 1994 and 2011, the on-the-ground effects of these economic improvements are less evident. The average African still earned only $639 in 2011, or less than two dollars a day (in 2000 dollars) but even these numbers they argue are misleading because a large portion of the continent’s income via mineral commodities does not reach the citizens of Sub-Saharan African states (Englebert & Dunn 2013).

A major cultural or political force in the state that must be accounted for when considering the rise of terrorism in the region is the legacy of colonialism. The imposed institutions of the colonial era have been suggested as one major reason for underdevelopment and instability in the developing world in general (Englebert 2000a, b). The effects of indirect versus direct colonial rule have also been thoroughly studied and should be considered in understanding how state capacity in the Sub-Saharan region is affected by the history of a given state. Whereas indirect rule of colonies occurred through the use of pre-existing local power structures, often referred to as protectorates, direct rule installed European governments to oversee the territory (Englebert & Dunn 2013). In terms of the effects of indirect rule, several scholars have found that this form of colonialism impeded political development through institutional legacies which left ineffective central administrations that created a system of decentralized rule under empowered chiefs which left developing states unable to rule, resulting in instability (Migdal 1988; Boone 1994; Reno 1995).

On the other hand, direct rule left a legacy of states being able to lead development efforts via public goods that enhance the productive capabilities of the state (education, health care, roads) (Amsden 1985; Kohli 1994). However, the strict dichotomy between the two has been questioned. The governing styles of the British, French, and Spanish all varied in terms of how extractive they were in their rule, and even varied within colonies (Asiwaju 1976; Schmidt-
Nowara 2006). Yet even with the end of the colonial era, in the majority of cases the colonizer maintained influence on postcolonial states and had extensive networks of access decades after independence (Young 2013). Lange (2004) finds that former British colonies, with less of a post-colonial relationship and governed under indirect rule, are now less politically stable and have a worse rule of law than their French counterparts for example. What appears to matter specifically are the protections established by the colonial ruler and the duration to which they have been adhered.

For several reasons, North Africa, or the “Maghreb” which means “west” in Arabic, must be considered separately as a region from the rest of the African continent. States in North Africa including Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia are typically considered with part of the ‘Arab World’ with the Middle Eastern countries to differentiate between the differences in the politics of these two regions (Englebert & Dunn 2013, p.14-15). For my purposes here I will also include Sudan in the North African category. The region is characterized predominantly by the Sahara desert and makes up large parts of the territories of several states in the North and Sub-Saharan regions. Steppe regions with enough water supply for grasses and small bushes to grow exist in the region as well, particularly along the Atlas Mountain area of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Consequentially, most of the region’s population is concentrated in cities and towns located along the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts as well as the Nile River (Cox et al 2009; Gasiorowski 2014).

Like its Sub-Saharan neighbors, the states of North Africa developed for the most part as colonial systems that gained independence after World War II. France in particular played a major role in the history of the Maghreb where “psychologically, the heart of overseas France was Algeria, whose northern portions were considered to be full French departments” but “the
savagery of the eight-year war for Algerian independence, especially the self-destructive fury of its final phases, compelled the exodus of one million French settlers and an independent Algeria taking on an anti-imperial foreign policy until the 1990s (Young 2013 p. 24). In the years after the era of independence and Rapoport’s anti-colonial wave of terrorism the states of the North African region formed absolute or constitutional monarchies and of the authoritarian republics, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in the Maghreb “established radical Arab nationalist regimes in the 1950s and 1960s” that were characterized by “strong state apparatuses featuring powerful executive branches, vanguard political parties, extensive state control over the economy, and powerful security apparatuses” (Gasiorowski 2014, p. 14).

In short, the colonial repression legacies in the states of North Africa, according to Githens-Mazer (2009), explain the struggle for establishing independent states governed by the rule of law and popular sovereignty. However, political repression since independence has created resentment and disappointment amongst North Africans who view the western character of the post-colonial regimes. Githens-Mazer further suggests that the repressive political character of the states in the Maghreb alongside western intervention in the region “continues to shape North African political mobilization, and worryingly has created a latent basis for radicalization among North Africans living and working in Europe” (p. 1015).

Finally, the region of Southeast Asia has experienced similar colonial and political developments as the states of Sub-Saharan and North Africa. The region consists of a mainland set of states that includes Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, and parts of Malaysia and a set of states characterized by their island and archipelago-based geography which includes Indonesia, East Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, East Timor, and Brunei as well as several smaller, non-independent island chains. The mainland area is characterized by complex ethnic
groups of Han Chinese and laborers brought to the area by European colonizers, sharing linguistic traditions and the predominant religion being Buddhism. The island component of the region is known for a mixture of Chinese and indigenous tribal groups that, due to the highly fragmented geography, has led to a very complex ethnic mixture. With the exception of the Philippines, much of the region though identifies primarily with Islam. The Philippines in contrast is overwhelmingly Catholic with the exception of a few Muslim majority islands such as Mindanao (Borthwick 2007).

Southeast Asia has a long history of combatting terrorist threats in the region which continues with efforts to counter threats from local terrorist organizations as well as transnational threats such as al Qaeda. For example, Communist-based groups using terror campaigns, including political assassinations, were typical of political violence in the Philippines from the early years of independence until the 1990s (Kingsbury 2017, p. 130). Prior to 9/11, Southeast Asian states did not deem terrorism an urgent concern (Febrica 2010). Today however, as the US spreads its focus for the “war on terror” to other regions outside Southeast Asia in the decades after 9/11, other states are looked toward as supporters in countering terrorism.

On an international level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has taken on efforts to fight terrorism as well. A series of agreements have been signed by the ASEAN states including joint declarations for cooperation on counterterrorism (Ojendal 2004). In response to the Bali attack as well as others, ASEAN member states implemented policies to fight terrorism that led to individuals allegedly linked to groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah have been jailed without trial and Islamic religious schools suspected of supporting terrorist activities have been monitored (Caballero-Anthony 2004, p. 177).
In the era since 9/11 states such as Singapore and Indonesia have adapted counterterrorism measures to different degrees. Singapore, not a regular target of the major terrorist movements in the region, has been a staunch supporter of US efforts in the region whereas Indonesia has distanced “its security policies from the U.S.-led “war on terror,” even though a series of terrorist attacks occurred in Indonesia” (Febrika 2010, p. 569-570). US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq fragmented US attention, making it even more difficult for it to tend to its relations with SEA. And because 9/11 happened early on in the Bush presidency there was no time to develop a coherent strategy toward SEA. (Ba 2009, p. 379). Leavitt (2005) notes that the US and Southeast Asian states have called on Japan to increase its military role in the region. Other regional issues including China’s territorial claims in the region are also a factor. 

*Secularism and Democracy in the Developing World*

Secularism and its role in democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb, and Southeast Asia must also be considered when trying to understand political violence and tensions over religion and authority. Hurd (2006) and Kuru (2006), as summarized by Fox (2011), also provide two different interpretations of what secularism means. The first, assertive secularism, exists where religion is separated from the public sphere entirely. Kuru argues however that passive secularism does not ban religion from the system of government but requires the government to remain neutral and treat all religions fairly and equally. The basic definition of secularism in short is the separation between the church and state or where there is no particular church, between religion and politics.

The difference is a product of Western definitions separating Christianity from the political structure (Masuzawa 2005; Casanova 1994; Asad 1993; Asad 2003; Taylor 2007). Some have argued though that secularism in its origins was a product of protecting the Christian
religion from the state (Asad 1993, p. 28). Western Christianity played a founding role in our concept of secularism and while that does not mean non-Christian countries cannot have secular systems, it does mean they are likely to encounter difficulties Christian-majority states did not encounter. Secularism is a tool rather than an aim but how do religious extremist groups within the state respond to this notion of secularism securing the freedom of various beliefs and non-belief react is the question. Gaskins et. al (2013) note that “secularization theory focuses on the ‘demand’ for religion and, in its most basic formulation, states that religion declines and eventually disappears as societies develop” (p. 824). However, secularization theory has been criticized for its lack of micro-foundations and lack of empirical support (Gill 2011). Gaskins et. al find that religious participation declines with societal development, the ability of citizens to take secular actions, and state regulations on religion. However, religious participation does sharply increase as inequality increases in a given state.

As Fox (2011) notes, the differences in approaches to secularism have consequences for public policy as well as the basic foundations and institutions of the state. Fox investigates how the nature of constitutional language regarding a separation of religion and state and clauses regarding a state’s official religion affect the likelihood of religious legislation. Clauses are a reflection of the ideals and policies of a society regarding the role of religion in government (Keith 2002). He notes that while most democracies have clauses referring to a separation between religion and the state in their constitutions, most also have religious-influenced laws. In other words legislation that is shaped by the predominant religious beliefs of the people of a given state. Others have also noted that political will is necessary to enforce constitutional structures in public policy, particularly in authoritarian regimes (Davenport 1996).
However, Fox also argues that democracies do not necessarily adhere to constitutional structures. In the case of Nigeria, the 1999 constitution bans state religion at the regional or national level but Muslim-majority states have adopted Shari’a law as state or regional law. In Hungary and Spain, despite separation between religion and state constitutional mandates, both countries permit citizens to donate portions of their income taxes to the Catholic Church but such options are not provided to other religions within each state (Fox 2008). As is apparent in the American context, a fine line exists between protecting religious freedoms and imposing legislation that favors a particular set of religious beliefs over others.

Fox finds that the wording of constitutional clauses regarding official state religions where one is established are more likely to consider religious legislation. References to God result in higher religious legislation scores as well but Fox also finds that declarations of separation between the state and religion have a minimal impact in comparison to states which do not address the issue of religion in their constitutions. In short, even when religious clauses are omitted from constitutions, Fox finds religious legislation is still considered and passed and argues this calls into question how much influence secular ideologies have on government policy. Additionally, if the state fails to adhere to its constitutional constraints on religion, or in contrast fails to provide legislation that protects the religious philosophies highlighted in constitutional language, this could certainly lead to discontent amongst the people of a state. In cases where the state reacts in force through legislation or physically through violence to discontent groups with religious-based extremist ideologies, this could lead to violence including terrorism.

“Religion and democracy can make tense bedfellows,” (p. 439) meaning that tensions between the two exist broadly across many societies and religions and can fuel what Buckley
(2015) calls a “secularism trap.” The trap is the collapse of democracy because of religious or secular elites pursuing the maximum or most-extreme demands or goals regarding the place of religion in a democratic system. The very opening of political change increases the likelihood of conflict between the two concepts. The driving argument becomes not how democratic should the state be but what role will religion play in the political system. Tensions may occur in debates over electoral systems, federalism, or courts but are rooted in the relationship between religion and the state.  

Buckley notes that other theories regarding secularism have failed to fully explain the tensions between religion and democracy. Modernization theory finds that development decreases the hold of religious institutions over public life while rationalist theories argue that the secularism trap is avoided in religious diversity where religious groups prefer the state to be secular to protect all religions freedom of worship. A third argument is that religious moderates minimize the secularist trap once they adopt liberal value systems. However, Buckley finds that a key factor is missing: the political institutions themselves. Institutional structures and how they are developed shape the trap.

Secularism within the regions under consideration in Africa and Asia has been considered by several scholars. Stepan (2012) finds that a series of vertical and horizontal “rituals of respect” facilitate accommodation of religion within the state and respect among groups in conflict. These aspects of civil society as well as religious-state relations in general contribute to Senegal being a functioning and relatively peaceful Muslim-majority country that is also a democracy. Abdullah (2013) examines how two primary Islamic organizations in Singapore, 

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2 Research as Buckley notes finds wide variation across cases. Alfred Stepan notes that there are “twin tolerations” between religion and democracy in some countries, particularly those with Catholic authorities while others such as Nasr find that Muslim democracies are no different than those early democracies struggling with their relationship to Christianity in pre-modern Europe.
MUIS (the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore) and Pergas (the Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers’ Association) are used by the state via what he terms “muscular” and calibrated” secularism. Both organizations agree to a supervisory role by the state and Abdullah argues this has created religious harmony in the state. Finally, Mujani and Liddle (2009) look at the factors that have led to the rise of several secular political parties in Indonesia in the decades since it became a democracy. They suggest a history of religious pluralism, the policies of the Suharto regime, Muslim responses to Suharto, a large moderate Muslim population, and the inability of Islamist parties to mobilize significant voting blocs have led to the secularization of the Indonesian state’s political system.

Finally, while Turkey falls outside of the regions of focus in this dissertation, it has served as an important case study for scholars on a Muslim-majority state embracing the concepts of secular practices that originated in Western democracies struggling to balance the relationship with Christianity and the state. Turkey is notable as the first Muslim country to embrace principles of secularism in its Constitution (Topal 2012). Kiling notes that between 2000 and 2012 Turkey instituted a variety of reforms to enhance the liberties of religious minorities despite the small size of these populations and decades of discrimination against Turkish Christians and others. Kiling finds that international pressure played an important role. Kiling argues though that to produce reforms, international pressure has to be matched with domestic-level actors motivated by material interests or normative beliefs. Pressure from the European Union could not alone accomplish reforms that protected religious freedoms of minority groups. Yet once the AK Party realized it was in their own interests, in combination with activism from other civilian groups such as political liberals and some Islamic social

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3 Muscular secularism refers to direct interventionist approaches using draconian measures and laws while calibrated secularism is a more indirect form of intervention using a symbiotic relationship between the state and religious groups or co-optation.
groups, such reforms to the treatment of minority religious groups was achieved. In short, scholars have found that secularism and the relationship between religious groups and the state has been very influential in the ability of each state to democratize while maintaining respect for religious groups within the state. In the cases where some religious sects or extremist groups have not embraced secularism though, particularly when the state has responded to discontent with violence, threats in the form of political violence in general and terrorism in particular have been the result.

Political Violence and Ideological Extremism in the Developing World

Finally, terrorism in each of the three regions analyzed in this dissertation can be examined through their experiences of ideological tensions, ideologically extremist-based violence, and extremist-motivated terrorism. This final section will first turn to the tensions within the religion of Islam. By far, the largest number of terrorist organizations in the ideological extremist wave of terrorism in the developing world have ties to radical interpretations of the Islamic faith not held by the overwhelming majority of Muslims in the world, including Sub-Saharan and North Africa as well as Southeast Asia. Then attention will be given to the much less prominent but still active Christian-motivated forms of political violence in the region as well as other religiously-motivated terrorist movements. Without question, much less has been written on Christian extremist terrorist organizations than their Islamist extremist counterparts. Finally, while Rapoport is correct to note that the modern wave of terrorism is predominantly characterized by religious-motivated forms of terrorism, there are also secular terrorist movements throughout the area under consideration not motivated by Christianity, Islam, or any other religion.
In the case of Islam, unlike Christianity, a large subset of followers do not distinguish the state from religion in the Western sense. As with Christianity, variation exists across religious sects, countries, and regions. Islam in some interpretations governs all aspects of a Muslim’s life, with no separation between religious and political responsibilities. (Husain 1995). Political institutions exist to defend the religion and are based on the Islamic system of Shari’a. As Husain notes, Muslims in this case must be loyal to the religion rather than the state they are living in because “at the heart of Islamic political doctrine lies neither state, nor the individual, nor yet a social class, but the umma, the Islamic community tied by bonds of faith alone” (p. 27). In times of crisis, when a ruler imposes laws or acts in a manner incompatible with the tenets of Islam, the devout Muslim has a duty to take political action, which may or may not be violent.

Political Islam, in which Muslims are actively engaged in the political system, can be traced in modern times to the Muslim Brotherhood movement which began in 1928 in Egypt under the leadership of Hasan al-Banna. The movement has affiliated and semi-affiliated branches across the Muslim world and in many countries where Muslims are in the minority (March 2015, p. 103). Political Islam itself is not a single movement or ideology, with various sects of Islam taking different approaches to the concept. Movements and ideologies range from left-leaning populism to ultraconservative interpretations that demand more societal control over morality (Dabashi 2006; Ramadan 2008). Though some sects of Islam seek traditionalism and others adapt to the modern world, Salafism in particular insists on strict, rigorous interpretation of the Qu’ran (Meijer 2009).  

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4 A prime example of the tensions within the Islamic world between traditionalists and those that have embraced modernity is over the role of shari’a law, or the detailed system of rules developed by Islamic scholars, in society today. Shari’a is regarded by Muslims as an expression of God’s will (Peters 2005) but with the rise of the state has become a challenging issue across the Islamic world in balancing the application of shari’a with the modern bureaucratic expectations of the state. During the colonial era, European states imposed their own systems of governance and in many cases replaced the local system that included shari’a but in others it remained, with shari’a courts receiving authorization from the state and codification of Islamic law into parts of the legal system (March 2015). Peters offers four categories that developed over time. First, some states saw complete secularization with no role for shari’a in the legal system. Second, other states have shari’a as the supreme law of the land, where secular law is imposed only on areas of the legal system where shari’a offers no guidance. Third, there are
Due to the fact that Islam in general never historically developed an institutional separation between church and state on its own, unlike Christianity in most countries (Roy 1994), political Islam has in fact been co-opted by many states in the developing world including Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Nigeria (Nasr 2001; Mandaville 2007; Otto 2010). However, the role of shari’a has been at the center of the tensions over the modern state. March notes that the majority of Muslim-majority states have some formal commitment to shari’a law in their constitutions. In countries such as Pakistan and Sudan, the inclusion of Islamic law in the legal system originates in strong ideological commitments by the regime. In others such as Egypt, this inclusion has been purely symbolic or adopted to appease internal Islamist opposition movements. In short, some states in the developing world have in general Islamized their legal systems since independence and found ways to make aspects of shari’a compatible with their system of governance (Brown 1997; Fadel 2003; Lombardi 2006; Moustafa 2007; March 2015).

Tensions over the role of the state and the role of shari’a law in society have become increasingly prominent with efforts to democratize the Islamic world. March (2015) argues that the more populist and democratic Muslim countries become, the more we should expect them to reflect the dominant religion of the state (p. 105). Others have suggested that democratization in states with deeply religious Muslim majorities has been possible because of a great degree of negotiation between the religious entities in the state and the secularists pursuing democracy. With democratization however, the debate moves from a “two-sided struggle between ‘secular’ and ‘Islamic’ actors to a much more fluid and open debate about what the content of democracy should be in a Muslim society” (p. 47).

some states that have been re-Islamized after the end of colonization and the return of Islamic regimes. Fourth, shari’a has been applied in some domains but not in others. This balance is the most common with shari’a being imposed in personal legal matters such as family law and succession.
At the same time, democratization may also create opportune moments for hardline religious groups within the Muslim community to gain influence over the direction of the country and criticize democracy itself (Villalon 1999; Soares & Otayek 2007; March 2015). As in the case of the Arab Spring, the factors that led to mass protests across several states in the developing world has created post-authoritarian instability while different factions struggle over what direction the country should develop. In several of these cases the factions include hard-line Islamists that want to base governance on strict interpretations of the Quran even if the majority does not support shari’a law, pragmatic conservatives that also seek a state based on Islamic law but are amenable to compromises that satisfy the majority of the population, and liberal Islamists that support Islamic principles but also believe in free will of individuals, tolerance of diversity, and an evolving interpretation of Islamic scripture (Haas & Lesch 2013, p. 5-6). As March suggests, brief moments of democratic rule in this region demonstrates that political Islam remains a core fault line in many Muslim countries (March 2015, p. 116).

As already noted, variation exists across the developing world, both in progress towards democratization but also in relations between sects of Islam and the state. The three aforementioned regions provide examples of this variation. The first which has already been briefly discussed is the Maghreb or “Arab West,” a region of northern Africa. Islam arrived to the region in the 7th century with the arrival of Arabs from the Middle East and has become the dominant religion through the region, those as discussed above includes various sects and ideological positions that are not always in agreement.

In 2010 after a street vendor immolated himself in protest of the Tunisian regime, the previously described movements of the Arab Spring occurred (Haas & Lesch 2013). While there was widespread expectation in the beginning that Islamist groups would take power and enforce
constitutional democratic norms, internal divisions in several cases resulted in instability and setbacks for democratization (March 2015). The 2013 military coup in Egypt is a prominent example. March calls this a historic turning point for the region. He argues that the Arab Spring “may mark a point where the mainstream Islamist movement splits again between those who reject democratic competition as a trap and turn to militancy and those who seek to lead a democratization of states presently in the process of deepening their autocratic tendencies” (p. 118).

For the Sub-Saharan region, secularism is the norm in most, but not all, states. However, variation within the Islamic religion between Sufis who are politically quiescent and Wahhabist and Salafist sects that are fundamentalists and seek political control characterize many of the states in the region (Soares & Otayek 2007). Democratization in the region in the 1990s has been suggested as the opening needed by Islamic groups to become more active in Sub-Saharan African political communities (Villalon 1999 in Senegal; Tayob 2005 in Nigeria; Soares & Otayek 2007 in the region). Not all Muslims have felt integrated in the democratic process however and those in some states such as Kenya and Tanzania have felt marginalized (de Waal 2004). Last (2008) suggests though that due to Muslim elites playing a role in the state in many cases and the ability to coerce and repress discontent has minimized extremism. Northeast Africa or the Nile River Valley however is an exception. “Neo-Fundamentalism,” rooted in the failures of modern Islam and the political system, has led to the rise of militant Islamists in countries such as Sudan and Somalia by embracing local agendas (de Waal 2004).

Finally, Southeast Asia has had a similarly long relationship with Islam which was introduced to the region in the 10th or 11th centuries, first at ports and capital cities of various kingdoms in the Malay Peninsula and the eastern archipelago but later penetrated the agricultural
populations in the region (Gross 2007). Gross notes that a common theme throughout the region, from Thailand to the Philippines to Indonesia, the country with the world’s largest Muslim population, is the struggle between “the forces of centralization and those of decentralization” (p. 5). Entry of Western European states into the region played a role in advancing the spread of Islam through Southeast Asia as well.

As European missionaries entered the region and European rule began in several states, Islam united the peoples of the region in resisting permanent Western rule (Gross 2007). Today, several countries in the region are transitioning into democratic governance while others have long been practicing some form of democracy. Additionally, many states in the region have growing economies and rapidly advancing industries (Cox et al 2009). Nevertheless, others have noted since 2000 a rise in Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist activity, attributed to insurgencies against the influence of the West, poverty, a failure of secular education to incorporate fundamental Islamic minorities, and the spread of Salafist Islam (Abuza 2002; Ressa 2003; Bakar 2005). In short, tensions between traditionalism and modernity are not unique to Islam and vary throughout the developing world. As Euben (1999) points out, “Christian as well as Islamic fundamentalists share a preoccupation with the erosion of values, traditions, and meaning seen as constitutive of post-Enlightenment modernity” (p. 15).

The result of these tensions, between generational shifts, a questioning of political institutions, and democratization, has been a Salafist movement within the developing world.

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5 Several scholars have attempted to explain these tensions specifically in the Islamic faith. One argument is that “Islamism is not Islam” at all because “Islamism is about political order, not faith” and it is a “cultural-political response to a crisis of failed postcolonial development in Islamic societies” as a result of globalization (Tibi 2012, p. 23). Islamism then is seen as a critique of the Westernization of society which political Islamists reject, particularly the notion of the state, centralized bureaucracy, and the use of technology (Hallaq 2013). March (2015) suggests that Muslims today are in a difficult position, where they cannot embrace modern institutions which are considered destructive to the culture of the developing world but at the same time these political institutions cannot be Islamized because they go against the ideas of the religion itself. Combined with generational changes, the illegitimacy of the political system has been considered a catalyst for the rise of reformist Islamic ideology (Villalon 1999) that challenges the Western model of the state in the developing world.
The goal of this movement is to reestablish the past glory of an Islamic state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, to restore authentic Islam, and to advocate for violent jihad against Western powers and influences that prevent the creation of a truly Islamic state (Sageman 2004). The reasoning behind a revivalist movement has to do with Salafists rejecting Islamic scholarship that has guided the religion after the time of Muhammad and beyond what is written in the Quran. In addition, Salafists, according to Sageman, have deemed violent action necessary due to repression of the followers of this sect of Islam within modern Muslim states.

The Salafist movement, led by militant extremists or fundamentalist Islamists has taken to using terrorism as its method for accomplishing their goals. Examining terrorism in the developing world requires a definition of what is meant by militant Islamists. Various definitions exist concerning who falls within this category. Most, however, agree on the differentiation between the religion of Islam, the political aspects of the ideology, and the nature of violent individuals acting on their beliefs. An appropriate definition for the purposes of this dissertation in explaining terrorism in the Islamic world describes militant Islamists as “a group or individual advocating Islamist ideological goals, principally by violent means” and these individuals call for the strictest of interpretations of the Quran, the opposition of both Western democracies and Middle Eastern governments, and political parties that are Islamist but do not participate violently in elections (Aboul-Enein 2010, p. 1).

Non-Islamist-Extremist Motivated Religious Terrorism and Secular-Based Terrorism

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6 Palmer (2008, p. 11) acknowledges the differentiation of the religion of Islam, the political aspects of the ideology, and the nature of violent individuals acting on their beliefs by defining Islamism as “the ideal of reestablishing the caliphate and its global dominion,” an Islamist as one who believes in the ideal of Islam, and a Jihadist as also one who believes in Islam but is willing to kill in order to achieve their goals, possibly including themselves in the process. Aboul-Enein argues that Palmer’s definition lacks precision and has the potential to group peaceful Islamist political groups with militant Islamists by describing them both as followers of Islam. Aboul-Enein suggests disaggregating ‘Islam’ from ‘Islamist ideology’ and both from ‘Militant Islamist Ideology’ (Aboul-Enein 2010, p.5).
Other forms of religious-motivated terrorism exist as well. Non-Islamist ideologically extreme terrorist movement are concentrated in the Sub-Saharan and the Asian-Pacific regions which make up approximately thirty-seven percent of the global Christian population while less than one percent of the world’s Christian population is located in the Middle East and North Africa combined. While around 800 million Christians lived in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Asian-Pacific as of 2010, just under thirteen million lived in all of the Middle East and North Africa. Three countries in the Sub-Saharan region (Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ethiopia) and one in Southeast Asia (Philippines) are among the top ten countries in terms of Christian population (Pew 2012).

Much of North Africa and Southeast Asia are Muslim-majority countries whereas only a small portion of Sub-Saharan Africa falls into this category. Instead, the majority of countries in the Sub-Saharan region are Christian-majority states. While there are still Islamist-extremist affiliated terrorist movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are also various instances of Christian and secular violence and terrorism. The Central African Republic is a recent and telling example. Starting in 2013, several thousand individuals have died in fighting between predominantly Muslim groups in the country’s north and predominantly Christian militias in the south. Early in the conflict, Christian anti-balaka forces carried out executions, mutilations, and general revenge attacks against Muslim civilians (CFR 2017). While this is just one example and there are others worth consideration in the Sub-Saharan and Southeast Asian contexts, it is a demonstrative case of extremist Christian violence in the region.

One particular “Christian” terrorist group that has been written on to an extent is the Lord’s Resistance Army active in Uganda and the states on its northern and western borders. The group originated as a spinoff of Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement Forces which arose
among the Acholi ethnic group in response to the Museveni government (Behrend 1998; Dunn 2004; Finnstrom 2006). As noted by Doom et al (2004), the moral code based on the beliefs of Alice included “the confirmation of Alice’s leadership” through promises to follow the orders of Lakwena, a holy spirit, “strengthening the solidarity of the in-group,” and “biblical references to introduce Christian power” (p. 18). Led by Joseph Kony, the LRA gained strength after the fall of Lakwena’s movement and used terrorism to control the population and loosely based their beliefs on Christian-based religious justifications as well (Van Acker 2004). Kony’s movement differed from Alice’s in several ways. While the previous movement sought harmony through order and holy leadership, Kony used “the sword” and he himself “places his hands on those who are killed in order that they may be purified through the power invested in him personally” (Doom et al 2004, p. 22) as a religious figure.

Finally, there are terrorist movements within Africa and Southeast Asia during the modern wave of religious terrorism that have either do not fall within the extremist or radical belief systems of sects of Christianity or Islam, or even have no religious affiliation or motivation at all. Recent attacks on Christian and Muslim groups in Myanmar and Sri Lanka for example include one instance where “Burmese monks were seen goading on Buddhist mobs.”7 Targeting non-Buddhist individuals does not meet the definition of organized terrorism but demonstrates there are other forms of religious tensions in the region. Very little appears in the literature that focuses specifically on this particular sub-set of religious violence and terrorism.

Rapoport refers to the non-religious terrorist organizations as holdovers from the last generation or wave of terrorism but nonetheless they remain active for various reasons. The Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) for example remains on

the US State Department’s list of designated foreign terrorist organizations and remains active in the Philippines. Emerging in the 1960s and experiencing several waves of growth and decline as a non-state actor challenging the various regimes over several decades, the most recent Country Report on Terrorism notes that along with other groups such as Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyah, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) are still involved in carrying out attacks and extortion operations, bomb-making training, and small-scale shootings despite pressure from Philippines and US joint-counterterrorism efforts (BCCVE 2016).

In short, in the modern wave of terrorism where groups with extremist interpretations of the Islamic faith are dominant in the number of attacks. However, other forms of religious violence by Christian-extremists, Buddhist-supported mobs, and secular ‘holdovers’ from prior waves of terrorism characterize the regions under consideration as well.

**Conclusion**

Despite several decades of scholarly literature on the subject of terrorism, the preceding review demonstrated debates still exist in regards to several elements of the topic. Initial efforts at defining terrorism from a legalistic point of view on an international level date back to the days of the League of Nations but no definitive consensus beyond terrorism being used as a tactic to achieve political goals has emerged in the century since those first efforts to define this form of political violence. Scholars as well continue to debate several aspects of what is and is not considered terrorism. While a consensus on the fact that terrorism must have political motivations and goals, the nature of who is targeted by acts of terrorism remains. In general, several tactics are utilized by terrorist organizations with some such as bombings being used more frequently than others. How successful terrorists are at achieving their stated goals and from where these goals originate are other elements of the debate that still lack consensus.
Both the nature of how groups are structured as well as the general goals of terrorist organizations have evolved over time. Groups such as al-Qaeda or the Lord’s Resistance Army are indicative of where modern terrorism has gone in what Rapoport terms the ‘religious wave.’ Groups have adopted leader-inspired but non-hierarchical structures that allow for adaptability and effectiveness at remaining active but amorphous groups of individuals using technological innovations to maintain connections without the rigor of a militaristic hierarchy. These transnational movements also demonstrate Rapoport’s point regarding a religious wave where groups use extremist interpretations of religion to recruit and promote their actions.

While a myriad of explanations have been offered regarding the causation of terrorism and the formation of terrorist organizations, this dissertation will focus predominantly on capacity arguments rather than grievance-based causal explanations for terrorism. The structure and integrity of states’ institutions, its capability to manage activity within its territory, and its capability to respond to the rise of terrorist organizations through its military and bureaucracy are deemed most important to identifying why terrorist organizations from Boko Haram to Jemaah Islamiyah have emerged in the developing world. The focus on terrorism and the capacity of the state in the Sub-Saharan African, North African, and Southeast Asian regions comes from their unique but generally similar histories in regards to the rise of terrorism during the modern wave of religious terrorism. The next chapter will illustrate my theoretical argument for why weaknesses in the capacity of the state drive the formation and activity of terrorist organizations in these regions as well as a general overview of the design that will be used to test these assumptions.
Chapter 3: A Theory of State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World

In the preceding chapter I provide an analysis of where the study of terrorism stands in the academic literature as well as the arguments over the origins of terrorism, how terrorism is defined, and what factors influence terrorist movements across the developing world. This chapter will first look at how those outside of the scholarly community see the issue of terrorism. The discussion in the following section is the result of conversations with US-based experts at governmental and non-governmental organizations on what they view as the most significant explanatory factors for why terrorist movements have found success from West Africa to Southeast Asia. After this discussion I turn to my theoretical assumptions for explaining the relationship between the capacity of the state and terrorism in the developing world. I outline several hypotheses that are tested in subsequent empirical chapters, looking broadly as well as in depth at the regions under consideration. Finally I conclude the chapter with a brief note on the potential concerns regarding endogeneity and how I consider that issue through the narratives investigated in the case studies in Chapters Five and Six.

Interviews with Analysts and Policymakers

In the summer and fall of 2016 I conducted a series of interviews for the purposes of theoretical development to complement the review of literature presented in Chapter Two. In general, each individual provided responses to the questions provided in Appendix A, though interviews were open-ended and included follow-up questions based on each conversation. These questions include a general discussion of their experience working on the issue of terrorism and, if possible, a brief description of their position in governmental or non-governmental work. One participant could not disclose this information for security purposes. Of the ten interviewed:
• three had roles in the US Department of Defense
• two in the US Department of State
• three in US intelligence and law enforcement agencies
• two in American think-tanks

Therefore it is important to note that the views provided in these interviews are American-centric and reflect the perspectives of the US as a hegemonic military power approaching the issue of terrorism in the US and around the world but were the focus for the convenience of sampling.

### Table 3.1 Description of those Interviewed in Fall 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview 1</td>
<td>Former advisor to an Assistant Secretary in Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 2</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs officer serving as deputy director at a State Department agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 3</td>
<td>Analyst for government agency on drug trafficking and international threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 4</td>
<td>US military officer working on terrorism over several decades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 5</td>
<td>Africa and Middle East policy analyst for DC think tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 6</td>
<td>Government analyst working on policy in Lake Chad region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 7</td>
<td>Middle East foreign policy advisor for multiple US vice presidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 8</td>
<td>Former agent with FBI, CIA, DoD, and US Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 9</td>
<td>Law enforcement officer, interrogator at Guantanamo Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 10</td>
<td>Vice-president of a foreign policy think tank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participants provided responses in each interview to a series of questions regarding the factors they feel, based on their experiences in the policy communities in which they are a part of, are most significant to the emergence of terrorist organizations around the world. Follow-up questions asked individuals to differentiate between domestic and international factors to allow for the respondent to provide more detailed responses to the initial questions regarding capacity of the state. I also asked participants if regional variation affects the emergence of terrorist organizations, with varying results based on their expertise. Finally, I inquired about the state’s ability to oversee its territory. This last question allowed for several follow-up questions regarding the various aspects of military and administrative capacity that are the focus of later empirical chapters.
In all, I conducted ten interviews in the fall of 2016. Table 3.1 provides a brief description of the background of those interviewed. I used snowball sampling to accumulate the responses for this section of dissertation, starting initially with a referral from a colleague at a military college in Pennsylvania who serves in the US Army and previously worked with the foreign affairs officer serving as deputy director at a State Department agency as well as the former advisor to an Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defense. From those two contacts I then received further contact information for several of the others listed in Table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.2 Notable Points of Consensus from interviews</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local vs. International Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Significant factors are local in nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ideology attracts some, but not all, recruits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Perception of marginalization matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The government’s relationship with communities matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• State capacity is a huge factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy, Corruption, and Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Good governance matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ability to divert resources to securing territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Infrastructure is key to communication, transportation, and information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The rule of law is essential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military and Security Apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military capability is a double-edged sword.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The state relying on use of force can be exploited by non-state actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Intelligence capabilities at the local and state level matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anti-state activity appears where the security apparatus is lacking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory and Density</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maintaining control of territory is key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The control of space leads to control of populations and revenue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
addition I created a list of public policy think tanks and agencies and solicited interviews through emails to these organizations. I derived the majority of the interviews from snowball sampling though Interview 10 with the vice-president of a foreign policy think tank responded to the cold-call email approach. In all approximately I contacted thirty policymakers and think tank members to participate in this section of the dissertation with one third responding and participating in interviews.

After I made initial contact with each participant I provided a general cover letter explaining the purpose of the interview, to inform the theoretical section of this dissertation, but avoided any specific references to state capacity and my theoretical assumptions in order to allow each respondent to provide an unbiased opinion on the questions asked. All ten interviews took place over the phone and nine of the ten permitted the use of a tape recording device to allow for detailed transcriptions of the conversation for the purposes of identifying key quotes and insights later in the project. The seventh participant, the Middle East foreign policy advisor, declined the request to record the conversation but did permit me to take hand-written notes. The average interview lasted approximately forty-five minutes though one interview with the seventh participant lasted over two hours, providing extensive and valuable detail to the interview questions.

I asked each expert a series of broad questions that allowed them to identify factors that would be incorporated into the research design presented later in this chapter. Several of the questions focused either on domestic or international factors that drive terrorism in the developing world while others focused more narrowly on the nature of the capacity of the state in relation to the success of terrorist movements in the developing world. The rest of this section

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8 Questions used in these semi-structured interviews were approved as part of an Institutional Review Board protocol and are included in an appendix to this dissertation
will focus on four major themes that emerged from the interviews. These themes and key points of consensus amongst multiple interviews are provided above in Table 3.2. In terms of generalization, the small sample size prohibits this to a degree but these interviews were conducted with the purpose of narrowing extraneous factors that affect the formation of terrorist movements.

Local vs. International Factors

Nearly all of those interviewed emphasized domestic factors and gave more detailed answers for those than any transnational or international-level factors. Transnational and international-level factors noted in interviews included broad cultural norms, the effects of globalization and technological innovation, and solidarity among Wahhabist or Salafi interpretations of Islam. In most conversations however, policymakers and researchers at think tanks focused more so on the local context. Ideology attracts some, but not all, recruits and the perception of marginalization matters. Finally, this initial theme leads into state capacity being one of the major local-driven factors to the emergence of terrorist organizations.

As a foreign affairs officer who focused on local-driven factors in our conversation noted, in terms of identifying critical factors to the emergence of terrorist organizations, “it really boils down to these issues, they’re very local in nature.” Local-driven research is necessary for “developing strategies for how to sort of counter those violent extremist groups in” Africa and Asia. He suggested that there are broader categories of factors that drive terrorism including ideology, governance, and economics but it does not help to compare across states and regions at that broad level (Interview 2, 9/16/2016). In the case of Boko Haram he noted “there’s not a preponderance of evidence that recruits are driven to that group for ideological reasons…although there is a small core that is driven by that.” Instead, he suggests most has
been through “conscription and in many cases like in Cameroon and Niger and Chad they’ve been offered economic” incentives. In contrast when “you look at the foreign fighter flow when it comes to ISIL, you know clearly social integration to those communities of where they’re leaving and going to, Syria and Iraq…those are issues of ideology and sense of belonging” (ibid.) In short, local context is a determining factor in which of the broader categories might be driving terrorist activity.

Amongst those interviewed though, there was no observable consensus regarding local contexts such as socioeconomic status and its effect on the formation of terrorist groups or the recruitment of individuals to terrorist organizations. One respondent working on US foreign policy in the Middle East suggested that there is no correlation between poverty and radicalization. However, others highlighted frustration with socioeconomic conditions and unemployment which leads individuals to join terrorist groups for protection, income, and notoriety in the community. The aforementioned analyst did suggest that who is driven by what factor does to a degree depend on their place in the organization. For example, in some cases terrorist organizations offer a steady source of income and status in the community but also may offer a chance for revenge on other tribes or clans. One particular quote demonstrates the variation in what may be the driving factors that must be considered:

“So if you are a poor, disempowered youth in Niger and someone comes to you and says "hey, if you join this organization you will be carrying an AK-47, which commands a lot of automatic respect and you'll be part of this organization that is feared" and there's some attraction to that for status that you can’t otherwise...people have to respect you or at least take notice of you. So I draw a pretty clear distinction between the leadership, which is ideologically driven, and then some of the foot soldiers, some are also ideologically driven, but some are opportunists” (Interview 5, 9/23/2016).
The ideological component, according to some interviewed, sits at the center of the broader, international-level factors that must be considered in explaining the origins of terrorist movements. Internationally, ideological factors include ethnic or religious tensions. In terms of the factors that drive terrorism, the previously mentioned foreign affairs officer also noted that ideology is a major factor and “in a lot of cases we’ve found the ideology attracts certain segments of society” (Interview 2, 9/16/2016).

An individual who formerly worked on counterterrorism strategies at the Department of Defense concurred. He suggested in terms of religious-based ideological grievances that there is a degree of “solidarity across religious groups such as the whole Muslim world, [and] there might be an attraction regardless where you are a Muslim geographically… which is why people participate where they aren't even part of a minority that has been…oppressed.” This points to why extremists in the Islamic religion identify with broader terrorist movements such as al-Qaeda. Additionally, this individual noted that most in Sub-Saharan Africa have more nuanced goals to overthrow governments or establish a state they believe the most powerful. In the African context those cases have been traditionally based on ethnic and religious beliefs. Yet when asked about how regions vary, he suggested that while there are different complaints and grievances, “they all have a political end, otherwise they are just killing people just to kill them” (Interview 1, 9/12/2016)

A clear link between several of these grievance-based factors proposed by those interviewed appears to be the perception of marginalization by those in the community that turn to terrorism to achieve their desired goals, whatever they may be. As another individual interviewed noted:

“When you start to look at the reasons that these groups are forming, what I'm perceiving most often...is an identification of
marginalization, a perception of being marginalized, sometimes that may be a sense of being marginalized by their own family, by their own local community” (Interview 6, 9/26/2016).

This sense of marginalization can be political, social, or economic. When the marginalization occurs simultaneously with a lack of development there is a correlation with violent extremism specifically but there are other factors as well. First he argues, there may be the emergence of a supremacist ideology, often religious, but it can also not be religiously-based as well. By supremacist ideology, this analyst means “ideology that doesn't just say that they are the correct ideology but they feel an incumbent pressure to make others believe that or coerce others to believe that same sort of ideology [and] even the willingness to use force to create that coercion.”

A second factor, in terms of how marginalization develops, is a lack of space for disagreements with the ruling authorities or those in power. In this context, “there’s not an ability to express disagreement, whether through political dialogue or parties or inter-religious or inter-ethnic communication venues” so those that feel excluded may decide violent extremism is their best option. He adds the caveat though that support for violent extremism does not necessarily mean participation in the violence and that you cannot “undermine both of those groups in the same way…you have to find different ways to target those populations” (ibid.)

A long-time military officer offered similar sentiments. He also suggested that “if the government has a good relationship with its population, I think you will see very limited problems as far as terrorism… [and] if the government, you know tries…to make concessions and tries to maybe meet halfway I think that… there are some groups that that might be the only goal, to have recognition from the sitting government.” Yet if the government is militaristic “or people who are in control by the gun I'd say that they'll be a segment that will be fearful of the
government and I think there’ll be a segment that will take up arms and do the asymmetric type warfare, hitting the weak, soft targets, types of things like that” (Interview 4, 9/20/2016).

*Bureaucracy, Corruption, and Infrastructure*

The idea of spaces then, both literal and metaphorical, brings us to the idea of state capacity as a critical factor in terrorism. All of those interviewed in some manner addressed the issue focusing on several areas that directly impact state capacity including governance and clientelism, administrative capacity, and military capacity while also indirect aspects of capacity such as territorial border control and population density. As the foreign affairs officer noted, state capacity is a “huge” factor from two perspectives. One factor is that violent extremist organizations see vulnerabilities through state capacity and it determines where they go and “stand up operations.” The second is that populations where the “government is not providing and delivering protections…can’t deliver services and options” become discontent and “violent extremist organizations provide alternatives” (Interview 9/16/2016). In short, weak governance is a huge factor.

The first aspect of state capacity or governance to be considered here is that of the administrative capacity of the state. As the long-time military officer put it:

“[This] boils down to the government, if they have a somewhat stable country that can provide services that have you know, basic necessities, food, water, shelter, maybe medical facilities or the ability to care for their people, you'll see individuals being a little bit more content with what's going on…I think it's a big thing if the country or government can keep its population…somewhat content, you'll find that it'll be a little bit more peaceful” (Interview 4, 9/20/2016).

The government analyst working on issues in the Lake Chad region offered similar sentiments, noting that terrorism emerges where the state does not have good governance models. He also noted that relationships between those in power and overseeing a large territory or economic
system and the people are critical because they depend on the individuals that make up the state to enforce things and send them whatever benefits, such as taxes or information, that make the system work. If the state relies on “very narrow lines of communication, it creates the opportunity for the intermediary” (ibid.) in this case a terrorist movement.

A former law enforcement officer and interrogator at Guantanamo Bay, the facility where the US military holds those captured around the world that are accused of involvement in terrorism, offered a slightly different but also similar take on the governance or administrative side of capacity. He suggests good governance is about capacity but it is also about willpower and “a leader with money and the capacity to control a region may not matter without willpower.” Countries such as those in the Islamic Maghreb region of Africa have to have the willpower to divert resources to securing the porous regions of their territory. Even so, states such as the United Kingdom, with “tremendous capacity still had the IRA” (Interview 9, 10/5/2016).

Infrastructure also appeared as a theme throughout these interviews, noted as a major component of the state’s administrative capacity. As one individual argued, infrastructure is not only a significant part of the security of the state but also as a major component of capacity. It likely provides opportunities of employment for citizens as well as necessary services and “if you have, and I won’t say ten times out of ten, but I’d say a good majority” of the time if you have “the ability to provide basic needs for individuals—clean water, garbage pickup or at least some sort of sanitary conditions or environment,” then people are less likely to turn to violence or extremism (Interview 4, 9/20/2016). As the Lake Chad region analyst noted, the choice to build a road or school in one community is a double-edged sword. In one sense it may marginalize another community that is not seeing resources being diverted to its needs and if it is
a minority ethnic community for example there may be tensions that develop with the state. At the same time the same road or school might be the factor that ends up minimizing the sense of marginalization if done well (Interview 6, 9/26/2016).

As the foreign affairs officer noted, infrastructure is key because “it moves people and ideas…it provides people options and alternatives to these groups. So as a way to move goods, opportunities to go to other areas for other economic opportunities, opportunities to get to school, to get an education” (Interview 2, 9/16/2016). Another individual who has worked on the issue of terrorism at several US intelligence agencies suggested that infrastructure can act as a “beacon for dissatisfaction and for grievance” which allows it to become a propaganda tool for extremist groups when infrastructure is lacking as it undermines the credibility of the official governing body of the state (Interview 8, 9/28/2016). The foreign affairs officer also added “it'd be unique to see if you can sort of couch [infrastructure] in a way...when you think about violent extremism how infrastructure can provide alternatives to what extremist organizations are offering...I think that would be value-added to the current body of research” (Interview 2, 9/16/2016).

Several interviewed noted the justice system and the rule of law being essential to good governance as well as offering a stable alternative to individuals buying into the propaganda or services ‘provided’ by militants or terrorists. As a policy analyst noted, the state is responsible for providing an equitable justice system and when it does not “then terrorist organizations can move in and impose a level of peace, a justice system, even you know [if] the justice code by which they live is appalling in many ways but it is a system” (Interview 5, 9/23/2016). As the military officer also notes, when the rule of law is applied equally then people will “respect others or at least respect their space” (Interview 4, 9/20/2016).
When the system of justice is inequitable or the political system is corrupt there are opportunities for terrorist organizations to succeed in challenging the state as well according to several of those interviewed. Corruption came up frequently in an interview with an analyst who conducts research on drug trafficking and transnational threats including money laundering, trafficking in weapons and drugs, and other global criminal activity for a federal agency. As she discussed in terms of the capacity of the state: “most of us who work in… law enforcement state-side, look at it from the point of view of governance and rule of law which is where my business comes from” but “if you have a position in the police force or some other government structure you can extract bribes from people to get certain things done” that weakens capacity:

“[A]t the borders for example, border guards take bribes to let people through. And sometimes those organizations or police will set up additional checkpoints that are not required or are not official but are in places where they can extract more bribes. And that doesn’t have to do with official governance. It has to do with enabling people in those positions to look out for themselves…I'm thinking of it as a pyramid but basically the idea is a hierarchy where the people above empower the people below to do this extractive behavior and they look out for each other. [A]ny place that has this model in place is going to [be] vulnerable to having low state capacity because they’re not even trying to have good state capacity. If the West pours money in it's not going to fix the problem we want to fix…it's not going to improve capacity if you have this suction process where resources are being taken away as they come in” (Interview 3, 9/19/2016).

Furthermore, as noted by the DC think tank analyst working on the Middle East and Africa argues, corruption combined with other factors discussed thus far such as marginalization increases the appeal of the rhetoric coming from terrorist organizations.

**Military and Security Apparatus**

In addition to the bureaucratic and infrastructural capacity of the state, several of those interviewed highlighted the importance of security and the capacity of the state’s military as well
as police forces to combat terrorist threats to the state. The common theme among the comments those interviewed made regarding the military capacity of the state is the double-edged nature of the state’s security apparatus. The vice-president at a think tank that has worked on terrorism from an academic but not policy standpoint summed up this concept as a balance between too little and too much capacity. He suggested that if the military of the state cannot provide security for the people then organizations such as terrorist groups may come along to protect them (Interview 10, 10/12/2016).

A former foreign policy advisor concurred with this point. As he suggested, when you cannot “depend on the central government for your protection, then you have to start looking elsewhere. Whether it’s a tribal leader, a terrorist group like ISIS. You need someone that can provide that stability and protection for you and your family.” Yet as the vice-president of a think tank also noted, “the flipside is a military [when] able, [can] quash…[or] crush any nascent rebellion before it generates much popular support” and “the mere act of decimating a potential challenger will strongly discourage copy-cats” (Interview 1, 9/12/2016).

There is a consequence to relying on the use of violent force to establish order however, as noted by the policy analyst working on issues in the Middle East and Africa. When individuals start to associate violence with state actors it can create the feeling that the state is not interested in the grievances of its citizens and “that is an easy area for extremists to exploit because it’s easy to make the state look like it’s merely a predator rather than an institution looking to support its population” (Interview 5, 9/23/2016). Part of military capacity then, noted two of those interviewed, is the nature of the state. The former Defense advisor argues “in most authoritarian or even autocratic states…they can probably stamp it out a little better because civil liberty issues may not be as important” (Interview 1, 9/12/2016).
In contrast, he believes democracies cannot use the same draconian measures as used by authoritarian leaders. Democracies though can minimize or marginalize terrorists so they are not acceptable to the broader society. Northern Ireland and the IRA were one example mentioned. The problem of course then is how to negotiate with terrorists, as in the case of IRA. In short, these policymakers argue state militaries or security forces using violence against their own people may create order in the short-term but may create opportunities for backlash and support of extremism in the long-term. As one put it, “it’s all about balance” (Interview 8, 9/28/2016).

Related to military capacity in general, the capacity for intelligence gathering by the military and security forces specifically is an essential factor as noted by the former Defense advisor. Intelligence operations by the state military but also by local police can mitigate terrorism in the state. Again, important to this capability is the relationship between the state and the people. As he argues, having people that belong to the same community “being willing to share information with the authorities about extremists and those engaged in terrorism in their specific communities” affects the state’s ability to use its resources to provide security and deter terrorism (Interview 1, 9/12/2016). The long-time military officer similarly suggested that the seeds of rebellion or anti-state movements emerge where the state’s security apparatus is lacking. Even in authoritarian states where the military apparatus is a major component of governing, unless “you have someone standing on a street corner [and] you pretty much are watching everywhere” then inevitably “there are going to be places where the government, or the police, or whoever you wanna call who is in charge, may not have full control over that territory” (Interview 4, 9/20/2016).
Territory and Density

Finally, several of those interviewed touched on the idea of space to act or “stand up operations” as one individual put it (Interview 2, 9/16/2016), leading to a discussion of some of the indirect aspects of state capacity including territory and population density. Related to the security capacity of the state then is the state’s ability to maintain control over its borders and sparsely populated regions. The long-time military officer noted that these areas are where individuals such as terrorists use not for hostile acts but instead for “rest and recuperation” or “fundraising, places where they can lay low or get training” (Interview 4, 9/20/2016). In other words, all of the things that go into being a terrorist movement that are not essentially direct attacks on a civilian population.

Several interviewed mentioned specific examples that particularly illustrate the idea of territorial control and population density. Indonesia’s sparsely populated regions allow terrorists and others to operate and promote extremist ideologies such as Salafist interpretations of Islam as one analyst noted. The former foreign policy advisor to multiple vice presidents focused on the example of ISIS in Iraq and Syria where “you don’t have centralized governments that exercise effective control over the whole country itself” and in the case of Iraq it was “sectarian policies of the Maliki government in Baghdad” that led to alienation of populations in the sparsely populated territories along the border with Syria. On that side of the border “you had the 2011 Syrian army fall apart, so [al Qaeda in Iraq which later became ISIS] moved to Syria [and] it gave them oxygen they needed to survive and grow” after the surge in US troops in Iraq at the end of the Bush administration. That control of space, he noted, gives groups a dedicated source of revenue (Interview 7, 9/28/2016).
In summary, those interviewed offered a broad set of explanatory factors when it came to the origins of terrorism in the developing world, why terrorist organizations or extremist groups utilizing terrorism emerge in some countries in Africa and Asia but not others. There was however more consensus on the role the capacity of the state plays in both allowing for these non-state actors to gain a foothold in the state as well as how areas of weakness in several aspects of governance lead to threats to the state apparatus. Space for operations was generally the most consistent theme. As the analyst that previously worked with refugees in East Africa argued, terrorist movements succeed in gaining the support of the people when ungoverned or poorly governed spaces exist (Interview 5, 9/23/2016). Therefore in terms of implications for policymakers, the capacity of the state looms as a significant challenge. As the former foreign policy advisor in two administrations argued:

“We made a huge financial investment in Iraq and Afghanistan trying to [build capacity] and it doesn't appear to have worked so you know that's a huge problem for policymakers because it has...if it's right that these are the key issues that are creating the breeding grounds for the rise of terrorist groups and they're next-to unsolvable, [so] that means we don't have a lot of good options going forward” (Interview 7, 9/28/2016).

Terrorism and State Capacity in the Developing World: Theory and Hypotheses

The capacity of the state to put down threats to the status quo impacts the success or failure of the mobilization of terrorist movements but can also increase terrorist attacks in the wake of higher capacity. Informed by both the scholarly literature on terrorism as well as my interviews with policymakers and analysts, the following details my assumptions regarding how direct and indirect elements of the capacity of a given state explain why such groups emerge in certain parts of the developing world and not in others. In terms of direct factors, I consider these to be elements of capacity the state has tangible influence over via spending, legislation,
establishment of institutions, and implementation. In contrast, indirect factors are considered to be elements that the state must account for via its ability to govern in an effective and efficient manner. In one sense a state can invest heavily in its military or expand its revenue-generating or information-gathering capacity via spending or legislation. In another, the challenges of repressive tactics alongside clientelistic practices can affect security and development simultaneously.

**Direct Factors of State Capacity: Military and Security**

How the state responds to nascent threats from extremist groups that challenge the security of the state through acts of terrorism has an inevitable impact on the growth and success of those movements in the developing world. When the state lacks the capacity to respond to domestic issues it cannot effectively respond to violence that occurs as a result. As a portion of the population becomes radicalized under a particular ideological cause, the state may lack the perceived ability to intervene against a movement. As noted in the previous chapter, the state’s ability to use its security apparatus to counter terrorist movements has been found to be an important factor in prior studies of terrorism and capacity (Mason, Weingarten & Fett 1999; Derouen & Sobek 2004; Hendrix 2010; Shelton, Stojek & Sullivan 2013; Hendrix & Young 2014). Those interviewed for this chapter also highlighted how critical the state’s ability to have what Weber (1919) called a monopoly over violence is an essential aspect of state capacity.

If a monopoly is not held by the state then, rebel movements of any nature can find their opportunity to build up as a challenge against the state. Conventional wisdom has been that the state’s ability to root out terrorist threats and use the state’s security forces to deter terrorism. While that conventional wisdom appears to be logical at first glance, there are certainly reasons
for why an increase in the state’s capacity to use military force can in fact result in a backlash by non-state actors resorting to terrorism. Therefore, to test that suggestion, I hypothesize:

H1: as the state’s military capability increases, terrorism increases.

While gaps in the state’s military apparatus in terms of territorial control can result in terrorist attacks succeeding, terrorism in response to political repression, discussed in a later section, that relies on brutal military force may increase terrorist attacks. When the particular movement has a religious background, common in the current religious wave of terrorism, it can also activate nationalistic support among a discontent ethno-religious group, which may even come from factions of the state’s military apparatus.

Direct Factors of State Capacity: Administration and Bureaucracy

While military capacity against a challenge to the status quo by the state in the short-term may or may not deter terrorism, a state’s long-term ability to administer or manage its territory and people matters as well and probably more so in the long run. As previously noted, the administrative capacity of the state has been found to be more effective against terrorist movements than military capabilities (Hendrix & Young 2014). Administrative capacity that inhibits or deters contentious behavior can take many forms, including but most importantly the dispersion of resources and the collection of information.

Several aspects of administrative capacity that were highlighted during the interview process are important to consider here as elements of what I am referring to overall as the administrative capacity of the state. First, infrastructure forms the backbone of the state’s capabilities to interact with the population in nearly every shape and manner. By infrastructure I refer to everything from the roads that allow access from the capital to distant territorial reaches and villages, the schools that provide the system of education the state deems appropriate to its
population to establish a well-informed citizenry, hospitals and local police forces that offer safety and protection, and telecommunications that allow for the people of the state to interact with those outside their own community. As one individual interviewed put it, infrastructure allows for the movement of not just goods and employment opportunities but ideas as well. Infrastructure both metaphorically and literally fills the spaces within the state where extremist ideologies may develop in isolation and without challenge otherwise.

As one might guess though, infrastructure alone can have a double-edged sword effect like raw military capability. From the United Kingdom to the United States to the countries of the developing and developed regions of the world, the ease of movement of information can also be used by the same terrorist movements several of those interviewed argue it can help to counter. ISIS from its start as a splinter of other terrorist movements in Iraq and Syria has found success in using the internet to transmit its ideology and to radicalize individuals from thousands of miles away. Attacks in the US, Canada, Western Europe, and elsewhere have been claimed by ISIS but carried out by members that “joined” their movement without ever stepping foot in Syria or Iraq. None of the aforementioned states are those that would be considered as lacking capacity to counter terrorist movements.

The ability of the state then to provide deterrents and alternatives to joining terrorist movements through its administrative capabilities is an essential layer to the administrative capacity side of the argument. Providing educational and employment opportunities can minimize discontent. Several of those interviewed noted that while ideologically-driven members of Boko Haram, ISIS, and al Qaeda exist, large portions of their membership are driven by economic or non-ideological motivations. Opportunities and alternatives alone however cannot be the be-all, end-all solution to preventing terrorism in a country. The United States and
the United Kingdom again are illustrative cases of where capacity can only be relied upon to do so much in limiting, not eliminating, threats from non-state actors such as terrorist organizations.

Therefore, the state’s ability to enforce the laws and effectively run the institutions that make up the state in an equitable manner is a final essential factor. A functioning judiciary that citizens have trust in and a political system that provides opportunities for those discontent with the status quo matter as much as the buildings and roads and educational or employment opportunities. For these reasons then, I hypothesize

H2: as the state’s administrative capacity increases, terrorism decreases.

As opportunities for terrorist organizations are created by the lack of a presence of the state on the ground or through other bureaucratic means, groups can form and challenge the state from within its claimed territory.

**Indirect Factors of State Capacity: Repression and Marginalization**

The state’s ability to use both of these dimensions of state capacity to identify and disrupt terrorist movements within their territory cannot be considered in isolation. While the state has to maintain its capabilities to defend itself and provide resources to its citizens, both the scholarly literature and those interviewed highlight the fact that this is a matter of balance when it comes to state capacity. In other words, state capacity is critical to the operation of the state but there is such a thing as too much of a good thing. Too much use of the state’s military and administrative apparatus to push back against resistance to the state’s authority can have the same effect as leaving open space for movements to gain control in areas of the state. As resistance movements take shape but find themselves isolated or threatened by an intense response from the state apparatus, I expect to see groups and their members resorting to terrorism as a tactical response to an asymmetric situation.
Marginalization of certain populations in the state was another topic that regularly came up not only in talks with policymakers and think tank analysts but in the academic literature as well. In spite of the characterization of some states as democracies, many of the states within the developing world face challenges of internal instability and subsequent regime change on a regular basis. While states such as Indonesia have been relatively stable in terms of their democratic governance, countries such as Somalia have experienced abject failure of a central government for years. Other states that have been perceived as moderately successful democracies since the 1990s have in the past decade fallen to coups. Mali in Sub-Saharan Africa and Thailand in Southeast Asia are notable examples.

Even long-time authoritarian regimes in some countries have fallen as in the case of Libya after the Arab Spring. In most of these cases, unstable governments have witnessed fundamentalist groups challenge their authority over territory and terrorist organizations bring chaos to their capital cities as well as the far-flung reaches of their country. States that have found a balance between secular and democratic rule and also have found a way of satisfying the concerns of minority groups with religious demands in the developing world find themselves better able to prevent violent extremist movements that resort to terrorism. Therefore I hypothesize that:

H3: more democratic regimes where citizens participate in institutions reduce terrorism.

Some of those interviewed noted that essentially what can serve as a deterrent to buying into a terrorist movement’s rhetoric on top of economic opportunities is inclusion in the political process. Therefore, higher levels of democratic principles without stigmatization or isolation of specific communities serves as one obvious way to consider this factor.
No matter the nature of the regime though, the combination of increasing the military capacity of the state with the effect of the administrative capacity may not be as clear-cut as a negative indicator of terrorism. In fact, as the state expands its ability both militarily and bureaucratically to suppress activity by discontent actors, something else may occur. The response of the state to discontent movements with political goals being a harsh, violent crackdown can serve as the motivation for terrorist movements in the developing world. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H4: as states increase their resources militarily and bureaucratically, terrorist attacks increase.

As the administrative and military capacity of the state rise, extremist groups that seek to challenge the status quo turn to terrorism more often to achieve their goals.

**Indirect Factors of State Capacity: Clientelism, Corruption and Control**

The state’s capacity through spending and the establishment of institutions that serve as deterrents and outlets to discontent groups is one important aspect of how a state can respond to the threat of terrorism. Indirectly though, the state’s control of a particular territory is another aspect of capacity that deserves specific consideration. In cases where the state struggles to maintain its authority over distant regions or minimally-populated provinces, groups of discontent individuals find opportunities to steadily build a movement.

The regions under consideration in this dissertation offer a myriad of cases where states exist with varying territorial sizes. States in North Africa contain large swaths of desert that lack almost any aspect of the state in the form of infrastructure or administrative influence on the ground. Sub-Saharan states also contain deserts and remote areas of forest and jungles that have been integral to the success or at least prolonged existence of rebel movements across the region. Finally, Southeastern Asia is not only challenged by dense jungles and remote territorial areas
but also large archipelagos that make centralization of power difficult even without movements against the state. In all of these regions, one can travel for miles without encountering tangible forms of the state or even large numbers of inhabitants. As some interviewed noted, these open spaces can offer non-state actors like terrorist organizations areas to set up shop for training and fundraising or just areas where they can lay low after striking at the state through a terrorist attack. This concept of open space creates opportunities for strongholds of resistance to develop. How spread out the state’s population is will affect how influential a state with insufficient control can be in monitoring its territory. I hypothesize:

H5: states with low population density will experience more terrorism.

Another potential outcome for states that have the challenge of controlling distant populations and minimally-regulated territories is the growth of clientelistic practices by local officials that lack oversight from a centralized and influential state apparatus. Many states within Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Southeast Asia experience challenges with corrupt and clientelistic behavior at the local, state, and national level. From bribery in legislatures to clientelistic behavior among politicians in the ‘frontier’ provinces of a country, how corrupt a state is unquestionably affects its ability to enforce laws and regulate activity. As one individual interviewed suggested, when border guards are taking bribes to let people through, that is an area where state capacity to prevent terrorist organizations from moving freely in a territory is weakened. Teets and Chenoweth (2009) find that terrorism increases in the wake of states being more corrupt. However, even though states may certainly be weakened in their ability to govern, this may also provide an outlet to non-state actors. Discontent groups may find themselves the recipients of payoffs or access that has a suppressing effect on how motivated groups are to carry out acts of terrorism. Therefore, I hypothesize that
H6: *clientelism actually decreases terrorist activity.*

The example provided by Tuanstad (2010), summarized in Chapter Two, is illustrative of this point. In the case of Palestine between 2004 and 2007 several groups allied and clients of figures in the Palestinian Authority increased violent terrorist activity in response to the threat posed by democratic elections and reforms that would potentially sever the benefits provided from the existing patron-client relationship. Thus the presence of clientelistic relationships between terrorist movements and figures in the state potentially reduces activity.

In summary, the capacity of the state administratively through the rule of law has been found to be significant in explaining a decrease in terrorist attacks in a given state (Choi 2010; Hendrix and Young 2014) while the capacity of the state militarily has been found to be significant in raising the likelihood of terrorist activity (Hendrix and Young 2014). Logically then, the combination of the two has to be considered as well. If a state responds in a way that is perceived as harsh or extremely violent to challenges to the status quo through increased military and administrative capacity, this tension may flare into a major movement against the authority of the state. In addition, there are several components of the state that indirectly affect its capacity to counter the operations of terrorist organizations. A state with large swathes of relatively uncontrolled territory or a history of clientelistic behavior must be factored in to the equation when explaining why some states in the developing world experience the violence of terrorism and others have not.

**A Note on State Capacity, Terrorism, and the Potential for Endogeneity**

Logically there is the potential for the two major concepts under consideration in this dissertation, state capacity and terrorism, to impact one another. While the hypotheses presented in this chapter point to state capacity’s impact on terrorist activity, there is some concern that the
reverse may be true. Several other scholars attempt to account for or rectify this concern theoretically and methodologically. The theoretical discussion of endogeneity between the two concepts is presented here while alternative methodological suggestions from the literature will be discussed in Chapter Four.

*Terrorism, Military Capacity, and Endogeneity*

In terms of terrorism and military capacity, Chenoweth points out that many policies such as military occupations can motivate a portion of the population to attack the offending country but even when demands of groups are met this may create more resentment among other constituents (2013, p. 369). Further Chenoweth argues that “it is not clear whether democracies initiate conflict with authoritarian regimes because they have been targeted by transnational terrorism or anticipate that they will be” and “we should not be surprised to find that the initiation of conflict is followed by terrorism, since anticipation of terrorism was the pretext for the conflict itself (370).”

Similarly, Hendrix and Young (2014) argue a reciprocal relationship between state capacity and terrorism is understandable theoretically because “if governments are strategic they will likely respond to armed attacks by bolstering military assets” and go on to argue that “it would be more surprising if states did not respond to violent dissent with an increase in military spending and hiring” (p. 354). In short if governments anticipate violent action that will be taken against the state they may spend more on military resources and increase the number of soldiers.

Other forms of conflict do suggest that violent activity is likely to impact state capacity. In studying civil war and state capacity, Thies (2010) finds that there is an endogenous relationship between civil war and state capacity. In fact civil violence actually affects state capacity rather than the reverse and thus state capacity has no significant effect on civil war onset.
once this is controlled. Coggins (2015) argues terrorism is endogenous to various measures of state failure and finds that most failing and failed states are not predisposed to terrorism but states going through political collapse are significantly more likely to experience terrorist acts. She also argues that war fighting’s relationship to terrorism has not received sufficient theoretical attention,” arguing that much of the relationship between the two can be explained by “terrorism as war fighting (p. 457).”

Coggins breaks state failure down into three categories with measures that she argues are not endogenous to terrorism: human insecurity, state incapacity, and political collapse. Through cross-panel analysis Coggins finds little support for a relationship between increases in state weakness and local groups’ perpetration of terrorism. There is a relationship between certain types of state failure such as human insecurity, state incapacity, and political collapse and increases in terrorist activity. She finds instead, and counterintuitively, that as a country’s development improves incidences of terrorism increase (p. 457).

Terrorism, Administrative Capacity, and Endogeneity

In terms of administrative capacity several variables are endogenous to state capacity including the size of a state, the terrain and forestation of a country, and infrastructure like roads and telephone lines (Englehart 2009). Macroeconomic variables have been one conceptual area scholars note the potential for endogeneity between terrorism and economic factors (Arin 2016). And in terms of education as an administrative capacity concept, previous literature suggests terrorism and other forms of political violence impairs the specific administrative capacity element of education (Thyne 2006; Dreher, Krieger, and Meierrieks 2011) but Brockhoff (2015) argues that in terrorized economies there may be a lower demand for education and thus an endogenous relationship exists (p. 1205).
Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Sul (2013) find no influence of terrorism on economic growth for several regional samples. As summarized by Hendrix (2010) however, while GDP per capita is an advantageous measure of administrative capacity for its widespread availability for numerous states over a long time frame it is highly correlated with other measures of bureaucratic and administrative capacity and thus the endogeneity of institutions and level of economic development is a persistent problem in the study of comparative economic development (see also Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001).

While the issue of endogeneity between these concepts to conflict is not unique to administrative capacity, it is likely to be magnified when considering the rule of law and bureaucratic quality for example (p. 277). Hutchison and Johnson (2011) look at the endogenous relationship between political capacity and trust and argue that, in the African context, government capacity creates trust throughout the public. Theoretically the common thinking that trust is required to have effective governance is Euro-centric as an assumption (p. 742). Finally Abadie (2006) in studying terrorism uses a measure of political rights instead of civil liberties to account for the political climate of the state because endogeneity becomes a concern when states begin restricting civil liberties in response to terrorism (p. 52).

**Accounting for Theoretical Endogeneity Concerns**

As presented above there are several concerns in terms of whether changes in state capacity drive terrorist activity or whether terrorism inhibits state capacity. Based on the review of theoretical discussions regarding this issue of endogeneity I now provide my own theoretical interpretation of how endogeneity may be a factor in understanding state capacity and terrorism in the developing world.
As argued by Hendrix and Young it is logical that states will respond to attacks against the state or its citizens by increasing military spending, developing new military units, and implementing new tactics to respond to nascent threats within the state. Therefore military capacity is likely to be responsive to any new threat introduced be it terrorists, rebels, or outside actors. As noted by Coggins the relationship between war fighting and terrorism has not received as much direct attention and finds that the type of capacity-based changes implemented drives terrorist activity in response.

Thus as noted previously in my assumptions and hypotheses it is how the state utilizes improved forms of military capacity that drives the hypothesized increase in political violence in the form of terrorism in the developing world. As states establish more effective forms of military organization, redirect resources to counterterrorism, and in turn potentially misuse or are perceived as misusing these new resources and structures non-state actors are likely to respond. The response then is likely to be further, more targeted, violence against not just the civilian populace but likely those that represent the state’s military as well.

In terms of administrative capacity and endogeneity there is reasonable concern that several administrative or bureaucratic concepts are not only endogenous with terrorism but endogenous to one another as well as economic measures of the state, the size of the state, and various concepts typically used to control for potential alternative explanations. While some such as Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Sul find no influence of terrorism on economic growth there is a logic to considering reverse causality beyond this direct relationship when considering the damage terrorism does to other elements of the state such as Brockhoff’s argument regarding education which then impacts economic activity in the state. For the purposes of this dissertation however the focus is more predominantly on the legal and administrative capacity concepts that
also face potential endogeneity issues with terrorism. Like military capacity, as the state begins to create its response to a nascent terrorist threat the state’s administrative capacity may increase but indirectly may contribute to more terrorist activity as well when repressive tactics are considered.

In short any state reasonably is going to react to the earliest potential terrorist threats by finding ways to improve military and administrative capacity, be it organized anti-terror units or new legislation governing the charges and proscribed punishment for perpetrators or supporters of terrorist acts. As noted by Hutchison and Johnson in their study of political capacity and trust though, context matters. For Hutchison and Johnson this referred to the relationship between capacity and trust in African governments. The same point applies when considering the state taking responsibility for combatting terrorist threats versus creating new laws and military entities that can be abused by those in power. This abuse then creates further grievances amongst those discontent with the status quo in the state who then support or continue to support terrorism as a reasonable alternative. In short the timing of specific changes in capacity is an important consideration in understanding the relationship between capacity and terrorism in the developing world.

To provide some insight into the timing of how these factors impact one another and attempt to account for concerns related to the potential endogenous relationship between state capacity and terrorism the following three empirical chapters use both quantitative and qualitative methods to look at the relationship from different perspectives. Chapter Four takes a broad look at the regions considered in this dissertation and offers a cross-national analysis of terrorism in the developing world between 1985 and 2012 through zero-inflated negative
binomial analysis to test the relationships between several aspects of state capacity and the number of terrorist attacks in Sub-Saharan, North African, and Southeast Asian nation-states.

Several measures of military and administrative capacity are considered yet, as noted above, the theoretical potential for endogeneity remains. Therefore in Chapters Five and Six I delve into four of the factors found to be significant in Chapter Four: administrative capacity, military capacity, repression, and corruption. Again, while all four are found to be significant in Chapter Four, endogeneity remains a consideration. The goal then with each case study is to elucidate the story of how each region responds to the development of terrorist groups like Boko Haram and Jemaah Islamiyah, thus identifying how increases in military capacity and administrative capacity after the development of a group impact its activity.

In Chapter Five I focus on the aforementioned case of Boko Haram and its impact on four states in the West Sub-Saharan African region: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. All four are concentrated around the Lake Chad region as is a majority of the activity of Boko Haram. In addition all four respond to the development and spread of Boko Haram into their territory with various changes to military and administrative capacity. Yet in all four cases the implementation of new military units, inclusion of vigilance committees as additional security support in each state, and new laws defining and criminalizing support or involvement with terrorist groups has come with misuse of these capabilities and continued and in some cases increased terrorist activity.

In contrast in Chapter Six I consider four Southeast Asian states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. I consider each through the same four factors and find Given that the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah dates back to the 1990s the states in Southeast Asia adjusted over a longer period of time to terrorism than those states examined in the case of Boko Haram. Newer
threats though including al Qaeda and the Islamic State entering the region and local threats to states like the Philippines in the case of Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) require continued adaptation to present circumstances.

Reorganization of military and police units, redefining terrorism and establishing new legal statutes and procedures, and improving intelligence gathering and monitoring of terrorist activity all are examples of improved bureaucratic and military capacity taken on by the four subject states in the last few decades. Informal approaches and coordination with private groups occurs as well but a major difference between the two regional cases is the more rehabilitative approach taken by Southeast Asian states in both counter-propaganda and prison rehabilitation programs. Thus when comparing the trends in activity between the newer phenomenon of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region versus that of Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia where different tactics and programs have been employed, we can observe, while keeping in mind the limits of generalizability with the case study approach, the chronology of events and the change in terrorist activity in response to changes in state capacity. The findings from these chapters as well as on the concern regarding endogeneity between terrorism and state capacity will be addressed in Chapter 7, the conclusion.
Chapter 4: Cross-National Analysis of Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World

In the preceding chapters I presented a discussion of terrorism and state capacity in the developing world among those in the academic and policy communities as well as my own theoretical argument. In short, the overarching theory guiding this chapter examines the capacity of the state to use the combination of bureaucratic and military capabilities to take on the threats posed by terrorist groups acting against the state within their territory. When a state responds in a way that individuals perceive as harsh or indiscriminate, these tensions flare up quickly in some cases to mass movements against the authority of the state. Weaknesses in the state’s capacity to provide for its population or the outright misuse of resources through clientelistic practices may lead to a response from the population including the rise of non-state actors against the authority of the state as well.

In this chapter I test the relationships between those proposed factors. This chapter begins with a discussion of the empirical design used to assess state capacity and terrorism in the developing world at a broad level of analysis and then provide the results of those empirical tests. Military capacity, measured through a general accounting of the strength of a state’s military force, and administrative capacity, measured through a series of proxies that account for both infrastructural and rule of law-driven concepts, are the primary focus of the analysis. I also consider repression and clientelism as factors of the state’s behavior in responding to citizens and non-state threats like terrorist groups. The results of this chapter find significant support for the theoretical arguments regarding military capacity and repression driving terrorist activity. Administrative capacity is also a significant factor, but the relationship runs against the theoretical argument made in the previous chapter while some support exists for the
hypothesized relationship between corruption and terrorist activity. Later chapters will drill down on military capacity, repression, administrative capacity, and clientelism, the factors of significance in this analysis.

Research Design for Cross-National Analysis

I begin with a cross-national analysis of states in select regions of the developing world where state capacity still lags behind other regions. This analysis includes all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Southeast Asia, illustrated in Figure 4.1 with a few noted exceptions. While similar issues play out between discontent groups and states with varying levels of state capacity elsewhere, states in the African and Asian regions have been at the forefront of the religious wave of terrorism, specially but not exclusively in the post-9/11 era.

Many of the notable terrorist movements outside of the Middle East in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries develop within these territorial regions since the end of the Cold
War, much more so than other developing regions such as South America and Eastern Europe as depicted in Figure 4.2.

As for the Middle East, many of the terrorist movements long precede the time period under consideration in this chapter. I analyze terrorism and capacity in the states listed in Table 4.1 from 1985 to 2012. This time frame includes the development of terrorist organizations in the regions after events such as the Iranian Revolution, a notable point in the rise of religious terrorism, and during the waning days of the Cold War and Soviet-funded left-wing terrorism (Choi 2010). In total, sixty-five countries fall within the regions specified but several drop out of the analysis due to missing data. Figure 4.1 provides a map of the countries under consideration. A few countries such as Eritrea and Timor-Leste are included once they gain independence while I exclude South Sudan, only a country for a handful of years, from the analysis.

The dependent variable for this analysis is a count of terrorist attacks in a country per year. While there are arguments for distinguishing between transnational and domestic terror events (Enders, Sandler, & Gaibulloev 2011) I believe in the context of understanding the
capacity of the state to prevent incidents of terrorism this distinction is unnecessary. A successful terrorist attack on a state be it by a domestically-focused group or a transnational terrorist movement still indicates a degree of weakness in the state’s capacity to prevent an attack. I obtain data for this variable from the Global Terrorism Database (START 2016) which lists terrorist attacks by six hundred identifiable groups in this region in the specified time frame. 

Table 4.1 Countries under Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Africa</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Laos</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Laos</td>
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<td>Botswana</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Rep. of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Sao Tome &amp; Principe</td>
</tr>
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<td>Central African</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Togo</td>
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<td>Rep. Chad</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
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<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. of the Congo</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Because the GTD dataset does not include data for 1993, I average the count data for 1992 and 1994 in each case as done by others to deal with this issue (Choi 2010). As noted by the GTD’s codebook, “incidents of terrorism from 1993 are not present in the GTD because they were lost prior to START’s compilation of the GTD from multiple data collection efforts. Several efforts were made to recollect these incidents from original news sources. Unfortunately, due to the challenges of retrospective data collection for events that happened more than 20 years ago, the number of 1993 cases for which sources were identified is only 15% of estimated attacks. As a consequence START excludes all 1993 attacks as an actual count” (START 2016, p. 3).
START researchers use a mixture of automated and manual data collection strategies for deciding when to include an incident as a terrorist attack and when to categorize an event as a non-terrorist incident. Using keyword filters that search through approximately one million open-source media articles on any topic published globally in a given day in over 160 countries and over 80 languages, researchers refine the pool of articles and then manually reviews the final subset to ensure events meet GTD inclusion criteria. To be included in the GTD dataset, an event must be documented by one source recognized by START as a high-quality source. Six coding teams focused on location, perpetrators, targets, weapons and tactics, casualties and consequences, and general information code domain-specific variables for each event included in the GTD (START 2016).

The GTD defines a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (9) and requires all three of the following elements are present in the description of an event for it to be considered for inclusion in the dataset:

- Incident is intentional—a calculated attack by a perpetrator.
- Incident involves violence or the threat of violence—damage to people and/or property.
- Perpetrators of incidents are sub-national actors.

Additionally, the GTD requires two of the following three criteria are also met for inclusion:

1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.\(^\text{10}\)

2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience than those immediately impacted by an attack.

\(^{10}\) Economic goals cannot be solely for the purpose of profit for inclusion in the GTD.
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.\textsuperscript{11}

Further explanation of the inclusion and exclusion criteria can be found in the GTD codebook.\textsuperscript{12}

In the majority of cases START researchers attribute a terrorist incident to a particular terrorist organization. Of the 5,285 attacks in the regions of interest between 1985 and 2012 1,888 are listed as ‘Unknown’ attackers so I cannot disaggregate between different types of terrorist organizations for this analysis. The average number of terrorist attacks in a given country-year is approximately fifteen but varies largely depending on the country. The maximum count for the number of terrorist attacks in a given country-year is Nigeria in 2012 with 616 listed incidents.\textsuperscript{13}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>10.454</td>
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<td>9.471</td>
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<td>-2.138</td>
<td>2.382</td>
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<td>Public Administration</td>
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<td>.966</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative Political Allocation (RPA)</td>
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<td>1.024</td>
<td>.161</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>1.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Political Reach (RPR)</td>
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<td>.357</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>1.694</td>
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<td>2.121</td>
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<td>1435</td>
<td>.0157</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>-2.460</td>
<td>2.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service (Per 100)</td>
<td>1757</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>7.078</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1707</td>
<td>.390</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Terror Scale (State)</td>
<td>1763</td>
<td>1.847</td>
<td>1.088</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>1783</td>
<td>3.738</td>
<td>1.402</td>
<td>.334</td>
<td>8.926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Corruption</td>
<td>1736</td>
<td>.650</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita (Log)</td>
<td>1679</td>
<td>6.690</td>
<td>1.236</td>
<td>4.171</td>
<td>10.905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Exec a Military Officer</td>
<td>1685</td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>.487</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{11} GTD recognizes this as acts not permitted by international humanitarian law, specifically the deliberate targeting of civilians or non-combatants.

\textsuperscript{12} http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf

\textsuperscript{13} Analysis for this chapter was run with and without Nigeria in 2012 and there was no significant effect when dropping that country year.
I group the independent variables into two general categories of state capacity. Structural capacity factors such as the size of the military and the bureaucratic or administrative ability of the state make up the first grouping of variables. State behavior factors such as clientelism and repression fall into the second grouping. I also include several controls. Robust standard errors are clustered on the country account for structural issues with the data.

**Structural Capacity Factors: Military & Administrative Capacity**

To measure military capacity I use a factor-analysis\textsuperscript{14} based composite approach of military capacity (Hendrix and Young 2014) based on variables from the National Material Capabilities dataset, a subset of the Correlates of War data established in the 1970s (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972). As they note, this is preferable to the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score approach in the NMC dataset.\textsuperscript{15} I operationalize Military Capacity as military capability based on military personnel, military expenditures, and military expenditures per soldier. I expect a one unit increase in the index measure for military capacity to result in an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in a given country-year. As the size of the budget and military force in terms of soldiers expands in a given country-year, the number of terrorist attacks will increase as well. Responses to terrorism that rely on brute or overwhelming military force that can also involve repressive tactics or indiscriminate killing and not in any way work towards a reconciliation with those fighting the status quo of the regime leads to a response in kind from terrorist movements.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Major Conflict & 1792 & .057 & .233 & 0 & 1 \\
\hline
Land Area (Log) & 1784 & 11.999 & 2.138 & 6.13 & 13.683 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{14} See Appendix D for discussion of the factor analysis approach.

\textsuperscript{15} See Appendix D for discussion of the CINC score measurement.
To measure the Administrative Capacity of the state I use several measures of administrative capacity in different models to both account for different conceptual measures of administrative capacity but also to serve as a check on other measures. While a variety of measures on specific infrastructural aspects such as the number and quality of public facilities may be more enlightening for this measure, limited or unavailable data over time for states in the region of analysis precludes this approach. To account for public infrastructure in some way I use a measure of Telephone Service or the proportion of fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 people as a proxy for infrastructure development. The measure refers to the sum of active fixed telephone lines, voice-over-IP subscriptions, fixed wireless local loop subscriptions, ISDN voice channel equivalents, and fixed public payphones. The data is from the International Telecommunication Union via the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. As the proportion increases I expect the number of terrorist attacks to decrease. The state’s long-term ability to administer or manage territory and people through services such as telephone service leads to citizens not becoming dissatisfied with the status quo if their needs are being met.

In addition I look at aspects of legal capacity of the state to account for the state’s ability to implement the rule of law and effectively utilize public institutions. A measure on Rigorous and Impartial Public Administration examines the performance of public officials in following laws in an unbiased or non-arbitrary manner (Pemstein et al. 2015). The measure is coded on an ordinal scale, converted to an interval of 0-4 in the measurement model. ‘0’ indicates the law is not respected and is administered arbitrarily while the high end, ‘4’, indicates law is generally respected in full by public officials.

To examine another approach of understanding the administrative capacity of the state I include a measure known as Relative Political Reach (RPR) which is “a ratio of actual
participation in the formal economy—the economy that is taxed and directly supported by public infrastructure—to expected participation in the formal economy, estimated as a linear function of the structure, size, and degree of social spending in the national economy” (Hendrix & Young 2014; see also Kugler and Tammen 2012).  

Finally, in a separate model I include a third measure also derived from the Relative Political Performance Data Set. *Relative Political Allocation* is a composite indicator which allows me to understand how public expenditures are prioritized by a government in the budgeting process. The RPA measure is estimated for over 150 countries starting in 1970 and composed of measures on Secondary School Enrollment, Economic Openness, Government Output Ratio, Capital Output Ratio, and several other elements of Public Expenditure Shares. RPA examines the gaps between the actual expenditures on certain sectors and what they refer to as the “best” expenditures that maximize economic growth on any particular portion of development. Kugler and Tammen define political allocation as “public expenditures on security, infrastructure, education, health, housing, or welfare compared to the optimal value that maximizes economic growth,” (2012, p. 12) all factors which fit conceptually with how I define administrative or administrative capacity. By understanding which sectoral resources governments are over- or under-allocating allows us to understand how states develop and proceed on a path to prosperity. I expect an increase in any of the measures of administrative capacity results in the hypothesized decrease in terrorist attacks in a given year. Administrative capacity inhibits contention against the state by allowing for the dispersion of resources and the collection of information.

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16 See Appendix D for further discussion of the RPR measure.
17 See Appendix D for further discussion of the RPA measure.
18 See Appendix D for further discussion of the Relative Political Capacity dataset.
In addition to these measures, I include an interaction term to account for the fact the combination of both aspects of capacity impacts terrorist activity in the state. The interaction term is included for the military capacity measure and each of the three measures of administrative capacity in appropriate models. As hypothesized, the increased ability of the state to act both bureaucratically and militarily against perceived threats to its authority is expected to increase terrorist attacks in a given country-year. As the bureaucratic and military capacity of the state rise, extremist groups that seek to challenge the status quo turn to terrorism more often to achieve their goals.

**State Behavior Factors: Democracy, Control and Clientelism**

To better understand the institutions of the state, both for engaging citizens in the political process as well as being used as an instrument of repression against those opposed to the status quo, I also examine four other factors: population density, democratic institutions, political repression, and clientelistic behavior by those in the state apparatus. First, to assess the relationship between sparsely populated territory and more terrorist activity in the form of terrorist attacks, I use a measure of Population Density or people per square kilometer of land area to consider the cleavage that exists between governing those in the population centers of the state versus the peripheral regions. Data for this measure comes from the World Bank. I expect a decrease in population density to result in an increase in the number of terrorist attacks.

Second, to account for the effect of democracy on terrorism in the developing world, I use a measure from the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016). The Participation in Democracy Index measures the extent to which participatory democracy is achieved in a given state. This includes participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral and also accounts for the level of electoral democracy. The model
emphasizes participation in civil organizations, direct democracy, participation in elected
government, and the level of electoral democracy (ibid).

Third, to understand the use of force by the state in a different manner I use the Political
Terror Scale to account for Repression. I chose to use the scale developed by Gibney et al.
(2016) for the annual reports on human rights practices published by the US State Department as this is the most complete measure covering the period of interest. The scale ranks each country on its experiences of political violence and terror in a particular year on a five-level scale where a ‘1’ indicates a secure rule of law and political murders are extremely rare whereas a ‘5’ indicates no limits on the means used by governments to pursue personal or ideological goals. I recode this scale run from 0 to 4. Coding of the measure ignores violence by non-state actors and focuses on measuring levels of violence by the state, ensuring the level of political violence being captured in this measure is not including violence by terrorist organizations. The measure essentially captures terror by the state and not by terrorists. I expect an increase in this measure results in an increase in terrorism by non-state actors in a given country-year.

The last measure included other than the controls is an index measure for Political Corruption that serves as a proxy for the concept of clientelism and its effect on terrorist activity. This index accounts for types of corruption which inhibit the state’s ability to perform its duties (McMann et al. 2015). The index is created by aggregating measures and taking the average on public sector corruption (a combination of public sector bribery and embezzlement), executive corruption (a combination of executive bribery and embezzlement), legislative corruption, and judicial corruption.\textsuperscript{19} I expect an increase in the corruption measure, again serving as a proxy for clientelism in the state apparatus, to result in a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks in a

\textsuperscript{19} See Appendix D for further discussion of the Corruption measure.
given country-year. If the state offers clientelistic rewards to those discontent with the regime, this may actually decrease terrorist activity.

Controls

Finally, control variables employed by others in the study of state capacity and terrorism (Hendrix and Young 2014; Piazza 2011; Choi 2010) are included. First, \textit{Log GDP per capita} examines an income-based grievance effect when considering terrorist attacks in a given country. Second, I control for whether the state is a military regime by using a dichotomous variable on whether the chief executive is a military officer in a given country-year. The variable is coded as ‘0’ if the leader formally retired or never held military rank prior to entering office and ‘1’ if chief executives are officers with no indication of formally retiring their rank (and are listed as officers for the duration of their term) (Beck et al. 2001). Third, I use a measure of major conflicts in a state from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). I recoded the intensity variable from the dataset so ‘1’ indicates what the dataset defines as ‘war’ or at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year and ‘0’ if the conflict is less than 1,000 battle-related deaths or there is no conflict in a given year. I recode this variable to account only for major conflicts going on in the state in a given country-year. Fourth, I include the land area of the state to account for territorial variation between the states in consideration. Finally, the count of terrorist attacks is also included as a lagged independent variable (by one year and two years in separate sets of models) to ameliorate the potential for reverse causality and to account for whether terrorist activity in the prior year influences the likelihood of terrorism in the following year.

Given that the dependent variable for this analysis is a count variable, I use the zero-inflated negative binomial regression technique. As noted in other studies where terrorist
incidents serve as the dependent variable, there are several reasons to use this method over ordinary least squares, Poisson regression, or non-inflated negative binomial techniques. As Piazza (2011) explains, a count of terrorist incidents in a state in a given year cannot be negative, incidents of terrorism are unevenly dispersed and clustered in given countries, and there are years where some countries do not experience any terrorist activity at all. The zero values can be divided into two distinct types.

**Results of State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World**

To understand the relationships between the aforementioned variables I provide several models for analysis, based in general on the following equation:

\[
\text{Terrorism (t)} = \text{Terrorism (t-2)} + \text{Military Capacity} + \text{Administrative Capacity} + \text{Mil*Bur Capacity} + \text{Phone Service} + \text{Population Density} + \text{Democratic Institutions} + \text{Political Repression} + \text{Political Corruption} + \text{Controls}
\]

As previously noted, I test multiple measures of administrative capacity composed of various elements of what can be defined as the administrative capacity of the state, from rule of law to infrastructure. The first three models (Public Administration, RPA, and RPR respectively) include the basic models without controls and provide a base line look at the different measures of state capacity. The second set of three models include the basic models as well as the interaction measure between military and administrative capacity. The third set of models discussed include the control variables and the last set of models include regional dummies as a robustness check. These first twelve models are tested with a one-year lag of the count of terrorist attacks. I then repeat this exercise with all twelve models substituting a two-year lag and will briefly discuss those findings as well. Discussion of all results is focused on the non-certain zero count models as part of the zero-inflated negative binomial analysis. Figures for the one-
year lag are provided in the text of this chapter, those for the two-year lag appear the end of the chapter, and the full regression tables are available in Appendix B.

First, the results of the baseline models without controls, interaction terms, or regional dummies find a few variables that are significant no matter which measure of administrative capacity is included. Military capacity and repression are significant in all three base models and have positive coefficients, suggesting increases in military capacity and repressive actions by the state do result in an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in a given country-year. In short, as the state’s military ability is turned against non-state actors, extrajudicial killings occur, and civilians are arrested and detained or brutalized by the state’s forces, these non-state actors become more violent.

20 If the confidence interval line crosses the zero (dotted) line, the results are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, the zero-inflated method is not compatible with the clarify module so this figure is created running the data as a negative binomial instead. The regression results are similar and the same variables are significant at the 0.1 level.
In these base line models, participation in democracy is the only other explanatory factor which appears to be significant across all three base line models. The democracy measure interestingly is also significant in the positive direction, suggesting as states in the African and Southeast Asian regions become more democratic, they also face more terrorist violence. In two of the three models the proxy for infrastructure, phone service, is significant and in the negative direction suggesting an increase in the phone service measure results in a decrease in the number of attacks.

Corruption is significant in the third baseline model and in the negative direction, suggesting an increase in this measure leads to a decrease in terrorist incidents. In short as hypothesized, repression and growth in military capacity lead to increases in terrorism. Also as hypothesized more democratic practices do not necessarily lead to more harmony in a state and providing non-violent outlets for political discontent does not guarantee a reduction in terrorist attacks while the proxies for infrastructural development and corrupt behavior by the state does show an inverse relationship with terrorism. The puzzle of more democratic institutions leading to higher rates of terrorist activity is discussed further at the end of this chapter. The lagged measure of terrorist attacks is significant in all three models and exhibits a positive relationship. When the two-year lag is included in these baseline models in Figures 4.16-4.18 public administration remains significant but RPA and RPR do not. The democracy and repression measures are consistent in the two-year models as well and corruption is significant in two of the three models.

The second set of models include the interaction between military and administrative capacity. The results are more or less in line with the previous set of models. Again, military
capacity, repression, and participation in democracy are significant and in the positive direction while phone service is significant in the negative direction.

The public administration measure is significant and consistently in the positive direction in one model while corruption, the proxy for clientelism, remains significant in the negative direction in the RPA model as well. None of the other measures, including the interactions, are significant other than the lagged count measure. In the two-year lag models the findings remain consistent as well.

The third set of models includes the full model plus control variables. Repression and the democracy measure remains consistent and in the same expected direction across all three models. Military capacity does as well in two of the three models. As for the measures of
administrative capacity, they are significant in two of the three models (Public Administration and RPA) but not in the hypothesized direction. An increase in either measure of administrative capacity also results in an increase in the number of terrorist attacks as well. Both major components of state capacity, structural and behavioral, demonstrate a positive relationship with the growth of terrorism in these regions.

As for the interaction terms between those components, the interaction is only significant in the RPA model and in the negative direction. Phone Service is not significant in any of these models but corruption is in the latter two. For controls, only GDP is significant in all three models while the measure on the presence of a major conflict is in one model. An increase in GDP suppresses terrorist attacks across all three models which is consistent with much of the
literature. The major conflict measure is significant in the positive direction in the RPA model. The lagged variable for terrorist attacks is significant as well. As for the two-year lag models the results are similar though some of the measures lose their significance in some models though no other measures are found to be significant in Figures 4.22-4.24 that were not significant in one-year lag models.

Finally, I include a few last models that provide insight into the significance of each region of interest as a robustness check. These final models include each region as a dummy with the North Africa dummy omitted in all three models as Chapters Five and Six focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia respectively. Across these models military capacity and the democracy measures are significant and consistently in the positive direction in two of the three
models as is the Administrative Capacity measure (Public Administration and RPA). The interaction term between Military and Administrative Capacity are significant in the first two models of this group while corruption is in the second two and both the interaction term and corruption are significant in the negative direction. Finally in terms of controls the measure on GDP is consistently significant in the negative direction and the presence of major conflict is in the positive direction. None of the regional dummies is significant in the one-year lag models. In the two-year lag models the results are consistent in the same directions of significance as well, though a few measures become insignificant depending the models presented in Figures 4.25-4.27. The only measure that becomes significant with a two-year lag is the land area measure in the RPA model and suggesting an increase in the size of the state’s territory results in an increase in the number of terrorist attacks, though this is the only model where this is the case in terms of significance. In terms of the other controls chief executive being a military officer is not significant in any model. Nor is the proposed explanatory variable population density.

Capacity and the State in Summary

The previously discussed models offer a variety of points worth discussing in terms of the effect of varying factors of state capacity and state behavior and their impact on the number of terrorist attacks across the African continent and the countries of Southeast Asia. The results provide some insightful results that support some of my hypotheses but contradict others, namely the effects of increases in measures of administrative capacity. The hypothesis as the state’s military capability increases, terrorism increases, has statistically significant support across all of the models: military capacity’s growth can drive up the number of terrorist attacks. Similarly, increases in the repression variable offer support for the hypothesis states that are more repressive experience more terrorism. These two concepts logically go together and suggest
states in Africa and Southeast Asia becoming more militarily capable or more repressive against their citizens can drive members of the state to radicalization and engagement in violence against the state.\textsuperscript{21}

Meanwhile, the analysis does not offer clear support for the hypothesized relationships between bureaucracy and terrorism in the developing world. In fact, these results directly contradict two of the hypotheses presented in Chapter Three. In the case of administrative capacity when Public Administration, Relative Political Allocation, or Relative Political Reach are significant they have positive coefficients. In short increases in any of these proxies for administrative capacity lead to a rise in the number of terrorist attacks. In contrast though the phone service variable (serving as a proxy for infrastructural development in the state) does appear to be significant as a measure of administrative capacity in a few of the models in this analysis, suggesting this measure of infrastructural development results in a reduction in the number of the attacks, supporting the logic of the theory that the expansion of the state via infrastructure does impact terrorist activity. Thus, I have minimal or no clear support for the hypothesis \textit{as the state’s administrative capacity increases, terrorism decreases.} The legal administrative capacity of the state is explored in more detail in Chapters Five and Six and provides some insight into how bureaucratic expansion by the state in some places leads to fear of misuse of the state’s authority and repression of those opposed to the state in various ways.

In the case of the hypothesis \textit{as states increase their resources militarily and bureaucratically, terrorist attacks increase}, a few models find the interaction term between the military and administrative capacity measures as a significant factor. The relationship when this measure is significant is in the negative direction. In other words an increase in the interaction

\begin{footnote}{\textsuperscript{21} As noted in Chapter Two, indiscriminate violence by the state has been found to increase terrorist violence in some cases (Kalyvas 2006; Gilli & Gilli 2014), including against civilians (Wood 2010).}\end{footnote}
term between military and administrative capacity demonstrates a suppressing effect on the number of terrorist attacks. The combination of military and administrative capabilities together appears to better explain how the state denies terrorist groups opportunities to attack the state or provides alternative outlets for the discontent actors to utilize as opposed to the taking of life through asymmetric acts. The observed relationship requires further investigation to identify clearer support and is explored further in Chapters Five and Six as I investigate how bureaucratic components of the state’s legal system provide the state’s security apparatus with structures to identify and counter terrorist threats to the state and the civilian population.

On the subject of democracy and terrorism however, the findings are consistently significant but not in the hypothesized direction and the hypothesis that more democratic regimes where citizens participate in institutions reduce terrorism does not appear to be the case. This contradiction requires further investigation and will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six as well as I investigate administrative bureaucracy at the individual state levels in four Sub-Saharan Africa and four Southeast Asian nation-states. When considering the relationship between repression by the state and terrorism it suggests that transitioning democracies, not fully Westernized in the sense of the rights and liberties of citizens, fully democratic institutions, and checks on the power of the executive, suffer from upticks in political violence such as terrorist activity. As the institutions of democracy develop over time and states maintain democratic stability for an extended period this may offer some explanation as to why this particular measure of democracy has a positive relationship with the number of terrorist incidents in Africa and Southeast Asia during the observed time period.

There is no support in this analysis for the hypothesis states with low population density will experience more terrorism which suggests no strong relationship between terrorism
Finally the corruption variable appears as significant in several models and in the hypothesized direction. The hypothesized relationship corruption actually decreases terrorist activity is supported by the results of that model. Teets and Chenoweth (2009) also find an indirect relationship exists between corruption and terrorism. Groups benefit from corrupt practices financially. Tuastad’s (2010) study of clientelistic practices in Palestine discussed in Chapter Two also aligns with this finding. However, this final hypothesis certainly deserves further consideration as the literature on how corruption impacts terrorism as a form of political violence is scarce and contradictory in some cases.22

**A Note on State Capacity, Terrorism, and Endogeneity**

Clearly several of the explanatory variables identified in this chapter are significant and suggest an existing relationship between terrorism and state capacity. Yet there is reason to consider endogeneity and the potential that the relationship is actually the reverse of that which is hypothesized in Chapter Three. The following section briefly addresses how others have noted this concern in similar research on terrorism and state capacity and offers several future options that could be introduced into the models presented here to consider endogeneity in this design.

To account for potential endogeneity issues between terrorism and macroeconomic variables Arin (2016) lags all independent variables in her model (Footnote #3 p. 1114). Brockhoff (2015) uses a two-step Hausman-type procedure to control for endogeneity in modeling the relationship between education and terrorism. The first stage regresses the education variable on a set of exogenous controls and stores the residuals which are then

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22 As noted in Chapter Two, there are two potential explanations for the relationship between terrorism and corruption in the literature. The motivational explanation whereby terrorists attack corrupt governments to exploit public distrust in the system and selling themselves as the viable alternative to a corrupt status quo (Teets and Chenoweth 2009; Felbab-Brown 2010) and the facilitation explanation whereby corruption creates opportunities for groups to benefit from reduced operating costs due to a lack of or weak rule of law.
included in the second stage count model where any significant residuals indicate endogeneity is present. Brockhoff finds no significant residuals however and thus concludes education, as a concept of administrative capacity, is not endogenous to terrorism (p. 1205).

Dreher (2010) uses a two-stage least squares estimate because of the lagged dependent variable for terrorism that can lead to dynamic panel bias. Therefore Dreher includes a generalized method of moments estimator and treats the lagged dependent variable and terrorism measures as endogenous, including time dummies in the regressions and using several tests for autocorrelation to account for this complication (p. 75) but the employment of these correction models does not change the primary findings and the Sargan-Hansen and Arellano-Bond tests are argued as evidence that endogeneity is not an issue in their design (p. 81-82).

Hendrix and Young (2014) in their study of the relationship between military capacity and terrorism control for the presence of domestic armed conflict using a measure of armed conflict intensity that differentiates between low-level conflicts and those with 1,000 or more battle deaths to “mitigate concerns about the endogeneity of military capacity to expectations about facing armed resistance—that is, states that expect to fight insurgents/dissidents will invest in more military capacity” (p. 346). They go on to note however that if endogeneity were significant they would expect to see the level of and changes in past political violence” would be correlated with changes in measuring state capacity (p. 352).

To address this potential issue of reverse causality Hendrix and Young (2014) estimate the effect of terror attacks on changes in measures of state capacity using error correction models. They argue “if reverse causality accounts for the observed correlations, then past terror attacks should be a significant determinant of present levels of state capacity” so if endogeneity is an issue past terror attacks cause the buildup of military and administrative capacity as a result
of the violent threat (p. 352). The results of the error correction models “do not lend strong support to the conjecture that either the number of past attacks or changes in the frequency of attacks are strong determinants of current levels of bureaucratic and military capacity and are insignificant across several specifications.”

In further discussion after correcting for this potential issue Hendrix and Young do find the change in conflict intensity is negatively associated with administrative capacity which suggests some reasonable concern that state capacity might be endogenous to armed conflict” but do find “terror attacks do not, in the main, drive either the expert assessments of bureaucratic/administrative capacity or military capacity” (p. 354). Thus controlling for large-scale forms of political violence, as done in all models in this chapter, is one consideration for accounting for endogeneity when studying the relationship between state capacity and terrorism among others that should be implemented in future studies. For the purposes of this dissertation though I use case study analysis of two regions to trace the chronology of developments in state capacity and the subsequent terrorist activity across the African continent and in Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

In short, the results of the cross-national analysis in this chapter find some support for the argument that while the quality of bureaucracy and administration in the state affects terrorism, the relationship is not entirely in line with the theory presented in Chapter Three and requires further consideration in the next chapters. In contrast, military capacity as well as repression are strong explanatory factors for increases in terrorist activity and consistently lead to higher rates of terrorism as states engage in increased military spending and repressive behaviors against their citizens. The proposed infrastructure proxy, telephone service, is a significant factor in some of the models of state capacity presented here and exhibits the hypothesized relationship.
between infrastructural development and terrorism. The role of democracy and democratic institutions does have what appears to be a clear relationship with terrorist activity and in fact suggests transitioning or more democratic societies in the regions of analysis appear to be more susceptible to terrorism. Other factors such as population density show no clear or significant relationship with terrorist activity. Looking within the state and terrorist activity along porous border regions and how states develop resources and capabilities in response to terrorist movements may offer more understanding of this relationship. Lastly, clientelism as measured via a proxy variable for political corruption and its relationship with terrorism requires more investigation as well but there does appear to be some relationship between corrupt behavior and a decline in terrorist activity.

In Chapters Five and Six I delve deeper into several of the significant relationships identified by the cross-national results on state capacity and terrorism. In particular I focus on four of these factors: bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military capacity, repression, and corruption. Chapter Five provides a more nuanced examination of state capacity in the Sub-Saharan Africa. With porous borders and cultural differences across the continent, a variety of examples can provide a better understanding of the relationship between how the state’s military and bureaucratic abilities interact to counter terrorist threats to the state. However I choose to focus on one particular case, that of Boko Haram which has impacted four particular states in the West Sub-Saharan African region: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. All four are concentrated around the Lake Chad region as is a majority of the activity of Boko Haram which in the last several years transcended international borders in its attacks on civilians and those that represent the states in the region. In Chapter Six I follow a similar pattern of analysis and consider the case of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and others affecting four geographically-
concentrated states in the region: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. All four of these nation-states are situated across multiple islands and experience far different challenges with state capacity in terms of terrorists traveling between territories. Both chapters consider the period when each respective group of states began to face the challenge of countering terrorist movements in their territory and how each state responded to improve administrative and military capacity as well as the capacity-compromising issues of repression and clientelism.
Figures 4.15-4.29 Coefficient Plots for Two-Year Lags

Figure 4.15 State Capacity & Terrorism (1985-2012)

- Terr. Attacks (t-2)
- Military Capacity
- Public Administration
- Phone Service
- Part. in Dem.
- Repression
- Corruption
- Population Density
- Land Area

Figure 4.16 State Capacity & Terrorism (1985-2012)

- Terr. Attacks (t-2)
- Military Capacity
- RPA
- Phone Service
- Part. in Dem.
- Repression
- Corruption
- Population Density
- Land Area
Chapter 5: The Case of Boko Haram and Capacity in the Lake Chad Region

Introduction

As noted in Chapter Four, several elements of state capacity impact the frequency of terrorist activity in Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. In this chapter I consider four of those factors: bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military capacity, repression, and clientelistic behavior. From the cross-national analysis we see evidence of how each impacts the number of terrorist attacks in these regions and this chapter provides a more in-depth qualitative analysis of examples of each factor in a specific set of cases in Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter focuses on the case of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization and how state capacity developed in response to the rise of the Boko Haram movement in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.

Where Chapter Four examines more broadly how weaknesses in state capacity create opportunities for terrorist movements to develop and challenge the state, Chapters Five and Six examine how those states address weaknesses in bureaucratic and military capacity in response to terrorist activity in the state. The four aforementioned states in West Africa, concentrated around Lake Chad, are chosen to illustrate the development of the identified areas of state capacity in response to the development of an active and widespread terrorist movement over a period of several years. Different policy approaches developed as each state began to confront the challenge of improving areas of weakness in state capacity and can be examined in how each state approached the question of improving state capacity to respond to terrorism.

First, to examine bureaucratic or administrative capacity I consider how state’s developed legal structures to respond to Boko Haram and other terrorist movements in the last decade. Defining terrorism and support of terrorism is highly contentious in several Sub-Saharan states
but is necessary to enhance state capacity in response to groups like Boko Haram. As noted in the previous chapter, the observed relationship at the cross-national level indicated an increase in the proxies for bureaucratic or administrative capacity resulted in an increase in terrorist activity, counterintuitive to the proposed hypothesis in Chapter Three but explored further in these two state-level analytical chapters. The balance between legislative efforts to define terrorism and whether those legislative efforts are perceived as abusive by the state could be an explanation.

Second, the military’s capacity to combat groups using force and how it implements its use of force through different formal and informal bodies requires consideration here as well. Like administrative approaches including defining legal structures for responding to terrorism, states responded to Boko Haram and other terrorist movements by developing new programs. New military units and coordination between police and military institutions in the state enhance state capacity but also have the potential for becoming repressive responses to any challenge to the status quo. The use of informal groups of individuals to police border regions and conduct the duties of the state’s police and military forces similarly raises similar issues for capacity.

Third, another significant factor in state capacity is border security which requires both major elements of military might and administrative capability. Groups such as Boko Haram are able exploit these specific weaknesses in Sub-Saharan states and are able to transcend borders both in their activity as well as in their efforts to elude authorities responding to terrorism. Therefore, building bureaucratic and military capacity at a regional level and through regional organizations provides some insight into the improvements in state capacity across the states involved. As mapping across these sub-regions within the Sub-Saharan case demonstrates, understanding state capacity and terrorism requires analysis transcending state borders and the
interconnecting strengths and weaknesses of states. Therefore in both the bureaucratic and military capacity sections I discuss efforts to improve border security locally and regionally.

The factors noted above are explored in a qualitative approach. First I identified notable policies and issues of capacity discussed in the US State Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism* from 2007 to 2017. I then explore those policies further through additional data from government and international organization reports and local and international media coverage of specific incidents across the region in the last decade. Geo-spatial mapping is also presented to highlights specifically where incidents of terrorism are occurring in each region of interest. After discussing the policies undertaken to improve bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military capacity, and briefly examining regional capacity I conclude with a discussion of the ongoing capacity weaknesses in the region that result in clientelism and repression.

**West Africa: The Rise of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region**

*The Lake Chad Region*

For this chapter I consider four countries surrounding the Lake Chad region: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Figure 5.1 provides a map of the region. All four share colonial pasts. In the 1960s, Chad, Niger, and parts of Cameroon gained independence from France while Nigeria and the rest of Cameroon gained independence from the United Kingdom. Over the next several decades all four experienced issues with weak governance, military rule, transitioning to democracy, refugees, and environmental issues. Most important for consideration in this chapter, each fell victim to terrorist attacks in recent years, particularly incidents involving Boko Haram.

These four states also struggle with the challenges of building and maintaining basic elements of capacity as well as monitoring and benefiting from the extraction and export of various natural resources. Important for these states as well, an extremely large youth population
has proven problematic in terms of creating enough employment opportunities and resources to satisfy growing populations that may otherwise become discontent and question the status quo.

As noted in Table 5.1, the four states vary in some aspects. In terms of population, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger all have between 12 and 25 million citizens. In contrast Nigeria has a population of over 200 million, much larger than any of its neighbors. The total land area of Chad, Niger, and Nigeria is around one million square kilometers whereas Cameroon is less than half that size. Cameroon and Nigeria have much higher percentages of their populations residing in urban areas compared to Chad and Niger where populations are much more dispersed. Both Chad and Niger contain very sparsely populated desert regions to the north as well. These
variations lead to similar challenges for each state, namely governing empty spaces and extensive borders. When considering how each scores on the measure of Institutionalized Democracy in the Polity IV dataset, with a range from 0 to 10 with higher values representing more democratic states, we see variation as well. The Institutionalized Democracy score includes three components: the ability of citizens to express political preferences effectively, the existence of institutionalized constraints on the executive, and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1 West Africa General Demographics (2018 estimates)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime Type</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon: Presidential Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad: Presidential Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger: Semi-Presidential Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria: Federal Presidential Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Population Size</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon: 25,640,965</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad: 15,833,116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger: 19,886,231</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria: 203,452,505</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Area (sq. km)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon: 475,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad: 1,284,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger: 1,267,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria: 923,768</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Land Borders (km)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon: 5,018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad: 6,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger: 5,834</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria: 4,477</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Polity Democracy Score (2017)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger: 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria: 8</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative Divisions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon: 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad: 23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger: 7 (1 capital district)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria: 36 (1 territory)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Urban Population</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon: 56.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad: 23.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger: 16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria: 50.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Military Size (as Percent of GDP, 2016)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon: 1.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad: 2.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger: 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria: 0.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Terrorist Threats</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon: Boko Haram, Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS-West Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad: Boko Haram, Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS-West Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger: Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham networks in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS-West Africa), Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria: Boko Haram, Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS-West Africa)</td>
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</table>

In 2017 measures Cameroon and Chad score very low on the scale at one whereas Niger at six and Nigeria at eight are much more democratic. In summary, the states surrounding Lake Chad have been chosen because they exemplify several of the concepts identified as significant factors in Chapter Four: military capacity and repression as well as administrative capacity and clientelism.

*Terrorism in the Lake Chad Region*

Terrorism in the Lake Chad region today consists predominantly of acts carried out by Boko Haram, an extremist Islamist militant group originating in Nigeria. Several other domestic or home-grown movements in the four countries of interest in the chapter exist as well and are briefly discussed. Figures 5.2 through 5.5 provide the count of incidents in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria between 1985 and 2016, graphed separately due to the drastically higher number of incidents in Nigeria in the last decade during the rise in violence carried out by Boko Haram. Hence the varying scales in the number of attacks for each state. In the case of Cameroon terrorism has been relatively rare outside of a small number of incidents in the early 1990s up until the spread of Boko Haram militants into the country after 2012.
In the cases of Chad and Niger, terrorism has been more frequent than in Cameroon but the number of incidents is still significantly less than that of Nigeria. Prior to the rise of Boko Haram the highest number of incidents in a year in Chad was just over 10 while in Niger it was approximately 15 in the early 1990s. Nigeria though has suffered from terrorism at a much higher rate in the late 2000s, with annual figures climbing to several hundred in recent years.

As a consequence of efforts to improve state capacity, capacity targets are a significant portion of terrorist incidents in the region. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database we can examine...
the aggregate of attacks in Figure 5.6 and see that approximately thirty-five percent of the 3,528 terrorist incidents in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria between 1985 and 2015 fall into categories that involve some aspect of military or administrative capacity. These categories include Infrastructure, Government Institutions, Military Institutions, Police, and Education Institutions. Others such as Religious Institutions and Private Citizens and Businesses make up a majority of the rest of the incidents. As the chart demonstrates while private entities and individuals are the majority of those affected by attacks, the institutions of the state that form the basis of a state’s capacity are specifically targeted as well.

Boko Haram

Of all the movements in the West Africa region, Boko Haram has been the greatest threat to the stability of the states analyzed in this chapter. With its origins in the early 2000s as a pro-Islamist movement under cleric Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram grew quickly into a national

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23 The GTD differentiates between several elements of infrastructure that I included under one categorical name. Thus, ‘infrastructure as listed in Figure 5.6 includes the following sub-categories: Airports and Aircraft, Telecommunications, Transportation, and Utilities.

24 The GTD lists Government Institutions as one of two sub-categories, General or Diplomatic, and are combined in Figure 5.6.

25 Private Citizens & Property and Businesses are listed as separate categories in the GTD but are added together for the purposes of Figure 5.6.

26 Approximately 18 percent of the total number of incidents in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria are listed as ‘Unknown’ or ‘Other.’ To the Other category I also added targets designated Maritime, Journalists and Media, NGO’s, [Other]Terrorists and Non-State Militia, Tourists, and Violent Political Parties.
and regional terrorist organization in 2009. In July of that year several hundred followers of
Yusuf’s were killed by Nigerian security forces during a wave of protests against a new
motorcycle helmet law. The protests turned violent between Boko Haram protesters and the
Nigerian security forces in Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, and Kano states and Yusuf himself died while
in police custody (START 2014).

Like many of the post-9/11 terrorist movements, Boko Haram’s ideological goals include
extremist interpretations of the Islamic faith. The group’s overall goal is to establish an Islamic
Nigeria including shari’a criminal courts to replace the state’s secular justice system where
shari’a courts do not currently exist. As a trained Salafist, Yusuf founded the movement to
oppose Western concepts and teachings such as evolution and the Big Bang theory (Sergie and
Johnson 2015). The group’s name colloquially translates to “Western education is sin”
(Blanchard 2016) and primary targets reflect that name. Targets include Westerners in Nigeria,
the secular government, and Muslims that cooperate with those entities.

Immediately after the events in July 2009 the group’s activity declined significantly and
was believed to be past its prime as a movement (START 2014). Just over a year later though the
group, now under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, returned to the forefront of Nigerian
national security concerns. In September 2010 Boko Haram members attacked a prison in the
state of Bauchi and freed 700 prisoners, many supporters of Boko Haram detained in the
previous year. A year later in August 2011 the group claimed responsibility for the bombing of
the headquarters of the United Nations presence in Abuja, the national capital. From then on the
organization increased in violence and succeeded in carrying out attacks across Nigeria. The
violence by Boko Haram militants targeted civilians and non-civilians alike as well as fellow
Muslims who the organization deemed sympathetic or supportive of Western-style government
(START 2014). Not all followers of the movement agreed with the indiscriminate approach and a number of members established a splinter movement, Ansaru, opposed to targeting of Muslim civilians and more focused on targeting only symbols of the West (Kassim 2018). Shekau responded by targeting members of the faction in 2013 and reintegrating some Ansaru members into the fold of Boko Haram while others moved into other extremist groups across the Sahel (Blanchard 2016).

By June 2013 the government of Nigeria came to consider Boko Haram a significant threat to stability. President Goodluck Jonathan soon designated Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organizations and declared the need to increase counterterrorism resources in the state (Blanchard 2016). In response Boko Haram increased its attacks on civilians and the government. In July 2014 the group began to shift its efforts from asymmetric attacks on civilian and government targets to conventional offensive efforts to hold territory in the northeast of Nigeria according to Blanchard. Attention to the growing threat of Boko Haram increased after the abduction of hundreds of schoolgirls from a school in Chibok. The increased violence even led the Jonathan administration to approach the group with ceasefire negotiations in October 2014, rejected by Shekau a month later (START 2014).

Figure 5.7
Incidents by Boko Haram

- Cameroon: 7%
- Chad: 2%
- Niger: 2%
- Nigeria: 89%
Violence by the movement continued to rise and an attack on a multinational military base and villages around the town of Baga left nearly 2,000 dead over a several month period (Blanchard 2016). Soon thereafter Boko Haram began to strike at targets outside of Nigerian territory, first in Chad in February 2015. Boko Haram responded to Chadian military support in Nigeria with attacks in Chad’s capital, N’Djamena. Attacks in Cameroon and Niger occurred soon thereafter. The challenges of dealing with thousands of displaced Nigerians flooding across international borders to seek refuge in neighboring areas quickly increased. As noted by Blanchard, by 2016 the violence displaced 2.8 million in the Lake Chad region and 5.6 million required food aid. Boko Haram also pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015, believed by experts to be an effort to bring more international attention to their cause as well as the financial resources of the transnational Islamic State movement (Kassim 2018).

Between the rise of Boko Haram as a violent movement in 2009 and 2015 the organization has been identified as responsible for 1,839 terrorist incidents in the Global Terrorism Database in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. A breakdown of where these attacks
occurred in Figure 5.7 shows the overwhelmingly majority of incidents are in the northeastern territory of Nigeria. As noted in Figure 5.7, the count of incidents by Boko Haram in Nigeria (1,642) still far outpaces the number of Boko-Haram-attributed incidents in Cameroon (128), Niger (40), and Chad (29). In short, while Boko Haram has in recent years increased its activities to include neighboring states, 89 percent of attacks by the organization occurred within Nigerian territory.

Since 2015 efforts by the new Buhari administration as well as by Cameroonian, Chadian, and Nigerien forces led to a reversal of territorial gains made by Boko Haram and a notable decline in Boko Haram activity as shown in Figure 5.4. Yet militants maintain the ability to travel freely through a region that stretches from the Diffa state in southern Niger to the northern reaches of Cameroon and across the border into the area surrounding Lake Chad (Blanchard 2016). The map in Figure 5.8 shows all incidents attributed to Boko Haram by the GTD up to 2015.

Beyond Boko Haram

Boko Haram, while the most significant terrorist movement to security in the Lake Chad region, has not been the only movement to threaten stability in the four countries considered in this chapter. Figure 5.9 provides a map of where incidents by groups other than Boko Haram.

The most well-known of these movements, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an organization that formed as a merger of the former Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and the transnational al-Qaeda movement in the mid-2000s.

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This includes a number of incidents categorized as 'Other' or 'Unknown' perpetrators by researchers for the Global Terrorism Database. They are still important to note because even without a designated perpetrator by the GTD researchers, these incidents of terrorism still occurred within the states of interest.
AQIM activity occurs mostly in countries outside of the Lake Chad region, particularly Algeria and Mali, but the group claimed responsibility or has been identified as the perpetrator by the GTD in several incidents in and Niger and Nigeria. AQIM’s most notable attack occurred in 2007 with the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Algiers but more recently the movement shifted focus to the Sahara-Sahel region due to improved counterterrorism efforts in Algeria and weak governance in southern Algeria and the surrounding states (Thornberry and Levy 2011). The group also spawned several splinter organizations active in the region that have carried out isolated attacks in Chad and Niger, including al Murabitoun (“The Sentinels”), al Mulathamun (“The Masked Ones”) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (CRS 2017).

Other notable movements include the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the New Delta Avengers, active predominantly in Nigeria and, to a small degree, Niger. MEND’s origins date back to 2006 when the group claimed responsibility for an attack on foreign oil workers, the group’s preferred target (Hanson 2007). Unlike terrorist movements such as Boko Haram and AQIM, MEND’s activities in the region have been gauged toward
environmental causes. Active in the oil-rich Niger Delta, MEND militants seek to disrupt Nigeria’s oil refineries, a major factor in the Nigerian economy. The combination of environmental degradation and federally-directed revenue sharing from oil profits not reaching the 30 million residents of the Delta due to clientelism and wasteful spending led to the rise of the MEND movement (Hanson 2007), starting first as a series of armed groups supplied by local politicians used to rig local elections but later to demand increased benefits from oil revenue to improve roads, schools, hospitals, and basic utilities in the Delta (Duffield 2010). MEND came to serve as an umbrella organization or “loose web of armed groups” (Duffield 2010), organized at the village or clan level. Sub-groups include the Ijaw Youth Council, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Niger Delta Vigilantes (Hanson 2007).

MEND remained active until 2009 when the group agreed to a ceasefire with the federal government as well as amnesty and job training for its members. In 2017 though old tensions returned and a new generation of militants formed in the Delta, calling themselves the New Delta Avengers. The Avengers have been responsible for a series of attacks on Nigeria’s oil production facilities in response to continued clientelism and corrupt behavior in the region. In a statement by the group, the Avengers declared a resurrection of “the spirit of insurgency to demand a better deal for our people…through bloody attacks and destruction of oil assets in the creeks and upland areas so as to disrupt and eventually cripple oil prospecting and production operations in the state” (Owolabi 2017). Their main grievance is with the governor of Delta state, Ifeanyi Okowa, who they accuse of misusing oil revenue. The group’s tactics have proven effective, resulting in a reduction in Nigerian oil production of nearly thirty percent and impacting the national economy according to Owolabi.
A final movement of significance to briefly consider is the Fulani militants, active in Nigeria and Niger respectively.\textsuperscript{28} Fulani cattle herders in the northern regions of Nigeria, believed to be the largest semi-nomadic group in the world and spread across territory from Senegal to the Central African Republic committed numerous terrorist incidents dating back two decades (Mikailu 2016). In 2014 the Fulani militants killed approximately 1,200 in the region, making them one of the deadliest groups in the world (IEP 2015). The militants primarily carry out acts of violence in response to disagreements over farmland, grazing areas, and access to sources of potable water for their herds. Underlying tensions between the predominantly nomadic Muslim Fulani herders and established Christian farming communities have also been a factor (Mikailu 2016).

**Capacity in the Lake Chad Region**

In response to the Boko Haram movement and other terrorist threats to their states, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria attempted various policies to improve capacity. As noted in Chapter Four, military capacity, measured through a general accounting of the strength of a state’s military force, and administrative capacity, measured through a series of proxies that account for both infrastructural and rule of law-driven concepts, are the primary focus of the analysis. In addition I consider how weaknesses in these two areas lead to factors such as repression and corruption impacting the prevalence of terrorist movements in a state.

The following section focuses first on administrative capacity and considers significant legislative acts which give states the ability to distinguish terrorism from other criminal acts. I also consider how those bureaucratic measures meet criticism due to the broad powers granted to executive institutions across the Lake Chad region. I also consider informal approaches that

\textsuperscript{28} Various other terrorist groups identified in the GTD exist but perpetrated in most cases less than ten attacks in the time period under consideration.
exemplify the attempts at improving administrative capacity such as relationships with religious organization in the state as well. Second, I turn to military reorganization, the establishment of anti-terror units, and cooperation with citizens living on the front lines of the fight against Boko Haram to illustrate how military capacity improves to respond to terrorism in the state. Regional efforts also support these bureaucratic and military efforts are a third area of consideration. I conclude this section with a brief discussion of weaknesses in bureaucratic and military capacity in each state, particularly repressive behavior and corrupt practices.

**Bureaucratic Measures against Terrorism**

To consider how the states responded to the weaknesses in capacity exposed by terrorism in the region from an administrative perspective, I consider two general areas. All four states passed legislation in the last decade to establish definitions of terrorism as well as systematic approaches to charging individuals with criminal acts for carrying out terrorist attacks or providing support for terrorists or terrorist organizations. Prior to the presence of Boko Haram none of the four states have clear standards for handling terrorism from an administrative perspective. Another effort taken by some of the Lake Chad states consists of creating relationships with religious leaders, particularly Islamic figures in the Lake Chad region, to coordinate on information sharing between religious communities and the state. Both policy approaches that illustrate the administrative capacity measure of state capacity vary across the four states and are impacted by how the state utilizes these capabilities which can lead to charges of repression and corrupt behavior among elites that hinders the state’s capacity to respond to terrorism and other issues. I consider the weaknesses of these bureaucratic approaches, particularly the impact of political corruption and abuse of these new laws to repress political opponents and minority groups in a later section.
**Legal Capacity: Legislating against Terrorism in the Lake Chad Region**

**Legal Efforts in Nigeria and Niger**

Nigeria, dealing with Boko Haram since 2009, and Niger, dealing with porous borders and terrorists and other militants from neighboring Algeria, Libya, and Mali, took the first steps in 2011 to establish legislation defining certain criminal activity as terrorism or support of terrorist organizations in order to improve the state’s administrative capacity in routinizing the response to terrorist incidents in the states’ legal systems. Niger’s legislature passed Law 2011-11 in January of that year to establish a special chamber within the Court of Appeals’ to investigate, prosecute, and punish acts of terrorism (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013, p. 23). The new legal framework has allowed the state to process more cases of terrorism through the judicial unit with 230 cases involving terrorism suspects, including 11 women and 25 children, in approximately sixty days (UNODC 2017; UN Volunteers 2017). More staff are needed to account for the increasing numbers of individuals arrested for terrorism charges however. Approximately 1,500 individuals in 2017, including women, children, and those with mental disabilities were in detention and not provided with legal defense services. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has worked with Niger though to train lawyers to provide legal assistance to detainees, and provide information about international terrorism legal structures (UNODC 2014) but backlogs in the system continue. While Niger’s capacity to process terrorists through its legal system improved with the introduction of this legislation, specific resources such as staff are still needed to further improve capacity.

To Niger’s south, the Nigerian National Assembly passed the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) of 2011 and President Jonathan signed the bill into law in June of that year. The 2011 act, amended in 2013, provides a legal framework for the Nigerian state to identify, charge, and
prosecute terrorists as well as those who provide various forms of support for terrorist organizations (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013). Terrorist acts under the TPA are those in which serious harm or damage to a country or international organization is expected with the intention of:

“compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; seriously intimidate a population; destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or international organization; or otherwise influence such government or international organizations by intimidation or coercion” (Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011).

In addition, the TPA includes terrorist acts are those that inflict harm to people or involve kidnapping, the destruction of a “public facility, a transport system; an infrastructure facility, including an information system; a public place or private property” (TPA 2011) and a high likelihood of endangering human life or resulting in economic losses. The hijacking of planes or public transportation, releasing dangerous substances into the environment or disrupting the water supply are other examples included in the TPA. Individuals convicted under the 2011 version of the law faced sentences of up to twenty years (TPA 2011; Goitom 2011). The act goes on to define other elements such as terrorist meetings, support or harboring of terrorists, training terrorists, obstruction of terrorist investigations, terrorist financing and property, jurisdiction for the prosecution of terrorist cases, and interactions with foreign states in pursuing terrorist organizations (TPA 2011). Section 2 of the act also allows the state to designate groups as terrorist organizations. Only a judge with advice from the Attorney General of Nigeria, the National Security Advisor, and the Inspector General of the Nigerian Police Force have the power to declare a group a terrorist organization.

One of the first notable uses of the new anti-terrorism law came with the charging of Senator Ali Mohammed Ndume of Borno state with four counts of violating the TPA of 2011 for
collaborating with a spokesperson of Boko Haram (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013, p. 26). The ability to use this new legislation to identify and charge not only common citizens but also elites within the state for supporting terrorist organizations demonstrates how Nigeria’s administrative capacity to respond to terrorism not only improved with the legislation but that to a degree it allows the state to credibly respond to elites not supporting the state’s battle with Boko Haram.

In February 2013 the Nigerian legislature passed an updated version of the 2011 law. The amendments to the original act allows law enforcement to detain and prosecute terror suspects and establishes criteria for the judiciary to follow when sentencing those found guilty of terrorism. The amended act also added the death penalty as an option for consideration during sentencing (Terrorism Prevention Act 2013; Bureau of Counterterrorism 2014, p. 37).

The law met with vocal opponents soon after it passage in 2011 and again in 2013. The TPA gives the state significant leeway for investigating terrorist suspects and does not include strong oversight mechanisms. If there is “reason to suspect” an offense is being committed, officers are permitted to searches persons or places without warrants and detain or arrest anyone suspected of committing or being about to commit an offense. Law enforcement officers are also given immunity from civil or criminal liability regarding the use of force in the pursuit of terrorist suspects (Goitom 2011). In September 2017 the Nigerian Defense Headquarters faced accusations of acting without authority when they declared the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) to be a militant terrorist organization under the Terrorism Prevention Act. A justice for the Nigerian Federal High Court found the federal government failed to provide evidence for sustaining charges of IPOB being a terrorist organization under the law (Kingsley 2017). Therefore while the TPA illustrates an improvement in Nigeria’s administrative capacity to
respond to terrorism, abuse of the authority granted through the legislation and a lack of oversight could lead to repressive behavior by elites in the state.

**Legal Efforts in Cameroon and Chad**

Despite the passage of these legislative acts in Niger and Nigeria, the threat from Boko Haram continued to spread and by 2014 attacks occurred in neighboring Cameroon and Chad. Both states adopted their own laws to establish their own terrorism-focused legal structures and expand administrative capacity. Cameroon does so with the 2014 Law for the Fight against Terrorism and Chad with Law 034/PR/2015 the following year. Before 2014 Cameroon had not enacted legislation that clearly criminalized terrorism but rectified the issue with a new law that confers the death penalty on those guilty of participating in or supporting acts of terrorism (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2015, p. 16). The law defines terrorism as committing:

“an act likely to cause death, endanger physical integrity, cause bodily injury or material damage, destroy natural resources, the environment, or cultural heritage with the intent to:

- a. Intimidate the public, provoke a situation of terror or face the victim, the government and/or a national or international organization to carry out or refrain from carrying out an act, adopt or renounce a particular position;
- b. Disrupt the national functioning of public services, the delivery of essential services to the public to create a crisis situation among the public;
- c. Create widespread insurrection in the country;
- d. Shall be punished with the death penalty” (Johnson 2014)

The law also designates the financing of acts of terrorism and laundering funds for the purpose of acts of terrorism, recruitment and training, and other special provisions such as remand during prosecution. The law provides the state with bureaucratic tools to target and remove potential threats as well as identify those playing non-combatants roles in terrorist movements and codifies the state’s administrative capacity in responding to terrorism.

The anti-terrorism law however, as is the case in Nigeria, faces criticism within Cameroonian politics. Members of the legislature, political figures, the media, and civil society
groups all expressed concerns with the wording of the law they argue could allow the state to target political opponents and those not providing favorable coverage of the state (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2015). The law as it stands includes wording used to require government approval for journalistic accounts of the state’s battle with Boko Haram and tactics used by the government, (Johnson 2014) inhibiting free speech by the press. The Bureau also notes members of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), one of Cameroon’s political parties, expressed concern that the law could be used to suppress political opposition as well and limit the media’s ability to report on anything that might portray the regime in a negative light. Overly broad provisions in the law, the death sentence for various offenses, allowing authorities to detain those accused of terrorism indefinitely, and trying cases of civilians accused of terrorism in military courts (Quintal and Rozen 2017) are all issues with the law.

Kah Wallah, a leader in the Cameroon People’s Party, noted similar concerns as those made by the SDF. Wallah argued at the time of the consideration of the legislation that “[t]his [anti-terrorism] law is manifestly against the fundamental liberties and rights of the Cameroonian people. In the guise of fighting terrorism, the government’s real intent is to stifle political dissent” (Johnson 2014). In short, the state’s effort to establish the legal authority to come after terrorists and their supporters also opens the door for abuse by the state which then could lead to further dissent among the Cameroonian people and increase support for opposition to the status quo. According to Johnson, the government response to criticism of the legislation noted its similarity to other anti-terror legislation such as the 2001 Patriot Act in the United States. Yet as more recent reporting from Cameroon has shown, the very abuses of the law feared by political opponents of the Biya regime reportedly occur, suggesting this effort to improve administrative capacity instead has increased repressive behavior by the state.
In 2015 the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported on recent cases where Cameroon used the anti-terror law to prosecute journalists reporting on militants and others that have been critical of the Biya administration. In one case, Cameroonian authorities arrested a journalist reporting on Nigerian refugees fleeing to Cameroon after a series of suicide bombings, charging him under the anti-terror law where he spent two years in custody. The court found the journalist guilty of “laundering the proceeds of terrorist acts” by a military tribunal, and sentenced him to ten years in prison (Quintal and Rozen 2017, p. 7). Similarly, the editor of one publication stated they are “not told what the difference is about reporting the facts or acclaiming what is happening and [they] therefore run the risk of contravening the anti-terrorism law” (p. 7).

The CPJ also identified four other cases in which journalists faced charges through the anti-terrorism law and detention until a presidential decree released them in August 2017. Without the decree all four faced a military tribunal and the death penalty (Quintal and Rozen 2017).

Amnesty International also provides examples of how this effort to build the state’s capacity to fight terrorism through the legal system had negative consequences for the people of Cameroon. In a 2017 report on human rights abuses by the Cameroonian state in its battle against Boko Haram, Amnesty documented 101 cases of individuals detained, tortured, and killed by Cameroonian security forces between 2013, the year before passage of the anti-terrorism law, and March 2017. In several reported cases Cameroon arrested individuals using soldiers from the regular army, the Rapid Intervention Battalion, or by unidentified men in civilian clothing. Nearly all faced arrest without a warrant or even a reason provided for their arrest. As one individual interviewed noted, even being related to a suspect of terrorism can lead to arrest by the security forces (Amnesty 2017). The majority of the cases involved Cameroonian men between ages 18 and 45 and from the Far North region that borders southern Nigeria, especially
the Kanuri ethnic group. 32 of the 101 individuals interviewed by Amnesty suggested they witnessed the deaths of others as the result of torture by Cameroonian security forces. In short, capacity to counter terrorism improved but potentially led to a more repressive state apparatus.

Finally, Chad’s Law 034/PR/2015 serves as the most recent effort in the Lake Chad region to establish anti-terror legislation as a way to improve administrative capacity. The Chadian parliament unanimously adopted the law in 2015 and included several measures the state argued would boost its capacity to respond to terrorists. The law itself came in response to two suicide bombings in June of that year in N’Djamena targeting the National Police School and the capital city’s central police station (Boring 2015). The attacks led to the discovery of a Boko Haram safe house and weapons cache in the city (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016, p. 21).

One of the measures taken in Law 034 is the substitution of the death penalty for life imprisonment as the maximum sentence available as an option in terrorism cases (Severin 2015). The death penalty can be prescribed for committing a terrorist act, financing an attack, or recruiting or training individuals to participate in terrorism (“Chad Adopts” 2015). Other policies in Law 034 included new identity cards and passports as well as new policing powers to initiate unannounced searches of individuals at checkpoints on roadways and in public places (Boring 2015). According to Boring, individuals can also be detained up to 15 days as suspicion of terrorist activities and the banning of the burqa is another measure taken by the state in 2015 to prevent the camouflaging of suicide bombers. Therefore like the other examples presented in building legal capabilities in the Lake Chad region, administrative capacity improvements had the unintended consequence of repressive actions by those in power.

Criticisms of the law include the fact that the death penalty is not a deterrent for those expecting to die as part of their actions on behalf of terrorist organizations and a definition of
terrorism that has been argued to be too broad and could allow anything to be called terrorism (Severin 2015). Article 14 of Law 034 defines terrorism as the “intention to disrupt normal functioning of public services and provision of essential goods to the public, or creating a crisis situation among the population as well as inciting a general uprising in the country” (“Chad Adopts” 2015). Like the other states with new anti-terror legislation, reported abuses include executions of innocent individuals charged with terrorism (Severin 2015). The Coordination of Political Parties for the Defense of the Constitution (CPDC) also suggest the law is repressive and CPDC a spokesman for the organization argued at the time that “instead of punishing the acts [of terrorism], it punishes the opinions, yet opinions are protected by the Constitution…[and] it is therefore unconstitutional” (“Chad Adopts” 2015).

In short, all four states enacted laws in the last decade to provide new authorizations and structures to the security and judicial sections of the government to protect citizens from terrorism and improve the capacity of the state. Providing legislative definitions and prescribed punishments for terrorist offenses allows states to improve administrative capacity by more effectively targeting not only those involved in physically carrying out an act of terrorism but also those who provide various forms of support. The state also is able to more efficiently process cases of terrorism through the legal system. The challenge however is for states to not abuse these laws, as alleged in several instances. New bureaucratic tools are sought to improve state capacity but the flipside of this issue is the potential for using those tools for repression.

*Semi-Formal Bureaucratic Measures: Working with Religious Leaders*

Two of the states in the Lake Chad region also implemented semi-formal measures to connect with representatives of the religious communities that illustrate attempts to improve administrative capacity. Cameroon and Chad enforce several policies to target religious
extremism in the state as well as coordinate and communicate with Muslim clerics and cultural figures. Cameroon’s constitution provides for a secular government and prohibits discrimination based on religion as well as the right to practice a religion and worship. The government of Cameroon however does require religious groups or institutions to seek approval to operate as a group. The state does not impose penalties on those without official recognition but does reserve the right to suspend activities of unregistered groups (Bureau of Democracy 2016a). Similarly, Chad also enacted regulations to govern the establishment of religious associations which by law must register with the Minister of Territorial Planning, Urban Development, and Housing. Associations applying are also required to provide a list of all founding members of the organization, various documentation, and submit to background checks. Failure to apply to be a registered religious association in Chad can lead to bans, fines, and even imprisonment.

Other measures seek to govern particular aspects of religious behavior in the name of improving the state’s administrative capabilities to monitor and limit potential extremism in the population. Cameroon implemented a ban on full-face Islamic veils in the Far North region after a series of terrorist attacks in 2015 but never actually enforced the ban according to the report. Another tactic by the Cameroonian government to combat terrorist groups such as Boko Haram in their recruitment efforts is working with the Council of Imams and Religious Dignitaries of Cameroon to train Muslim clerics and cultural figures from the Far North region in communication technology and information sharing. The program coordinates with individuals interacting with susceptible groups in the population and alert security forces to suspicious activity or individuals they believe are potential recruits of Boko Haram (AOAV 2016).

One individual who participated in the program, Mudibo Alidou, represents a mosque that serves an area straddling the Nigeria-Cameroon border and praised the program. He argued
to his fellow religious figures they “do not have weapons but [they] have a duty to inform the military and Cameroon officials of any suspected visitors in [their] localities” (Kindzeka 2015). Bureaucratic measures such as these programs with the religious communities are meant to build the state’s ability to collect information on potential sources of strife and identify those sympathetic to Boko Haram’s cause. Yet as can be said for the various laws passed in the Lake Chad states to address who is and is not a terrorist, abuse of the programs that require the support of Cameroon’s and Chad’s religious communities could result in a backlash and lead to claims of repression by the state.

Military Capacity Measures against Terrorism

In terms of military capacity, states in the Lake Chad region implemented a combination of policing and military forces in the wake of Boko Haram’s growth across the area. Regional and national level police forces are used in conjunction with specialized units of the state military to maintain border security, identify potential terrorists, and respond after attacks by Boko Haram and other militants. All four states also developed informal arrangements with groups of citizens to combat terrorism in the region as well.

Anti-Terrorism Units in Nigeria and Cameroon

As the heart of the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria implemented the earliest policy changes to improve state capacity and its ability to identify and subdue supporters of Boko Haram after its development as a terrorist group in 2009. Nigeria’s constitution establishes a national police force that operates in all regions of the country but also allows for the creation of additional branches to work alongside the armed forces to protect “harbors, waterways, railways, and airfields” and other elements of the state’s infrastructure (Pike 1998). The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) currently consists of approximately 350,000 men and women who serve as federal
officers for all 36 states and the federal capital territory of Abuja. A presidentially-appointed inspector general and several deputies oversee police operations, including a department responsible for “countersubversive activities” (Dept. of Justice 2013).

While the NPF is the only constitutionally-authorized police force in Nigeria, a separate policing force does exist in the twelve northern states of Nigeria that are governed by Shari’a law, and is a source of tension within the state that could be seen as diminishing military capacity. Shari’a law is compulsory for Muslims in these regions and optional for non-Muslims though some reports have suggested the Hisbah Police or Shari’a police in Kano state have attempted to apply Shari’a law to non-Muslim populations in the area (Shuaibu 2008). The Hisbah are local men led by traditional leaders armed with various weapons other than firearms (Jamestown 2008). The Hisbah often investigate crimes, detain suspects, and hand them over to the NPF though they have also been accused of carrying out summary executions (Adamu 2008).

Clientelism and improper actions by the NPF and the Hisbah police damages credibility with the citizens of Nigeria. NPF officers on occasion exceed their constitutional mandate in administering justice and commit other violations. A sample of policing issues include:

- Armed officers demanding bribes and extorting money.
- Embezzlement of public money by high-level officials.
- A “return” system where the rank-and-file share extortion money with those higher up the chain of command.
- Physical and sexual assault, torture, and extrajudicial killings of those detained by the NPF.
- Mass arrests of individuals in public places without cause (HRW 2010).

While there is some support for a constitutional amendment to allow for state-level, locally-organized police forces given that Nigeria is one of the only states to rely solely on a federal-level law enforcement structure, others have opposed the establishment of regional forces they fear would be abused by state governors (“A State of Emergency” 2018).
Nigeria also instituted a state of emergency in response to the growing threat and inability of Nigeria’s police and military forces to end the insurgency. In May 2013 President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states due to the violence carried out by Boko Haram militants, extending a previous state of emergency from the previous year (Ross 2013; Associated Press 2013; Campbell 2013). During previous states of emergency, governors in Nigeria have been removed from office but in this instance the president ordered the governors of the three northeastern states stay in place to maintain the constitutionally-elected offices and quell criticism from the opposition (Campbell 2013). Jonathan renewed the order in November 2013 and again in May 2014. Under the first state of emergency Jonathan also ordered the establishment of the joint task force (JTF) between the military and police.

In August 2013 Nigeria also re-organized units of the state’s military to improve the response to Boko Haram. The Nigerian military established the 7th army division in August 2013 with the goal of providing additional security to the three northeastern Nigerian states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The division’s headquarters is based in the city of Maidugri in the region (Nigerian Army 2016a). After President Buhari took office he ordered a new command center be established as a “forward command base” for the military, arguing the war against Boko Haram could not be won from the nation’s capital, Abuja (DeCapua 2015). The establishment of the Maiduguri command did not end attacks on civilians and the military by Boko Haram forces. The burning of villages in the northeastern states, attacks on army convoys, and the burning of military bases by gunmen all occurred after the standing up of the seventh division (Adamczyk 2017). A third army division was later established in Adamawa state to provide additional support and is headquartered in Jos. (Nigerian Army 2016b). Troops from the third division patrol the northeastern border areas against Boko Haram as well as settling armed
disputes between local communities including herdsmen. The establishment of local security forces and improving coordination between the state’s military and policing operations are indicators of improvements in military capacity, corrupt behavior among elites in the police force and military weakens capacity.

In the case of Cameroon, despite terrorist threats across the country’s Far North region, no specialized border police officers existed prior to the spread of Boko Haram into its territory. Instead border units drew forces from Cameroon’s general police force (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2014). By 2016 the state had recruited new border security officers with specific assignments to the country’s borders and improved screening procedures at ports but uncontrolled border crossings continue (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017).

**Anti-Terrorism Units in Niger and Chad**

Niger increased its counterterrorism capabilities in the wake of violence to its north in Mali and to its south in Nigeria around the same time as Cameroon. Counterterrorism duties now fall to a specific investigative organization, the Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism (SCLCT) which includes representatives from Niger’s three primary law enforcement bodies: the Nigerien National Police, the Nigerien National Guard, and the Gendarmerie (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017, p. 45). A separate National Police Intervention Group (GIPN) under the Ministry of Interior also performs some counterterrorism duties, particularly emergency response to terrorist attacks. Additionally, the Nigerien government began spending more on border security after the Tuareg insurgency in Mali beginning in 2012. The Nigerien cities of Arlit and Niamey suffered attacks in response to Niger providing military support to reestablish control over Malian territory under the Malian government. A joint command between Niger, Mali,
Mauritania, and Algeria increased surveillance and monitoring of terrorist groups operating in the Sahara region (ACHPR 2014).

Lastly, efforts in neighboring Chad came later as did the Boko Haram threat but the state eventually adopted similar policing and security policies as its neighbors. All twenty-two police brigades are involved with counterterrorism duties and the Director General of the Chadian National Police is working to increase training in border control and crisis response. Chad’s border patrol conducts border-crossing screenings for Boko Haram affiliates and contraband. The unit consists of a mixture of dedicated border police, general police, the military, and gendarmes (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017, p. 24). Chad also cooperates with Libya and Algeria to monitor porous and desolate border areas while Sudan and Chad share a history of cross-border rebel activity and provide one another with tactical support in tracking insurgents crossing into Chadian territory (HRW 2006).

Cameroon, Chad, and Niger also established dedicated military units to respond to the growing Boko Haram threat as violence spread into their territories. Niger’s aforementioned SCLCT serves as a coordinating body for terrorism response and the military operates a specialized cell of the joint response entity out of the city of Diffa, a location significantly impacted by Boko Haram activity (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017). Cameroon’s Rapid Intervention Battalion and Chad’s Special Anti-Terrorism Group (SATG) conduct similar duties in their respective countries according to the Bureau. In short the common theme across the four states in terms of formal institutions of military capacity is the effort to improve coordination between various elements of the state’s security apparatus and codifying the specific duties of military and police personnel in counter-terrorism, much like the administrative capacity efforts.
Semi-Formal Measures: Vigilance Committees

On a less-formal level of institutions in the area of military capacity, all four states in the Lake Chad region work with individuals that are not part of the police or military, referred to as vigilantes or vigilance committees. These groups, controlled by local figures such as village chiefs, play a role in state security in Cameroon for example since the 1950s. In the 1990s and 2000s Cameroon worked with *comités de vigilance* to combat bandits in the north, the same area where Boko Haram is active today. While the Rapid Intervention Battalion exists as a state-established military unit, the government also works with vigilance committees through local chiefs as a secondary force as well. Chiefs maintain membership lists and provide identity cards for these ad-hoc security units (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016; International Crisis Group 2017). By 2016 Boko Haram carried out 113 attacks in the Far North, killing 262 civilians, 30 vigilance committee members, and six soldiers (Bureau of Democracy 2016b) and actively searched out members of the vigilance committees as targets (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017), demonstrating the front-line role vigilantes are playing in the fight against Boko Haram.

Local leaders such as the governor of the Far North region, Augustine Awa Fonka, issued regional decrees formalizing vigilance committees in the wake of Boko Haram’s attacks in 2014. After the suicide bombings in the regional capital of Maroua in July 2015 the state established more committees and had nearly 16,000 vigilantes available as of the end of 2015 (Chimtom 2015). In December of that year in the Far North town of Waza a group of vigilance committee members came upon three female suicide bombers during a routine patrol. Three vigilantes and one of the attackers died in the ensuing confrontation but prevented the bombers from detonating their devices (Chimtom 2015; Reuters 2016).
While vigilantes received credit for decreasing the number of suicide bombings through their active roles as patrols in public places (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017), members also went beyond their prescribed duties. Cameroonian vigilance committees launch occasional offensive attacks beyond their defensive duties, pursuing Boko Haram militants into Nigerian territory at times (ICG 2017). The death of a suspect who attempted to steal a bicycle and the burning of the body of another suspect (Bureau of Democracy 2016b) are just a few examples. Some officials in Cameroon express concern over the independence of vigilance committees and creating an “uncontrollable militia,” resulting in a reluctance to arm and train vigilantes. Cameroon does not sanction automatic weapons possession for vigilantes, most of whom only possess machetes, spears, bows, and arrows (Chimtom 2015). Others accused some vigilantes of being double agents for Boko Haram or reselling goods confiscated from Boko Haram members, with several arrests in Cameroon as well as neighboring Nigeria (ICG 2017). Vigilance committees also allegedly use children as young as twelve years old (Embassy 2018).

Vigilantes play a more limited role in neighboring Chad. The official use of vigilance committees began in 2015 but Chadian authorities are more cautious about the role of vigilantes, given the Chadian civil war from 2005 to 2010 (ICG 2017). Yet after the first attacks directly attributable to Boko Haram in 2015 the minister for territorial administration and Chadian President Idriss Deby called on Chadians around the Lake Chad area to establish comités de vigilance. Deby also visited vigilantes on patrol such as a visit to Ngouboua in 2016. The state also provided weapons to local chiefs overseeing vigilance committees according to the ICG. In the case of Niger the government had concerns with vigilance committees due to the Tuareg insurgencies in the 1990s and 2007, a weak security force, and fears over the establishment of ethnic militias. In addition, the state had issues with Nigerian vigilantes
operating inside *Nigerien* territory. The ICG notes Niger banned civilians from creating roadblocks but the state does allow vigilantes such as the *dan banga* to operate in the public markets of Diffa and Mainé Soroa. The state also utilizes vigilance committees in thirty localities to monitor and prevent child trafficking (Bureau of International Labor Affairs 2014). Militias formed in the Peul and Mohamid Arab communities briefly received permission to operate by Niger but later lost authorization due to rising ethnic tensions in the region (ICG 2017). Niger instead used vigilante groups as a network of informants in less secure regions of the state such as Bagara and Toumour.

Finally, the use of vigilantes in Nigeria against Boko Haram first began to take shape in 2013, though the practice of raising vigilante forces dates back decades. With increasing violence in Maiduguri the Joint Task Force (JTF), under the direction of the Nigerian army, organized groups with assistance from local and traditional authorities (ICG 2017). The Civilian Joint Task Force, the formal name given to the vigilance committees in Nigeria consists of nearly 30,000 civilians helping to fight Boko Haram (Cropley 2017). Individuals from the area with local knowledge became an integral part of the effort to push Boko Haram out of the city.

In exchange for their service some vigilantes receive compensation in the form of small salaries and healthcare while others only gifts in cash from local officials or military commanders (ICG 2017). Other requests for a more formal arrangement with the state face concerns over the “blurred lines in Nigeria between local politics and orchestrated violence” (Cropley 2017). Some vigilantes do receive a stipend of 15,000 naira ($48) per month from the Borno state government (Cropley 2017) which raises questions of the vigilantes being a volunteer force or a mercenary-like arrangement the state could use for other purposes in the future. Vigilantes face the same threats as state forces, thus the desire for compensation beyond
recognition. In one example, a couple on patrol in the town of Gambaru died after being targeted by Boko Haram militants in the region (Lauvergnier 2018).

In Nigeria the groups patrol border areas, run checkpoints to observe new arrivals to markets, mosques, and villages, perform arrests for security forces, interrogate detained suspects, and participate in operations outside of their home cities and villages (Cropley 2017; ICG 2017). Concerns over human rights abuses, looting and stealing, sexual violence, extortion, and summary executions of some prisoners by vigilantes exist, as in other states in the region. One solution implemented is keeping vigilantes operating in their home communities, where their actions will be known to people that know them on a personal level (Cropley 2017; ICG 2017).

In sum, all four states recognized weaknesses in their military capacity after the increase in terrorist attacks by Boko Haram militants, first in Nigeria between 2009 and 2013 and later in the neighboring states as violence spilled over into their territories. Dedicated police and military units with appropriate training introduced a more formal level of military capabilities in the area of counterterrorism that paralleled the bureaucratic moves taken by each state. In addition, all four states, to varying degrees, organized groups of citizens to fill in the gaps in the state’s military capacity and found success using vigilance committees to do everything from conduct patrols of prime bombing targets to collect intelligence as natives and locals invested in protecting their communities. As with the bureaucratic measures though, improvements in military capacity, both formal and informal, run the risk of abuse by those within states when not held accountable for their actions. The Boko Haram violence escalated shortly after concerns grew regarding the treatment of those that supported its hardline views on Islam and the implementation of shari’a law in the state in 2009. While the state’s responsibility is to protect its
citizens against violent extremism, extrajudicial killings and corrupt practices by representatives of the state are damaging to the efforts to end Boko Haram as well.

Regional Efforts at Building Capacity

While each of the four states implemented various measures to improve bureaucratic and military capacity in response to terrorism in the last decade, all four also benefited from regional-level coordination on combatting terrorism. Beyond the African Union (AU), two other organizations provide support and resources that enable states to enhance their ability to respond to Boko Haram and other terrorist organizations in the region. Nigeria and Niger are members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) while Cameroon and Chad are members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Both are economically-centered regional organizations but established counter-terrorism efforts in response to the threat of Boko Haram. The following briefly explores how these regional-level approaches build state capacity in response to the regional threats like Boko Haram.

ECOWAS and ECCAS

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a fifteen-member regional organization established in 1975 and revised in 1993 to promote economic integration and acts as a trade union between the member states. Members include Niger, Nigeria, and 13 other states though not Cameroon and Chad. The group allows for free movement of citizens through the member states, supports non-aggression between member states and the “maintenance of regional peace, stability, and security through the strengthening of good neighborliness” and “is meant to be a region governed in accordance with the principles of democracy, rule of law, and good governance” (ECOWAS Treaty 1993). Members also consult on border administration and security policies, the establishment of joint commissions to handle
regional threats, and provides support for peacekeeping operations when necessary. Among its current initiatives, ECOWAS is coordinating the development of a regional-level ten-year plan to improve infrastructure in the region, particularly improving the efficiency of transport corridors (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017, p. 372).

The ECOWAS pact failed to include defense and regional security in the beginning but by the 1980s members decided to sign the Protocol on Mutual Assistance Defense for any armed threat or aggression against a member state. ECOWAS established the Defense Committee and Council and the Allied Armed Force of the Community in the 1980s as well. Later the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, a multilateral armed force in 1990 and intervened in Liberia in 1990, Sierra Leone in 1997, and in Guinea-Bissau in 1999. The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping, and Security, adopted in 1999, created a formal structure to respond to various threats to the region, from political instability to Boko Haram (UNECA 2016).

In February 2013, the member states signed on to the Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism, the official counter-terrorism strategy of ECOWAS. In it, members declared support for efforts to freeze or confiscate financial assets for those known to support terrorism, for efforts to prevent territory within their state becoming safe havens for terrorists, and encouraged the adoption of counter-terror legislation and zero-tolerance policies regarding terrorist activity (ECOWAS Strategy 2013). The declaration and strategy plan also included the establishment of ECOWAS’ Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit that monitors states’ implementations of counter-terrorism efforts and coordinates training and technical issues with monitoring and preventing terrorism in the ECOWAS states.
Central African states formed their own version of ECOWAS in 1983, ECCAS or the Economic Community of Central African States, but the organization was inactive for several years due to conflicts in the region. The member states resurrected the group in 1998 (African Union n.d.). Formed as a customs union between member states (UNECA 2016), ECCAS also added a non-aggression pact to the agreement in 1994 and formed the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) in 1999 (AFCAC 2013). In 2016 the heads of ECOWAS and ECCAS met at the 27th Summit of the African Union and among several issues discussed how the two organizations can coordinate on combatting the threat of Boko Haram (ECOWAS 2016), given that member states from ECOWAS (Niger and Nigeria) and ECCAS (Cameroon and Chad) are directly affected the growth of the terrorist organization.

The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

On a continental level, the African Union works to support efforts to stymie the growth of Boko Haram across West Africa. As Boko Haram activity surpassed territorial boundaries of one state, the surrounding countries and the African Union formed an international-level response to support Nigeria and the other Lake Chad states. In 2015 the Peace and Security Council of the African Union authorized the Multinational Joint Task Force, operating under the guidance of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to eliminate Boko Haram and other terrorists groups (MNJTF 2018; Assanvo et. al. 2016). The force includes the four countries under consideration in this chapter as well as the country of Benin (Assanvo et. al. 2016). The MNJTF began to work on retaking territory from the territory around and islands in the Lake Chad area (Besheer 2017), though the origins of the MNJTF predate the rise of Boko Haram and dates back to an agreement between the members of the LCBC in March of 1994. The task force’s mandate is to “create a
safe and secure environment in areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram,” to restore authority of the states, and to return internally-displaced persons and refugees (MNJTF 2018).

The MNJTF carried out several major military operations after its authorization to target Boko Haram in 2015. Operations in the Nigerian towns of Ngoshe and Kumshe in February 2016, the latter on the Cameroonian border resulted in the taking of a Boko Haram support base while a May operation that year targeted Boko Haram militants in the Madawya forest in Nigeria using forces from Cameroon and Nigeria (Assanvo et. al. 2016). By 2017 the MNJTF reportedly killed 828 Boko Haram militants, arrested 615 others, had over 1,000 more surrender to the task force, and freed more than 20,500 hostages while also destroying 32 terrorist camps, mostly belonging to Boko Haram (Besheer 2017). Operation Gama Aiki (‘finish the job’ in Hausa) involved forces from Niger and Nigeria on several fronts around Lake Chad and resulted in the liberation of several towns and villages in the Niger/Nigeria/Chad border area (ISS). Refugees in the region noted destruction from air strikes and repeated attacks by Boko Haram militants in areas to which people had been evacuated as part of the operation (Bavier 2016). While the operation succeeded at pushing back militants in several areas, Boko Haram remains active. The Joint Steering Committee on Support to the MNJTF against Boko Haram in December 2017 recommended continuing the MNJTF authorization for the time being (UNOAU 2017).

An issue the MNJTF has faced thus far in its operations is the need for more financial and material support from the Lake Chad states and the African Union, including a need for specific equipment such as flat-bottomed patrol boats and helicopters for rescues and patrols of the region (Besheer 2017). MNJTF support has increased since Muhammudu Buhari took office in Nigeria in 2015. Shortly after becoming president, Buhari reaffirmed his support for the regional force by
adding $100 million to MNJTF funds (Assanvo et. al. 2016), though the operational budget of the force is close to $700 million (Bavier 2016).

Both ECOWAS and ECCAS serve as multi-faceted organizations focused predominantly on economic growth in their respective regions. By mitigating conflict throughout their members’ territories by enhancing regional capacity, ECOWAS and ECCAS serve as excellent examples of states supporting one another’s weaknesses in state capacity. The MNJTF exhibits this regional-level cooperative mechanism in the area of military capacity specifically, providing states such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria with a structure to enhance their efforts to end Boko Haram’s insurgency in particular and combat terrorism in general.

Findings and Continuing Weaknesses in Capacity

Despite the various bureaucratic and military capacity improvements made by Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria since Boko Haram’s wave of violence began in 2009, there remain identifiable weaknesses in bureaucratic and military capacity in these four states. Given the results of the analysis in Chapter Four, improvements in the legal structures used to punish terrorism and the establishment of formal and informal security entities are hindered if issues with repression and clientelism continue to plague the states in question.

Corruption in Cameroon is widespread with Transparency International in 2015 ranking Cameroon 130th out of 168 countries. Cameroonians regularly report bribery and extortion in the government and business sectors (Freedom House 2015), with 69 percent of respondents in one survey suggesting they paid a bribe to police (Ardigo 2016). The presidency also exercises significant control over national and local level politics and political figures, requiring sponsorship and financial support from those seeking political appointments (Atangana 2012; Freedom House 2015). Appointments to the Ministry of Justice, prosecutor positions, and the
Higher Judicial Council are all appointed by the president as well (Bertelsmann Stifung 2016a), resulting in similar issues of corrupt behavior in the selection process.

More recently, President Biya approved a new penal code in 2016 that bans political protests at public buildings, schools, and universities (Freedom House 2017a). The previously mentioned cases of Ahmed Abba, a journalist arrested for reporting on Boko Haram and later sentenced to ten years in prison (Amnesty 2018a), and a radio reporter in Douala the year after being strip searched after she asked questions at a public hospital are two examples of Cameroon’s repression of free speech (Freedom House 2017a). Pre-trial detention and trial time limits are not being enforced systematically (Freedom House 2015) and the Rapid Intervention Battalion detained over 100 people between March 2013 and March 2017, who then faced systematic torture likely sanctioned by senior military officials (Amnesty International 2018a).

Chad continues to struggle with various forms of corruption. Transparency International’s 2016 ranking of Chad as 139th in the world, up from 166th in 2013, shows some signs of improvement in the area of ending clientelism but problems remain (Chene 2014, 2016). Low salaries for civil servants and a lack of training and accountability in the civil service (KPMG 2014), power remaining concentrated in the executive branch regarding elections, the shutting out of the opposition in election reform (Chene 2014), absenteeism in public facilities (World Bank 2010), and officers in uniform committing street crimes (Bureau of Democracy 2013) are all longstanding issues.

Recently, several public incidents highlighted the continuing issues with clientelism and repressive tactics by the state. After President Idriss Deby won a fifth term in 2016 several members of the military disappeared allegedly for voting against Deby as well as reports from the opposition that their organizers faced arrest for questioning the election’s outcome (Freedom
House 2017b). In 2017 the Chadian government banned several peaceful assemblies and
detained protesters including two leaders of a movement called IYINA (“We Are Tired”) who
call on citizens to wear red as a protest against corruption (Amnesty International 2018b).

Clientelism and repression remain significant issues in Niger as well. Approximately 16
percent of respondents to the 2015 Global Corruption Barometer reported paying a bribe to
officials in the police or the court system (Chene 2017). In addition, the national budget
allocations remain secretive and not open to public scrutiny (Bertelsmann Foundation 2016b)
and in October 2014 the former president, Mamadou Tandja faced indictment for corruption in
relation to nearly $800 million of public money from the national treasury (Heritage Foundation
2016), though he was released shortly after (Bertelsmann Foundation 2016).

On the repression side of issues, Niger’s 2016 legislative and presidential elections saw
the primary opponent of the incumbent president jailed and reports of electoral irregularities, the
banning of an international journalist over coverage of Boko Haram, and the detention of a
local civil rights activist who received a six month sentence for criticizing the government on
Facebook (Freedom House 2017c). In 2017 security forces responded to a student protest in
Niamey with force, killing one student with a tear gas canister which a commission of inquiry
found to be due to negligence of the gendarmerie (Amnesty International 2018c).

Lastly, Nigeria is notorious for issues with corruption as with the aforementioned cases of
the Nigerian police force. Embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds are notable
examples. A former governor of Delta state was found guilty of using public money to purchase
several houses around the world, luxury cars, and a private jet (Global Witness 2012) and a scam
involving government subsidies paid for oil products resulted in financial losses for the state and
higher prices for fuel for Nigerians (Martini 2015). Corruption in the judiciary including illegal
payments for favoritism, buying the appointments of judges are problems as well according to Martini. President Buhari has made corruption in the state a priority since taking office and in signed Executive Order Number 6 in 2018 to target high profile corruption in the country (Wakili 2018) and the administration claims the recovery of $9 billion in stolen assets since Buhari took office in 2015 (Freedom House 2018d).

Repression in Nigeria, especially in the efforts to thwart the growth of Boko Haram, remains a major issue. The Nigerian military arrested and detained thousands of individuals including women and children. Overcrowded cells, denial to access to lawyers and family members, disease and dehydration are all problems as well. Hundreds of detainees have died in detention and women have given birth to children also being held in detention now as well (Amnesty International 2018d). Attempts by the state to rectify some of the issues with repressive and illegal tactics by the state include holding police and military officers accountable. Amnesty also notes the sentencing of two police officers to death for taking part in extrajudicial killings of six traders in Abuja in 2005 and the High Court in Port Harcourt convicting five policemen for executions in 2009 are positive signs of reform under the current administration.

**Conclusion**

As the discussion in this chapter illustrates, the states of the Lake Chad region implemented various legislative and structural policies to improve bureaucratic and military capacity after the rise of Boko Haram as a regional threat between 2009 and 2018. As the number of attacks in Nigeria continued to increase and then spill over into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, each state incorporated formal and informal measures to improve counterterrorism efforts within their territories and the region. New laws defining terrorist activity and establishing systematic approaches to punishment provide the four states the ability
to process cases of terrorism through the legal system and move the fight against Boko Haram away from all-out warfare to more of a criminality issue.

Reorganizing police and military units to better investigate and counter terrorist operations improved military capabilities in the region as well. Informal approaches including partnerships with the religious community and the use of vigilante forces add to the four states’ capacity to counter Boko Haram and terrorism in general as well. Finally, regional organizations create an additional layer of capacity building each state benefits from, not only economically as is mostly the case with ECOWAS and ECCAS, but also militarily with the MNJTF that allows for transnational cooperation to respond to a transnational threat to state security.

Yet despite these various efforts to build bureaucratic and regional capacity, problems remain within all four states. Corruption and clientelistic acts inhibits the state’s ability to police its own citizens while repressive tactics cause the people of each state to question the authority and effectiveness of the regimes currently in power. Abuses of legislative efforts and using new anti-terrorism laws to tamp down political opposition and the press while police and military officers continue to face accusations of improper detainments and extrajudicial executions compound weaknesses in state capacity and only inspire citizens questioning the merits of supporting the current regime.

Chapter Six will follow the same pattern of investigation into terrorism and state capacity in the Southeast Asian region, considering the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. The chapter highlights similarities with the Lake Chad states in terms of military and administrative capacity developments in the same general time period as the rise of Boko Haram. Chapter 7, the conclusion, will offer a brief discussion comparing the two regions.
Chapter 6: Jemaah Islamiyah and State Capacity in Southeast Asia’s Island States

Introduction

In this chapter I continue to explore the four factors identified in Chapter Four: bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military capacity, repression, and clientelism. As previously noted from the cross-national analysis we see evidence of how each impacts the number of terrorist attacks in the regions researched in this dissertation. Where Chapter Five explored these factors in four states in Sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter provides a similar qualitative analysis for the same set of factors in Southeast Asia.

As with Chapter Five, this chapter explores incidences of terrorism and changes in state capacity across a set of geographically-concentrated states. I examine state capacity in four predominantly island-based nation-states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. These four states, like those chosen in Chapter Five’s exploration of Sub-Saharan Africa, are linked by their experiences with terrorist movements that transcend national boundaries. Where Chapter Five explored one major terrorist movement, Boko Haram, this chapter considers two separate but parallel organizations in Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf. Predating Boko Haram’s activity in the twenty-first century to a degree, these two terrorist organizations developed across the four aforementioned states but are comparatively less active today than the Boko Haram movement.

This chapter follows the same methodology and organization of Chapter Five. First, to examine bureaucratic or administrative capacity we can consider how state’s developed legal structures to respond to Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and other movements in the last decade. Like states in Sub-Saharan Africa, contention exists over defining terrorism and support of terrorism versus state’s taking advantage of security issues to repress citizens.
Second, the military’s capacity to combat groups using force and how it implements its use of force through formal and informal bodies requires consideration here as well. Like administrative approaches such as legal structures for responding to terrorism, states responded to Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and other terrorist movements by developing new programs. New military units and coordination between police and military institutions in the state enhance state capacity but also have the potential for becoming repressive responses to any challenge to the status quo. Unlike Sub-Saharan Africa, less evidence exists of informal groups of individuals policing border regions and conducting the duties of the state’s police and military forces.

Third, another significant factor in state capacity is border security which requires both major elements of military might and administrative capability. Different challenges exist in securing border regions in Southeast Asia compared to the Sub-Saharan states studied in the previous chapter however. A maritime security component therefore is more significant in state capacity in this region. Groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf able exploit these specific weaknesses in Southeast Asian states and are able to transcend borders both in their activity as well as in their efforts to elude authorities responding to terrorism, much like Boko Harm does across land borders. Therefore, building bureaucratic and military capacity at a regional level and through regional organizations provides some insight into the improvements in state capacity across the states involved. As mapping across these sub-regions within the Southeast Asian case demonstrates, understanding state capacity and terrorism requires analysis transcending state borders and the interconnecting strengths and weaknesses of states. Therefore in both the bureaucratic and military capacity sections I discuss efforts to improve border security locally and regionally.
The factors noted above are explored in a qualitative approach which parallels the approach taken in the previous chapter. First I identified notable policies and issues of capacity discussed in the US State Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism* from 2007 to 2017. I then explore those policies further through additional data from government and international organization reports and local and international media coverage of specific incidents across the region in the last decade. Geo-spatial mapping is also presented to highlights specifically where incidents of terrorism are occurring in each region of interest. After discussing the policies undertaken to improve bureaucratic or administrative capacity, military capacity, and briefly examining regional capacity I conclude with a discussion of the ongoing capacity weaknesses in the region that result in clientelism and repression.

**Southeast Asia: Terrorism and Capacity in Pacific Island States**

*Islands, Archipelagos, and Terrorism in the Pacific*

For this chapter I consider four states located in close proximity to one another but not generally connected via shared land borders as with the states discussed in Chapter Five. The four states under consideration in this chapter, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore are all predominantly states made of island chains with Malaysia and Indonesia sharing land borders on the island of Borneo and with Thailand, Brunei, and Papua New Guinea. Figure 6.1 provides a map of the region. As with the Sub-Saharan cases in the previous chapter, the four Southeast Asian states share a common experience in the form of colonial rule for at least some period of history prior to the late twentieth century. Independence came significantly earlier for the Philippines and Indonesia but indirectly compared to the Sub-Saharan examples. Spanish colonial rule of the Philippines for example ended not with independence for the state but acquisition by the United States as the result of the Spanish-American War in 1898. A Philippines Independence Act established the Commonwealth of the Philippines in 1935 with the
intent of full independence during the next decade. The Japanese occupation during World War II lasted from 1942 to 1945, interrupting the process but the US ultimately recognized the Republic of the Philippines as an independent state in 1946. Indonesia similarly became an independent state at the end of World War II, ending the Japanese occupation that replaced Dutch colonial rule which existed for several decades prior to the occupation in 1942. British colonial rule of Malaysia and what ultimately became Singapore ended in 1963. Two years later the Federation of Malaysia and the people of Singapore agreed to separation, creating the fourth state under consideration in this chapter.

Most important for our consideration in this chapter though is not the colonial experience of these states but their shared experience with terrorism in the last two decades, particularly
incidents involving Jemaah Islamiyah. Each of the four states struggled with the challenges of building and maintaining the same basic elements of capacity as did the Sub-Saharan states. Unique to the region however is the expansive, unconnected territory these states must maintain, with the exception of Singapore. Employment opportunities, access and control of natural resources, and basic infrastructure are all considerations for capacity-building. As noted in Table 6.1 the four states vary in some important aspects. In terms of population the state vary drastically, from just under six million in Singapore to over 260 million in Indonesia. Total land area varies significantly as well with Indonesia’s nearly two million square kilometers to Singapore’s 719. Three of the four states have between 46 and 76 percent of their population living in urban areas while the fourth, Singapore, has 100 percent living in urban areas given its and status as a city-state with not much additional territory.

What these four states do have in common in terms of territory though is a significant amount of coastline that must be monitored and presents unique challenges for state capacity not faced by land-locked states in Sub-Saharan Africa or Central Asia. Indonesia for example has over thirteen thousand islands that make up its territory while around one thousand are inhabited by humans. The Philippines has over seven thousand islands though the population is concentrated primarily in the northwest and south-central Luzon chains, the islands of the Visayan Sea such as Cebu and Negros, and nearly one eight of the state’s population resides in Manila. Mindanao is the second-largest island of the Philippines with approximately twenty million residents and home to several of the long-standing conflict and terrorist movements in the country. Malaysia consists of over eight hundred islands with much of its population concentrated on portions of the Malay Peninsula and the island of Borneo. Even comparatively small Singapore consists of around sixty islands that hold various parts of the larger city-state.
Finally, considering how each scores on the measure of Institutionalized Democracy in the Polity IV dataset, with a range from 0 to 10 with higher values representing more democratic states, we see some variation. The Institutionalized Democracy score includes three components:
the ability of citizens to express political preferences effectively, the existence of institutionalized constraints on the executive, and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens. Three of the four states have scores between six and nine, high on the democratic end of the scale and Singapore at two or much less democratic. In summary, significant variation exists in terms of the population and geographic characteristics of the four Southeast Asian states but all four have the shared experience of dealing with Jemaah Islamiyah as well as widespread, disconnected territory through the region.

**Terrorism in the Southeast Asian Region**

Terrorism in the Southeast Asian states considered in this chapter varies drastically by state and only Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf exist in multiple states, though their activities are concentrated in some places than others. Several other domestic or home-grown movements in the four countries of interest in the chapter exist as well. As is apparent in Figure 6.8 the Philippines in particular experiences a significantly higher number of terrorist incidents in the observed time period, 1985 to 2016.

In contrast very few terrorist incidents are listed in the Global Terrorism Database for Singapore. As with Chapter Five the number of terrorist attacks for each of the four states under consideration are graphed separately. In the case of Indonesia as depicted in Figure 6.2 terrorist
incidents peaked in the observed time period in 2001 with over 100 separate attacks but dropped precipitously in the mid-2000s and steadily climbed back to the 20-40 range in the last several years. For the Philippines the annual number of attacks, as noted in Figure 6.3, is much higher, especially in the last several years, reaching several hundred in 2014 alone. In the cases of Malaysia and Singapore, depicted in Figures 6.4 and 6.5, terrorist incidents are less common. For Malaysia the annual number of incidents never reached twenty in the observed time period and for Singapore in this time period only once did more than one attack occur in a year and only one incident is attributed to a specific terrorist group. Nevertheless as will be discussed throughout the chapter Singapore finds itself on the forefront of terrorist activity in the region in other ways, in particular financing and several failed terrorist plots.

Capacity targets are a significant portion of terrorist incidents in the region. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database we can examine the aggregate of attacks in Figure 6.6 and see that approximately fifty-eight percent of the 6,359 terrorist incidents in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore between 1985 and 2015 fall into categories that involve some aspect of military or administrative capacity. These categories include Infrastructure.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{29} The GTD differentiates between several elements of infrastructure that I included under one categorical name. Thus, ‘infrastructure as listed in Figure 6.6 includes the following sub-categories: Airports and Aircraft, Telecommunications, Transportation, and Utilities.
Government Institutions, Military Institutions, Police, and Education Institutions. Religious Institutions and Private Citizens and Businesses make up a majority of the rest of the incidents. As the chart demonstrates while private entities and individuals are the majority of those affected by terrorism, institutions of the state that form the basis of capacity are specifically targeted as well.

![Figure 6.6 Southeast Asia Targets of Terrorism (1985-2015)](image)

**Jemaah Islamiyah**

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) dates back to the late 1970s though experts disagree on whether the name’s original usage referred to a formal organization or an informal gathering of individuals with shared ideological views about Islam in the region (CFR 2009). JI’s ideological roots are in another movement, Darul Islam. Darul Islam appears first after the end of Dutch colonial rule in the state in the 1940s that sought to establish Islamic rule across Indonesia and fought a violent insurgency against the state throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Australian

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30 The GTD lists Government Institutions as one of two sub-categories, General or Diplomatic, and are combined in Figure 6.6.
31 Private Citizens & Property and Businesses are listed as separate categories in the GTD but are added together for the purposes of Figure 6.6.
32 Approximately 9 percent of the total number of incidents in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore are listed as ‘Unknown’ or ‘Other.’ To the Other category I also added targets designated Maritime, Journalists and Media, NGO’s, [Other] Terrorists and Non-State Militia, Tourists, and Violent Political Parties.
Government n.d.). Other experts suggest JI formed in the 1980s under a group of Indonesian extremists exiled in Malaysia (CFR 2009).

Nonetheless the group turned violent in the 1990s after existing for several years as a non-violent religious movement. The group’s leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, joined Darul Islam in the 1970s, served a prison sentence for Islamist activism, and then fled the state for Malaysia after a court ordered his return to prison. Bashir worked from Malaysia to recruit volunteers to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, increase funding from sympathizers, and form connections with al-Qaeda, though some question the depth of these connections (CFR 2009; Vaughn et. al. 2009). At the end of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998 Bashir returned to Indonesia and led the Mujahadeen Council and established an Islamic seminary on the island of Java (CFR 2009).

While JI existed prior to the September 11th attacks, the group’s notoriety as a violent terrorist movement comes afterwards first with the 2002 bombing of a nightclub on the predominantly Hindu island of Bali. A few incidents prior to this attack including a wave of bombings at Christian churches and another series of bombings in the Philippine capital Manila indicate the group’s violent turn took place even prior to ties developing with al-Qaeda. Within just a handful of years however the group established cells in Australia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and southern Thailand (BBC 2012; Bureau of Counterterrorism 2007). Throughout the 2000s JI carried out several significant terrorist attacks or plotted attacks including:

- A 2001 plot uncovered by Singaporean authorities targeting American, Israeli, British, and Australian embassies and diplomatic facilities.
- The 2002 Bali nightclub bombing.
- The 2003 bombing of the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia.
- The 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.
- The 2005 Bali suicide bombings.
- The 2009 suicide bombings against the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta.

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- A 2010 plot uncovered by Indonesian authorities targeting the Danish Embassy in Jakarta.
- A 2013 plot uncovered by the Philippine military as a joint operation between JI and Abu Sayyaf to carry out bombings across the island of Mindanao.
- A 2015 plot uncovered by Philippine authorities targeting a visit by Pope Francis to Manila and Tacloban. (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2007-2015)

Jemaah Islamiyah overall is responsible for far less attacks than groups in Southeast Asia and beyond such as Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. During Jemaah Islamiyah’s existence, the GTD identified JI as responsible for seventy-five terrorist incidents in Indonesia and the Philippines and zero in Malaysia or Singapore, however several plots and arrests of JI members in the latter two states, as discussed later in the chapter demonstrate the group’s transnational presence. Figure 6.7 provides geo-spatial mapping of the aforementioned JI-attributed incidents.

Prior to the 2002 Bali bombing authorities in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines failed to take significant action against JI operatives but after Indonesia as well as its neighbors began several capacity-building policy reforms that eventually led to the capture of several high-level leaders of JI and over 1,500 JI members dead or detained (Singh 2018). Singapore and
Malaysia soon outlawed citizens from being members of JI while the Philippines and Indonesia focus on arresting perpetrators of specific terrorist acts by the group (CFR 2009) and until recently maintained lax financial controls and minimal visa requirements as well as porous borders (Vaughn et. al. 2009). No JI or JI-affiliated attacks occurred in 2016 or 2017 but authorities believe the group continues to recruit and strengthen its network of operatives and finances as well as uses ISIS-affiliated training camps in Syria to prepare operatives for future operations (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016-2017; Australian Government n.d.).

The regional focus on more recent developments with other terrorist movements such as ISIS allowed JI to regroup and focus more narrowly on Indonesia and a period of “strategic dormancy” as well as spreading its ideology through pesantrens or religious boarding schools, mosques, educational institutions, and publishing houses (Singh 2018; Vallee 2018). As one analyst in the region noted, JI as of 2016 had about 2,000 active members, “roughly where it was prior to the crackdown” which is corroborated by former JI members (Jenkins 2016). As the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict suggests, “Jemaah Islamiyah is not an immediate threat, but rather one with a 25-year time frame for achieving an Islamic state” (Vallee 2018, p. 63).

Beyond Jemaah Islamiyah

Much of the terrorism beyond transnational movements in Southeast Asia in the last two decades occurred in the Philippines, specifically the southern end of the state’s numerous island chains. Figure 6.8 illustrates the sheer number of incidents in the Philippines between 1985 and 2015, excluding Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) formed as an Islamic separatist organization in the late 1970s and remains active, seeking an independent Islamic state or autonomous region for the Muslim minority population, the Moro,
who primarily live in the Mindanao region. The MILF originated as a splinter of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) due to ideological and political disagreements (Bale 2003).

Ultimately the MILF focuses on building up its larger organization but also an armed wing known as the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). The MILF continued negotiating with the Philippine government to achieve the goals of autonomy and independence but carried out bombings and damaging property to illustrate its ability to force the government to negotiate which ultimately results in a truce and semi-autonomy. A peace agreement between the MNLF and the state leads to increased support of the MILF in the late 1990s (Bale 2003). The group also gained power due to its secluded mountainous hideouts in the southern Philippines and weak local presence of the Philippine government. In turn the MILF established Islamic communities with their own governing and judicial systems but continued fighting the state until a ceasefire agreement in 2003 (Vaughn et. al. 2009). While negotiations continued for several more years and resulted in a peace agreement and signed legislation in 2018, other splinter groups to
continue the violence developed in between. The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters emerged in 2010 and disrupted the peace process, targeting military and police in the Philippines and some evidence the group coordinates with other movements in the region (Chalk 2013).

Another group develops as a splinter of the much larger Moro National Liberation Front but soon rivals the MNLF in its intensity and violence across the southern Philippines (CFR 2009). The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) emerges in the early 1990s under Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani and other leaders that spent time training and fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2007; CFR 2009). Janjalani, having studied in Saudi Arabia and Libya where he became radicalized, returned to the Philippines to recruit former MNLF members to rise up against the secular state (Niksch 2002). Janjalani died in 1998 in a clash with police in the Philippines and his brother Khadaffy replaced him until his death in 2006 during “Operation Ultimatum” led by the Philippine Armed Forces to disrupt ASG operations. Shortly thereafter the group posted a video on YouTube featuring the Janjalani brothers and asking for financial support for the ASG (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2008). The group is known for various acts of terrorism in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, the Muslim-dominant areas of the southern Philippines. The group engaged in bombings, kidnappings for ransom, beheadings, and assassinations throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. The group’s first attacks came in the early 1990s against the town of Ipil in Mindanao and an earlier grenade attack that killed two American evangelists (CFR 2009; Bureau of Counterterrorism 2007). Other notable incidents include a bombing near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga in 2002 and the bombing of SuperFerry 15 in Manila Bay in 2004, the Valentine’s Day bombings in Manilla, Davao City, and General Santos City in 2005, and a motorcycle bomb outside the Philippines Congress in 2007 (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2007). The group also failed to
assassinate President Gloria Arroyo after Philippine security officials discovered the plot in 2008 (CFR 2009). One of the group’s few plots beyond the territory of the Philippines came in 2000 in the kidnapping of several foreign nationals in nearby Malaysia (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2007). Figure 6.9 provides a map of these incidents.33

Figure 6.9 Abu Sayyaf Terrorist Attacks

ASG activity increased in 2010 with multiple attacks on civilians, humanitarian groups, Christian churches, and military and police personnel (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011) and despite leadership turnover the group maintained the ability to replenish its base of recruits among those discontent with the state in Basilan, Marawi, and elsewhere in the south (Banlaoi 2010). An attack on the island of Basilan in 2010 included a vehicle-based improvised explosive device resulted in 11 deaths. Between 2011 and 2016 the ASG carried out numerous kidnap for ransom operations as well as a series of bombings on various islands in the Sulu Archipelago and

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33 Various other terrorist groups identified in the GTD exist but perpetrated in most cases less than ten attacks in the time period under consideration.
elsewhere in the Philippines (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011-2016). In 2014 the group’s current leader, Isnilon Hapilon, swore allegiance to ISIL (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2015).

The group remains active and in the last few years carried out ambushes on the Philippine military, continued to kidnap for ransom, and execute those for which ransom demands were not met including citizens of Malaysia, Germany, and Canada. In May 2017 the Philippine Armed Forces launched an operation to capture Hapilon in the city of Marawi. The ASG and the pro-ISIS Maute Group laid siege to Marawi resulting in 150 security forces, 47 civilians, and 800 militants killed and 40,000 displaced by the fighting (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2018). Soon after President Rodrigo Duterte took office in 2017 he initiated an “all-out-war” against Abu Sayyaf’s stronghold on Jolo Island and severely disputed the group’s operations for nearly two years. Yet in late 2018 reports suggested several members of the ASG leadership believed to be killed by Duterte’s operations in 2016 survived and are now leading a resurgence of the group and new kidnapping operations (Vanar and Golingai 2018). Eight alleged members of Abu Sayyaf detained in Malaysia appeared to be attempting a series of kidnappings for ransom off eastern Saban in Malaysian Borneo in November 2018 (Asyraf 2018).

Finally as with the cases in Sub-Saharan Africa presented in Chapter Five, the threat of ISIS entered the Southeast Asian region in the last few years. While the MILF and ASG are predominantly limited in their activity to the Philippines, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham is noted as an active threat in Indonesia and Singapore as well, though its activities are limited and as one expert noted in testimony to the US Congress, “There is at present no ISIS Southeast Asia nor has ISIS formally declared an interest in any Southeast Asian country…the presence of ISIS is expressed in the form of radical groups…who have taken oaths of allegiance to ISIS” (Liow 2016). The five-month siege of Marawi that included ISIS support for militant groups in
the conflict suggest the group’s interests in the region are evolving with the introduction of additional resources to the region and local language-based propaganda, as noted by the same expert (Liow 2018). Reports of black ISIS flags flying from “every corner of the city” of Marawi in the Philippines and ISIS-linked suicide bombings in Jakarta around the same time of the siege would suggest support if not the presence of the terrorist network in the region (Griffiths 2017). Later in 2018 ISIS also claimed responsibility for a series of church bombings in Surabaya, Indonesia carried out by one family including two children (Jamjoom 2018), indicating the group’s activity in the region is minor but nonetheless active.

**Capacity in Southeast Asia**

In response to JI, Abu Sayyaf, ISIS, and other threats in the region, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore attempted legislative and military reforms to improve state capacity. As noted in previous chapters military capacity, measured through a general accounting of the strength of a state’s military force, and administrative capacity, measured through a series of proxies that account for both infrastructural and rule of law-driven concepts, are the primary focus of the analysis. In addition I consider how weaknesses in these two areas lead to factors such as repression and clientelism impacting the prevalence of terrorist movements in a state.

As with Chapter Five I focus first on administrative capacity in this section and consider significant legislative acts which give states in Southeast Asia the ability to distinguish terrorism from other criminal acts. I consider as well how those bureaucratic measures balance national security with criticism over broad powers and governmental overreach in the executive institutions across the region. I also consider informal approaches that attempt to mitigate terrorism and improve administrative capacity such as relationships with religious organizations in the state as well as de-radicalization programs. I then turn to military reorganization, the establishment of anti-terror units, and cooperation with citizens impacted by first JI and later
other movements in the region. A factor particularly important to capacity in Southeast Asia is coastal security and monitoring movements across the territorial waters of these four states.

Where the states discussed in Chapter Five struggle with border security over porous land borders, Southeast Asian states encounter different challenges regarding border security over expanses of sea and ocean. Thus regional efforts are particularly important at coordinating and improving bureaucratic and military capacity in this chapter, the third area of consideration. Finally as with Chapter Five I conclude with a brief discussion of existing weaknesses in bureaucratic and military capacity in each state, particularly repressive behavior and corrupt practices.

**Bureaucratic Measures against Terrorism**

To consider how states in Southeast Asia responded to the weaknesses in capacity exposed by terrorism in the region from an administrative perspective, I consider two general areas. All four states, like Sub-Saharan Africa, passed legislation in the last decade to establish definitions of terrorism as well as policies for charging individuals with various terrorism-related crimes, from financial support to the use of nuclear materials in a terrorist attack. Prior to the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah and other movements none of the four states have clear standards for handling terrorism from an administrative perspective, much like the Sub-Saharan cases post-9/11. Another semi-formal bureaucratic effort across the four Southeast Asian states in the wake of dealing with groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah is the establishment of de-radicalization programs alongside counter-propaganda campaigns staffed by religious figures that call out the narratives and ideologies of extremist groups. Both policy approaches illustrate the administrative capacity measure of state capacity and how it varies across the four impacted states in the region. As with increasing the bureaucratic and legal capacity of Sub-Saharan executives though, concerns regarding corrupt practices and repression hinders the state’s
capacity to effectively counter terrorist movements. These issues are discussed further in the end of this chapter.

*Legal Capacity: Legislating against Terrorism in Southeast Asia*

**Legal Efforts in Indonesia and the Philippines**

In the days after the September 11th attacks in the United States, Indonesia developed legislation to improve administrative capacity in order to respond to terrorist threats active in the state. Local Islamist movements linked to international networks such as al Qaeda and after the 2002 Bali bombing the Indonesian parliament passed the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law. Under the 2003 version of the law Indonesia allowed for the detainment of suspected terrorists for a week and for the military to conduct arrests, discontinued after abuses by the army during the Suharto era. Weaknesses in the judiciary at the time though made the law’s requirement that intelligence gathering be approved by a judge an ineffective check on the military and the law (HRW 2003).

In 2016 the Indonesian legislature took under consideration a plan to amend the 2003 Anti-Terrorism law to provide for more cooperation between the National Police and the Army of Indonesia by allowing the police more leeway in taking preventative steps against terrorist groups and suspects (Johnson 2017). The Indonesian legislature eventually passed a revised anti-terrorism bill in 2018, after two years of debate over several issues including the role of the police and the definition of terrorism. Pressure to pass an amended version of the 2003 legislation came from a wave of suicide bombings carried out in Surabaya and Jakarta by the Islamic State starting in 2016 and a threat from President Joko Widodo in 2018 to issue an emergency proclamation if Parliament failed to pass the updated law (Da Costa and Kapoor 2016; Arab News 2018; Diela 2018). Among the changes to the 2003 law, Parliament included protocols to allow police to detain terror suspects for up to 21 days (200 for a formal
investigation) and charge citizens for joining or recruiting for terrorist groups in Indonesia or outside the country (HRW 2003; al Jazeera 2018).

The new law defines terrorism as using violence or threats of violence to create a “sense of terror or fear among the wide public; claiming massive victims, taking away freedom, properties or lives of other human beings, and/or causing damage or destruction of strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities and/or international facilities” (Revised Law of 2003). Criticisms of the new definition include the fact the counterterrorism law could be used to target peaceful political activities of indigenous groups, environmental advocates, and religious organizations due to the wording regarding political dissent and property damage. In addition the prolonged pre-detention period raises concerns regarding the conditions of detention and the potential for abuse and torture of suspects (Adams 2018a). Therefore while the updated legislation does improve state capacity by adopting a clearer definition of terrorism, the potential for abuse of the law by the executive branch remains a concern in the state.

Other legal measures taken by Indonesia to respond to Jemaah Islamiyah and other movements and build state capacity include the Presidential Regulation Number 46 in 2010 and the Intelligence Bill of 2011, both of which attempted to reorganize the counterterrorism and intelligence structures of the state to better respond to terrorism and other domestic threats to state security. In July of 2010 the Yudhoyono administration issued Presidential Regulation Number 46 in an effort to reorganize the counterterrorism structure in Indonesia. Yudhoyono established a new National Anti-Terrorism Agency responsible for “formulating policies and national programs, coordinating government offices…in the field of anti-terrorism by set up taskforces with members of government offices” including existing anti-terrorism units from the Indonesian military, the Anti-Terrorism Desk, and the National Police’s Anti-Terror Squad
(Detachment 88) (Buchanan 2010). Regulation 46 raised concerns among human rights groups due to the lack of clarity regarding what constitutes a “radical” group or individual and the military’s role in the enforcement of anti-terror legislation (Buchanan 2010).

A year later in October of 2011 Indonesia passed a new State Intelligence Law to allow for greater authority for the State Intelligence Body (Badan Intelijen Negara or BIN) to intercept private communications, conduct surveillance, and wiretap suspects for organized crime, terrorism, and other criminal acts (Freedom House 2012). Versions of the bill appeared in Parliament for nine years but failed to receive enough support for passage due to widespread criticisms from civil society organizations, the media, and international groups due to the broad, ambiguous terms set in the legislation, though the Yudhoyono fought for the broadest version with the least oversight (HRW 2011a; ICG 2011). ‘Opponent’ for example includes any “party from inside and outside the country engaged in effort, work, activities, and action that may be detrimental to national interest and national stability” (HRW 2011a) which could potentially allow the state to use the law to target not only terrorist groups or drug traffickers but also more benign opponents of the states such as opposition political parties and protest groups.

Similar legislative efforts at building capacity took place in the Philippines around the same time period as the state also encountered threats from Jemaah Islamiyah as a transnational movement and domestic terrorism by groups in Mindanao as well. In 2007 the Philippines enacted the Human Security Act that defines terrorism as “causing widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and provides the state the power to arrest suspects of terrorism or supporters of terrorist groups without warrants and detain them without charges though they are provided with access to lawyers, priests, and family members (HSA 2007).
Like Indonesia however, the definition of terrorism in the HSA received criticism from various human rights organizations for being vague and ambiguous and has the potential for abuse of the freedom of speech for citizens of the state (Roque 2007; HRW 2007). Establishing the military as responsible for performing policing duties and operating without warrants for arrests and detentions of suspects also raises human rights concerns (Morallo 2018), though the ban on the use of torture, threats, and coercion of detainees included in the law received praise as a positive check on the state’s treatment of terror suspects (HRW 2007).

In 2018 a series of amendments proposed in Congress met significant opposition over concerns that the revisions to the law are geared toward increasing the authority of new president Rodrigo Duterte beyond what is necessary to combat terrorism in the state. To quote a legislator:

“These bills should be seen in the light of the Duterte regime’s recent ouster of the chief magistrate which places the Supreme Court under the thumb of the executive, its fake anti-corruption campaign that recycled venal officials close to Malacanang, its majority control over Congress, its war on drugs which is getting local and international backlash for taking away ordinary lives without the due process of law, its unjustified placing of Mindanao under martial law, [and] its heightened military attacks on peasant and lumad communities which have resulted in the escalation of extrajudicial killings and human rights violations” (Luci-Atienza 2018).

Others criticized the proposed amendments to the law as well. The International Commission of Jurists lobbied to the Congress that the amendments would be “incompatible with laws and standards that prohibit unfettered surveillance power and arbitrary deprivation of the right to liberty and protect the rights to privacy, information, redress, and freedom of opinion and expression” (ICJ 2018). In addition the ICJ argues the proposed changes allow for military personnel to conduct surveillance and detain citizens suspected of terrorism. Five years after the passage of the HSA, the Philippines created legislation to support capacity in monitoring and stopping financial support for terrorism. The government passed two laws in 2012: The Republic Acts No. 10167 and 10168. The first act, No. 10167, amended a 2001 law regarding money
laundering and allowed the Anti-Money Laundering Council to investigate bank accounts without a depositor’s knowledge (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013; Republic 10167).

The second act, No. 10168, established the financing of terrorism as a stand-alone criminal offense in the Philippines in 2012. The law allows the state to freeze property and funds of individuals suspected of financing terrorism or acts of terrorism. In addition the act also permits the Anti-Money Laundering Council to investigate the bank accounts of suspects without their knowledge. Due to weak monitoring of the authorities granted this power groups raised concerns over ensuring the integrity of the investigatory measure (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013) though freeze orders by the Council are limited to twenty day periods (Republic 10168). A recent application of the law by President Duterte announced the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)-New People’s Army (NPA) would be declared a terrorist organization and financial support for the CPP-NPA would become a criminal offense (PCOO 2017).

Another piece of legislation worth considering in a discussion of the state’s effort to improve administrative capacity through legal measures is the 2012 Peace Framework Agreement, also referred to as the Bangsamoro Basic Law. For several decades the Moros in the southern region of the Philippines fought the state over land appropriation of ancestral lands and formed groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Both movements spurred violence in the region and used terrorist tactics to fight for a separate Moro state. The Supreme Court of the Philippines declared the agreement to establish an autonomous political region for the Moros unconstitutional in the 2000s. Under the Aquino administration in 2012 the state formed a Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) to establish the framework for a peace agreement that both sides agreed to in 2014, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2012).
A major feature of the agreement included the replacement of the existing autonomous region of Mindanao with a new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) with its own government and greater autonomy on budgeting, law enforcement, civil liberties, and natural resources (Ximenes 2018). In 2015 44 members of the Special Action Force died in an encounter with the MILF and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom fighters, derailing progress on legislation (Marcelo 2018). In short the intent of the legislation included the establishment of a new bureaucratic structure with autonomy for a region of the state that the central government long struggled to govern due to cultural and religious differences as well as the exploitation of locals for the benefit of the state overall.

Another four years passed however before legislation to meet the terms of the agreement made its way through the Congress of the Philippines. The Basic Law passed the Senate and House of Representatives in July 2018 and abolished the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao by creating a new governmental structure for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. Delays in the passage of the law four years after terms established in the peace negotiations led to breakaway groups in the region including the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Ansar al-Khalifa and the Maute Group taking up arms against the state (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2018). The expectation is the Basic Law’s passage will end decades of fighting in the region which Duterte noted as an effort at healing the long suffering of the Moros and received support from leaders in Mindanao as well but see it as a milestone, not the end and will require adherence to the law by the state (ABS-CBN 2018).

A final legislative effort to improve administrative capacity to consider is part of an effort to improve the investigating ability of the Philippine government. The state passed the National Bureau of Investigation Reorganization and Modernization Act in 2016. Previously several units
with overlapping counterterrorism authority had limited investigative powers, overlapping jurisdiction, and unclear, undefined roles in responding to and investigating terrorist attacks and organizations (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017). Among changes made under the legislation include establishing regional offices in all provinces of the Philippines with a Head Agent and defined roles for each investigative unit in terms of specific types of criminal activity including terrorism (Republic 10867).

**Legal Efforts in Malaysia and Singapore**

Finally, the early legislative foundations for modern counterterrorism policy and efforts to build the capacity of the state are intertwined for the states of Malaysia and Singapore. As noted in an earlier section, Malaysia and Singapore once existed as a single entity until the Malaysian Parliament voted to expel Singapore from the Federation in 1965. Prior to their separation legislators in the Malaysian Parliament introduced the Prevention of Crime Act (POCA) of 1959 and the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1960. The two acts served as the basis of criminal law in the state for several decades. The POCA of 1959 established the general legal structure for the state post-British rule and only briefly mentions terrorism, noting the act’s importance for “the more effectual prevention of crime throughout Malaysia and for the control of criminals, members of secret societies, terrorists, and other undesirable persons” (POCA 1959 [2015], p. 7) with more specific details regarding terrorism left to the Malaysia Penal Code.

The ISA of 1960 provided the state with expansive powers in terms of detaining suspects of crimes including terrorism during a national state of emergency in the early 1960s during a communist rebellion (HRW 2002). Under Section 73 of the law any police officer had authority to arrest and detain any person suspected of acting or preparing to act in a manner that could threaten the security of Malaysia (Suhakam 2002). Meant to be a temporary measure, the ISA
remained a regularly used law until its repeal in 2011 ("Malaysia Repeals" 2011). The ISA allowed authorities to detain individuals for sixty days and an infinite number of two year extensions to the initial detainment. Individuals did not receive the right to a trial and the ISA included no process for judicial review (HRW 2002). Prime ministers and officials in Malaysia since 1960 used the ISA for political purposes to target opposition leaders, academics, unions, and religious, social, environmental, and women’s rights activists (HRW 2002).

Meanwhile Singapore continued to use the ISA after its separation from Malaysia. Unlike Malaysia though, Singapore revised the legislation in 1985 and the law continues to provide the foundation for state security in Singapore. Singapore’s ISA focuses on providing the state with the power to preventatively detain individuals and suppress organized violence in Singapore (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2009). The act specifically defines terrorist as anyone who possesses firearms or explosives in a manner that threatens public safety and the public order, possesses weapons without legal authority to do so, and anyone who “is about to act, or has recently acted, in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order.” Anyone convicted under the ISA faces life imprisonment (Internal Security Act 2018).

Both the POCA and the ISA have received criticism for violating human rights norms and the civil liberties of Malaysians and Singaporeans. In the case of the POCA, revised several times since 1959, the Home Ministry in 2018 announced plans to establish a special committee to review the POCA and other laws related to national security to ensure they are not being used for political purposes or to persecute individuals based on their ideology ("Special Committee” 2018; “Malaysia Repeals” 2011).

Meanwhile in September 2011 Prime Minister Najib Razak in Malaysia announced plans to repeal the ISA and its replacement with the Security Offenses (Special Measures) Act
(SOSMA) of 2012. Parliament passed SOSMA and replaced the ISA in July of 2012, though Razak allowed the ISA to be used in the interim to detain 13 individuals indefinitely for suspected links to militant groups in the country (HRW 2011a). The opposition in Parliament also raised concerns regarding the lack of inclusion of an amendment to allow judges to hold discretionary power over evidence submitted by the police to ensure torture or force are not used to obtain testimony or other evidence (Arukesamy 2015).

Among the changes included in SOSMA after passage is a clause granting suspects the right to a fair trial and a maximum detention period of 28 days after which the attorney general must provide a decision on the intention to prosecute and the charges to be brought against individuals. The 28-day period sub-section of the law must be renewed every five years to ensure the police are not abusing the provision and currently has been renewed through 2022 (Bernama 2017). SOSMA also guarantees notification of next-of-kin and the right to a lawyer (SOSMA 2015). The use of SOSMA to detain suspects came soon after its passage with the arrest of two suspects in February of 2013. The act immediately received criticism because of its arbitrary use and the fact one of those detained had been held for several years under the ISA (Amnesty International 2013), raising questions of if the effort to maintain the state’s capacity to detain suspects accomplished the stated goals of reform.

SOSMA continues to raise questions among human rights organizations though for many of the same issues associated with the ISA. No judicial oversight exists in the first 24 hours in custody, access to a lawyer and next-of-kin notification can be delayed for 48 hours on the approval of a high-level police officer, and prosecution witnesses can remain anonymous and not subject to cross-examination at trial (HRW 2011b; Spiegel 2012). Further, the definition of a security offense under SOSMA as an act “prejudicial to national security and public safety” and
acts “detrimental to parliamentary democracy” (SOSMA 2015) which sets up the potential for abuse due to the vagueness of what to consider prejudicial or detrimental (Spiegel 2012).

Both Malaysia and Singapore established other legislative measures to improve state capacity in addition to revising and replacing the ISA. In the case of Malaysia The Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) of 2015 allows Malaysian authorities to detain those suspected of involvement in terrorist activities for up to two years and does not allow for appeal or judicial review of those detentions. A Prevention of Terrorism Board reviews each case instead. POTA received legislative approval shortly after a plot against the capital and the arrest of several suspects (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016).

The most recent piece of legislation in Malaysia introduced to improve the administrative capacity of the state to combat terrorism among other issues, the National Security Council Act of 2016 received legislative approval in December 2015. The act allows for the creation of a National Security Council, the establishment of specific security zones, and grants new legal authority to the Security Forces in an effort to improve the state’s ability to maintain security and stability in various regions of the state. The act allows the Prime Minister to declare areas of Malaysia as “national security areas” for six month periods when security is “seriously disturbed or threatened by a person, matter or thing which is likely to cause serious harm to the people, or serious harm to the territories, economy, national key infrastructure of Malaysia or any other interest of Malaysia, and requires immediate national response” (Buchanan 2016).

In short the state’s ability to expand military capacity into particular regions of the state can be quickly implemented without legislative debate. Critics and leaders of the opposition coalition raised concerns that the NSC Act specifically blurs the lines between executive, legislative, and judicial authority (Buchanan 2016). The Act provides Malaysian authorities with
the power to execute warrantless searches and arrests as well as impose curfews on areas of the
state as well as suppress demonstrations by citizens (Buchanan 2016; al Jazeera 2016). Provision
18 for example provides the Prime Minister the authority to establish security areas (Benedict
2016). While military capacity to respond to terrorism quickly is enhanced with the NSC Act
there is a degree of concern over leaders utilizing this authority in unproductive, non-democratic
ways that could lead to repression of opposing factions.

For Singapore a series of acts passes since 2006 specifically add legal definitions and
penalties for terrorism to the city-state’s legal code. In October 2006 the Singaporean Parliament
approved the Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act which supports the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. Under this legislation any individual
“who intentionally and without lawful excuse delivers, places, discharges or detonates an
explosive or other lethal device” in public places, state or government facilities, public
transportation systems, or infrastructure facilities “with intent to cause death or serious bodily
injury, or extensive destruction of such place, facility, or system that results in or is likely to
result in major economic loss” (Terrorism Act 2008). In short the act, updated in 2008, clearly
delineates who the state considers a terrorist based on actions taken in support of a movement or
organization. The parliament amended the act to allow the government to respond to extradition
requests (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2008) and any person in Singapore with knowledge of
terrorism not provided to the state faces a fine or prison term (Terrorism Act 2008).

Singapore passed two other pieces of legislation to support legal capacity efforts in the
city-state. In August 2010 the Singaporean Parliament passed the Hostage Taking Act to support
the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2010).
The act supports state capacity in combatting terrorism by defining specific punishments for
hostage-taking including life imprisonment, death, fines, and caning (Hostage-Taking Act 2011). Most recently in 2017 the Parliament passed the Terrorism (Suppression of Misuse of Radioactive Material) Act which updates several elements of the 2007 act including language regarding nuclear and radioactive material. Possession of such material can result in a sentence of life in prison while threats to “do any act that would be an offense under section 6 or 7,” (Terrorism Act 2017) using radioactive material or attacking a nuclear facility, faces charges up to ten years in prison. The actual use of radioactive material to carry out an attack results in the death penalty while similar legislation regarding biological and chemical weapons is under consideration as well (Liang 2017).

In short, in the wake of movements such as Jemaah Islamiyah in the 1990s and 2000s all four states in the region revised existing or enacted new laws to provide additional authority to the executive and judicial sections of government to improve the capacity of the state. Specific legal definitions and proscribed punishments for acts of terrorism allow each Southeast Asian state to improve administrative capacity by targeting terrorists and their supporters alike. These legal revisions parallel those discussed in the Sub-Saharan cases covered in Chapter Five and illustrate a similar approach across regions of the developing world to accounting for terrorism in the twenty-first century. Yet also as is the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, the challenge in Southeast Asia is for states to not abuse their newfound powers as noted in cases in both regions. New bureaucratic tools improve state capacity but again, the flipside of this issue is the potential for using these tools to repress those not involved in terrorism.

Semi-Formal Bureaucratic Measures

Also similar to the Sub-Saharan cases of Cameroon and Chad, states in Southeast Asia integrate their bureaucratic efforts with members of the religious community. While the focus in the former cases is providing legislative guarantees for religious freedom in the state’s legal
system, the latter Southeast Asian cases adopted de-radicalization and counter-propaganda programs in conjunction with their religious communities to both preempt recruitment and radicalization by terrorist organizations and work to safely reintegrate ex-terrorists back into society. All four states adopted this approach in one form or another with varying results.

**Semi-Bureaucratic Measures in Indonesia and Malaysia**

Indonesia’s counterterrorism strategy includes not only military and bureaucratic operations but also prison reform, rehabilitation programs, and the production of counter-propaganda (Gindarsah 2014). In the early years of the program Afghan veterans, members of JI, and those from smaller movements received de-radicalization “training” in a program that soon spread to prisons around Indonesia. The program revolves around the idea that radicals listen to other radicals and by providing inmates with an informed, welcoming approach to call out the inaccuracies of extremist Islamic ideologies, individuals will leave the terrorist life behind upon release (Schulze 2008). Other related programs such as Yayasan Prastasi Perdamaian build libraries in Indonesian prisons to provide those being de-radicalized with texts and religious teachers that challenge the key tenets of extremist ideologies (Yayasan 2018). De-radicalization or ‘soft approaches’ lead to the construction of large networks of paid informants and former militants that work to persuade other radicals though those involved with the program gain a degree of suspicion for their complicity in working with the state (Tyson 2011).

In late 2012 Indonesia’s Minister of Law and Human Rights issued Regulation 99 in order to reduce the chances of recidivism by those released from prison. The new regulation required those convicted of narcotics trafficking, corruption, and terrorism to sign loyalty oaths to the Indonesian government, provide evidence and information to prosecutors, and exhibit notable good behavior as well as participation in “de-radicalization” programs (IPAC 2013).
Participation in the program to qualify for release includes a statement of loyalty which varies from prison to prison. For example, the Kedung Pane prison requires prisoners to sign a “Justice Collaborator Statement” also signed by a Detachment 88 official stating:

“I the undersigned […] state truthfully that I am prepared to cooperate with law enforcement officials (police, prosecutors, Detachment 88) to investigate the crime that I have been accused of and I am prepared to help expose the crime I committed. This is a truthful statement and if I violate the terms of this statement I am prepared to be charged in accordance with existing laws and regulations” (IPAC 2013, p. 12).

Indonesia implemented a de-radicalization program in their response to trying and convicting those involved with terrorism. As of 2013, Indonesian police arrested and tried around 700 suspects for since the first major post-9/11 incident in Bali in 2002 (IPAC 2013).

The efforts to de-radicalize have not been entirely without issue. Those opposed to violence and charged with supporting terrorists quickly signed on and benefited from de-radicalization efforts while others such as the Bali bombers showed no interest in participation. No post-prison rehabilitation exists and a lack of skills, employment prospects, and money also result in former terrorists returning to their old networks (Schulze 2008). By 2018, it became clear the de-radicalization efforts by Indonesia are not foolproof. One report in 2013 suggested of some 270 released after serving their sentences, 28 have been re-arrested or killed in police operations related to counterterrorism (IPAC 2013), though other agencies report different figures due to varying definitions of arrests and convictions (IPAC 2013).

In 2018 the Indonesian National Police admitted further incidences of recidivism. Out of 1,200 convicts linked to terrorism since 2002, 300 are involved with de-radicalization programs. Yet the suspect of a terrorist attack in Bandung, West Java in March of 2017 had been released in 2014 after completing a de-radicalization program. Yayat Cahdiyat served two of a three year sentence for robbing a gas station to fund a paramilitary training camp in Aceh in 2010. Soon
after his release in 2014 Yayat joined the Islamic State-linked Jemaah Ansarud Daulah (JAD) (Ramadhani and Aritonang 2017). Inmates responded negatively to the issuance of Regulation 99 in 2012 and within a month a riot broke out at the Tanjung Gusta prison in Medan over several issues including the injustice of Regulation 99. The Minister of Justice capitulated by agreeing to only apply the regulation to those convicted after November 12, 2012 (IPAC 2013).

Malaysia also implemented rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs in its prisons for those convicted of terrorist activity in conjunction with Muslim leaders in the state. In addition, the state established the Islamic Development Authority (JAKIM) to counter violent extremism among other issues related to the practice of Islam in Malaysia. Meant as an entity to promote Islam in the state, JAKIM has been accused of being a state apparatus of the ruling Umno party since the 1980s to push the state’s preferred vision of Islam with the Home Ministry having the authority to ban books, ban the use of certain words such as “allah” by non-Muslims, and JAKIM’s operation of a free-to-air televisions station, Alhijrah (Teoh 2017).

Among other activities, JAKIM works to train teachers in mosques and Islamic institutions and to guide the implementation of Islamic family law among those of the faith in Malaysia’s thirteen states and three federal territories. The Razak administration allocated JAKIM and the Federal Territory Islamic Department 810.9 million ringgit (approximately 197 million USD) (Hassan 2018). Participants are segregated from the rest of the prison population to ensure they are not influenced by those not participating in the program. The state works in conjunction with JAKIM (the Malaysian Islamic Affairs Department), psychologists, and NGOs. (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011; Star 2016). Malaysia established a de-radicalization center for rehabilitation of terrorists at the Kamunting Detention Center in Taiping to provide a specialized area for those in the program. Concerns over recruitment of individuals in prison by
two former prisoners in Tapah prison, held under SOSMA, and seven wardens of various prisons around the country, now being rehabilitated themselves under POCA, led to the need to create separate facilities for extremists (FMT Reporters 2017). By 2018 Malaysia’s deradicalization program succeeded in rehabilitating ninety-seven percent of those that participated according to Malaysia’s defense minister (“Mat Sabu” 2018).

Concerns however with the scope and budget of JAKIM emerged in recent years. In 2017 JAKIM faced criticism for overstepping its authority in seizing Malay and Iban-translations of the Bible owned by the Bible Society of Malaysia which it then refused to return despite a state order (Teoh 2017). In another case JAKIM refused to discontinue the program testing the genealogy of illegitimate Muslim children disputed in federal court but supported by the National Fatwa Council (Bernama 2017). In 2018 Prime Minister Mohamad announced intentions to review the work of JAKIM and make changes to the organizations budget though observers suggest the agency has approval of the people of Malaysia and interference with the organization could raise fears of the targeting of Malay-Muslim rights (Hassan 2018).

_Semi-Bureaucratic Measures in the Philippines and Singapore_

In the case of the Philippines the government established a counter-radicalization program, the Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan or PAMANA (Resilient Communities in Conflict Affected Communities), in 2010. Established by President Aquino for peace-building, reconstruction, and development in five thousand specific conflict-affected locations across the country, the program provided resources for those displaced by conflict, reintegration support for former combatants and terrorists, and development programs (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011).

The program included the implementation of the Bayanihan Leaders Program in 2011. The program originated out of the country’s larger Internal Peace and Security Plan which
focuses on reducing the vulnerability of those living below the poverty threshold to recruitment by criminal syndicates and terrorist groups that ultimately require government expenditures and resources on national security that could be applied to other state-wide concerns if these organizations could be diminished (National Security Policy 2011-2016, p. 22). The program brings various members of the community including the Department of Education and the Department of Social Welfare and Development, local government entities, religious organizations, and youth groups together to educate communities about the threats of extremist organizations, their efforts to recruit new members, and identify propaganda from extremist movements (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011). The program has its roots in a successful program in the Bohol region that succeeded in eradicating insurgents in 2010 by reducing poverty, enhancing public services such as healthcare and education, and coordinating efforts between the security forces, local governments, and private sector (Brawner 2012). The program received national attention and local officials in Mindanao pushed for replicating the national-local military coordination on the island and replicating mock security maneuvers, another aspect of the larger “Bayanihan” program (Unson 2017). The program continues under Duterte.

Finally Singapore adopted similar semi-formal measures as those established in the other three Southeast Asian cases. The Religious Rehabilitation Group, formed in 2003, is a voluntary organization in Singapore that promotes tolerance and through programming seeks to provide counter-narratives to those pushed by violent extremist organizations in the state (Nasir 2018). Initially the group’s primary goal focused on rehabilitating detained Jemaah Islamiyah members and their families but broadened their scope to include those self-radicalized and supportive of ISIS (RRG 2016). Among those subjected to religious rehabilitation, none freed after counseling had returned to extremist organizations as of 2010 (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2010). A major
component of the RRG’s stated mission is to “correct the misinterpretation of Islamic concepts and dispel the extremist and terrorist ideologies they have been indoctrinated with…and help them come to terms with the fact that they have been misled” (RRG 2016). RRG counselors are certified by a selection board and require specialist degrees in counseling and psychology as well as being well-read in geopolitics. RRG also attempts to reach out to those recruited via social media platforms including Facebook, Youtube, and other platforms to counter false ideologies and message from terrorist groups (Song 2015). Singapore also encourages inter-religious and inter-ethnic coordination and facilitates meetings between various communities and groups to build trust and address issues within the state (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016).

In 2016 Singapore launched the SGSecure Initiative and a smartphone application while the RRG launched its own application that allows users to ask questions and have conversations with RRG imams and counselors. The SGSecure Initiative focuses on sensitizing, training, and mobilizing Singaporeans during terrorist incidents (Nasir 2018). The Initiative provides all citizens of Singapore with advice on being aware of articles left unattended in public places, looking out for suspicious behavior by individuals, and signs of radicalization in family and friends (Ministry of Home Affairs 2018a). Downloads of the SGSecure application reached one million in the first year of operation but the government began efforts to move from raising public awareness about terrorism to increasing preparedness among individuals for terror attacks (Sue-Ann 2017). The RRG’s new smartphone app is geared toward deterring potential recruits by providing a counter-narrative to extremist propaganda posted online by ISIS and other organizations (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016). Individuals participate in private chats with RRG counselors. The RRG evolved after its first mission in de-radicalizing members of JI to
now be proactive against those radicalized online (Salleh 2017), demonstrating an almost individual-level state capacity approach to counterterrorism in Singapore.

In summary the four cases under consideration in Southeast Asia adopted not only a series of legal reforms to improve bureaucratic and administrative policy but also worked closely with the religious community to build de-radicalization programs and counter-propaganda measures to supplement the legal capacity side of countering terrorism in the state. While Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore each revised or established definitions of terrorism and specific punishments for participation or support in terrorism-related activities, all four also established forward-thinking measures to attempt to inhibit recruitment of future terrorists as well as minimize the potential for those that serve sentences for involvement in terrorism to returning to violent extremism.

**Military Capacity Measures against Terrorism**

As with the states of Sub-Saharan Africa considered in Chapter Five, the states of Southeast Asia also established new military units and structures as well as new policing priorities and programs to complement the administrative capacity-building efforts taken since the rise of JI and other movements in the 2000s. Regional and national level police forces are used in conjunction with specialized units of the state military to maintain border security, identify potential terrorists, and respond after attacks by Jemaah Islamiyah and other militants. Unlike the Sub-Saharan cases however, there appears to be less evidence of informal arrangements with groups of citizens to combat terrorism in the region.

**Anti-Terrorism Units in Indonesia and Malaysia**

Indonesia established three particular units to support counterterrorism efforts in the state. First, the Indonesian National Police (INP) exists as a Ministry in the Indonesian government and answers directly to the President of Indonesia. In 1999 Indonesia restructured the 400,000
police to separate the organization from the military to establish a civilian force and improved efforts at community policing and crime prevention (INTERPOL 2018). The INP continued to struggle with issues of human rights abuses after the division from the military in 2000. For example in 2009 the INP faced accusations including the use of torture tactics such as electric shocks, sexual assault, and beatings during police interrogations and detention (Uppal 2009).

Special Detachment 88, also referred to as Densus 88, is the second specialized branch of the INP dedicated to counterterrorism efforts. Established in 2003, Densus 88 came in response to the 2002 Bali bombings and through financial support for counterterrorism from the United States. The unit soon began investigating and deterring activities by Jemaah Islamiyah and arrested several of its members using DNA analysis and forensics rather than invasive and violent suspect sweeps through Central Java (McDonald 2008). However, like the INP, Densus 88 forces have committed human rights abuses against terror suspects including torture and physical violence including kicking a suspect repeatedly in the chest in one case (Prasetyo 2016).

Densus 88 remained active over the last fifteen years, particularly in response to a number of incidents in 2018. In May 2018 Densus 88 personnel attempted to arrest and then shot four terror suspects in West Java (Kahfi 2018). In response to the recent wave of attacks in Indonesia the chief of the INP, General Tito Karnavian, worked to increase Densus 88’s capabilities. At the end of 2017 Densus 88 received resources to add 600 extra personnel to monitor Islamic State activity and prevent lone wolf attacks in Indonesia (Kapoor 2017). Karnavin also requested in June of 2018 an increase of funding of the police budget from parliament by 44.4 trillion rupiah ($3.1 billion USD) in 2019 to expand Densus 88 to 34 provinces in Indonesia to allow for quicker response to terrorist threats (Andespu 2018).
Finally, the Indonesian military maintains a role in counterterrorism as well. In June of 2015 the Indonesian military (TNI) established a new counterterrorism squad called the TNI Joint Special Operations Command or Koopsusgab (Parameswaran 2015). The Koopsusgab is an inter-service team of eighty military officers from the Indonesian Army, Navy, and Air Force Special Forces units. The unit raised concerns however. After years of improving civil-military relations and police units such as Densus 88 taking over counterterrorism responsibilities, the Koopsusgab is seen to some as a reversion to the military-driven security of the Suharto era and a lack of coordination and separation between military and police responsibilities. The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict has argued though Indonesia should focus its counterterrorism efforts on building the capacity of Densus 88 instead of establishing a parallel military unit (Parameswaran 2015).

Leaders suspended Koopsusgab operations within a year of its inception but in May of 2018 President Widodo agreed to reinstate the unit to assist the INP with counterterrorism but under certain conditions: only when the National Police’s capacity was deemed inadequate for an emergency situation (Sapiie 2018). Democratic and military observers and activists in Indonesia continue to warn though that despite increased support for Koopsusgab operations after the attacks in Surabaya, steps should be taken to ensure the unit operates on a temporary basis only due to Indonesia’s history of military-involved repression (Anugerah 2018).

In neighboring Malaysia leaders formed several specialized units and task forces in the last decade to combat threats from Abu Sayyaf, ISIL, and other terrorist movements. In 2009 the Prime Minister established the Special Task Force within the RMP to oversee counterterrorism efforts and terrorism-related investigations (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2010). Formed in 2016 by Prime Minister Razak as part of Malaysia’s National Security Council, the National Special
Operations Force (NSOF) serves as the response unit to terrorist activity in Malaysia and incorporates elements of the Malaysian military and police. The unit allows for improvement of interagency coordination and information sharing (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016).

Malaysia established one unit, the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM), in response to an uprising and standoff with a militant group in 2013. The Malaysian government created ESSCOM to oversee security and respond to threats from pirates and militants from the southern Philippines in the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZONE). The area consists of a 1700 kilometer coastline that borders Indonesian and Philippine territory and includes a civilian-led task force of 64 military, police, and civilian agencies (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2014). By the next year, 2014, the Malaysian government had established a maritime curfew along the entire coastal region of Sabah and announced the addition of 330 police officers and 350 army personnel to the ESSCOM force to continue securing the border region (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2015) though kidnappings for ransom by Abu Sayyaf in the Malaysian territorial waters continued into at least 2015 (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016).

**Military Measures in the Philippines and Singapore**

In the case of the Philippines the Internal Peace and Security Plan called for a reform in security responsibilities across the state, moving internal security functions from the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the Philippine National Police (PNP). However even in 2016 the armed forces continued to play a lead role in counterterrorism as gaps in the capabilities between the military and domestic security services remain unaddressed (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016) though the PNP succeeded in November 2017 at thwarting an Abu Sayyaf plot to disrupt the meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) world leaders as well as officials from the European Union and United Nations in Manila (Davies 2018).
Finally, in the case of Singapore Internal Security Department (ISD) is the law enforcement entity responsible for investigating and preventing terrorism in Singapore but is the primary law enforcement agency for the state overall (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2013). The ISD’s powers of investigation are regulated by the Criminal Procedure Code, Official Secrets Act, Internal Security Act, and Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act and the organization dates back to the British colonial government and originally focused on dealing with subversion in the state (Ministry of Home Affairs 2018b). Singapore maintains both military and domestic divisions of its security forces which provide external and border security for the state in addition to the ISD’s role in domestic security. While the Singapore Civil Defense Force are tasked with firefighting, emergency services, and emergency warning systems in the event of air raids, industrial accidents, or natural disasters, the Defense Force plays a role in responding to terrorist incidents as well (SCDF 2018).

As noted in a Bureau of Counterterrorism report, “the government of Singapore has a ‘not if, but when’ stance regarding the likelihood of terrorist attacks within the city-state” (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016). Thus several units of the state’s internal and external security forces are counterterrorism units. As with the other states discussed in this chapter an important element to Singapore’s counterterrorism efforts is naval and coast guard operations. The Singapore Police Coast Guard includes several units and squadrons as well as bases across the city-state. The Loyang and Lim Chu Kang Regional bases focus on the northern port waters of Singapore while the Brani and Gul Regional bases provide support to the southern port waters of the state. After a JI plot uncovered in 2002 indicated the need for increased maritime-based counterterrorism, Singapore increased port and ship monitoring for various terrorist threats and explosives to the Coast Guard responsibilities (“Singapore Reveals” 2002).
Anti-Terrorism Programs

In addition to the aforementioned military and police units with dedicated responsibilities for counterterrorism in the region three of the four states considered in this chapter developed a series of programs and reforms, in some cases in consultation with US representatives, to improve military capacity across each state in the region and improve border security. First in the case of Malaysia the Eyes-in-the-Sky (EiS) program coordinates aerial surveillance of the Singapore and Malacca Straits between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The Malacca Straits, the world’s busiest shipping lane, also allows for monitoring of illicit trafficking and other potential security threats to Malaysia and its neighbors (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2008).

For the Philippines improved monitoring of territory in the southern end of the country’s expansive territory allowed for increased military capacity in terms of minimizing the freedom of movement of terrorist groups and their supporters in the Sulu Archipelago and the island of Mindanao. In September 2011 President Aquino signed an executive order establishing the Coast Watch System to coordinate security and protect maritime boundaries against violent extremism (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2011). With US assistance, the Philippines opened the National Coast Watch Center (NCWC) in 2015 to function as a strategic hub for maritime security in the southern Philippines (Parameswaran 2017). The NCWC coordinates policies and programs to secure border regions and trade traffic through the Sulu Archipelago and the Sulawesi Sea, the long-time safe-haven for groups such as Abu Sayyaf (Comer 2010; Porcalla 2011).

With assistance from the US Department of Justice the Philippines improved policing through the Southern Philippines Law Enforcement Development Project and provided training to the PNP in policing and investigation techniques in several provinces as well as equipment for maritime policing in the Palawan Province through the Maritime Police Project (Bureau of
Counterterrorism 2008). In addition, the program included training for every individual officer serving in the critical areas of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao including the Sulu and Tawi-Tawi provinces and Cotabato and Isabela cities and specialized training for select units across the southern Philippines (Embassy of the US, Manila 2012) as well as a computer-based forensics systems to boost the state’s ability to collect and utilize evidence in pursuing criminal charges against terrorist groups and individuals (Chalk 2008).

Finally, Singapore established the Changi Regional Command and Control Center to coordinate large-scale multinational operations and exercises and share information on regional disasters as well as strengthen networks of information with partner militaries in the region (“New Maritime Command” 2007). In 2015 to further the integration and coordination of agencies involved with border security in Singapore, the state announced a new Integrated Checkpoints Command system which includes land, air, and sea components and streamlines the chain of command for agencies involved with narcotics, immigration, and terrorism (Min 2015).

In addition to improve military capacity and the state’s response to various threats, Singapore established a series of military readiness exercises that include terrorist attack simulations. The state conducts an annual sixteen-day readiness exercise referred to as Northstar which consists of a series of coordinated mock terrorist attacks on hotels and infrastructure across the country, simulating attacks similar to the bombings in Mumbai in 2008 (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016). The 2017 edition of the Northstar Exercise included the first-ever large scale counterterrorism exercise at Changi Airport with a scenario responding to six gunmen and a suicide bomber on a simulated busy Saturday afternoon. The exercise resulted in the neutralization of the simulated terrorists and an improvised explosive device (IED) (Parameswaran 2017). Several hundred personnel from the state’s army, police, port authority,
and civil defense forces coordinate their efforts in responding to the simulated attacks each year (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2016). An additional annual exercise, APEX, tests the government’s response to maritime terrorist incidents (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2009).

Internationally, the country hosts the Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise Deep Sabre with thousands of personnel from twenty-one countries to improve coordination between states and demonstrate Singapore’s multi-agency program for responding to terrorists and those attempting to move people or materials through Singapore (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2009). The 2016 edition of the Deep Sabre exercise included table top exercises with allies on intercepting cargo as well as an at-sea phase practicing the boarding, searching, and seizure of a vessel-of-interest (Task Force 73 2016). Singapore also supported efforts to train Afghan civilians in counterterrorism strategies and improving administrative capacity elements including healthcare, civil aviation, and wastewater management (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2009).

In sum, like the cases considered in Chapter Five, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore each implemented reforms to the structure of their military and domestic security apparatuses to improve military capacity in response to the threat of terrorism in the 2000s. While in some cases jurisdiction over counterterrorism moved to either the external or internal security apparatus of the state, in most coordination and integration of responsibilities replaced haphazard response plans and allowed for improved capacity and response to threats form JI, ISIS, and other movements across the region.

**Regional Efforts at Building Capacity**

In addition to the national-level efforts carried out by the four states considered in this chapter, each is member to larger, sub-regional and regional agreements and organizations which also strengthen state capacity. Two are discussed in detail here: the counter-terrorism agreements
and conventions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Southeast Asian Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) headquartered in Malaysia. Other regional and international efforts such as Project Trace, a three-year initiative from 2017 to 2020 supported by INTERPOL to build counter-terrorism capacity in the ASEAN member states by providing training, resources, and intelligence (INTERPOL 2017), exist as well but the ASEAN conventions and the SEARCCT are the most developed initiatives taken in the 21st century to combat terrorism in the region.

ASEAN

Members of ASEAN signed several agreements in the last twenty years to coordinate efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime in the region including the 2001 Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism as well as sub-regional efforts including the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in 2002 to combat transnational crime and Malaysia’s joint effort at establishing its Regional Counter-Terrorism Center (Pushpanathan 2003). Members of ASEAN signed on to the Convention on Counter Terrorism in 2007 which specifically notes that “terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group,” signifying the importance in the region of differentiating between religious movements and terrorist organizations and focusing counterterrorist policy efforts on violent extremists, not on repressing various entities in the state. In particular, the convention encourages states to work to prevent transnational terrorist activity including financing and the movement of resources through member state’s territory but also establishes jurisdiction over terrorist offenses to facilitate ensuring perpetrators are subject to the rule of law where an attack occurs.
All ten member states of ASEAN ratified the Convention by 2013 but had been in force since 2011 (“ASEAN Convention” 2013). A revised ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counterterrorism, introduced in 2017, expanded the region’s counterterror strategy (Bukit 2018) and in 2018 ASEAN announced a historic agreement on the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation to Counter International Terrorism which includes technical and regulatory assistance, financial intelligence sharing, and countering online radicalization in the ten states plus Australia (Manila 2018). Critics note though ASEAN fails to address the issue of thousands of Southeast Asians departing for the Middle East to join ISIS and later return to the region as trained combatants to support local terrorist movements (Bukit 2018). Others such as the Chief of Army for the state of Singapore argue that ASEAN militaries must improve the collective response to more than terrorist financing including chemical, biological, and radiological terrorist threats where joint efforts are still lacking (Liew 2018).

*Southeast Asian Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT)*

Malaysia established the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur in 2003 as a regional entity to support Malaysia and its neighbors in improving state capacity across the region and mitigate the threat of transnational terrorism to the region. SEARCCT provides training to Malaysian and other police and military forces and collaborates with other governments and international organizations. Specifically, SEARCCT promotes the idea that terrorism can be fought by more than military means through several core areas of training such as investigation, aviation and maritime security, cyber terrorism, financing of terrorism, and prevention and rehabilitation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018).

SEARCCT hosts hundreds of training events between 2003 and 2017 including seminars on crisis training, finance, and transportation security (SEARCCT Prospectus 2018; Bureau of
Counterterrorism 2015) and coordinates with other organizations such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to increase regional law enforcement and collaboration on prosecutions of terrorism cases (UNODC 2011). SEARCCT also produces a series of publications encouraging various prevention and de-radicalization strategies. One example is “Don’t-Lah Wei!: A Peer-to-Peer Resource Guide on Ensuring Your Kawan (Friend) Never Becomes a Terrorist” which includes chapters entitled “I Am a Female Terrorist-HEAR ME ROAR: The Terrorist Call to Women” and “So You Think You Can Dance Counter Terrorism?: Running a Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Module for Young People” (Samuel 2018), demonstrating the state’s regional capacity strategy being centered on much more than military coordination.

**Findings and Continuing Weaknesses in Capacity**

Indonesia ranks 96th out of 180 countries listed in Transparency International’s *Corruption Perceptions Index 2017*, therefore around the middle of the pack in terms of corruption in states around the world. While Indonesia’s democratic institutions grew after the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 leading to multiple peaceful transitions of power including transitions between political parties. However, systemic corruption and violence against some minority groups continues. Indonesia also politicized defamation and blasphemy laws in recent years, repressing the freedom of speech of Indonesians (Freedom House 2017a). Corruption in Indonesia is present in all three branches of the government with Parliament widely considered the most corrupt institution with rampant bureaucratic corruption as well. However, in recent years the state’s Anti-Corruption Commission improved public perceptions and the business environment with several anti-corruption reforms. Decentralization of political powers shifted corruption from the state to the local level though and corruption in the judiciary indicates the needs for protection for the Commission and its authority (Merkle 2018).
Recent incidents include sending hundreds of members of a banned religious group to “reeducation” sessions, the arrest of thousands during non-violent rallies supporting independence for the Papua and West Papua provinces, and the use of defamation and blasphemy laws to target minority religious groups by regulating dress and behavior (Freedom House 2017a). Nine members of the persecuted Ahmadiyah religious community filed a petition to abolish the blasphemy law on the basis that it fuels discrimination and abuse of religious minorities. Indonesia’s Constitutional Court however ruled the abuses against religious groups occur due to ‘local regulations’ and enforcement, not the blasphemy law itself (Winowatan 2018). In addition, in November 2018 Indonesia launched a smartphone application, much like the SGSecure app in Singapore, to allow mobile users to report individuals suspected of ‘religious heresy’ and lists several religious groups as ‘deviant,’ risking further religious tensions and persecution of minority groups in the state (Harsono 2018).

Indonesia’s counterterrorism law, argues Human Rights Watch, uses an overly broad and ambiguous definition of terrorism that allows for the targeting of indigenous groups and religious or political organizations’ political activity. HRW also criticizes the law for its extensive pre-trial detention period, giving law enforcement the authority to arbitrarily open and examine private mail and packages, and gives the Indonesian armed forces domestic policing authority without law enforcement training (HRW 2018a). In 2018 officials in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta authorized a new anti-crime campaign for one month allowing police to use deadly force against suspects resisting arrest. Officials instituted the ‘shoot to kill’ program after observing the tactics used by the Philippines Duterte in his “war on drugs” (Kine 2018). In addition, Indonesian security forces unlawfully killed at least 95 people, many engaged in legal political activities,
over an eight year span in the Papua and West Papua provinces according to a recent report by Amnesty International with no consequences for the perpetrators (Amnesty International 2018).

Malaysia ranks 62nd out of 180 countries listed in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, just outside the upper third of states in the world. The same political coalition however has held power since 1957 by gerrymandering, encouraging and appealing to ethnic nationalists, suppressing criticism of the coalition through restrictive free speech laws and prosecutions of political opponents. (Freedom House 2017b). Several anti-corruption reforms improved the state’s ranking including a judicial reform program aimed at driving out corrupt judges through improved monitoring of court proceedings and existing cases (McDevitt 2017) but elsewhere in the Malaysian legal world political opposition figures continue to face sedition charges for criticizing the government and the judiciary and in 2016 a court ruled against making public a report on Prime Minister Najib Razak’s mismanagement and embezzlement of a state development fund, 1MDB (Freedom House 2017b).

Recent incidents include the government’s arrest of several activists and organizers, shutting down independent news sites such as The Malaysian Insider, and the incarceration of a member of the political opposition for making public a report on the 1MDB scandal (Freedom House 2017b). The government also used the Sedition, Communications, and Multimedia Act to prosecute those that make ‘insulting’ comments on social media to Prime Minister Najib and members of the royal family (Melayu 2015). In early 2018 the Najib administration proposed a new “fake news’ law with various penalties in an effort to control any negative coverage of the regime (HRW 2018b). Before the bill could be passed into law however the Najib administration lost a May 2018 election and the state charged Najib with ten counts of breach of trust and additional criminal charges (“Year of Anti-Corruption” 2018) as well as Najib’s wife with two
counts of corruption for 45 million in bribes for government contracts (“Malaysia Charges” 2018). The current government under the Pakatan Harapan coalition promised in 2018 to repeal the Sedition Act, deeming it “oppressive and unjust,” as well as the death penalty by the end of the year (HRW 2018c) While the Mohamad administration suspended the Sedition Act in 2018, the full repeal of the law has yet to occur (“Malaysia to Abolish” 2018).

The Philippines ranks 111th out of 180 countries listed in Transparency International’s *Corruption Perceptions Index 2017*, the lowest of the four states discussed in this chapter and thus the most corrupt. The election of Rodrigo Duterte and the subsequent assassinations and threats against activists, and overall corruption in politics limit the state’s capacity in spite of various reforms and policies. Extrajudicial killings and vigilante justice increased with the ‘war on drugs,’ resulting in the deaths of more than six thousand in 2016 (Freedom House 2017c). Investigations of numerous incidents find that the police routinely plant weapons and evidence including drugs and ammunition next to victims’ bodies though few follow-up prosecutions occur (Adams 2018b).

Even when the Philippine National Police announced the suspension of anti-drug operations following revelations regarding the death of a South Korean businessman, Duterte immediately ordered the Armed Forces of the Philippines to “fill the gap created by suspended police operations by taking a frontline role in the anti-drug campaign” who then wear civilian clothes and balaclava-style facemasks, illegally enter homes, and beat or kill various targets (HRW 2017). The Philippine legal system tried cases involving police officers in 2018 including one case in which the court convicted three officers for the murder of a 17-year old from Caloocan City, caught on CCTV which contradicted the official story from the Philippine National Police. In the footage, the 17-year old did not shoot at the officers and instead executed
him in a dark alley while kneeling on the ground. The verdict is the first conviction of security force personnel since the initiation of the ‘war on drugs’ (Adams 2018b). In spite of various concerns with repression and extrajudicial killings Duterte vowed in July 2018 that the ‘war on drugs’ would continue and “be as relentless and chilling as on the day it began” (Conde 2018).

Finally, Singapore ranks sixth out of 180 countries listed in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, sitting only behind New Zealand, Switzerland, and a group of Scandinavian states as the least corrupt states in the world. While the state’s political system remains dominated by the People’s Action Party (PAP) and the family of the current prime minister since 1959, the state experiences minimal corruption but also limited growth of opposition parties and freedom of speech (Freedom House 2017d). Early on in the state’s history though the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau investigated the Singaporean Police Force, rampant with corruption in the British colonial era, and by the 2000s resulted in very low rates of corruption in the state’s police force (Lee-Jones 2018). In 2017 for example, the Bureau registered an all-time low of 103 corruption cases state-wide (Lam 2018).

The state experiences a very low level of corruption but the use of repressive tactics by the state remain an issue. Recently a 44 year old man openly supporting the Islamic State in Facebook postings and who recruited other Singaporeans to the cause faced charges under the ISA (“Singaporean Man” 2016) while another 22 year old woman became the first female detained in Singapore for radicalism in 2017 and faced charges under the ISA after her social media postings supporting ISIS appeared online (Ministry of Home Affairs 2017). Two others also faced charges under the ISA in 2017 for terrorism-related activities after evidence linking one to Jemaah Islamiyah and the other supporting ISI online (Cheong 2017).
The act met significant criticism in recent years as well however. Several individuals including members of the business community and journalists called for reducing the authority of the state under the ISA including ending detainment without trial, phasing out caning and capital punishment, and not targeting individuals critical of the state for expressing their views publicly without violent intent (Salleh 2015). Singapore used the ISA to detain other individuals, reporters, and bloggers “on the grounds that comments they had posted on their personal Facebook pages violated rules on advertising during the ‘cooling-off period’ before a by-election” and public events are limited in terms of whether or not “foreigners are involved, the topic to be covered is in no way related to race or religion, and the organizer is present at all times” (“Killing the Chicken” 2017).

Conclusion

As the discussion in this chapter illustrates, the states of Southeast Asia adapted to the changing nature of the threat of terrorism in the twenty-first century through similar bureaucratic and military measures as discussed in the Sub-Saharan case in Chapter Five. Given that the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah dates back to the 1990s the states in Southeast Asia adjusted over a longer period of time to terrorism than those states examined in the case of Boko Haram. Newer threats though including al Qaeda and the Islamic State entering the region and local threats to states like the Philippines in the case of Abu Sayyaf and the MILF require continued adaptation to present circumstances.

Reorganization of military and police units, redefining terrorism and establishing new legal statutes and procedures, and improving intelligence gathering and monitoring of terrorist activity all are examples of improved bureaucratic and military capacity taken on by the four subject states in the last few decades. Informal approaches including coordination with private
organizations, namely the religious community, to provide support and access to information about the goings-on of at-risk individuals in the state also build state capacity. Each of the four states discussed here also require a maritime-centric strategy at building capacity with far-flung, disconnected territorial features that create conditions ripe for terrorist bases and hideouts. Thus, Malaysia’s Regional Center for Counterterrorism and ASEAN-based counterterrorism doctrines and policies support trans-regional coordination.

Yet despite these various efforts to build bureaucratic, military, and regional capacity, problems remain as with the Sub-Saharan case, though not as evenly distributed as in the Lake Chad Region. Corruption remains a much more significant issue in Indonesia and the Philippines but comparatively less so in Malaysia and Singapore. Repression however is a central issue across all four states that remain Partly Free in Transparency International’s rankings. Each of the four states takes counterterrorism and efforts to reduce political violence in the state to the point of repressing certain minority groups and using anti-terrorism laws to further political goals, hindering both capacity-building and community trust in the state.

Chapter 7, the conclusion to this dissertation, offers a comparison and brief discussion of how bureaucratic and military capacity, regional coordination, and weaknesses in state capacity vary between the Lake Chad region and the states of Southeast Asia considered in this chapter. The conclusion also provides a brief summary of the findings across all three empirical chapters and what evidence there is to support the proposed theory and hypotheses from Chapter Three.
Chapter 7: Conclusion: Findings and Future Avenues of Research

Throughout the last several chapters of this dissertation I consider why terrorism has been more prevalent in some states but less so in other countries. As noted early on in this dissertation there is no clear consensus on the primary factors driving terrorism in the world today. While others focus on individual-level explanations of ideology or economic based grievances that drive terrorist activity in the state, I look at the status of the state itself as a driving factor in explaining terrorism in the developing world. Specifically I consider the strength or weakness of state capacity and how it increases or decreases the potential for extremist organizations to implement terrorist activity. Relating back to the predator-prey analogy presented in Chapter One, the state’s weaknesses lead to a situation where the state becomes the prey to an active terrorist organization. This leads to the growth of terrorist movements that challenge the state’s authority to rule and the ability to recruit members not satisfied with the status quo in their lives in the state.

We cannot consider only one aspect of state capacity however. The abilities of the state’s military exist alongside the state’s administrative capabilities to govern. If the state finds itself incapable of deterring dissent and political violence and could fall victim to a particular terrorist movement or organization able to identify a strategic advantage. This advantage may be limited to a particular geographic territory as we see in the border regions surrounding Lake Chad in West Africa or a broader region where non-state actors can find an opportunity to operate and target the state at its weakest points as in the scattered island regions of Southeast Asia. Yet the state can also create conditions in which citizens become discontent with the state, particularly when the brutalization of citizens or corrupt practices by state institutions, lead to discontent in the population and the formation of terrorist movements to challenge the status quo.
Summary and Comparison of Findings between Regions

Chapter Four provided a broad overview of several factors of state capacity and offered a cross-national analysis of terrorism in the developing world between 1985 and 2012. After considering various factors against the number of terrorist attacks across Sub-Saharan, North African, and Southeast Asian nation-states, I found military capacity as well as repression are strong explanatory factors for increases in terrorist activity. Both consistently led to higher rates of terrorist incidents as states engage in increased military spending and repressive behaviors against their citizens. These findings are consistent with the larger body of literature on terrorism and capacity as well as terrorism and repression. Yet the results regarding my proxies for administrative capacity proved more complex to explain as the results of the cross-national analysis in Chapter Four suggests a relationship not entirely in line with the theory presented in Chapter Three. Other measures such as a proxy for infrastructural development in the state and corruption do show consistent negative relationships with the number of terrorist attacks in the developing world.

I then chose to explore four of these elements of capacity, military and administrative capacity as well as repression and clientelism, further in Chapters Five and Six and found some qualitative evidence to support the broader argument that state capacity is a balance. In regards to the Sub-Saharan African case the states of the Lake Chad region implemented various legislative and structural policies to improve bureaucratic and military capacity after the rise of Boko Haram as a regional threat between 2009 and 2018. As the group grew in membership and organizational capabilities in northeast Nigeria the state slowly begins to adapt military and administrative capacity to respond to an internal threat in a sparsely populated region with a few large population centers. At the same time the states porous borders and geographic conditions
allowed Boko Haram members to escape the authority of the state when necessary and continue to grow as a terrorist movement. By 2015 the group became a regional threat and begins to carry out attacks in the neighboring states of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger that then also began to adapt their military organizations and legal structures to respond to weaknesses identified in the state’s capacity to stop the violence carried out by Boko Haram.

Elsewhere other regions adapted to the rise of terrorism in the 21st century. In Southeast Asia, the focus of Chapter Six’s discussion of the relationship between state capacity and terrorism, I found the states of Southeast Asia adapted to the changing nature of the threat of terrorism through similar bureaucratic and military measures as discussed in the Sub-Saharan case in Chapter Five. A longer history with facing the challenges of governing vast territories and threats such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf resulted in states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore adjusting the major elements of state capacity earlier than those states noted in West Africa. Hence when presented with newer threats such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State entering the region the reorganization of military and police units, new legislation on defining terrorism as a crime and improving intelligence gathering capabilities had already developed to a degree in response to earlier threats to the region.

In both regions though there are some identifiable similarities in the response to improving state capacity in response to the growth of terrorist threats like Boko Haram and Jemaah Islamiyah. In the early years of the 2000s Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law, Singapore’s 2006 Terrorism Act, the Philippines’ Human Security Act followed later by Malaysia’s Security Offenses (Special Measures) Act and Prevention of Terrorism Act expanded executive and judicial authority across the region to respond to terrorism with new legal definitions specific to acts of terrorism and proscribed punishments for acts of violence and support for terrorist
movements. Later in the 2000s in response to the rise of Boko Haram the states of Sub-Saharan Africa discussed in Chapter Five introduce similar measures as well. Nigeria’s Terrorism Prevention Act, Niger’s Law 2011-11, Cameroon’s Law for the Fight against Terrorism, and Chad’s Law 034/PR/2015 all take similar actions as those laws introduced in the Southeast Asian states to expand executive and judicial authority on the specific issues associated with countering terrorism through the bureaucracy and legal system of the state.

As presented throughout this dissertation though, administrative and military capabilities go hand in hand in explaining state capacity. All eight states involved in these two case studies adopted various military reorganization policies and introduced new military and policing units to provide better-trained soldiers and officers that could respond to the threats presented by Jemaah Islamiyah and Boko Harm in their respective areas of the developing world but to varying degrees. In Southeast Asia that includes Indonesia’s Special Detachment 88 and Koopsusgab units as well as Malaysia’s Eastern Sabah Security Command and Eyes-in-the-Sky Program, the Philippines’ National Coast Watch Center, and Singapore’s Changi Regional Command Center. The latter two states do not have dedicated anti-terrorism units however. In West Africa this includes Cameroon’s Rapid Intervention Battalion, Niger’s Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism, Chad’s Special Anti-Terrorism Group, and Nigeria’s army divisions dedicated to operations in Boko Haram’s areas of operation in northwestern Nigeria.

All of the states involved in these case studies also incorporate regional-level components to their capacity-building efforts. In Southeast Asia all four states are members of ASEAN as well as the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism headquartered in Malaysia. For Sub-Saharan Africa the equivalents are the Economic Communities of West and Central African States, two separate organizations, as well as the Multi-National Joint Task Force
established to directly respond to Boko Haram Activity in the region. All of these units and regional entities came in response to the development of terrorist movements in the state and exemplify responses to weaknesses in state capacity.

Of course there are a few broad differences across the two regions that suggest capacity-building responses are unique to a degree to the context of the threat as well. In the Sub-Saharan African region all four states, to varying degrees, organized groups of citizens to fill in the gaps in the state’s military capacity and found success using vigilance committees to do everything from conduct patrols of prime bombing targets to collect intelligence as natives and locals invested in protecting their communities, an approach not taken by the states in Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile the Southeast Asian cases adopt a drastically different approach in the form of de-radicalization and counter-propaganda programs. These states adopted an approach to terrorism in the region that not only includes creating legal structures to criminalize terrorist support and activity but also reform and rehabilitation programs to re-incorporate ex-terrorists back into society as well as counter-propaganda programs to try and expose the messaging of terrorist movements like ISIS as corrupt versions of religious ideology. While two of the Sub-Saharan states, Cameroon, and Chad, notably coordinated with the religious community leaders as those in Southeast Asia do in terms of rehabilitation and counter-propaganda, the Sub-Saharan polices have been more geared towards information gathering and monitoring of religious activity than coordinating with the religious community to counter extremist religious organizations.

A continuing area of concern across all eight states discussed in the previous two chapters though in terms of state capacity and terrorism center around two factors noted in Chapter Four as having a significant relationship with terrorist activity: repressive tactics and clientelism. In
particular the primary concern across both regions with new legislative doctrines governing the powers given to the state to combat terrorism is abuse of these powers to repress political opposition and the freedom of citizens to criticize the state. From abuses by Nigerian and Philippine police and military officers committing extra-judicial killings of those suspected of providing support to terrorists to Cameroonian and Malaysian authorities using laws to detain and imprison journalists and those critical of the state on social media, the state’s tactics in countering terrorism raise serious questions regarding the treatment of the public and state’s obligations to civil rights and due process. Additionally the wording of some of the previously discussed pieces of legislation suggests the state’s administrative components are being used to abuse the rights of citizens as well. The results identified in Chapter Four then regarding a positive relationship between administrative capacity and the number of terrorist attacks could possibly be explained by the abuses committed by those in power when the state uses its legal authority to suppress criticism of the state.

In summary there are general similarities and differences across the regions that highlight the relationship between state capacity and terrorism in the developing world. Military capabilities and repressive tactics remain consistent indicators of higher numbers of terrorist incidents in the developing world. States in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia restructured military and policing organizations to respond to new threats of terrorism but at the same time have been accused of abusing new authority granted through legislation to protect the citizens of their respective states.

Yet through the two case study chapters I do identify some major differences in the approach to capacity-building and responding to terrorist threats to the state. In Sub-Saharan Africa a key component of counterterrorism and capacity-building has been co-opting groups of
civilians into creating additional security units to monitor border areas and conduct official operations on behalf of the state. The result has been additional patrols to monitor territory and counter threats like Boko Haram along the porous border regions of Nigeria and Cameroon but also abuses have been committed by some of those involved with the vigilance committees against the civilians the state expects them to protect. In Southeast Asia in contrast the states have taken a more holistic approach to countering terrorism.

From efforts to deter individuals from joining by exposing the extremist ideological interpretations of religions like Islam to providing rehabilitative programming for those caught and imprisoned for carrying out or supporting terrorist actions, states such as Indonesia and Malaysia attempt to identify the roots of the problem rather than the symptoms. While the data suggests these policy approaches are not silver bullets to the problem of violent extremism and terrorism, and a degree of recidivism does occur, the region as a whole experiences lower levels of terrorist activity comparatively than those in the Sub-Saharan African case.

General Findings, Limitations, and Future Research

In summary I turn to a brief discussion of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter Three and what evidence I find to support each. In regards to the first hypothesis, as the state’s military capability increases, terrorism increases, there is considerable support presented across the empirical chapters that military capacity is tied to an increase in terrorist incidents but this relationship is connected to repressive tactics used by the state’s military and police forces in the effort to counter terrorism. As for the second hypothesis, as the state’s administrative capacity increases, terrorism decreases, the evidence is mixed. While in the statistical models the relationship is the opposite of that predicted, further investigation of administrative capacity suggest that the context of it, much like that of military capacity, depends on the behavior of
those in power in the state. Using new legislation for example to repress those that criticize or challenge the state appears to have some relationship with terrorist activity. Therefore the hypotheses more democratic regimes where citizens participate in institutions reduce terrorism and as states increase their resources militarily and bureaucratically, terrorist attacks increase are likely explained by this same relationship between the state expanding its capacity to govern and secure its territory and abusing its authority to quash any criticism of those in control of the state apparatus.

Finally, the last two hypotheses, states with low population density will experience more terrorism and clientelism actually decreases terrorist activity, require further investigation as well. In terms of population density no statistical significance was found in the cross-national chapter but logically the porous land borders in Sub-Saharan Africa and the vast coastal areas of Southeast Asia where the state is less present on a permanent basis and populations are sparser suggests these are weaknesses in the state that could be exploited by terrorist movements moving between geographically-concentrated areas. As for corruption and clientelism the relationship determined in Chapter Four is negative as hypothesized and terrorism declines in states with more corrupt institutions though as highlighted in the latter chapters I find corruption serves as a grievance in the state for a discontent population who could then be radicalized against the state. Therefore more exploration of this relationship is required to make a more definitive statement on the relationship between corruption and state capacity in terms of the impact on terrorist activity in the developing world.

There are a few notable caveats to the methods and findings presented in this dissertation. For one there are limitations to the data available regarding infrastructural data in Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. While a variety of measures on specific infrastructural
aspects such as the number and quality of public facilities or the kilometers of road or rail may be more enlightening for measuring infrastructure as an important element of administrative capacity, limited or unavailable data over time for states in the region of analysis in this dissertation precluded this approach. Other proxies beyond telephone service might offer different findings than determined in this dissertation and is an area of research to explore further in better understanding the relationship specifically between infrastructure and terrorism in the developing world.

In addition, much of the analysis in this dissertation focuses on national-level events in terms of state capacity. In Chapter Four I provide a cross-national analysis to identify factors across states that are shared significant factors related to terrorism and terrorist activity in the state. In the latter chapters on Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia I focus predominantly on national-level polices established to counter terrorism and build capacity in the state. Considering sub-state variation, why terrorism occurs predominantly in northwestern Nigeria rather than in the southeast or why large areas with smaller villages in southern Niger and parts of Indonesia experience more acts of terrorism than cities like Singapore or Lagos could be better explained with multi-level modeling and focusing on resources available by state or province level. This would require new sources of data as well.

There are then three general areas of future research to be pursued based on the findings in this dissertation. Administrative capacity and its relationship with terrorist activity should be explored in terms of considering sub-sets of the category. Legal capacity to respond to terrorism through non-military means and treat terrorist support and action through the criminal justice system, infrastructural capacity to govern all of the territory of a state and provide the expected resources to all citizens, and administrative capacity to respond to the needs of citizens are three
potential avenues to consider separately. Second, corruption in the state’s institutions be they transitioning democracies or authoritarian regimes requires further exploration to determine if clientelism creates outlets to the grievances of citizens or is a grievance of the citizens themselves that drives participation in organized violence, or both. Finally, understanding state capacity at the sub-state level by incorporating new sources of data will help to understand how variation between the sub-units of a state result in terrorist movements that develop in one region of state remain predominantly active in that region rather than nation-wide.

In short, if we return to the question asked at the outset of this dissertation, why has terrorism so far been more prevalent in some states but less so in other countries in the developing world, state capacity does appear to be a significant factor though the specific elements of state capacity that increase or decrease the likelihood of terrorist activity share different relationships to the phenomenon and depend to a degree on the context of the relationship between the state and the non-state actors involved.
Appendix A: Questions for Interviews

Below are the questions for the preliminary interviews that were submitted to the IRB.

Can you generally describe your current position and your experience working on the issue of terrorism?

What factors do you believe are significant for why terrorist organizations emerge in different countries?

What domestic factors in your opinion explain why terrorist organizations form in some countries but not in others?

Are there any particular international factors that you, as an expert, consider explanatory for the development of terrorist organizations in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia?

Do certain regions of the world experience terrorism for different reasons? Please explain why or why not.

How does the state’s ability to oversee its territory and citizens factor into the development of terrorist organizations?

Which factor do you believe matters most for offering an explanation for why terrorist groups form?
## Appendix B: Full Regression Tables (with 1 Year Lag)

### Table 4.3 State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (Basic Model)

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<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-1)</td>
<td>0.019 (.003)***</td>
<td>-2.125 (.455)***</td>
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<td>.017 (.187)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>.231 (.115)*</td>
<td>.251 (238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.060 (.032)*</td>
<td>.026 (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1.175 (.538)*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>.561 (.088)***</td>
<td>-.268 (.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
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<td>-.451 (.762)</td>
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<td>Zero Observations</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

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<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
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<td>.005 (.040)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>Phone Service</td>
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<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
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<td>Repression</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

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* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Table 4.7: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions)

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<td>Phone Service</td>
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<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
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<td>Phone Service</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.
* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
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<td>Military*RPA</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wald Chi Sq.</td>
<td>535.23***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
<td>7.60***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-2496.307</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
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<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-1)</td>
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<td>-1.945 (.399)***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>.447 (.427)</td>
<td>.573 (.547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>0.013 (.339)</td>
<td>-.476 (.444)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military*RPR</td>
<td>.169 (.362)</td>
<td>-.660 (.541)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.030 (.034)</td>
<td>.015 (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1.49 (.491)**</td>
<td>.996 (1.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>.53 (.080)***</td>
<td>-.322 (.189)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-.919 (.426)**</td>
<td>-.63 (.805)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Log)</td>
<td>-.152 (.055)**</td>
<td>-.052 (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Executive Military Officer</td>
<td>-.036 (.135)</td>
<td>-.226 (.997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
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<td>-.226 (.789)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>.047 (.059)</td>
<td>.029 (.097)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>1.340 (2.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1228 (Non-Zero Observations: 610) (Zero Observations: 618)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>535.23***</td>
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<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
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<td>Log. Pseudolikelihood</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

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<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-1)</td>
<td>0.017 (.003)**</td>
<td>-2.054 (.571)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>0.538 (.232)*</td>
<td>0.819 (.629)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>1.666 (.808)*</td>
<td>0.254 (.242)</td>
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<td>Military*Bureaucracy</td>
<td>0.314 (.097)**</td>
<td>-0.276 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-0.955 (.032)*</td>
<td>-0.074 (.038)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>0.842 (.590)</td>
<td>-0.435 (1.361)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>0.619 (.088)***</td>
<td>-0.273 (.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-0.586 (.484)</td>
<td>-0.158 (.810)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>0.041 (.075)</td>
<td>0.063 (.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Log)</td>
<td>-0.149 (.047)**</td>
<td>-0.001 (.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Exec. Mil. Officer</td>
<td>-0.049 (.128)</td>
<td>0.209 (.392)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
<td>0.406 (.210)*</td>
<td>-0.673 (.823)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>0.011 (.058)</td>
<td>-0.028 (.102)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>-0.154 (.435)</td>
<td>-0.007 (.717)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-0.632 (.438)</td>
<td>-0.007 (.766)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.809 (1.119)</td>
<td>-0.089 (2.026)</td>
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<td>957.26***</td>
<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood 2583.136</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
<td>8.13***</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Table 4.13: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions, Controls, and Regional Dummies)

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<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-1)</td>
<td><strong>0.016 (.003)</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>-2.039 (.472)</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td><strong>2.795 (.807)</strong>*</td>
<td>1.371 (1.728)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>*<em>1.348 (.807)</em></td>
<td>-.128 (1.270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military*RPA</td>
<td><strong>-2.099 (.782)</strong></td>
<td>-1.109 (1.627)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.033 (.030)</td>
<td>.059 (.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>*<em>1.215 (.546)</em></td>
<td>.438 (1.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td><strong>.543 (.082)</strong>*</td>
<td>-.369 (.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>*<em>-.953 (.424)</em></td>
<td>-.556 (.744)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>.083 (.085)</td>
<td>.046 (.170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Log)</td>
<td><strong>-.178 (.050)</strong>*</td>
<td>-.036 (.153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Exec. Mil. Officer</td>
<td>.048 (.14)</td>
<td>-.541 (.781)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
<td>*<em>.347 (.193)</em></td>
<td>*<em>.347 (.193)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>.095 (.061)</td>
<td>.095 (.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>-.152 (.39)</td>
<td>-.152 (.39)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-.336 (.374)</td>
<td>-.336 (.374)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-1.096 (1.219)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1228 (Non-Zero Observations: 610) (Zero Observations: 618)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wald Chi Sq.</td>
<td>1244.34***</td>
<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood -2482.384</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
<td>7.69***</td>
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</table>

Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.
* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-1)</td>
<td>0.016 (.003)**</td>
<td>-1.949 (.418)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>0.230 (.398)</td>
<td>0.814 (.615)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>0.101 (.302)</td>
<td>-0.604 (.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military*RPR</td>
<td>0.323 (.377)</td>
<td>-0.731 (.572)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-0.041 (.030)</td>
<td>0.048 (.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1.588 (.503)**</td>
<td>0.727 (1.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>0.561 (.081)**</td>
<td>-0.373 (.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-0.987 (.443)*</td>
<td>-0.481 (.773)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>0.105 (.088)</td>
<td>0.041 (.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Log)</td>
<td>-0.159 (.052)**</td>
<td>-0.481 (.773)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Exec. Mil. Officer</td>
<td>0.022 (.135)</td>
<td>0.463 (.393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
<td>0.393 (.208)*</td>
<td>-0.448 (.892)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>0.062 (.065)</td>
<td>-0.011 (.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>-0.501 (.482)</td>
<td>0.392 (.991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-0.582 (.435)</td>
<td>1.029 (.78)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.543 (1.114)</td>
<td>1.025 (2.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1228 (Non-Zero Observations: 610) (Zero Observations: 618)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi Sq.</td>
<td>804.55***</td>
<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
<td>7.85***</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Appendix C: Full Regression Tables (with 2 Year Lag)

Table 4.16 State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (Basic Model)

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<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-2)</td>
<td>.018 (.003)***</td>
<td>-.997 (.316)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>.866 (.152)***</td>
<td>.027 (.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>.279 (.134)*</td>
<td>.518 (.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.068 (.042)</td>
<td>.026 (.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1.287 (.585)*</td>
<td>-.574 (1.400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>.707 (.092)***</td>
<td>-.198 (.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-.819 (.561)</td>
<td>-.513 (.921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>-.001 (.093)</td>
<td>.163 (.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.590 (.581)</td>
<td>-.811 (.944)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1338</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Zero Observations</td>
<td>668</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero Observations</td>
<td>670</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi Sq.</td>
<td>347.82***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
<td>6.23***</td>
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<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood</td>
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</table>

Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.
* 0.1  ** 0.01  *** 0.001
Table 4.17: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (Basic Model)

<table>
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<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-2)</td>
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<td>-.927 (.288)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>.778 (.157)***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>.587 (.817)</td>
<td>-.385 (1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.056 (.049)</td>
<td>.004 (.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1.821 (.659)**</td>
<td>.736 (1.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>.644 (.096)***</td>
<td>-.290 (.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-.951 (.575)*</td>
<td>-.917 (.972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>.01 (.103)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Zero Observations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zero Observations</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

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<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-2)</td>
<td>.018 (.003)**</td>
<td>-.934 (.287)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>.771 (.148)**</td>
<td>-.14 (.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>-.091 (.334)</td>
<td>-.133 (.595)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.066 (.047)</td>
<td>.001 (.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1.936 (.677)**</td>
<td>.766 (1.342)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>.65 (.092)**</td>
<td>-.297 (.207)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-1.036 (.546)*</td>
<td>-.811 (.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>.001 (.118)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Zero Observations</td>
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<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-2)</td>
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<td>-1.015 (.338)**</td>
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<td>.84 (.212)***</td>
<td>.270 (.423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>.280 (.133)*</td>
<td>.533 (.31)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military*Bureaucracy</td>
<td>.018 (.122)</td>
<td>-.120 (.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.069 (.043)</td>
<td>.027 (.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1.285 (.59)*</td>
<td>-.671 (1.442)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>.708 (.095)***</td>
<td>-.177 (.245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
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<td>-.501 (.936)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.002 (.093)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.908 (.29)**</td>
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<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>1.812 (.763)*</td>
<td>.345 (1.034)</td>
</tr>
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<td>RPA</td>
<td>.922 (.741)</td>
<td>-.095 (1.532)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military*RPA</td>
<td>-.995 (.741)</td>
<td>-.444 (1.012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.061 (.048)</td>
<td>-.003 (.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1.832 (.661)*</td>
<td>.671 (1.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>.634 (.098)**</td>
<td>-.303 (.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-1.059 (.567)*</td>
<td>-.986 (.936)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>.009 (.105)</td>
<td>.165 (.166)</td>
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<td>.248 (1.806)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Zero Observations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zero Observations</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi Sq.</td>
<td>349.69***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
<td>5.98***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-2709.21</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
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<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-2)</td>
<td>.017 (.003)**</td>
<td>-.93 (.287)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>.63 (.369)*</td>
<td>.299 (.597)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>-.108 (.341)</td>
<td>-.302 (.584)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military*RPR</td>
<td>.158 (.334)</td>
<td>-.459 (.590)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.068 (.047)</td>
<td>-.004 (.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1.941 (.666)**</td>
<td>.779 (1.327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>.649 (.093)**</td>
<td>-.303 (.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-1.068 (.115)*</td>
<td>-.870 (.908)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>.007 (.115)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zero Observations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi Sq.</td>
<td>334.56***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
<td>5.97***</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.
* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
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<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-2)</td>
<td>0.017 (.003)***</td>
<td>-0.957 (.337)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>0.854 (.235)**</td>
<td>0.483 (.527)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>0.278 (.14)*</td>
<td>0.583 (.367)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military*Bureaucracy</td>
<td>-0.018 (.115)</td>
<td>-0.22 (.225)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-0.04 (.044)</td>
<td>0.046 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>0.959 (.593)</td>
<td>-1.096 (1.695)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>0.723 (.095)***</td>
<td>-0.104 (.249)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-0.709 (.616)</td>
<td>-0.266 (1.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>0.035 (.097)</td>
<td>0.195 (.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Log)</td>
<td>-0.165 (.07)**</td>
<td>-0.042 (.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Exec. Military Officer</td>
<td>-0.126 (.362)</td>
<td>0.06 (.504)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
<td>0.162 (.293)</td>
<td>-0.905 (1.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>0.001 (.062)</td>
<td>0.037 (.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>Zero Observations</td>
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<td>Wald Chi Sq.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
<td>6.09***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood</td>
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</table>

Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
### Table 4.23: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions/ Controls)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-2)</td>
<td>.015 (.003)***</td>
<td>-.812 (.235)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>3.915 (1.028)***</td>
<td>1.2 (1.746)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>1.568 (.697)*</td>
<td>.734 (1.657)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military*RPA</td>
<td>-3.061 (.967)**</td>
<td>-1.234 (1.719)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.023 (.040)</td>
<td>.023 (.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>.967 (.659)</td>
<td>-.174 (1.471)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>.601 (.082)***</td>
<td>-.294 (.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-.932 (.495)*</td>
<td>-1.273 (.884)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>.115 (.098)</td>
<td>.261 (.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Log)</td>
<td>-.211 (.062)***</td>
<td>-.079 (.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Executive Military Officer</td>
<td>-.032 (.175)</td>
<td>.385 (.398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
<td>.256 (.065)</td>
<td>-.691 (.671)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>.136 (.065)</td>
<td>.093 (.148)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zero Observations</td>
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<td>Wald Chi Sq.</td>
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<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
<td>5.78***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood</td>
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</table>

Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-2)</td>
<td>.016 (.003)***</td>
<td>-.859 (.244)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>.497 (.461)</td>
<td>.367 (.636)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>.058 (.392)</td>
<td>-.345 (.542)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military*RPR</td>
<td>.157 (.397)</td>
<td>-.551 (.646)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.026 (.046)</td>
<td>.023 (.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1.354 (.639)*</td>
<td>.522 (1.474)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>.649 (.081)***</td>
<td>-.275 (.198)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-1.01 (.517)*</td>
<td>-1.082 (.945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>.112 (.101)</td>
<td>.229 (.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Log)</td>
<td>-.18 (.179)**</td>
<td>-.091 (.167)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief Executive Military Officer</td>
<td>.007 (.179)</td>
<td>.430 (.389)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
<td>.198 (.299)</td>
<td>-.670 (.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>.067 (.070)</td>
<td>.091 (127)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>.062 (1.262)</td>
<td>-.017 (2.271)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
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<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-2)</td>
<td>.015 (.004)***</td>
<td>-.865 (.385)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>.494 (.285)*</td>
<td>.520 (.705)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>.383 (.121)***</td>
<td>.604 (.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military*Bureaucracy</td>
<td>.078 (.121)</td>
<td>-.205 (.261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.066 (.042)</td>
<td>.058 (.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>.644 (.731)</td>
<td>-1.546 (1.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>.745 (.091)***</td>
<td>-.156 (.227)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-.669 (.571)</td>
<td>.01 (.1.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
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<td>.203 (.173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Log)</td>
<td>-.170 (.058)***</td>
<td>-.041 (.155)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief Exec. Mil. Officer</td>
<td>-.144 (.165)</td>
<td>-.019 (.489)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
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<td>-1.034 (.931)</td>
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<td>Land Area</td>
<td>.01 (.067)</td>
<td>.011 (.118)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>-.121 (.479)</td>
<td>.155 (.788)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-.872 (.490)</td>
<td>.373 (.1.04)</td>
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<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.
* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Table 4.26: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions, Controls, and Regional Dummies)

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-2)</td>
<td>0.014 (.003)***</td>
<td>-0.825 (.269)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>3.497 (.961)***</td>
<td>1.556 (2.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>1.646 (.759)*</td>
<td>0.298 (2.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military*RPA</td>
<td>-2.768 (.902)**</td>
<td>-1.485 (2.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-0.036 (.039)</td>
<td>0.043 (.063)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>0.93 (.699)</td>
<td>-2.47 (1.414)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>0.626 (.884)***</td>
<td>-0.323 (0.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-1.047 (.506)*</td>
<td>-1.109 (.834)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>0.113 (.097)</td>
<td>0.238 (1.85)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP (Log)</td>
<td>-0.211 (.062)***</td>
<td>-0.075 (1.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Exec. Mil. Officer</td>
<td>-0.006 (.188)</td>
<td>0.426 (.436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
<td>0.283 (.226)</td>
<td>-0.805 (0.809)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>0.128 (.870)*</td>
<td>0.066 (1.45)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>-0.043 (.449)</td>
<td>-0.155 (1.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-0.428 (.432)</td>
<td>0.657 (1.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.564 (1.501)</td>
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<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
<td>5.87***</td>
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Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Table 4.27: State Capacity and Terrorism in the Developing World 1985-2012 (with Interactions, Controls, and Regional Dummies)

<table>
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<th>Count Model (Non-Certain Zero)</th>
<th>Inflated Logit Model (Certain Zero)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Terror Attacks (t-2)</td>
<td>0.015 (.004)***</td>
<td>-0.851 (.25)***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Capacity</td>
<td>0.220 (.413)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>0.225 (.336)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military*RPR</td>
<td>.3 (.394)</td>
<td>-0.678 (.663)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Service</td>
<td>-.043 (.043)</td>
<td>.039 (.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Democracy</td>
<td>1.364 (.700)*</td>
<td>.263 (1.425)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>0.674 (.064)***</td>
<td>-.304 (.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-1.105 (.539)*</td>
<td>-.963 (.879)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Log)</td>
<td>.134 (.1)</td>
<td>.213 (.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Log)</td>
<td>-.187 (.064)***</td>
<td>-.077 (.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Exec. Mil. Officer</td>
<td>-0.044 (.186)</td>
<td>.454 (.418)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Conflict</td>
<td>.326 (.247)</td>
<td>-.774 (.786)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>.079 (.082)</td>
<td>-.054 (.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>-.48 (.537)</td>
<td>.572 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-.796 (.486)</td>
<td>.643 (.953)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>.481 (1.405)</td>
<td>-.016 (2.305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Vuong Z-Test</td>
<td>6.03***</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors clustered on country reported in parentheses.

* 0.1 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Appendix D Measurement Notes

6—As summarized by Hendrix and Young (2014), “factor analysis is useful for situations in which key concepts, like bureaucratic/administrative capacity, either cannot be measured directly or can be measured multiple different ways, each with varying degrees of construct validity—the degree of correspondence between the operationalizations in the empirical study and the theoretical constructs in the model—and measurement error. Factor analysis determines whether the interrelationships between a set of observable variables can be expressed by a smaller set of latent variables, or factors. Eigendecomposition yields orthogonal vectors (the latent factors) with eigenvalues corresponding to the common variance explained by the retained components/factors. Factors with eigenvalues greater than one are significant and explain an important amount of variability.” The results of the factor analysis are included in a table in the appendix of this chapter.

7—Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score from the 2010 National Material Capabilities Data (Version 4.0) is used to measure the state’s material capacity to wage war. The CINC is comprised of several measures: iron and steel production (in thousands of tons), military expenditures (in thousands of current year USD), military personnel (thousands), primary energy consumptions (thousands of coal-ton equivalents), total population, and urban population (those living in cities with populations larger than 100,000 reported in thousands). Hendrix and Young (2014) argue the CINC score reflects both actual military capacity and economic as well as demographic factors of capacity. This establishes and upper bound of military capacity for total mobilization toward war and not a degree of mobilization which is more logical to consider for how a state counter’s the threat of non-state actors such as terrorist groups. The CINC also captures variation between sovereign states and not the state’s capacity to counter dissidents. For further discussion see Hendrix and Young (2014), p. 342.

9—Components of the RPR score include the Economically Active Population, Unemployment, Activity Rate, Young Population, Social Security Revenues, Education, Urban Population, GDP per Capita, and Bureaucracy. Economically Active Population (the population engaged in the production of goods derived from Arbetman and Johnson (2008b) who use data from Taylor and Jodice (1982) and International Labor Organization (ILO) data), Unemployment, an Activity Rate (the unemployment rate subtracted from the economically active population rate), Young Population (the population between 0 and 14 years old, divided by the total population), Social Security Revenues (derived from IMF GFS data, the World Bank, and national sources), Education (gross secondary enrollment ratio for all programs per thousand people derived from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics), Urban Population (derived from the World Bank Development Indicators), GDP per Capita (derived from the World Bank in 2005 constant dollars), and Bureaucracy (share of government wages in total general government expenses derived primarily from Arbetman and Johnson (2008b) who used the Government Finance Statistics published by the IMF, World Development Indicators, Europa Yearbooks, and national sources).

10—Data is sourced from the World Development Indicator measure by the World Bank, National Accounts Estimates of Main Aggregates by the United Nations Statistics Division
(UNSD), the Global Indicator Database by the UNSD, and Government Finance Statistics by the International Monetary Fund. Further information on this measure can be found at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/16845

11—The codebook for the Relative Political Capacity dataset provides further detail on this measure but I provide a summary of the procedure here. The measure is established by first “defining each country’s distinct production function that specifies the output of an entire economy” and notes the political economic process that converts private capital and public spending into the total income of a country (p. 13). There are nine different dimensions of the public expenditure component: general public spending, defense, public ordering, economic affairs, housing, health, recreation, education, and social protection, derived from original COFOG criterion published by the UN in 1980. Second, coefficients are developed using the condition of profit maximization achievable by the government by allocating its public expenditures in accordance with optimal ratios. Two alternative estimations of the optimal allocative ratios are derived by running separate regressions on different samples of the data. The obtained beta coefficients are then used to construct a distance function as a “social allocative inefficiency score” for each country that allows measurement between the difference and the optimal public spending ratios. Finally, they calculate the RPA index from the obtained allocation inefficiency scores and normalize the measure to one as an average by using individual social inefficiency divided by its mean value, to maintain consistency with other measures in the dataset (See Kugler and Tammen 2012).

12—The Varieties of Democracy corruption measures cover all countries and begins in 1900 and is based on expert surveys. The four different government spheres are weighted equally in the index and missing values for countries with no legislature are averaged using the other three measures. The individual measures of corruption (Public Sector, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) are formed by taking the average of the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for bribery and embezzlement for each (McMann et al 2015).
Bibliography

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