Breaking and Remaking the Mason-Dixon Line: Loyalty in Civil War America, 1850-1900

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Breaking and Remaking the Mason-Dixon Line:
Loyalty in Civil War America, 1850-1900

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Dissertation submitted to the
Eberly College of Arts and Sciences
at West Virginia University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

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in
History

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African American; cultural history; social history

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Abstract

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Charles R. Welsko

Between 1850 and 1900, Americans redefined their interpretation of national identity and loyalty. In the Mid-Atlantic borderland of Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia this change is most evident. With the presence of a free state and slave states in close proximity, white and black Americans of the region experienced the tumult of the Civil War Era first hand. While the boundary between freedom and slavery served as an antebellum battleground over slavery, during the war, the whole region bore witness to divisions between the Union and Confederacy as well as to define what loyalty and nation meant. By exploring how ordinary men and women, Unionists or Confederates, free or enslaved persons, articulated their understanding of loyalty, this project tracks the development of identity and nationalism for over half a century.

This project analyzes the rhetoric and discussions of national loyalty in order to unpack how Mid-Atlantic residents attached themselves to the idea of a nation in the second half of the nineteenth century. In doing so, it reveals how individuals shifted their interpretation of loyalty as a loosely held, reciprocal definition of loyalty in the antebellum period to firmer antagonistic definitions of allegiance. After the war, with the inclusion of African Americans in society, white Mid-Atlantic residents again redefined loyalty to focus on the hereditary connections between themselves and the Founding Generation, thereby excluding freedmen and women from inclusion in the nation and laying the foundations for a distorted memory of the Civil War Era.
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The end of a dissertation is an odd thing. After long hours of toil, sleepless nights, and immeasurable cups of coffee, the project ends. Although scholars are never truly done with a project, this one has reached a logical conclusion, before I pick it up again. The question of Civil War loyalty has been in my mind in one form or another since I entered graduate school in 2012. Over that time, this project grew a bit in its telling, in ways I never envisioned when the project began. That growth is due in large part to the help I received along the way.

As with all good history, this project was not a solitary endeavor as a wide array of individuals provided guidance, feedback, and support over the course of this project. The staff and librarians at the Southern Historical Collection at UNC, the Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections at UVA, the Virginia Historical Society, the Library Company of Philadelphia, the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the West Virginia and Regional History Center, the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, the Maryland Historical Society, and Moravian Archives all warrant special thanks. Generous financial support came from the West Virginia University History Department and Eberly College of Arts and Humanities, a Mellon Grant at the Virginia Historical Society, a Ridgway Fellowship through the U.S. Army Heritage Center, and an inaugural research grant from the Moravian Archives. Without this support, personally and materially, this project would not have been possible.

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Lastly, of course, I want to thank all my family for their love and support during this whole journey. To my parents, Cathy and Chuck, and my brother Brian, I thank them for all their support over the years. They made the long years on this project seem like a short journey. I look forward to having them along for the next adventure.
Introduction:
Loyalty and the Mid-Atlantic in the Civil War Era

On Thursday November 26, 1863, the congregation of St. Luke’s Church in Philadelphia gathered on South 13th Street. They moved past the black wrought iron fence, walked up the Massachusetts granite, shuffled between the eight tall white pillars that stood over the entrance, and in through the front doors to take their seats inside on wooden pews. They gathered on the first nationally recognized Thanksgiving Day to offer their praise to God for the continued success of the nation and to pray for an end to their civil war. The specter of the American Civil War weighed heavily on the hundreds of Philadelphians who gathered in the church that Thursday. They had borne witness to a series of tumultuous trials throughout 1863. The official implementation of Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation in January had caused the large population of free African Americans in Philadelphia to celebrate the momentous shift in the Union’s wartime objectives. Military campaigns during the year had oscillated between despair in the spring and early summer for Unionists as defeats multiplied, to joy as the Battle of Gettysburg expelled the Army of Northern Virginia from Pennsylvania in early July and Vicksburg surrendered to Ulysses S. Grant the next day. Finally, political tensions leading to Pennsylvania’s gubernatorial election witnessed intense partisan conflict between Republicans and Democrats within the City of Brotherly Love as well as throughout the state.¹

It was in the wake of these tensions that Mark Anthony DeWolfe Howe, the pastor of St. Luke’s Church, rose to offer his sermon on that Thanksgiving Day. Howe’s oration centered on the thorny political issue of wartime loyalty. Howe called on his congregation to ponder the meaning of loyalty. In particular, he called upon the Philadelphians to consider just what

allegiance should mean to ordinary Americans. That question, he elaborated, was a tricky one for
the nation to answer. Howe stated that difficult emerged not from an inability to define loyalty,
but rather the trouble extended from their style of government, as republics proved incompatible
with European views of loyalty. Across the Atlantic and for those who lived under monarchies
around the world could easily tie allegiance to an individual, hereditary ruler, Howe stated that
people could define loyalty “as that devotion and fidelity which the people cherish towards the
reigning sovereign and his family, among whom his successors must be found.” Other
governments could pass down the rightful authority of their nation through blood or family ties,
not political elections. Indeed, the Episcopal preacher informed the congregation that some “men
have boldly affirmed that there can be no such thing as loyalty in a Republic, the Highest Officer
of which is elective.”²

Howe disagreed as he believed Americans had the perfect foundation to establish their
own definition of loyalty. However, Howe encouraged the Philadelphians gathered before his
pulpit that they owed their loyalty not to individuals. Nor, he proceeded, did they deserve to rest
their faith in laws or the policies of any federal administration. People, legal stipulations, or
governmental policies, as part of a republic, were “changeable.” Rather, Howe urged the men
and women gathered in St. Luke’s Church to affirm their loyalty to the Declaration of
Independence. The Declaration, he noted was “the corner-stone of National Existence; it is the
principle of our social structure; it is the pretext which we announced to the world, for an organic
and independent life, for a place among the family of nations: our initial faith.”³ It was in the
principles of the United States, the idea that all men were created equal, with inalienable rights,

² Mark Antony DeWolfe Howe, *Loyalty in the American republic, what is it? and what its object?: a discourse
delivered in St. Luke’s Church, Philadelphia, on Thursday, November 26th, 1863, being the day of national
³ Howe, *Loyalty in the American republic*, 6-10.
that Americans should place their loyalty. Over the remainder of his sermon, Howe encouraged
his congregation to embrace emancipation as a central pillar of the war effort, to fight for the
restoration of the Union, and to labor for the righteous conclusion of the Civil War.

Undoubtedly, as the congregation of St. Luke’s Church shuffled out past the tall pillars
and down the granite steps of their church, some members disagreed with the sermon.
Throughout the city, Pennsylvania, and the nation, countless individuals debated the meaning of
loyalty during the Civil War Era. Yet, unlike the crowd that filtered out of St. Luke’s, Howe’s
sermon, and thereby his interpretation, made its way out of the stucco building when James S.
McCalla published the sermon a few weeks later. McCalla, a printer on Dock Street, produced
sermons and a wide assortment of printed pieces before, during, and after the war. It is difficult
to determine just how far Howe’s sermon spread throughout Philadelphia or the wartime North.
However, at some point, a copy ended up in the Library Company of Philadelphia’s collection: a
relic of the Civil War Era and the conversations about loyalty that pervaded the United States
and Confederacy for well over half a century.

Loyalty mattered to Howe, as it did to numerous other Americans during the Civil War Era. It pervaded their daily lives before, during, and after the war that restored the Union and
doomed slavery. Yet, contemporarily for Howe and historically for Americans, the issue of
loyalty between 1861 and 1865 has remained an unresolved quandary. The recent socio-political
conflicts from New Orleans and North Carolina to Charlottesville and to Richmond over the
presence over Confederate monuments underscore the persistence of divided loyalties from the

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long Civil War. Americans, white or black, Unionist or Confederate, constructed their own definitions of loyalty and often remade those definitions as time wore on after 1865. So, to rephrase Howe’s question and sermon: what did loyalty mean to Americans?

To answer that question, this work turns to an examination of loyalty rhetoric in the Mid-Atlantic border region: Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. These four states, the last of which came into existence during the Civil War, represent a wide cross-section of the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century. A bevy of groups—Unionists and Confederates, Republicans and Democrats, white and black Americans, freed and enslaved persons—all resided in this borderland from 1850 to 1900. Centered on the Mason-Dixon Line, or as Scott Hancock has termed it “Freedom’s Fault Line,” the Mid-Atlantic serves as a compelling area to explore how a cross-section of America inserted the language of loyalty into their lives. Pennsylvania and Virginia, frequently compared states representative of the North and South, offer a solid foundation for an important Union and quintessential Confederate state. The addition of Maryland, with its tenuous place in the Union after Virginia’s secession, and West Virginia’s equally troubled birth during the war, highlight the pull of competing national loyalties in Border Regions that were also slave states. West Virginia and Pennsylvania also provide an examination into the Appalachian region, an area often studied exclusively for its irregular warfare, contested allegiance, and unique position in American history. Moreover, the presence of black Americans, both enslaved in Maryland and Virginia as well as free blacks

throughout the region, offers another layer of identity in this loyalty study. In short, if loyalty mattered to Mark Antony DeWolfe Howe, and if it mattered to other Americans, the Mid-Atlantic makes an excellent place to study loyalty, with its diverse population, the presence of both the Union and Confederate capitals, as well as the home of many famous Civil War events.

It should come as no surprise with a civil conflict, especially one so persistent and transformative as the American Civil War, that a number of historians have paid careful attention to the issue of wartime loyalty. This scholarship owes its foundations to the work of Frank Klement, particularly his monograph *Copperheads in the Middle West*. One of the first significant and (relatively) objective examinations of the anti-war, pro-peace Copperheads, Klement took a look at the anti-war Democrats that resisted Lincoln, Republicans, and emancipation in Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and the mid-western states as a whole distinct region of the United States. Klement argued that these Democrats, while opposed to the war, were not un-American or disloyal to the nation, rather their political principles compelled them to challenge Republican centralization of power. Published in 1960, during the Cold War and on the cusp of anti-Vietnam protests, it is perhaps unsurprising that Klement argued for the loyalty of anti-war protestors from a bygone age in American history. He asserted that the memory of Copperheads (and Civil War Democrats as a whole) as disloyal Americans was part of Republican partisan efforts to damage their political opponents.

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6 For example in Andrew K. Diemer’s *The Politics of Black Citizenship*, he explores the political actions of African Americans in a Mid-Atlantic Borderland, largely the free black populations of Philadelphia and Baltimore. Diemer’s work, along with the scholarship of Barbara Fields’ examination of slavery in Maryland, and other examinations of borderlands like the Ohio River Valley, prompt consideration of the Mid-Atlantic as a region worthy of study for its divisions between the Union and Confederacy, along with the large white and black populations that lived within the region. Andrew K. Diemer, *The Politics of Black Citizenship*; Barbara Jeanne Fields, *Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground: Maryland during the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).


8 Ibid., 3, 5, 12-3, 25-6.
At a broader level, Klement attempted to answer the question of “who” was loyal during the Civil War Era. Other historians have followed suit. Arnold Shankman and Jennifer Weber, though writing decades later, addressed that same question in their examinations of Democrats and Copperheads in Pennsylvania for Shankman and nationally for Weber.\(^9\) In a similar vein, Grace Palladino sought to explain the social and economic forces that compelled coal miners in the anthracite region in Pennsylvania to resist the war effort and clash with Union officials, subsequently earning label of disloyalty from Republicans and mine officials.\(^10\) Despite the geographical or argumentative differences, in each case, the aforementioned historians argued about whether particular socio-economic or political units remained loyal to the United States during the war. They cast loyalty in binary terms—the groups they studied were either loyal or disloyal, there was little ground for anything other than condemnation or vindication of these socio-political groups.

This should not detract from the contributions of these works as scholarly achievements. Klement, Shankman, Weber, and Palladino, to name but a few, have provided extensive interpretations of how Democrats, Republicans, miners, and a host of other individuals acted during the war. Put another way, they have expanded our understanding of the social and political aspects of the Civil War North. Indeed, they have demonstrated the divisions replete in Northern political culture during the conflict.

Along another line of historical inquiry, a number of historians have explored the tensions that divided the Confederacy. Building off the scholarship of Klement and the binary loyalty school, many historians in the 1980s, 1990s, and well into the 2000s, attempted to unpack

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the rationale behind the collapse of the Southern nation. Did a lack of fidelity to their new nation become the stroke that undid the Confederacy? For years, this question dominated how historians looked at the wartime South, as many scholars argued that internal pressures destroyed the Confederacy. \(^{11}\) Gary Gallagher argued for a change in this approach with his popular *The Confederate War*, asking historians to ponder not why the Confederacy fell apart so quickly, but rather why it stayed together for so long. \(^{12}\) Many of Gallagher’s students and others have continued the debate of just how patriotic, or loyal, Confederates were to a Southern nation. \(^{13}\)

Once again, the wider community of scholars and citizens has benefitted from such analysis, but the question is still wrong. It suggests that Confederates had to be either supportive or unsympathetic to the plight of their country. Loyalty and patriotism appear binary in such an approach.

More recently, historians have attempted to complicate the nature of loyalty studies by approaching the process in which individuals or communities aligned their support for one part of the nation or another. For example, scholars such as Margaret M. Storey and John W. Shaffer have offered county-level analyses that placed social or generational factors at the heart of support for the Union or Confederacy. \(^{14}\) Amy Murrell-Taylor and Patrick A. Lewis explored the experiences of families and individuals to demonstrate how events and ideologies compelled

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\(^{13}\) This includes the work of individuals like Amy Murrell Taylor, Aaron Sheehan-Dean, and Peter Carmichael.

different individuals to fragment along sectional lines. Anne Marshall and Robert Sandow demonstrated on a state-level how local, political, social, and national concerns influenced the construction of loyalty during or after the war. This line of inquiry differs from the binary approach to allegiance, or rather, the “who” of loyalty. Rather than trying to weigh which elements of American society were loyal during the war, these historians have aimed to explain why or “how” different elements of the United States, often in the Southern or Border States, came to support one side or another.

Traditionally then, there have typically been two historiographical schools of interpretation in the study of loyalty: the “who” and the “how.” Collectively, we should acknowledge the fact that these two groups, ranging from Klement to Sandow (and many others in between) have provided an abundance of information about the complexity of loyalty and the subsequent motivations of different individuals throughout the fractured American nation. That said it is important to look at these two schools a little more. The “who” historians have studied loyalty through a political or social lens, seeking to understand how either political partisans or individual communities expressed or acted loyally. Comparatively, historians of the “how” school, often those who looked at Southern or Border regions, constructed their arguments about loyalty around cultural as well as social or political factors. Furthermore, both historiographic groups have rarely crossed the perceptual boundary between the Union and Confederacy to study loyalty. They have examined diverse portions of the North or South or even Border States torn between allegiances, but they have rarely crossed the national boundaries between the Union and

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Confederacy. One of the crucial assertions of this study is that Americans, be they Northerners or Southerners, shared similar historical memories and cultural experiences in how they framed loyalty. While they did not share identical histories (regional developments and circumstances influenced each of these states), historians should not ignore the shared experiences before, during, and after the Civil War that influenced how Americans articulated loyalty.

Along with a limited examination of loyalty across geographic boundaries, there has been a dearth of discussion on how African Americans, slaves or freedmen, constructed their own loyalties during the war. Indeed, throughout the “who” and “how” scholarship, the subject of allegiance or loyalty is almost exclusively an exploration of white loyalty. African Americans rarely appear within these studies, save for their appearance as peripheral subjects—for example in discussions of how the Emancipation Proclamation impacted Democratic views on the Lincoln Administration. Yet, as the endeavors of historians have demonstrated over the past few decades, the experiences of African Americans were an integral part of the Civil War. Nearly 200,000 free and formerly enslaved Afro-Americans fought for the Union army. Countless thousands labored for either army, interacted with occupying forces, or escaped to seek their freedom. Furthermore, as Stephanie McCurry argued in Confederate Reckoning, African Americans had an influential impact on the course of the Civil War aiding in the overthrow of the Confederacy from within. Consequently, the ways in which all Americans, white or black, male or female, constructed definitions of loyalty, are necessary components of this project.

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18 Klement and Weber are exceptional examples of these limited views on African Americans. Their focus on the politics of Copperheads and white Democrats excludes blacks from the conversation as actors. Rather, they appear more as secondary subjects that influenced Democratic and Republican discourse on loyalty and the war.
19 Joseph Glatthaar, Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 199), x.
21 To help understand how Americans articulated their understanding of loyalty, I have pulled from a number of sources, including Benedict Anderson’s evaluation of nationalism as imagined and connected communities, cultural
There are of course challenges with my decision to include the narratives and experiences of African American loyalty in this project. Most importantly, there are significantly fewer black sources than there are those of white Americans from the Civil War period. To combat this disproportion of evidence, I will borrow methodologically from Martha Hodes’s *Mourning Lincoln*, where she practiced “radical inclusion.” Whenever possible in her study of responses to Lincoln’s assassination, Hodes quoted first and cited African American sources that conveyed a similar message to that of white authors. This method, I feel, will enable me to employ Afro-American voices alongside white sources more effectively. As a result, it is important to note though that no separate chapter on the African American experience with loyalty appears within this text. Such an approach is disingenuous to how black Americans saw themselves throughout the nineteenth century. While some African Americans supported emigration or abandoning the United States for brighter prospects elsewhere, most deemed themselves Americans. White Americans denied them equality and their rights for much of the nineteenth century, but that should not discount African Americans to their ‘own’ chapter. American history is their history just as well as it is the story of white Americans.

In order to add onto this diverse range of participants and discussions about loyalty, I will incorporate the work and methodology of more recent monographs of allegiance studies,

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22 Hodes describes her methodology in an article written for *Social Text* in 2015. In this article, Hodes noted the dearth of sources by African Americans. A lack of education for slaves especially and free blacks generally, prohibited many black Americans from recording their observations of Lincoln’s assassination. Alternatively, archivists and historians could have neglected or discarded the responses of African Americans as unimportant to the Lincoln’s story. Hodes argued that by privileging black voices when they offered commentary similar to white Americans, in addition to highlighting the different responses of both whites and blacks, would keep African Americans as central figures in her narrative. Martha Hodes, “Lincoln’s Black Mourners: Submerged Voices, Everyday Life, and the Question of Storytelling,” *Social Text* (2015), 68-76.
eschewing the older binary paradigms of the “who” and “how” historians. Gary Gallagher and Peter Carmichae recently articulated that loyalty was a personal choice made by elite Confederate leaders and a younger generation of college students.²³ William Blair and Elizabeth Varon have described how contemporaries could wield ideas (like treason and disunion respectively) as political weapons before and during the war to foster conceptions of allegiance to the nation.²⁴ Additionally, Ian Binnington, Michael Bernath, and J. Matthew Gallman have demonstrated how Americans used print culture and cultural symbols to form identities, either a unique Southern nationalism, or conceptions of proper, loyal behavior in the North during the war years.²⁵ More recently, Christopher Phillips’ study of the Ohio River Valley has been immensely influential on this work. In The River Ran Backwards, Phillips argues that Union and Confederate identities above and below the Ohio River (in Ohio, Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri) did not appear until after the Civil War. Wartime policy, equal parts Emancipation and hard war generated divergent identities in a borderland that, before the war, shared similar social, political, and racial views.²⁶ Each of these historians demonstrated that individuals formed notions of allegiance through their own choices, used those ideas in their daily lives, and communicated those messages through a variety of different media.

Phillips’ treatment of a borderland in the Civil War Era, along with this newer allegiance scholarship, helped shape this study. Due to Phillips’ scholarship, my work takes the Mason-Dixon Line as a central part of its narrative. Prior to the Civil War, occupants of the Mid-Atlantic

²⁴ William A. Blair, Malice Toward Some: Treason and Loyalty in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 2014); Elizabeth R. Varon, Disunion!.
had a relatively fixed understanding of their society and the nation. The nation divided between North and South along the Mason-Dixon Line. Slavery and freedom adhered to that divisive contour. Further, social divisions separated African Americans (enslaved or freed) from white society. Yet, Mid-Atlantic residents broke the Mason-Dixon Line in 1861 and in the process weakened other divisions in the region. I believe that loyalty shaped how residents of the Mid-Atlantic understood the Civil War Era, ranging from the late 1850s through the turn of the twentieth century. While historians have paid careful attention to the political differences and national interpretations of allegiance, this amorphous concept played a crucial role in how men and women, black or white, experienced the United States’ most transformative event. In the Mid-Atlantic, the Civil War and definitions of loyalty transformed how Americans viewed the boundaries in their lives.27

To return to the rephrasing of Howe’s question, it is important to note how Americans understood loyalty at the start of the Civil War and how this project treats the subject of loyalty. According to Edward Ayers, loyalty was not a singular concept for Americans, but rather a multitude of different ideas and identifies that the war forced to operate together. Loyalties, he argued, did not have one definition, but rather, they “live and breathe and die.”28 Although most Americans would have accepted a definition of loyalty that required “Faithful adherence to the sovereign or lawful government,” a number of factors, from religion to family to politics to race

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27 Historians, with few exceptions have not considered the Mason-Dixon Line or the Mid-Atlantic a borderland. Andrew Diemer’s The Politics of Black Citizenship: Free African Americans in the Mid-Atlantic Borderland, 1817-1863 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2016), sets the free black communities of the Mid-Atlantic, especially Philadelphia and Baltimore at the heart of this regional borderland and the narrative of how free blacks attempted to influence politics before the Civil War, despite lacking political franchise. Recent edited volumes, such as Andrew Frank and A. Glenn Crothers’s Borderland Narratives: Negotiation and Accommodation in North America’s Contested Spaces, 1500-1850, contains a number of American borderlands—the Ohio River Valley, Florida, the Southeast, Missouri, or the Mississippi River. However, the Mid-Atlantic remains an overlook border region.

all shaped how an American understood allegiance in the Civil War Era. Loyalty was never one thing, but rather took on a number of different forms between 1850 and 1900. This project explores how residents of the Mid-Atlantic interpreted a number of ideas and experiences into an understanding about national identity before, during, and after the Civil War.

Throughout the following pages, this project pays careful attention to national loyalty. The use of rhetoric associated with loyalty in the Civil War Era conflated nationalism and identity into a singular package. Loyalty was both an action (faithful support of the government) and a category (loyal or disloyal, patriot or traitor). Breaking and Remaking the Mason-Dixon Line focuses on this combination of national identity and loyalty because the war compelled Mid-Atlantic residents to articulate their understanding of what a nation was in a century where the western world established the foundations of the modern nation-state.

As a unified country, outside of the Revolution and the Early National Period, American citizens had little motivation to articulate a clear definition of national loyalty. An expansive, geographically and socially diverse nation kept Americans locally and regionally focused for much of the first half of the nineteenth century. As internal improvements from roads to canals to the telegraph and railroad linked the United States, Americans increasingly viewed themselves as a connected, if discontented, nation. Broadly, but not specifically, they understood loyalty as a

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29 This definition of loyalty would be at least one understood definition of loyalty during the Civil War Era. The Oxford English Dictionary indicated that this definition existed long before the Civil War (the most recent usage it listed was in 1857). Oxford English Dictionary, “Loyalty,” accessed via, http://www.oed.com/www.libproxy.wvu.edu/view/Entry/110759?redirectedFrom=loyalty#eid.


31 This does not suggest that Americans expected the government to offer the protections of a welfare state. As historians like Theda Skocpol have argued, it took a considerable time after the Civil War for Americans to push and accept increased government intervention in the daily and material lives of citizens. Other scholars, like Gregory Downs, sees the development of dependency emerging from the Civil War, as the conflict reshaped how individuals connected with the government as a result of the Civil War. Gregory P. Downs, Declarations of Dependence: The Long Reconstruction of Popular Politics in the South, 1861-1908 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
reciprocal relationship between government and citizen. If citizens offered faithful service to the nation (participation in political affairs, support of local, state, and Federal institutions, or military service), they expected protection from physical threats, foreign enemies and Native Americans chief among those challenges, and the maintenance of their socio-political rights.\textsuperscript{32}

For most of the nineteenth century, residents of the Mid-Atlantic firmly believed that this was how loyalty and citizenship operated—protection in exchange for loyalty.

The looming prospect of the Civil War and sectional conflict forced Mid-Atlantic residents to reframe their understanding of loyalty and nationhood. Before the Civil War, loyalty and nationalism were poorly defined concepts in the United States. Local, state, and regional interests influenced how individuals understood their place in American society, rather than a firm national identity. Indeed, Northerners and Southerners articulated their visions of what the United States should by highlighting the differences between one another rather than their similarities. Socio-political tensions in the 1850s compelled Mid-Atlantic residents to question their fidelity to the Union and the meaning of American citizenship. During 1860, Mid-Atlantic residents fractured over political issues, but maintained a moderate course. After Fort Sumter’s fall and Lincoln’s mobilization of the North, Virginia seceded when they felt compelled to pick between allegiance to their section or the ill-defined nation. As a result, many Mid-Atlantic residents in Virginia, as well as Maryland and West Virginia, cast their lot with a new nation, pledging their loyalty to the Confederacy in the belief that this new government would serve as a better steward of their rights and national institutions. In the process of division, separation, and

\textsuperscript{32} This does not suggest that Americans expected the government to offer the protections of a welfare state. As historians like Theda Skocpol have argued, it took a considerable time after the Civil War for Americans to push and accept increased government intervention in the daily and material lives of citizens. Other scholars, like Gregory Downs, sees the development of dependency emerging from the Civil War, as the conflict reshaped how individuals connected with the government as a result of the Civil War. Gregory P. Downs, \textit{Declarations of Dependence: The Long Reconstruction of Popular Politics in the South, 1861-1908} (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Theda Skocpol, \textit{Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
war, Mid-Atlantic residents articulated their understanding of nation and loyalty more clearly. Building off their pre-war experiences, they “otherized” their national opponents. The new reality of civil conflict prompted Mid-Atlantic residents to articulate stronger attachments to their respective nation framed in antagonistic terms.33

Over time, the actions of African Americans in their quest for freedom, as well as the adoption of emancipation as a war measure, fostered internal friction within both the Union and Confederacy. Political discontent between Republicans and Democrats grew more acrimonious after the war began as both parties borrowed the oppositional vocabulary of national loyalty for their own partisan purposes. Similarly, diehard Confederates and less enthusiastic Southerners—including slaves, Unionists, or individuals who prided familial obligations over national considerations—divided Virginia and Southern secessionists. Mid-Atlantic residents not only used the rhetoric of loyalty to draw clear divisions between themselves and their national opponents, but they also used that language as a tool to criticize internal and political adversaries.

After 1865 and the end of the war, Mid-Atlantic residents debated the future definition of loyalty. How could they, as part of the American nation, reconcile the discordant visions of national loyalty that had divided, distorted, and almost destroyed the nation? The continual use of reciprocal loyalty by Americans ensured that ex-Confederates (and perhaps some Northern Democrats too) would lose their place and voice in society. Conversely, Republicans, Southern Unionists, and African Americans would direct the course of the nation. This reciprocal

definition of loyalty remained in place for most of Reconstruction; however, white residents of
the Mid-Atlantic slowly distorted their interpretation of loyalty. The prospect of inclusion and
equality for former slaves and free black men concerned white Unionists and Confederates. To
curtail the influence of African Americans on regional and national politics, white Mid-Atlantic
residents shifted their understanding of loyalty away from a reciprocal relationship between
citizen and government, which included African Americans who fought for the victorious Union
Army, to a definition founded on the blood-based heritage of white Americans and the
Revolutionary Era.

As such, this project asserts that from 1850 to 1900, Mid-Atlantic residents broke and
remade their world—both in terms of the Mason-Dixon Line as the dividing boundary between
North and South as well as their conception of loyalty. The use of loyalty reinvented the map of
the region. Whereas the Mason-Dixon Line once stood as a clear division between two cultures,
sectional tensions over slavery, political discord, and the war itself created two nations. In the
process, black and white, Unionist and Confederate residents of the Mid-Atlantic had to produce
new understandings and interpretations of loyalty that were fluid, malleable, and shifting over
this fifty year period. The five chapters that follow present a broad narrative, which highlights
how Mid-Atlantic residents used, understood, and changed their understanding of loyalty as well
as their place in the nation.

Chapter One reveals how the issue of slavery and the actions of slaves themselves, as
well as extremists in the North and South, compelled Mid-Atlantic residents to evaluate sectional
divisions. The self-emancipation of human chattel in the Mid-Atlantic brought slave hunters and
legal headaches into Pennsylvania. Slaves sought their freedom. Northerners sought to preserve
their states’ and personal rights from the intrusive Fugitive Slave Law. Masters endeavored to
recoup their property. Other Mid-Atlantic residents sought the preservation of national unity at all costs. Starting with slaves who escape from the peculiar institution, and in particular the Christiana Resistance in 1851, the passage of slaves over the Mason-Dixon Line compelled Americans in the region to articulate increasingly divergent interpretations of loyalty. Southern slaveholders particularly felt that the inability of the Federal Government to protect their chattel property invalidated the need for them to support the Union. John Brown’s Raid in 1859, Lincoln’s election in 1860, and the opening salvos of secession, further prompted Virginians and regional secessionists to support a separate, Confederate government by the spring of 1861.

Chapter Two explores how Mid-Atlantic residents responded to the act of secession and division of the United States through cultural cartography. Although slaveholding Virginia removed itself from the auspicious of the Federal Government in Washington, many Marylanders and western Virginians demurred from such a divisive action. Both the slave-holding border state and the future Mountain State’s decision to remain in the Union created uncertainty. Who was loyal to the Union? Who supported the Confederacy? Where did loyalty begin and disloyalty end, both physically and conceptually? Through an examination of the American fondness for maps and the publication of physical maps as well as print culture that charted loyalty, this chapter connects cartography with the cultural assumptions of Northerners and Southerners as well as the othering process of oppositional loyalty. As the war progressed, regional residents wielded cultural cartography to confirm the superiority of the section and nation over that of their enemy. In particular, through the use of beauty, Confederates elevated the attractiveness of Southern white women over the ugly, unbecoming Union supporting women they encountered throughout the war. Comparatively, Unionists, with a prewar focus on a “culture of progress,” bemoaned the ugly and disloyal landscapes of the Confederacy during the
war to debase the South. In short, these individuals tried to make sense out of a divided landscape in the Mid-Atlantic, revealing in the process their cultural, social, and racial assumptions about loyalty.

Chapter Three places the experiences of emancipation and slavery at the heart of the narrative about Civil War loyalty. Slaves and freed people, black and white Americans, played an important role in the construction of loyalty—both their own and that of white Americans. African Americans in their service as soldiers for the Union Army and the continual dismantling of the ‘loyal’ slave myth confounded Confederates and compelled the North to consider the place of slavery and black Americans in the nation. Further, the actions of African Americans, as active supporters of the Union, would set the stage for their inclusion in the American body politic after the war. Though African Americans and slavery are an important part of this chapter, it is not a chapter about loyalty from a black perspective. African Americans, contrary to many works that highlight the differences between black and white American history, are not separated out into their own narrative in this work. Rather, blacks, free or enslaved, appear as essential elements of the story here, but also as part of a narrative where white Americans cast their own interpretation of black actions. More importantly, this chapter further demonstrates the centrality of slavery to the war, definitions of loyalty, and begins to form an outline of how Americans remember different versions of the Civil War following Appomattox.

Chapter Four examines of how Mid-Atlantic residents integrated loyalty into their politics between 1861 and 1865. While historians of the North have often approached the study of allegiance in the context of the political realm, this chapter places loyalty at the heart of many discourses in the region throughout the war years. Building off the previous chapter, that concludes with a conversation about how politicians responded to the issue of emancipation and
loyalty, this chapter views the contours of internal loyalty debates in the North and South, highlighting the ways in which the conversations over loyalty shared similar aspects but targeted opponents within and without of each nation. Using the memory of the American Revolution and religious language, Unionists and Confederates sanctified their respective causes. However, internal dissent, in the form of slaves who challenged the Confederate government or anti-war Democrats who resisted the Lincoln administration, forced Mid-Atlantic residents to debate the meaning of loyalty and dissent in democracies. As the war grew more intense, sanctified versions of loyalty left little room for disagreement and prompted increasingly harsh punishments of disloyalty.

Chapter Five picks up the narrative of Mid-Atlantic loyalty after the conclusion of the Civil War in the summer of 1865. This chapter reveals how different memories of the war emerged to challenge how residents understood loyalty. The reciprocal and oppositional visions of loyalty that had dominated the nineteenth century and war years allowed for the integration of African Americans into the body politic post Appomattox. They had dismantled the institution of slavery from within, shouldered rifles as well as spades to aid the Union’s restoration the nation, and had earned their freedom because of the war. Thus, black Americans could claim protection for their loyalty. In the immediate aftermath of the war, African Americans and Republicans pushed for a return to the reciprocal definition of loyalty. Democrats and former Confederates labored against the inclusion of African Americans by playing on racial fears. In time, most whites in the Mid-Atlantic either lost interest in the preservation of African American equality or actively worked against it. By the turn of the twentieth century, loyalty and the Mid-Atlantic had changed rather dramatically. Despite the protests of African Americans, some Union veterans, and a handful of Radical Republicans, the narrative and loyalty of African Americans was
expunged from the record of the war. Instead, white Mid-Atlantic residents remade the Mason-Dixon Line as a division between two culturally different, but united parts of white American society, both of whom had been loyal to their visions of the nation.

With this in mind, the goal of this project is to highlight how for over fifty years Americans in a contested border region, continually reinvented their identity and their understanding of loyalty. Before, during, and after the war, loyalty served an important force in the Mid-Atlantic, as an idea that compelled Americans to support one nation and fight against one another. It also clouded their experience of the war at home and on the battlefront, as well as for years after the cannons fell silent.

Finally, a few technical and methodological issues warrant attention. In the chapters that follow, I use the words ‘loyalty’ and ‘allegiance’ frequently, and often interchangeably. I do so, in part for linguistic variety (the word loyalty already appears often enough in the text as it currently stands). I also wield both words in tandem because I am not convinced that the average individual in the nineteenth century would have identified specific differences between the two concepts. We, much later, might be able to parse out a clear difference between the two terms. Legal scholars and other historians might point out a flaw in my logic. Any difficulties or shortcomings in such an interpretation are mine alone. However, gleaning a history of loyalty from diaries and letters, supplemented by print culture, hardly paints a picture with a clear demarcation between the words loyalty and allegiance in the voices of ordinary Americans. Indeed, these men and women, black or white, used the terms without a clear distinction between the two phrases. As such, this project applies both words together, while maintaining an emphasis on loyalty.
This is, at its very heart, a story about how ordinary people expressed an idea and developed (or redeveloped) their sense of identity over a fifty year period. For much of the project, diaries and letters serve as the foundational elements of the project. Print culture appears too, especially later in this project, as the Civil War concluded and personal correspondence with references to loyalty declined significantly. Despite the source-based shift that occurs, the pages that follow attempt to tell a story. The tale they weave is about how Americans understood themselves, their nation, and their identity for an extended period. In the end, the discussions of loyalty—the maps and perceptions that these individuals discussed and reshaped from 1850 to 1900 laid the foundations for many of the continued debates over the Civil War’s memory that last into the second decade of the twenty-first century. Indeed, I would wager that the loyalties created and molded during the Civil War Era have an important part to play in such contemporary conversations on flags, monuments, and memories.
Chapter 1:
A World Full of Mutations: Movement and Loyalty in Antebellum America

In 1849, four slaves owned by Marylander Edward Gorsuch fled his plantation in Baltimore County to escape across the Mason-Dixon Line for the free soil of Pennsylvania. Over the next two years, those four men eluded slavecatchers hired by the Gorsuch family. In Christiana, Pennsylvania, they blended into a small black community composed of free African Americans and other escaped slaves. Nestled in Lancaster County, Christiana’s black residents had formed a committee of self-defense against slavecatchers that crossed the Mason-Dixon Line in search of self-emancipated men and women. In early September 1851, the Philadelphia Vigilance Committee sent word to William Parker, a leader in the free black community of Lancaster County that Gorsuch, armed with a warrant and backed by a United States Marshal, was on his way to Christiana. On September 11, 1851, according to Parker, “a mine which shook the whole country,” exploded outside his front door. As Parker prepared to move the four former slaves further north, the Maryland slaveholder arrived at Parker’s home. Citing the Fugitive Slave Law, Gorsuch demanded the return of his former property. Events quickly spiraled out of control for Gorsuch.

Gunfire erupted not long after Gorsuch, his son Dickinson, a U.S. Marshal, and several other white Southerners surrounded the Parker residence. The dull roar of gunfire along with a horn blown by Parker’s wife drew a group of free blacks and a few local white men to the homestead. As the local residents arrived, armed to defend Parker’s home, someone killed Edward Gorsuch and wounded his son. The Southerners and U.S. Marshal scattered in the wake of Gorsuch’s demise and the arrival of armed men. In the wake of the assault, local authorities
arrested three white men, including one Castner Hanway, as well as thirty-eight African Americans. The charges levied against Hanway and the other men: 117 counts of treason.¹

The only trial to come of the Christiana Resistance was that of Castner Hanway, and it failed to secure a conviction, but the entire affair placed the issue of loyalty into the national conversation on slavery, sectional tensions, and national politics. Movement by white and black residents across the Mason-Dixon Line precipitated the crisis in Lancaster County: first the fugitive slaves who sought their freedom and then the arrival of Gorsuch’s armed band that pursued them under the Fugitive Slave Act. However, this event was symptomatic of a larger series of movements that crisscrossed the region, as slaves from Maryland, Virginia, or Delaware sought freedom in the North and whites moved through the region for business or pleasure. In doing so, both black and white residents compelled residents in the Mid-Atlantic to discuss how they connected to the government in Washington, D.C. If travel and movement, as some scholars argue, could help forge a nation and a national identity, it is also possible that the inverse of this is true: movement could unmake a nation.²

Five examples of movement between 1850 and 1861 set the stage for residents of the Mid-Atlantic to conceptualize and articulate the language of differing national loyalties. First, the escape of slaves across the Mason-Dixon Line upset local and national political harmony. The violent clash at Christiana, Pennsylvania between free blacks and the slave catchers sent to recover the human chattel, along with treason trial that followed provide a window into how

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freedomseekers influenced conversations about slavery, politics, and sectional tensions. Second, white Americans who moved across the Mason-Dixon Line, in search of education, business, or leisure highlighted cultural differences between Northerners and Southerners. Travel narratives and personal correspondences about the region encouraged individuals throughout the area to view themselves as different from one another. Third, John Brown’s Raid on Harpers Ferry further propelled divisions as Mid-Atlantic residents divided over the ramifications of the attack. Faced with inflammatory rhetoric and increased sectional discontent, Mid-Atlantic occupants increasingly found themselves torn between separate ideas of what their nation could or should be. Fourth, Lincoln’s election in November of 1860 provided another movement—in terms of people going to the polls, traveling to Secession or Union meetings and conventions, or setting volunteers in motion to defend their respective nations—that pushed Mid-Atlantic residents to reevaluate their loyalty to the American nation. Finally, Elmer Ellsworth’s march into

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3 I am making a particular choice here to reference escaped slaves as “freedomseekers” rather than fugitive slaves. My belief is that casting African Americans who fled slavery as fugitive slaves legitimizes the institution of slavery and delegitimizes the attempts of African Americans who attempted to gain their freedom.

4 Amy Murrell Taylor identifies this region as an area where white Americans traveled frequently in search of education, work, or leisure, a “crossroads” of the nation. Amy Murrell Taylor, The Divided Family in Civil War America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 3.

Alexandria, Virginia and his subsequent death, along with that of Jonathan Jackson, recast the language of national loyalty and identity into oppositional forces that directed how Mid-Atlantic residents understood allegiance throughout the war years.

These movements influenced the discourse on loyalty in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia (as well as what became West Virginia), because Americans understood the foundation of loyalty in the antebellum years as a reciprocal relationship between citizens and government. In exchange for loyalty to the nation, the government would protect faithful citizens. However, movement throughout the 1850s prompted questions about the extent to which Americans could rely on the government to protect their interests. In particular, Southern slaveholders in the Mid-Atlantic saw the flight of slaves across the “fault line” of freedom, the subsequent difficulty of recapturing their property, and hostility from an increasing number of Northerners to their interests, as proof that the Federal Government would no longer hold up its end of the arrangement. Further, travel across the Mason-Dixon Line by whites allowed Northern and Southern residents to envision increasingly divergent identities. Movement therefore allowed Mid-Atlantic residents to begin the process of drawing new boundaries and definitions of loyalty long before 1861 and the start of the Civil War.

The Flight of Slaves

At the heart of the sectional tension that pervaded the Mid-Atlantic in the 1850s was the Mason-Dixon Line. This geographic boundary served a dual purpose: as a cartographical division between Pennsylvania, Maryland, and western Virginia and as a symbolic “fault” between free and slave states. African Americans who sought to escape slavery in the antebellum United States found themselves limited by their geographic options. Enslaved men and women in

the Mid-Atlantic had a relatively easier opportunity than did enslaved persons in the Deep South. While this did not make escape easy, by any means, those freedomseekers prompted white residents of the Mid-Atlantic to engage in conversations about which rights the government and citizens would protect.\(^6\) The proximity of a free state to slave territory and the allure of freedom presented by the Mason-Dixon Line proved problematic. For black Americans held in bondage throughout the region, crossing the Mason-Dixon Line presented a chance to gain their freedom. Such movement did not guarantee a permanent escape from slavery, as slave catchers and Southerners traveled into the North to regain the fugitive property. As black men and women passed northward, through Chambersburg, Harrisburg, or Philadelphia they provoked tensions between Northerners and Southerners.\(^7\)

The Underground Railroad served as the critical vehicle to highlight the importance of the Mason-Dixon Line as a divisive boundary in the Mid-Atlantic. According to David G Smith, “Southerners knew that every single fugitive slave escaping by land east of the Appalachian Mountains had to pass through Pennsylvania.” Slaveholders in the Mid-Atlantic consequently looked upon the Keystone State with suspicion, as they rightly concluded that a portion of residents in the state aided freedomseekers in their pursuit of liberty. The papers of William Still, an African American antislavery leader in Philadelphia, and Sydney Howard Gay, a New York

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City abolitionist, confirm such suspicions. Black men, women, and children passed through the Mid-Atlantic with the assistance of white and black Pennsylvanians along the Underground Railroad. Centered in two of the major metropolitan centers of antebellum America, Gay and Still played crucial roles in assisting slaves who sought their freedom. As two members of an extended network of individuals that gave shelter, provided passage, or offered monetary assistance to freedomseekers, these two men kept meticulous records of the slaves that crossed their paths. Their records included the mundane escape of ordinary slaves like, James Jones, from Alexandria, Virginia who “Had not been treated badly, but was tired of being a slave,” and managed to escape on a ship to Baltimore, then to Wilmington, Delaware via freight car, and eventually arrived in New York City.8

Other accounts provide more harrowing tales of escape, but reveal the tensions and network of individuals who assisted freedomseekers in and around Pennsylvania. Robert Jackson escaped from Harpers Ferry in the fall of 1853 along with three other slaves. They made their way to Taneytown, Maryland, where a friendly African American informed them of local whites that would report their presence to authorities. Jackson and his compatriots attempted to hide in order to avoid detection, but a local farmer spotted them. After a pleasant conversation, the man hid the slaves in his barn before he returned with slavecatchers. The ensuing gunfight wounded several white men and Jackson. The assailants captured the other slaves and returned them to the South while Jackson convalesced at a nearby tavern. While there, a sympathetic African American smuggled Jackson rope, so that when he healed he could attempt an escape. On October 14, Jackson clamored down the building, met a friend, who hid Jackson and allowed the

freedomseeker to make his way across the Mason-Dixon Line.\textsuperscript{9} By November, Jackson was in Philadelphia, where Still recorded the former slave’s journey. Jackson’s escape was only possible because of an informal network of individuals along the Underground Railroad that assisted him in his escape for freedom while others in the region worked against the flight of black men and women.

Still and Gay’s journals highlight the fact that while white Americans directed the course of national politics as well as definitions of national identity and loyalty, slaves struck for their own interpretation, or at least their own freedom, when they could. The names and records of escaped slaves only appear for brief moments in their records, perhaps a few lines indicating that James Jones passed through New York City or a more detailed account of Robert Jackson’s engagement, capture, and eventual self-emancipation. In short, African Americans upset the political status quo of the American republic in the 1850s, compelling residents of the Mid-Atlantic to confront the emerging divisions around the Mason-Dixon Line. It is unclear from the pages of Still’s diary or Gay’s journal of the political intention of these slaves who fled from slavery, yet, from other historians, it is clear that free or enslaved African Americans were politically aware.\textsuperscript{10} Freedom was the primary goal of any slave that fled from their master, but it is possible, even likely to think, that they were aware of the tensions in the Mid-Atlantic over slavery. When freedomseekers struck out for their own liberation, like Jones or Jackson, they would prompt white Americans to react to the decisions of black Americans.


The responses of white residents above and below the Mason-Dixon Line to the escape of freedomseekers demonstrated the vulnerability of the region to sectional strife over slavery. As slaves escaped, Southerners often sent slavecatchers North to recapture their fugitive property. Pennsylvanians disliked the arrival of these slave hunters and after 1850 and the stipulations of the Fugitive Slave Law that further criminalized aiding freedomseekers angered residents of the Keystone State. Although Pennsylvanians largely disliked the intrusion of Southerners into their state’s rights, only a handful of them openly resisted the legislation. Instead, most Pennsylvanians took a more indirect, pragmatic root, relying on legal structures and politics to protect their rights and free African Americans. In 1847 the state passed a personal liberty law that required slavecatchers to bring captured African Americans before a jury trial to determine if they were fugitives or free persons of color. Three years later, the Fugitive Slave Law tightened the punishments for Americans who harbored or assisted slaves in their flight from slavery. Pennsylvanians persisted in their efforts to undermine Southern intervention in their state by rallying against local Democrats who supported the Fugitive Slave Act, petitioning for the release of wrongly imprisoned free blacks (or even escaped slaves), and most significantly, participated in the Underground Railroad through vigilance committees that guided blacks to freedom. Further, the Keystone State was the regional lynchpin in Underground Railroad, where an undisclosed number of free blacks and sympathetic whites aided and abetted freedomseekers in their quest to escape slavery.\(^{11}\)

The uncertainty of who aided African American freedomseekers in Pennsylvania combined with the knowledge that the Keystone State was a major avenue for the flight of slaves frustrated slaveholding residents of the Mid-Atlantic. In other parts of the nation, such as New England and the upper Midwest, antislavery advocates were openly hostile to the Fugitive Slave Law, engaging in riotous, violent acts to free black men and women accosted by slavecatchers. The fact that slaveholders could not pinpoint which Pennsylvanians aided escaped slaves did nothing to assuage their fears. In fact, the uncertainty may have made the discontent even worse. Rumors served as a vital tool for spreading information in antebellum America, from predictions about slave uprisings to local or national political news. Coupled with the historical fears of Southerners regarding slave insurrection, slaveholders in Maryland and Virginia likely looked across the Mason-Dixon Line with apprehension. Anyone, white or black, north of that division could oppose slave and entice slaves to seek their freedom by running away from their masters—as nearly one to five thousand African Americans did annually between 1830 and 1861. Pennsylvanians and the Mason-Dixon Line therefore stood as a possible threat to the rights, liberties, and property of Mid-Atlantic slaveholders in the decade before the Civil War.\(^\text{12}\)

Set against this backdrop of regional tension, the Christiana Resistance in 1851 thrust the conversation of loyalty, slave flight, and national unity into the public consciousness. Mid-Atlantic residents argued bitterly over the meaning of treason and national loyalty in regards to

the men who killed a white slaveholder in defense of escaped slaves. Enoch Lowe, Governor of Maryland during the Christiana Resistance, reported to the state legislature in early 1852 that Gorsuch’s death at the hands of a black, abolitionist mob, demanded justice. Lowe had pressured Washington and the Federal Government to send a prosecutor to Philadelphia to try the men arrested in the wake of Gorsuch’s death. The prosecution believed that Castner Hanway offered the best case they could make for treason in Christiana, as he was supposed to have led the assault on Gorsuch. However, the trial was a mess. U.S. Marshal Henry Kline who served as a key witness for the prosecution provided unreliable testimony, noting that he hid through most of the gunfight. Further, the defense was able to portray the Quaker Hanway as a man that feared slavecatchers had arrived to kidnap William Parker, a member of the community, not to protect escaped slaves. The Philadelphia court found Hanway not guilty of treason and shortly thereafter, the entire Federal case unraveled. In response, Lowe noted that the “peace-loving, the Union-loving, the law-abiding State of Maryland has failed to secure justice. Although, she is a border State, and is, practically more interested in this fugitive slave law, than all other States beside, nevertheless has she admonished South Carolina against secession, and cheered on Virginia in the ways of loyalty.” Though an affronted Slave State, Lowe expressed Maryland’s loyalty to the Union. Yet, the fact that the Christiana “rebels” had threatened the Fugitive Slave Law and the court deemed Hanway not guilty, prompted Lowe to call the Fugitive Slave Law practically dead. He feared “no resistance to the fugitive slave act, henceforth, can be brought within the law of reason.” While Lowe encouraged Marylanders, and by extension Southerners, to use their political voices to protect the nation, he saw the verdict in Pennsylvania as a dangerous portent of the unwillingness of Northerners and the Federal Government to protect Southern rights and property.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{13}\) E. Louis Lowe, “Annual Message of the Executive to the General Assembly of Maryland, January Session, 1852”
Lowe had cast Marylanders as loyal, law-abiding citizens of the Union, while radicals in the North had practiced disunion. His evocation of loyalty here was national. Though Maryland’s position as a slave state on the border of Pennsylvania gave it special interest in the Fugitive Slave Law, Lowe spoke about loyalty in a unifying context. The use of that language steered a moderate course. Such a middle ground chided extremists—either Southern fire-eaters or radical abolitionists in the North—as disloyal elements of American society opposed to national unity. The use of loyalty and treason around the Christiana Resistance reveal the tensions of the early 1850s over slavery, but it also highlighted how the Mid-Atlantic linked their vision of allegiance to the nation. Similar conversations connecting slavery, fugitive slaves, and loyalty played out across the region in the wake of the Christiana Resistance.¹⁴

In Pennsylvania, the question of blame and national unity became the central piece of the conversation about the Christiana Resistance. While moderate Whigs in Pennsylvania condemned the act of resistance at Christiana as “tumultuous and treasonable,” they blamed Democrats and pro-slavery individuals throughout the region. The ability of slavecatchers to abduct any black men or women, escaped slave or not, and receive permission to take them South with little to no proof of their identity, prompted Northern African Americans to defend themselves.¹⁵ According to the Lewisburg Chronicle, proslavery Democrats who denounced all those who opposed slavery or the Fugitive Slave Law as “Abolitionists and incendiaries,” missed

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¹⁵ *Lewisburg Chronicle*, October 1, 1851, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85055197/1851-10-01/ed-1/seq-1/#date1=1851&sort=date&date2=1852&searchType=advanced&language=&sequence=0&lccn=&index=0&words=Christiana&proxidistance=5&state=Pennsylvania&rows=20&ortext=&proxtext=&phrasetext=&andtext=Christiana&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=3;.
the point. Rather than unify the nation, their attacks against anti-slavery advocates only served “to widen the breach between the North and the South” while these disunionist Democrats claimed to be a “peculiarly National [party]—they are the only truly sectional party in the North, and their insane efforts have in them more hazard to the Union, than the labors of the open disunionists.”¹⁶ Comparatively, according to the Democratic, pro-slavery Mountain Sentinel from Pennsylvania, the Christiana Resistance happened only because of leading abolitionists like Pennsylvania Governor William F. Johnston, Thaddeus Stevens, and other fanatics across the North. The black and white men in Lancaster County “had been inflamed by abolition harangues and the circulation of incendiary” literature that made treason and murder “a moral duty, and…no crime” at all.¹⁷ National unity remained an important part in how Pennsylvanians discussed the Christiana Resistance, but they also demonstrated a framework where they painted political opponents as a threat. This rhetoric, from Christiana onward throughout the 1850s would help lay the foundations for how Mid-Atlantic residents would use loyalty in the Civil War Era. Antislavery advocates saw Democrats and Southern slaveholders as threats to the nation, while Democrats in Pennsylvania feared the actions of antislavery proponents jeopardized the longevity and unity of the United States.

In a similar vein, Virginians found reason to articulate their displeasure with what they saw as a radical, divisive section of the nation for their “treasonable” actions in Christiana, the Keystone State, and beyond. Citing an abstract from the Petersburg Intelligencer, the Richmond Enquirer strongly noted its disdain for the contempt of Northerners and antislavery advocates

¹⁶ Lewisburg Chronicle, October 1, 1851.
¹⁷ The Mountain Sentinel, October 2, 1851, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn86071377/1851-10-02/ed-1/seq-2/#date1=1851&date2=1852&sort=date&searchType=advanced&language=&sequence=0&lccn=&index=5&words=Christiana&proxdistance=5&state=Pennsylvania&rows=20&ortext=&proxtext=&phrasetext=&andtext=Christiana&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=3.
toward the South. Furthermore, unless Pennsylvanians dealt with the Christiana perpetrators harshly, it would not take many such instances to compel Virginians, though they were “the warmest Union men of the land,” to call forth a “Southern Congress, which will represent the unanimous sentiments and feelings of all slaveholding States, and will be clothed with power to frame a new Confederacy.” Protecting slavery would sit at the heart of this new confederacy. Combined with Governor Lowe’s statements, Maryland and Virginia wanted to maintain the Union, but their critiques of the Federal Government and Northerners after Christiana rested on the protection of their rights. Antislavery Northerners had put the foundation of national loyalty in jeopardy by threatening the rights of Gorsuch, his son, and Federal Law. The national government further provided a challenge to Southern loyalty, because in the eyes of Lowe and Southern slaveholders, they had failed to uphold their end of the arrangement in the exchange of loyalty: they had not protected or rectified the damage done to Southern rights.

From these debates, there are two important considerations to keep in mind about how slavery influenced the conversation about loyalty. First, the Christiana Resistance prompted Mid-Atlantic residents to convey loyalty in national terms. They placed the movement of slaves and the responses of one another, North or South, into a framework that evaluated an individual or group’s reaction in terms of national loyalty. Regional residents felt disturbed when their neighbors (locally and regionally) clashed with their vision of loyalty and reciprocal relations with the government. Second, the movement of slaves across the Mason-Dixon Line was not enough to break apart the Mid-Atlantic on its own. Other American borderlands, like the Ohio River Valley and the Mississippi River Valley, also experienced divisions throughout the

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18 Richmond Enquirer, October 24, 1851, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84024735/1851-10-24/ed-1/seq-1/#date1=1851&sort=date&date2=1851&searchType=advanced&language=&sequence=0&index=18&words=Christiana&proxdistance=5&state=Virginia&rows=20&ortext=&proxtext=Christiana&phrasetext=&andtext=&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=3.
antebellum years as slaves sought their freedom in the middle or far west.\textsuperscript{19} In the Mid-Atlantic, most residents did not articulate a divergent interpretation of national loyalties around the Christiana Resistance, though the actions of slaves compelled socio-political leaders in the Mid-Atlantic to adopt national frameworks for their conversations.

The interjection of treason and loyalty into the national political discourse is important. Treason in the United States, as historians and legal scholars have noted, is the only crime specifically laid out in the Constitution. It is also an extremely vague and difficult offense to pin down. Prior to the events in Christiana, there had been only a handful of cases of treason levied against American citizens. Excluding Benedict Arnold and John André, of Revolutionary War fame, actual trials or conversations about treason were limited to: the Whiskey Rebellion, the Fries Rebellion (also in Pennsylvania), and Aaron Burr’s trial for treason in 1807.\textsuperscript{20} Treason and by extension the question of loyalty had remained outside the discourse of most Americans’ daily lives. Of course, as sectional tensions flared between the Revolution and the 1850s, Northerners and Southerners often accused one another of pushing disunion or other quasi-

\textsuperscript{19} See for instance, Andrew K Frank ad A. Glenn Crothers edited volume on borderlands: \textit{Borderland Narratives}, which provides an overview of many different contested boundaries, but does not explore the Mason-Dixon Line as one. Other Civil War Era studies that look at borderlands, such as Aaron Astor’s \textit{Rebels on the Border} and Christopher Phillips’ \textit{The Rivers Ran Backward}, look at borderlands along the Ohio Rivers Valley and in relation to Kentucky and Missouri. This is not to suggest that historians have not paid attention to the Mid-Atlantic border area. For example, Steven Longenecker’s \textit{Gettysburg Religion}, Dietmer’s \textit{The Politics of Black Citizenship}, Stanley Harrold’s \textit{Border War}, and David G. Smith’s \textit{On the Edge of Freedom}, explore the region around the Mason-Dixon Line, but, these studies mostly focus on Pennsylvania and do not pull in the entire Mid-Atlantic Region. Aaron Astor, \textit{Rebels on the Border: Civil War, Emancipation, and the Reconstruction of Kentucky & Missouri} (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 2012); \textit{Borderland Narratives: Negotiation and Accommodation in North America’s Contested Spaces, 1500-1850} edited by Andrew K Frank ad A. Glenn Crothers (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2017); Dietmer, \textit{The Politics of Black Citizenship}; Stanley Harrold, \textit{Border War: Fighting over Slavery before the Civil War} (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Brian D. McKnight, \textit{Contested Borderland: The Civil War in Appalachian Kentucky and Virginia} (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2012); Christopher Phillips, \textit{The Rivers Ran Backward: The Civil War and the Remaking of the American Middle Border} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

treasonable acts.\textsuperscript{21} Yet, as historians Thomas Slaughter and Bill Blair have noted, the Christiana Riot forced Americans to think about treason and loyalty in the Mid-Atlantic and throughout the nation. The trial gained national headlines, but the lack of any convictions left the issue of slavery, the Fugitive Slave Law, and African Americans freedomseekers unresolved. The continued movement of African Americans, in search of freedom, would continue to exacerbate the tensions caused by Gorsuch’s death and the resulting trial of Castner Hanway.\textsuperscript{22}

The actions of other African Americans would prompt angrier responses from slaveholders throughout the region, as the quest for freedom from enslaved blacks struck directly at the heart of Southern society. The Christiana Riot served as one prominent, if singular moment, where enslavers articulated their discontent with Pennsylvanians, the national government, and antislavery advocates in the North. Curtis Jacobs a planter from the Eastern Shore of Maryland kept an intermittent diary from the 1850s through the Civil War, where he detailed key events in his relationship with the institution of slavery and sectional tensions. Jacobs’ diary is artificial in a sense. He did not write the account as a daily or even weekly journal. Rather he made long-winded entries after major events took place, with an eye to vindicate his actions. For example, in a discussion of 1855, he reported that his slaves appeared to dislike living on his plantation. Not only had two slaves attempted to flee in 1855 (one of them, Hardy, succeeded), but Jacobs’ slaves also “repeated[ly] murdered their own children” and plotted to poison the entire family on at least one occasion.\textsuperscript{23} In January of 1856, Jacobs then noted, and at different points thereafter, “letters came into my hands revealing a plot by which a

\textsuperscript{21} Elizabeth R. Varon, \textit{Disunion!: The Coming of the Civil War} (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 7-16.
\textsuperscript{22} William A. Blair, \textit{Malice Toward Some: Treason and Loyalty in the Civil War Era} (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 2014), 20-2; Slaughter, \textit{A Bloody Dawn}, 8-11, 103-4.
\textsuperscript{23} Curtis W. Jacob, Diary, “Negroes Hired Out in Alabama, June 1856,” Curtis W. Jacobs Diary, MS 3036, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland.
large number of our negroes were to runaway.” Collectively, across the “neighborhood” near Jacobs’ home, slaves from different plantations would come together, take a wagon, and weapons to protect themselves, and march northward. Although free African Americans and “several regular abolitionists who have been traveling amongst us under the pretence of other business” put the slaves up to this act of self-emancipation, Jacobs’ rallied several local owners. Together, they seized the suspected culprits, before they could strike out for freedom. Jacobs felt that “I have done my duty in thus taking said negroes from the evil influences operating on them and over which could have no control,” and remanded them to Alabama, out of the reach of abolitionists, free blacks, and the temptation of escape to the North.

Jacobs’ diary absolved him and other slaveholders of any blame for the institution of slavery, but like the response to the Christiana Resistance, it reveals the foundations of divisions within the Mid-Atlantic that black flight eroded. Jacobs could not fathom why his slaves worked against him. Some other factor beyond the institution of slavery caused African Americans to flee. Despite the professions of black Americans for equal treatment, few Southerners believed their desire for freedom was not a manipulation of white Northerners. Other proslavery advocates echoed this point throughout the Mid-Atlantic. Opponents of slavery throughout the region also spoke of divisions in the region as well, highlighting how the peculiar institution

24 Curtis W. Jacobs, Diary, “Negroes Hired Out in Alabama, June 1856.”

25 The exchange of slaves out of Maryland and Virginia had been a long accepted practice in the region, dating back to the end of the eighteenth and start of the nineteenth century. In total, between 1820 and 1860, according to Steven Deyle, Upper South slaveholders sold upwards of 875,000 slaves to the Deep South. Deyle notes that Virginia possibly sold upwards of 290,000 slaves in the three decades before the Civil War. As for Maryland, Deyle notes that there are debates over the extent to which Maryland participated in the internal slave trade. Although the sent far fewer slaves to the Deep South than neighboring Virginia, it was a shared experience by both states and a common way for enslavers to make money or punish slaves. Jacobs, Diary, “Negroes Hired Out in Alabama, June 1856.” For conversations on the internal slave trade see: William Calderhead, “How Extensive was the Border State Slave Trade? A New Look,” Civil War History, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 1972), 42-55; Steven Deyle, Carry Me Back: The Domestic Slave Trade in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 16, 25, 37-45, 98-9, 285; Walter Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Slave Market (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Joshua D. Rothman, Flush Times & Fever Dreams: A Story of Capitalism and Slavery in the Age of Jackson (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2012).
formulated a showdown between Northerners and Southerners, as anti-slavery proponents placed blame for Christiana and other instances of resistance on slavery itself. Regardless of the differences in opinion, clashes like the Christiana Resistance, and the interjection of loyalty into public discourse exacerbated national tensions and compelled regional residents to debate their attachment to the nation during the 1850s.

**Cultural Divisions**

White Mid-Atlantic residents also moved across the Mason-Dixon Line during the 1850s, where they also contributed to sectional divisions as they articulated perceived regional and cultural differences in the region. Connected by trade, family relations, and proximity, white men and women crossed the state borders for a number of reasons: business, political appointments, schooling, or to visit friends and family. When they did, unlike escaped slaves who traversed the Mason-Dixon Line in the hope of self-emancipation and left limited personal accounts, these white individuals recorded their own observations of one another. Not all travelers spoke in detail about regional differences, but when they did, their observations highlighted what they perceived as glaring differences founded on each individual’s cultural background. Northerners found Southern society in Maryland and Virginia backward, underdeveloped, and primitive. In comparison, Southerners argued that the economic progress touted by Northerners as a mark of virtue, was hollow, whereas the South remained morally virtuous. Such depictions would help sow the seeds of sectional (and eventually national) discontent in the region and allowed Mid-Atlantic residents to see themselves as different people, loosely held together in the same nation.

White residents above the Mason-Dixon Line, who travelled South, turned to observations of land and landscapes to highlight Northern progress over their underdeveloped, slave-owning neighbors. In doing so, Pennsylvanians would plot a divided landscape of the Mid-
Atlantic and the nation writ large. James Uhler a resident of Pike County, Pennsylvania, enlisted in the United States Army in 1857. In his diary that began at the time he volunteered and continued through his service in the Union Army, Uhler recorded differences between free and slave soil. While traveling to Fort Leavenworth Kansas for the start of his five years of service, Uhler evaluated the terrain over which he passed with an eye toward its productivity. On June 29, 1857, he passed through the slaveholding state of Missouri, after having traveled from Pittsburgh to Cincinnati and through Illinois. He found that Missouri, “don’t appear to be as nice and as good land as Illinois is neither is the improvements as good.” Not only did Uhler find the land overgrown with cottonwood, but he also felt that “the land don’t look as productive as Illinois.”

Uhler was not alone in his prewar vision of slave territory. Preacher Abraham Essick, originally from Franklin County, Pennsylvania spent his time from 1849 to 1857 throughout the Shenandoah Valley. In his travels, the preacher compared the landscapes of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. Between Allentown and Reading, Pennsylvania, while traveling to visit friends, he noted, “This is one of the richest and best improved agricultural districts through I have ever travelled. The farms are usually not much over one hundred acres in size, and in the finest state of cultivation.” Two weeks later, upon his return to Winchester, Virginia, he further articulated his observations. “During my visit to Pennsylvania I was deeply impressed by the contrast between the general appearance of the country and [Virginia].” While the two regions shared similarities due to their proximity, “The differences in cultivation, productiveness, and the general indications of thrift, are immensely in favor of Pennsylvania. It is usual to account for

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26 James M. Uhler Papers, Diary, June 29, 1857, Box 11 Folder 160, Typed Transcript of Diary in 2 Parts, page 3.
this on the grounds of Slavery." Both Uhler and Essick laid out their visions that a clear difference existed between slave and free territory. Both men argued that Pennsylvania and Northerner states in general had superior land, due to the freedom of it workers, while slavery retarded progress in the South.

Uhler and Essick were part of a larger trend of writers from the North that had visited the South before and contributed to the idea that two separate cultures thrived above and below the Mason-Dixon Line. For years, Americans had traveled across regional boundaries, but Northerners published renowned accounts of the slaveholding states, such as Frederick Law Olmsted’s observations, while a bevy of Southern travel literature never attracted widespread attention outside its home region. This might have to do with the fact that Northerners boasted a stronger printing establishment in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. The other part might have come from the regional publication and intention of Southern travel accounts. Southerners transmitted their evaluations of the North through private correspondence or regional papers, with an increasingly wide criticism of the region for its disdain for slavery and opposition to Southern culture.

As a result, although Uhler and Essick wrote their observations of the South for private consumption, they fit into this broader narrative of Northern critiques of the South that carried throughout travel literature. During the antebellum period, travel writers crossed the United States and printed their accounts in periodicals, journals, newspapers, or book-form. According

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28 Essick, Diary., June 6, 1857. Essick would later note that even Maryland farming, along with that of Pennsylvania remained superior to that of Virginia’s larger plantations and farms September 8, 1857.
29 Majewski, A Housing Dividing, 3-7.
to John D. Cox, travel writers, while often considered specific sojourners hired by newspapers to canvas and report back to the paper on a region—Europe, the South, or the West—were far more broad. Escaped slaves, women, and eventually Union soldiers, became part of a travel network that evaluated the South.\textsuperscript{32} Not only did these individuals use travel as a means of building national identity, but they also criticized, like Uhler and Essick, the South itself.\textsuperscript{33}

Frederick Law Olmsted perhaps best exemplified the view of the travel writer’s vision of the South as backward and hindered by the institution of slavery. Between 1852 and 1854, Olmsted made three trips throughout various parts of the South, missing only Arkansas and Florida in his excursions.\textsuperscript{34} The institution of slavery, Olmsted reported, had, “in some way [done] more harm than good,” to the Southern states.\textsuperscript{35} It was not the climate, but rather the choices of individuals throughout the region that had states like Virginia lagging behind their Northern counterparts. Indeed, Virginia became representative of a great portion of the slaveholding states in Olmsted’s eyes. He found that “The use of land and nearly all other resources of wealth in Virginia is much less valuable than the use of similar property in the adjoining Free States, these resources having no real value until labour is applied to them.”\textsuperscript{36} From Virginia throughout the Cotton States, Olmsted reported on the lack of productivity and dilapidated buildings that he found.\textsuperscript{37} Like Uhler, Essick, and other individuals who took upon the pen upon their travels, Olmsted found that slavery had ruined Southerners and their motivation to accomplish any work of meaning. They left the simple tasks to their slaves and

\textsuperscript{32} Cox, \textit{Traveling South}, 8, 13-5.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 1-4, 193-4.
\textsuperscript{35} Frederick Law Olmsted, \textit{The Cotton Kingdom}, 8.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 10-1.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 11.
hardly enjoyed the accomplishments of manual labor. Yet, where the soldier and preacher recorded their observations of the South for personal consumption, Olmsted sent his evaluations to a newspaper and then published his work into books. In doing so, he helped spread the notion that the North and South were two distinct places, where slavery had worked as a corruptive influence upon Southerners and the nation by extension. Even if Northerners were not racial egalitarians who sought to free African Americans from the clutches of slavery for their benefit, Olmsted’s movement, along with the writings of other Northerners, revealed how Northerners saw themselves as superior to their Southern compatriots. If Northerners were better stewards of land and resources, then they should be the ones directly responsible for directing the course of the nation and fixing the backward South.

Southerners disagreed with such depictions and reinforced their perceived superiority in their observations about the hollow backbone of Northern industry and economic progress. William Kinzer conceded the progress of Northern development while he attended school at Dickinson College in south-central Pennsylvania. In his travels, he reported that Pennsylvania had “a number of durable houses, a few substantial barns, and finely cultivated farms” and he hoped “that the people of Va. would cultivate their farms more and better, and educate their sons and daughters, like the people of Pa.” Yet, when faced with the prospect of returning home in 1857, Kinzer noted with delight that he would soon return to “breathe the free air of Virginia” once again. While Pennsylvania boasted superior internal improvements, Kinzer felt stifled by the presence of abolitionists, Republicans, and the differences between his state and the freedom he found in Virginia. An article from the Richmond Daily Dispatch puts Kinzer’s views in perspective. In March of 1854, the Daily Dispatch mocked New York and its grand hotels. The city, a representation of the North, had the contrast of “most abject poverty and squalid

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wretchedness, on the one hand, and the most superb, magnificent and luxurious living on the other.” The article further added that the tensions between Northerners and Southerners over the issue of slavery was easily assuaged when Southerners traveled north and placed before “yankee eyes,” the bounty of “golden tribute.” Northerners might have had an edge in terms of industrial prowess and internal development, but Kinzer and the Daily Dispatch found that progress morally bankrupt. Northerners had no moral compass. Yet, despite their claims of outrage at slavery, Northerners would gladly accept Southern money. Further, despite the presumed benefits of industrial improvements, Northerners allowed for disparity between the residents of their section, while the paternal protection of Southern slaveholders ensured that everyone had enough in the South, regardless of their race. Such a depiction was an exaggeration of slavery’s benefits, but it allowed Southerners to see Northerners as their moral inferior.39

Increasingly, the people of the Mid-Atlantic, with their feet or with their pens, articulated various interpretations of the nation, freedom, and identity above and below the Mason-Dixon Line, though they did so without requiring separate national allegiances. Personal correspondences and newspapers from the Mid-Atlantic echoed the idea of emerging divisions during the 1850s. Samuel B. Halsey wrote to his son Joseph in August of 1856 that he wanted his son to visit the family “before the Union is dissolved in fact. I suppose in Nov. next it must be either riveted together or it will all fall apart.”40 This was a clear indication that Halsey and other Northerners saw dangerous contention with Southerners. While Samuel wrongly placed the campaign of John Frémont in 1856 as the event that would bind the United States together or destroy it, he accurately evaluated how many Northerners felt about political events. People in

39 Kinzer, Diary, June 15, 1857 and August 7, 1856; The Daily Dispatch, March 20, 1854, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84024738/1854-03-20/ed-1/seq-1/#date1=1850&index=5&rows=20&words=damned+damning+yankee+yankees&searchType=basic&sequence=0 &state=Virginia&date2=1860&protext=damn+yankee&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1.
40 Samuel B. Halsey to Joseph Halsey, August 20, 1856, Morton-Halsey Papers.
the North, he noted felt that they were “all treated in the discussions of the slavery question as a set of fanatical, knavish, low born race whose opinions are not to be treated with argument but with contempt and is expressed with chastisement.”

Samuel Halsey blamed Southerners for the political discord that racked the nation, as Southerners disrespected the North and devalued their opinions. William Kinzer, while at Dickinson College in 1856, highlighted this point. After a speech by Republicans in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the Virginia noted that he saw Republicans as fanatics who discredited the South. The political speech by “Black Republicans and Abolitionists from [Massachusetts].-Burlingame. He spoke two hours – and the sum and substances of his speech was a slander on the South.”

Both statements indicate tension, but not separate national identities. Samuel Halsey and Kinzer indicate that they found sectional antagonisms yet, they did not articulate different national identities. While they saw tensions and divisions, they lacked a clear reason to see themselves as parts of a different nation. Why then did these individuals eventually produce antagonistic loyalties? The answer came in the form a long bearded, fiery anti-slavery advocate in the autumn of 1859.

**Harpers Ferry’s Discontent**

John Brown’s attack on Harpers Ferry pushed Mid-Atlantic residents to reevaluate how they understood loyalty and commitment to the national government. On October 16, 1859, Brown, with a band of black and white accomplices, assaulted the Federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Their ultimate goal was the liberation of the African American slaves in the surrounding countryside. Although Brown’s militant emancipation failed, it provoked an immediate reaction throughout the region and the nation as a whole. Historians rightly acknowledge that Brown’s raid upset the simmering tensions of the 1850s, yet the importance

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41 Samuel B. Halsey to Joseph Halsey, August 20, 1856.
42 Kinzer, Diary, October 10, 1856.
here is that Mid-Atlantic residents increasingly cast their discussion of loyalty in oppositional terms. 43 Most scholars have interpreted the Harpers Ferry Raid as the crescendo of sectional animosity, but it also pushed conversations about loyalty into the mainstream of Mid-Atlantic public discourse. Brown’s action compelled Virginians to reconsider the government’s willingness to protect their rights. An ironic result, considering it was Federal troops that broke the back of Brown’s attack. Virginia tried Brown on the grounds of treason against the Old Dominion because they had begun to see the interests of Virginia—or at least the protection of Virginia’s rights as something they could not rely on from Washington any longer. Repeatedly, the action or inaction of Northerners and the national government had proved ineffective to protect the rights of Southerners. Trying Brown for treason and executing him in Virginia challenged the national government and asserted Virginia’s place on the edge of the Union. The responses to the events of October to December 1859, from the raid through the trial and to Brown’s execution, highlighted how residents of the Mid-Atlantic began to articulate antagonistic loyalties before the start of the Civil War.

For the most part, Brown’s failed incursion united white Virginians in opposition to what they saw as Northern intervention into Southern affairs, aimed at their most prized property. Historical incidents explain, in part, the fiery responses from the residents of the Old Dominion. Nat Turner’s slave rebellion in 1831 although an event decades past, lingered in the minds of many Virginians. Combined with the precarious nature of slavery and the Southern economy, as well as the continued flight of slaves North via the Underground Railroad, whites across the

43 From the work of David Potter to more recent scholarly works, including Robert McGlone’s John Brown’s War against Slavery and Tony Horwitz’s popular history, Midnight Rising: John Brown and the Raid that Sparked the Civil War, Brown stands at the center of the bloodier war to follow. Comparatively, Brian McGinty, recently noted that it was rather Brown’s trial and ‘treason’ against Virginia (and by extension the slaveholding South), was the tipping point in sectional hostilities. Tony Horwitz, Midnight Rising: John Brown and the Raid that Sparked the Civil War (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2011); Brain McGinty, John Brown’s Trial (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Robert McGlone John Brown’s War against Slavery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); David Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).
state rallied against what they saw as the outgrowth of Northern hostility to the peculiar
institution.⁴⁴ Edmund Ruffin, via the “Resolutions of the Central Southern Rights Association,”
declared that the attack by Brown came from a “long-concocted and wide-spread Northern
conspiracy, for the destruction by armed violence and bloodshed of all that is valuable for the
welfare, safety, and even existence of Virginia and other Southern States.” Ruffin and the
association further advocated that Southerners should respond by assuring the protection of their
institutions and rights from further Northern aggression.⁴⁵ Ruffin’s attention to “all that is
valuable” and his advocacy for Southern nationalism to protect said property underscores how
Virginians feared the inability of the national government to sustain their rights. From another
perspective, Amanda Virginia Edmonds, from Fauquier County, Virginia, wrote in her diary
after Brown’s execution that while many rejoiced at his passing, locals feared an attack from “the
vile enemy,” (Northerners) who could try to save Brown from the gallows or avenge his death.⁴⁶
In Virginia particularly, and the South generally, Southerners responded with hostility to what
they saw as the outgrowth of antislavery discontent aimed southward from aggressive
Northerners. More importantly, Ruffin, Edmonds, and many others throughout the South cast
their response to Brown’s assault on Harpers Ferry in antagonistic terms: Edmonds called
Northerners enemies of Virginia, while Ruffin called on his fellow Southerners to defend
launched into the South.⁴⁷

Others, like the editors of the Richmond Whig, further elaborated on their support for the
execution of Brown and the unity of Southerners against the North. The murderer of Virginians

⁴⁴ Harrold, Border War, 9-15, 192.
⁴⁵ Edmund Ruffin, “Resolutions of the Central Southern Rights Association,” November 25, 1859, and Anticipations
of the Future, June 1860,” in The Tribunal: Responses to John Brown and the Harpers Ferry Road, edited by John
⁴⁷ Phillips, Looming Civil War, 93-5.
would be hanged and Virginia would deal with consequences of that action, even “Though it convert the whole Northern people, without an exception, into furious, armed abolition invaders, yet old Brown will be hung! That is the stern and irreversible decrees, not only of the authorities of Virginia, but of the PEOPLE of Virginia, without dissenting voice.”48 Likewise Baltimore The Daily Exchange, a pro-states’ rights, but anti-secession paper echoed the divisions brought on by Brown’s incursion. Brown had committed treason in their eyes, and had gained support from Northerners, evidenced by the pikes forged with New England iron. More importantly, the Exchange connected Brown’s raid to state politics, offering a lesson for Marylanders and Northern fanatics. The paper argued that individuals like Representative Henry Winter Davis, from the Fourth Congressional District in Maryland, portrayed Brown as a martyr for the Republican Party. Davis, in the words of the Exchange, aligned the interests of Maryland with the North rather than South. If re-elected, the paper argued that Davis would work with Republicans, thereby encouraging the appearance of more radicals like Brown, and Baltimore could not “hope to retain its position among Southern cities, or preserve the confidence and sympathy of the State.”49 Both papers connected the Harpers Ferry incident to a larger narrative of regional and national fragmentation. For the Whig, the hostility was direct—Brown’s attack demanded his execution and Virginians would fight Northerners if necessary. Yet, in Baltimore, they agreed on the necessity of hanging Brown, but they also linked his actions to the wider narrative of divisions in their state. Placed between the North and South, Maryland and the city of Baltimore specifically, felt the tug of two economies. Thus, Harpers Ferry agitated

Marylanders on the possibility of a slave uprising, but it also encouraged them to evaluate regional tensions that connected them to the North and South.

Pennsylvanians provided a variety of responses that lacked the unity of those below the Mason-Dixon Line, but still exposed the tensions within the Mid-Atlantic. Some tried to distance themselves from the actions of Brown and the possible connections to abolitionists. Others charted a middle course, which condemned Brown for his violent plan, but also advocated for the destruction of the peculiar institution. The Quaker paper, the *Friend’s Review*, in late October 1859 argued that although the goal of Brown’s mission was to end slavery, it also must have “been laboring under a species of insanity, or the blindest fanaticism.” The paper despaired at the fact that “politicians will use [the raid] for selfish and corrupt purposes.” While they heartily prayed for the end of slavery, its existence came not just from plantations but society as a whole, hence the need “in relation to its annihilation, devolving upon Christians generally,” is one of moral suasion, not violence. Similarly, William Henry Furness, a pastor at the First Congregational Unitarian Church in Philadelphia demurred from Brown’s attempts to incite slaves to violence. “So long as we maintain the right to shoot and stab to right any wrong, we are fairly open to the suspicion of being ready and willing to shoot and stab to any extent.” Furness noted his appreciation for Brown’s courage, but he was wrong in his course of action, as violence would only exacerbate tensions and prompt a harsh response from the Southern states.

Correspondences that crisscrossed the Mason-Dixon Line in the wake of Brown’s attack further allowed Northerners and Southerners to reveal how Brown had exacerbated the socio-political fault line in the nation. An anonymous letter from New York to the court in

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Charlestown, Virginia where John Brown awaited trial, assured the clerk as well as the whole South that if they “hurt One hair of [Brown’s] head,” then all Virginians would see “every City—Town and Village South of Mason & Dixon’s line in Flames. We are determined to put down Slavery at any odds.” According to the letter, “All of us at the North sympathize with the Martyrs of Harper’s Ferry.” While this letter was untrue, a fair amount of Pennsylvanians alone took a moderate or disappointed approach to Brown’s raid, it highlighted the hostility of some Northerners to the South. This mutual discontent emerged further in letter exchanged between Massachusetts abolitionist Lydia Maria Child and Virginia’s Governor Henry Wise. After Child sought permission to visit Brown and tend his wounds, Wise acquiesced to her request, but laid the blame for the whole affair at her feet and at that of all abolitionists. Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry was “a natural consequence of your sympathy,” toward him and other abolitionists. Northern support for abolitionists and inflammatory rhetoric against slavery had provided fertile ground for violence and sectional animosity to flourish. Child retorted that it was the action of Virginians and Southerners writ large, which had nullified or distorted the Constitution for the benefit of slavery. They, not the morally righteous Northerners, had precipitated the current crisis. While she did not condone Brown’s actions, Wise, who had supported expanding slavery without end in 1842, along with other Southerners had “weakened [the Union] beyond all power of restoration.” Wise and Child played off the foundations established before Brown’s raid. Each section had positioned the other as different and antagonistic to the other during the 1850s. In doing so, residents of the Mid-Atlantic increasingly

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53 Anonymous, “To the Clerk of Court, Charleston,” October 23, 1859,” in *The Tribunal*, 84.
argued that the residents of the other section were responsible for Brown and his actions or the conditions that had prompted Brown to act in the first place.⁵⁴

African Americans also participated in this discussion of the new socio-political realities in the Mid-Atlantic following the raid at Harpers Ferry. Free black residents called on the memory of the American past to portray Brown as someone who had adhered to national ideals of equality. Rufus Sibb Jones joined other black residents of Pittsburgh gathered at the Wylie Street Church on November 29, 1859 to defend John Brown. The free black men connected Brown’s raid, his capture, and proscribed execution to the memory of the American Revolution. They called Brown, “a hero, patriot, and Christian—a hero because he was fearless to defend the poor; a patriot because he loves his countrymen; and a Christian because he loves his neighbor as himself, and remembered those in bonds as bound with them.” Furthermore, the black residents of Pittsburgh noted that “we see in the Harper’s Ferry affair what Daniel Webster saw when speaking of Crispus Attucks, the black Revolutionary martyr who fell in Boston,—viz. the severance of two antagonistic principles.” By taking up arms to free slaves, he acted upon the maxim that “resistance to tyrants is obedience to God.”⁵⁵ Drawing on the heritage of the American past, just as Mid-Atlantic whites did and continued to do so throughout the Civil War, black Pittsburghers argued that Brown’s impending death was akin to that of Attucks, a man

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⁵⁵ “Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Cleveland Resolutions,” November 29, and December 2, 1859, in The Tribunal, 149-150.
murdered by (British) tyrants who denied liberty to early Americans. Brown, the hero, had remained loyal to the ideals of Americans who fought for liberty and freedom. The comparison to Attucks and the tyranny of the British likewise condemned slaveholders as an anathema to American ideals.

Frederick Douglass, a former Maryland slave, elaborated on the need for Americans to remember and adhere to the principles of the Revolutionary Era as the basis of their identity. He felt that it was “an appalling fact in the history of the American people,” that they had forgotten “their own heroic age, as readily to accept the charge of insanity against a man who has imitated the heroes of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill.”\(^56\) Douglass portrayed Brown as a descendant of the Revolution who acted in accordance with principles that defined American society.\(^57\) Brown, not white Southerners, had remained loyal to the original intent of the nation. As such, Douglas and African Americans in the Mid-Atlantic believed that he deserved protection for his actions, not execution. Failing to protect Brown, as Douglass and other free blacks realized they had limited political power to thwart his execution, they also sought to make him a symbol. Free blacks in Pittsburgh drove home this point when they noted, “in the event of the execution of John Brown,” on December 2, the “day be hereafter perpetually observed among us as a day of humiliation and prayer.” As a symbol to be commemorated, African Americans could use Brown as a cry—an idea to protect and preserve. If loyalty to nineteenth century Americans was about an exchange of faithful service for protection, making Brown a symbolic image of American values made his memory not about the violent act, but about how he had tried to maintain traditional principles of liberty and equality.\(^58\)

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 119.
\(^{58}\) “Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Cleveland Resolutions,” November 29, and December 2, 1859, in *The Tribune*, 150.
Douglass and other free blacks made explicitly clear how national identity influenced the conversation about loyalty in the Mid-Atlantic. As 1860 dawned and political campaigns began for that year’s presidential election, the memory of Brown, sectional violence, and regional division lingered. In Charleston, South Carolina, Southern Democrats broke from their national party organization as they advocated for a president who would steer the government to protect slavery and Southern property. In Baltimore, when the two Democratic conventions resumed, the Southern wing nominated John Breckinridge and Northern Democrats confirmed the candidacy of Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas, who also advocated for the defense of slavery. Events of the 1850s however, had convinced many Southerners that they could not trust Northerners, even from the Democratic Party, to protect their rights. Border States residents who wished to ignore the discontent over slavery nominated John Bell as a moderate candidate that would avoid making the election a referendum on slavery, while Abraham Lincoln deftly maneuvered himself into position as the Republican candidate. As the election drew near, John Brown’s body continued to march, through speeches and newspaper columns, highlighting the divisions that plagued the Mid-Atlantic on the eve of strife.\footnote{Harrold, Border War, 183-5, 190-3; Michael Landis, Northern Men with Southern Loyalties: The Democratic Party and the Sectional Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 222-30.}

**Election & Secession**

The aftermath of Brown’s raid and execution swept directly into the political fervor of 1860, offering residents of the Mid-Atlantic to put the divisive rhetoric and movements of the 1850s into action, articulating oppositional definitions of loyalty in the process. John H. Cochran, of Augusta County, Virginia wrote to his mother in October 1860, that Southern Democrats had consistently battled against abolitionism dating back to 1790. Despite the laws of the United States, confirmed in the Dred Scott Decision and by Congress, when Southerners
“demand that Congress shall exercise this protecting power we are branded as traitors by the very party who were loudest in their professions of loyalty to the South a few short months ago.”60 In his attack against Northern Democrats, Cochran demonstrated how individuals in the United States and Mid-Atlantic began to incorporate loyalty into their political discourse. Moreover, he saw clearly that Northerners, regardless of their affiliation with the Democratic Party, which had professed loyalty to the South, or Republicans, who never had, actively worked against the South. In an evaluation of John Brown’s influence on the election of 1860, the Pennsylvania Statesmen argued that “To vote for Lincoln is but little better than to put Pikes in the hands of such men as old Brown and send them on a marauding and murdering expedition to the South. Are Pennsylvanians prepared to do that? Let us remember that every vote they cast for Lincoln is a murderous Pike manufactured for another John Brown.”61 In clear terms, the paper from Harrisburg, laid out a direct link between Brown, Lincoln, and Republicans. More importantly, the paper also prophesized that supporting Lincoln would lead to violence, death, and the severance of the Union. While Cochran looked to the past, to argue that Northerners had historically labored against the South, the Statesmen peered into the future. Cochran provided a glimpse of a continued, seemingly ceaseless historical drama, where Northern, nonslaveholders, challenged the rights of Southerners and sought to unmake slavery. Comparatively, the Democratic Statesmen’s connection between Brown and Lincoln argued that a vote for Lincoln would divide and damage the nation. Both would have argued, that while faced with four candidates, one clearly pointed toward ruin and disunion.

Lincoln’s election, borne on the backs of Northern votes and opposed by a large majority of Americans, especially in the South, forced the dividing nation to articulate where their

loyalties rested in late 1860 and early 1861. From the outset, individuals in the Mid-Atlantic noted the discontent that swept over the region. Fabricius Cather, from western Virginia, recorded in his diary that by late November, competing meetings ran in Pruntytown, Virginia. He said in November that “The Union attempt holding a mass meeting But are broken up by the Disunionists,” and that on December 3, that there was another Union meeting that brought conflict between Unionists and Disunionists in town.\textsuperscript{62} Cather’s language is important here, as he begins to articulate the different loyalties that have emerged in western Virginia. His use of Unionist and Disunionist indicate the constraining of choices that emerged in late 1860. Cather painted no picture of compromisers or people in the middle attempting to negotiate a peaceable solution; rather he indicated that only two camps existed in the area.

Throughout the Mid-Atlantic, Cather’s narrative played out in a similar fashion, as residents of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia faced a transformation in the discourse on loyalty. Three factions emerged within the region that sidestepped partisan affiliations: unconditional Unionists, conditionalists, and outright secessionists. There was no formula in the Mid-Atlantic that predicted exactly which group an individual sided with during the Secession Winter. Some slaveholders like Waitman T. Willey from western Virginia saw the Union as the only means of protecting the institution of slavery. Others, in Maryland and Virginia, believed that leaving the Union provided the only means of protecting the peculiar institution. Politically, Republicans remained supportive of an unbroken Union—in control of the Federal government for the first time, they were unwilling to give up power. Democrats, comparatively, ran the gamut of supporting secession and open hostility to the destruction of the Union. While residents of the Mid-Atlantic had faced questions over the issue of loyalty before, secession compelled

\textsuperscript{62} Fabricius A. Cather, Diary, November 26 and December 3 and 22, 1860, Cather, Fabricius A., Soldier. Civil War Diaries A&M 3633, West Virginia and Regional History Center, Morgantown, West Virginia.
citizens of the region to declare if they were Unionists or Disunionists. Each state experienced internal divisions, but they demonstrated a transformation in how Mid-Atlantic residents discussed loyalty, as disunionists believed that the Federal Government had failed to protect their interests, invalidating their reciprocal loyalty to Washington. Unionists maintained that as long as citizens maintained their faith in the nation, through compromise and cooperation, they could forestall problems between the North and South.63

In Pennsylvania, the cold chill that blew in from the Secession Winter of 1860 and 1861 came not from the west or north, but from the South, as the Keystone State faced internal political discord about secession. Unlike the other states of the Mid-Atlantic, Pennsylvanians never seriously considered joining the Confederacy; indeed, they were the only state in this region to provide Lincoln with a slim majority in the election. Despite a small minority of Pennsylvanians with business or familial interests connecting them to the South, most residents of the Keystone state debated how to handle the Deep South states that fled the Union in December 1860 and January 1861.64 For many Republicans, the question was simple. On December 26, 1860, the Northampton County Journal, a Republican piece, asked its readers “Which Party is for Disunion Now?” It was not the Republicans, surely. “No! gentlemen, [the secessionists] were reared by the so called Democracy, and learned disunion in the ranks of that organization,” while the party of Lincoln stood for the Union and the preservation of the government.65 Other Republicans throughout the state joined in, berating the Democratic Party as the birthplace of secession and disloyalty to the nation. Conversely, Democrats throughout the

63 Harrold, Border War, 194-203.
64 Arnold Shankman argued that the anti-war sentiment in Pennsylvania was as strong as the resentment offered in the Mid-West, but only roughly five percent of the population favored leaving the Union. Despite the small portion of Keystone State residents that felt themselves drawn to the southern Confederacy, most Pennsylvanians debated how they should support the Union, not leaving it. Arnold Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 1861-1865 (Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980), 13, 59.
65 Northampton County Journal, January 26, 1860.
state blamed the Republican Party for its antislavery message and hostility to the South. *The Valley Spirit* from Franklin County argued that Southerners “refused their consent to come under an administration founded upon a sentiment hostile to their social system.” Likewise, other Democratic presses and individuals across Pennsylvania blamed Republicans, abolitionists, and anti-slavery advocates for antagonizing the South. They demanded that the South should be allowed leave peacefully or that they add a Constitutional Amendments to appease slaveholders. In fact, a number of moderate Republicans throughout Pennsylvania and the North also advocated for comprise, but largely and forcefully expected the Southern states to remain in the Union. Although both parties would define themselves as loyal members of the United States, they laid the foundations for wartime tensions as partisans on both sides would debate the meaning of allegiance before, during, and after the war.

In Maryland, a number of pro-secessionists articulated a clear loyalty to the Southern Confederacy that grew in response Northern actions. While the *St. Mary’s Beacon* had profusely condemned secession in 1860, after Lincoln’s election, it took a stronger pro-secession message. The *Beacon* highlighted the change in their sentiments and the local opinion in Maryland over a secession convention. It noted in January 1861, that a host of local individuals from all parties, “to initiate action looking to the call of a convention of the people of Maryland, and to provide, as best they may, against the threatened infraction of the peace and independence of the State and the liberty of the people.” Northerners had continuously threatened the South—damaging laws, allowing for the murder of Southerners who pursued fugitive slaves (perhaps an allusion to the Christiana Resistance), continually denounced the South, aided men like John Brown, and tried to take western lands for themselves alone. The “Public Meeting” of individuals from around St. Mary’s County noted that Maryland had “always been loyal to the Constitution and

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Union,” but not the government aimed to “overawe the people, by the military arm of the Government,” and it was time for Maryland to take a firm position to defend itself from the North. Former Governor Lowe stated in mid-February that the interests of Maryland aligned with Virginia and that “no power on earth could ever separate her from Virginia.” Other Marylanders echoed support for the Confederacy. Anna Kennedy of Baltimore debated the merits of secession and national divisions with her fiancé, John Davis, a Unionist from Clarksburg, Virginia. Throughout the Secession Crisis, Kennedy increasingly articulated a pro-Southern view, as she came to disdain coercion and though she felt that she was “not a secessionist” she was less supportive of a Federal Government that she saw as conducting “unmitigated tyranny” against the South. Other Marylanders provided simpler explanations, noting that if a war should come “between the two portions of our nation, the north and south, [Maryland] should certainly side with the south.” In each of these examples, pro-secession Marylanders articulated that Northerners were to blame or that differences were implicitly stark enough to easily transition into the Confederacy. Movement—slaves going northward, John Brown coming South, Unionists attempting to occupy military installations in Maryland—encouraged many in Maryland to actively support Secession, as the Federal Government had forfeited their support by its unwillingness to protect slavery and Southern rights.

A number of Maryland residents however, opposed Secession, either because they felt that leaving the Union was dangerous to their state or because they fundamentally supported the Union. Such opposition began at the executive level of Maryland’s government. While a number

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68 *St. Mary’s Beacon*, February 14, 1861.


70 James Hicks in *Maryland Voices*, 18.
of residents, like those of St. Mary’s County, Maryland, clamored for a secession convention, Governor Thomas Hicks, refused to call the state legislature into session to prevent a formal discussion of secession. In defense of his actions, he noted that many throughout the state encouraged him that “that the people of Maryland should have an opportunity of saying whether they would remain loyal to the Government framed by our fathers, or join the seceded States in their mad crusade against the continuance of the Union.”

Hicks asserted that he knew legislators hoped to launch Maryland “no matter how blindly, into the vortex of Secession.” Yet, Hicks believed that most ordinary Marylanders were loyal to the Union, while the legislature would have manipulated the state into secession, against the people’s wishes. Thus, he refused to call them into an emergency session. Union residents of Anne Arundel County, just outside of Baltimore, wrote in support to Hicks, as they understood his “patriotism and discretion to preserve for us and our children, to the extent of your ability, the integrity of our glorious and happy Union.” From Baltimore, George B. Cole, both a proslavery advocate and a staunch Unionist, noted that the Border States would play an important role in ending the issue over secession. As such, he supported Hicks’ ability to withstand any pressure for a convention, as he “kept the state out of the hands of a faction of scoundrels who are striving to make Maryland a cat’s paw for the seizure of the seat of Government.” Ultimately, Hicks and pro-Union Marylanders held off the question of secession long enough for Union troops to establish a firm presence in the state. While it is unclear exactly how a popular vote on secession would have played out in Maryland, divisions over the states place in the Union were real. Lincoln’s election

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71 St. Mary’s Beacon, December 12, 1861, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn89060119/1861-12-12/ed-1/seq-1/#date1=1860&index=0&date2=1870&searchType=advanced&language=&sequence=0&lccn=sn89060119&lccn=sn89060120&words=loyal&proxdistance=5&state=Maryland&rows=20&ortext=loyal%2A&phrasetext=&andtext=&dateFilterType=range&page=1.
72 Ibid.
73 “Citizens of Anne Arundel County to Thomas H. Hicks, 1861,” in Maryland Voices of the Civil War, 18.
74 George B. Cole to E. W. Cole, January 8, 1861, in Maryland Voices of the Civil War, 23.
and the secession of Southern states, the movement of other slaveholding states out of the Union, compelled Marylanders to address where their national identity and loyalty rested. While Pennsylvanians to the north divided politically over the legitimacy of secession, like their neighbors to the south in Virginia, Marylanders found deep social and cultural divisions over the specter of secession. 

Virginia’s debate over secession, in particular its Secession Convention, best exemplifies how movement in the waning years of the antebellum period influenced the debate over loyalty and the separation of the Union in 1861. Unlike Maryland, where Governor Hicks held off calls for a meeting, the Virginia General Assembly allowed for a special election in January of 1861 in order to send delegates to Richmond to discuss the possibility of breaking from the Union. Historians have paid careful attention to the convention that ran from February 13 to May 1, 1861, as a decisive moment in Virginia’s history as well as national events. Yet, the Richmond Convention itself demonstrates the origins of divisions within the Commonwealth of Virginia on the eve of the Civil War. Some candidates and eventual representatives to the convention, like Samuel Woods, campaigned to represent Barbour County in the western Virginia in order to protect the state. He noted the “bond of union has been for many years systematically and perseveringly trampled under foot by most of the nonslaveholding States,” as Northerners refused to return fugitive slaves and curbed Southern settlement of the West. In doing so, they allowed slaves to move freely out of the South and prevented the expansion of Southern interests to new territory—for Woods, only remedies to the Constitution to return slaves and allow the

75 William W. Freehling, The South versus the South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 54, 59. Freehling notes that while some Marylanders supported the Confederacy, they largely chose the Union, by a two to one margin. He further notes that only 90,000 “borderites” from Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, joined the Confederate Army throughout the war, while over 200,000 whites from the Border States joined the Union.

South access to open lands, would save the Union.77 Others throughout the state and convention echoed similar points. Movement or its lack thereof, influenced how Woods and a number of Virginians from the eastern and western portions viewed the prospect of secession.

Yet another western Virginian, Waitman T. Willey, disagreed as he pointed out the divisions within the Old Dominion as well as the ramifications of transporting Virginia out of the Union. Throughout the Convention, Willey called attention to the divisions between the northwestern and eastern portions of Virginia. On the eight day of the convention he noted that many from the eastern part of the state, made “intimations and insinuations prejudicial to the character of [northwester Virginia] for her loyalty to the institutions of Virginia.” He had allowed those comments to go uncontested for a time, but he stood forward to highlight the record of western Virginia, as their sons “have a glorious record. Your soil is consecrated with the memories of the loyalty of the West, because it contains the honored remains of some of her bravest and noblest sons. Why, sir, your honor is her honor; your interest is her interest; your country is her country; your faith shall be her faith; your destiny shall be her destiny.”78 Willey and many others from beyond the Shenandoah Valley cited inter-state divisions, but also professed their fidelity to the state of Virginia as a whole.79 Yet, Willey continued to us the convention as a platform to resolve western economic and political concerns. Eastern Virginians, in his opinion, and in the eyes of other western residents, taxed them unfairly, while they provided limited economic improvements and political representation.80 The western representative further added that removing Virginia from the Union would solve none of the

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79 Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861; Crofts, Reluctant Confederates, 56-60, 159-63; Curry, A House Divided, 13-27.
80 Ibid.
problems that Woods and other representatives brought forward. For example, on March 4, Willey argued that secession would not solve the issue of Northern Abolitionists who encouraged “our slaves to abscond, in the operations of the Underground Railroad, in the Personal Liberty Bills, and the inefficiency of the Fugitive Slave Law for the Recovery of fugitives.” He elaborated that dissolving the Union would only increase slaves “motives to flee across the line,” because “the negro would know that whenever he crosses that line, he will be free” as the fugitives slave legislation would no longer apply to Virginia and because the boundary would be that much closer. Secession would also forfeit Southern claims to any American lands held in the West. Movement and expansion, Willey asserted, may have been the motivation for why other convention members pushed for secession, but it would, in fact not solve any of their problems. Rather, leaving the Union would only make it worse.

This should not suggest that questions of movement—that of slaves or westward expansion or internal development—were the only questions that dominated the conversations of Virginians during their secession convention. A host of issues mattered to delegates gathered in Richmond and to residents throughout the state, including internal improvements, the perception of Virginia’s declining position in the United States, the protection of property as well as communities, and political influence. Yet, by looking at how they covered movement, it is possible to uncover how Antebellum experiences shaped the conversation over national loyalty in the Mid-Atlantic during early 1861. When Virginian representatives voted to leave the Union on April 17, they broke apart the region. However, two final movements would cement the national rupture that emerged in the Mid-Atlantic in the days to come.

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82 Carmichael, The Last Generation, 5-7, 18, 22-3.
Baltimore and Ellsworth

After Fort Sumter, Lincoln’s call for troops, and Virginia’s vote for secession, Mid-Atlantic residents faced only two real options in late 1861 for their national loyalty: the Union or the Confederacy. Although many in the region had attempted to prevent secession, through proposed compromises tempered rhetoric, the Civil War arrived all the same. Confronted with this new reality, Mid-Atlantic residents had to decide not only where they placed their allegiance, but also how they put meaning into their now divided nations. Although a handful of individuals in the Mid-Atlantic had called for a disruption of the United States before the Secession Winter, most held a moderate course for much of the antebellum period. Two events in April and May of 1861 provided fertile interpretive grounds for individuals throughout the Mid-Atlantic to create oppositional loyalties. The first came in the streets of Baltimore on April 19, 1861.

As the volunteers of the 6th Massachusetts Infantry made their way across Baltimore, their clash with Baltimore’s secession population prompted responses that painted a picture of two distinct nations split across the Mid-Atlantic. The city, as the “northernmost city in the South and the southernmost city in the North” was a stronghold for the Democratic Party, the institution of slavery, and secession sympathies. Consequently, the blue clad New Englanders, found hostile citizens greeting their arrival in town. Coupled with a long history of aggressive urban—or more accurately mob—politics and the passions of sectional tensions in the spring of

84 Seth Rockman’s monograph on Baltimore examines the torn nature of the city in regard to its position between the free North and the slave South. The overarching goal of Scraping By, is to look at the exploitation as the heart of capitalism, in his context, the presence of slavery allowed capitalists to exploit free and enslaved workers in the city (be they white or black), in turn keeping many in a state of limited work and poverty. His juxtaposition of Baltimore as a city caught between the two sections of the country highlights the precarious position that Baltimore occupied throughout the Nineteenth Century. Seth Rockman, Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 232. Also see, Frank Towers, The Urban South and the Coming of the Civil War (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004).
1861, Baltimore was on the edge of conflict.\footnote{Barbara Jeane Fields, \textit{Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground: Maryland during the Nineteenth Century} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 93-4; James McPherson, \textit{Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 284-6. Michael E. Woods, \textit{Emotional and Sectional Conflict in the Antebellum United States} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).} The men from Massachusetts were prepared to defend Washington, D.C., but to do so they had to march across the city, as no direct rail line cut through Baltimore. They disembarked at President Street Station and marched toward Camden Station. As the 6th Massachusetts made its way along Pratt Street, from the eastern to the western part of the city, a large crowd of pro-secessionists gathered around the Union soldiers. Reports suggest that the crowd began assailing the Unionists from front and behind, armed with at least stones and at most pistols. Such an onslaught panicked the inexperienced volunteers, prompting them to fire into the crowd before they made their escape to the waiting railcars. Sixteen people lay dead about Pratt Street: four of them dressed in Union blue, the others, Baltimoreans from the crowd, their allegiance unknown.\footnote{George William Brown, \textit{Baltimore and the Nineteenth of April, 1861: A Study of the War} (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001); McPherson, \textit{Battle Cry of Freedom}, 285.} The 6th Massachusetts continued on their way toward Camden Station and arrived in Washington later that day. The short exchange between Union soldiers and Baltimore residents, marked one of the first (albeit small) engagements of the Civil War.

More importantly, the responses to this first confrontation between Secessionists and Unionists in Maryland delineated the clear divisions between the two nations that now occupied the Mid-Atlantic. “The Slain at Baltimore!” a song written by the penname C.S.S. and published in Philadelphia, followed the bloody clash in Baltimore and painted a prominent demarcation in the region. C.S.S. called on Northerners, “to a man” to strike at the Confederate for freedom and...
the remembrance of the men in blue slain at Baltimore. The final verse in particular is important, in how it articulates the restoration of the Union.87

   And when the sound of conflict in speedy peace
   is hushed;
   When the rebel ranks are scattered and their
dark ambition crushed;
   When the Union stands untarnished, as it stood
   in days of yore,
   In our triumph we’ll remember the slain at Bal-
timore!

The fact that Union soldiers had to restore the nation so that it would stand “untarnished, as it stood / in days of yore,” calls attention to the national divisions and fragmented state of the Union. The song also provides a rollcall of the free, Northern states, encouraging them to rally in defense and restoration of the bifurcated Union. Conversely, the poem, *Maryland, My Maryland*, by James Ryder Randall, called on secessionists in Maryland to “Avenge the patriotic gore/ That flecked the streets of Baltimore.” However, unlike C.S.S.’s verses that beckoned Unionists to restore all that was shattered in the region, Randall endeavored to push Maryland into the Confederacy. The poem noted, “Virginia should not call in vain, / Maryland! / She meets her sisters on the plain.”88 By inviting Marylanders to the field of battle, Randall called the slave state to fight with Virginia, South Carolina, and other slaveholding states as its nation. He shifted the onus of where Marylanders should place their loyalty from the Union, the despotism that threatened the nation and to the Confederacy. In the end, despite their divergent responses, both pieces of print culture illuminated the fact that the Mid-Atlantic divided and compelled individuals to articulate different national loyalties as a result.

88 James Ryder Randall, “Maryland, My Maryland,” (Baltimore: Miller & Beacham, 1861).
The deaths of Elmer Ellsworth and James Jackson on May 24, 1861, provide a final retrospective of the divisions that took hold of the Mid-Atlantic as well as the new identities that came to dominate the region early in the war. On May 24, 1861, Ellsworth led a detachment of soldiers to remove a Confederate flag from the Marshall House in Alexandria, Virginia. Flying in defiance of the Union capital, directly across the Potomac River, Ellsworth sought to strike a symbolic victory for Lincoln and the Union. However, after clamoring up to the roof of the Marshall House, Ellsworth returned through the building. Descending the stairs with the Confederate flag in hand, Ellsworth encountered Jackson, who promptly unloaded his shotgun into the New Yorker. With a single shot he struck down Ellsworth, but another Union soldier, Corporal Francis E. Brownell, just as quickly returned the favor and shot Jackson dead. Although not the first casualties of the war, both Ellsworth and Jackson became useful symbols for defenders of their respective causes. 89

The opening page of The Life of James W. Jackson, penned anonymously in 1862, sets out the clear division between how Confederates and Unionists looked at Jackson, Ellsworth, and loyalty. The Life of James W. Jackson boisterously proclaimed that Jackson was “perhaps, at this time, as widely celebrated throughout the Confederate and the United States, as that of any man, either living or dead.” 90 This overblown focus on Jackson allowed the author to declare that the Union and Confederacy had once been a shared nation of brothers with a similar heritage of “heroic blood.” “But one had forgotten their fathers’ story, and wished to practice upon the other that very despotism which they all had pledged to overthrow.” 91 Jackson’s death gave a symbolic

91 Ibid., 10.
power to the Confederacy. His death, in defense of the Confederate flag, and by extension the Confederate nation, vindicated his actions. More importantly, while Unionists detested Jackson, painting him as an assassin, Southerners “lauded [him] as a hero, loved for his devotion to the flag of his country.”92 The fact that Jackson died to protect the Confederate flag made that representation of the new Southern nation sacred. A true Southerner, by all accounts a relatively average person, had acted like the ancestors of the United States—he had fought and died for his nation.93 While other individuals in Fairfax County, Virginia, or even more broadly throughout the South, were “disloyal to the vital interests of Virginia and the South,” Jackson was a true son of the South, guarding the rights of the Confederacy.94 Judith W. McGuire, a secessionist who resided not far from Alexandria lamented Jackson’s death, noting, “he was a devoted patriot” who died to defend the national flag.95 Jackson became the embodiment of Virginian loyalty to the Confederacy early in the war. He sacrificed his life to protect the symbolic existence of the new nation. In turn, he became a symbol for how Virginians and Southerners could forge a compact with the new nation and the reciprocal nature of loyalty familiar to Americans: sacrifice. By offering his life for the Confederacy Jackson received the reward of praise and the continuation of his memory. For other Confederates, serving the nation, physically, materially, or emotionally, would grant them the protection and praise of the new government.

Comparatively, the murder of Ellsworth at the hands of Jackson prompted Northerners to reflect on the young man as the embodiment of the United States in opposition to Jackson’s Confederacy. Out of Clearfield, Pennsylvania, the Raftman’s Journal, a Know-Nothing turned

92 The Life of Jackson W. Jackson, 10.
94 The Life of Jackson W. Jackson, 22.
95 Judith W. McGuire, Diary of a Southern Refugee During the War, by a Lady of Virginia, (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 17-8.
pro-Republican paper, reported that Ellsworth, “has fallen by assassination.” The paper printed
by Benjamin Jones went on to note that Union soldiers swiftly avenged Ellsworth’s death, “but if
treason intends to fight its battles by assassination, a terrible retribution will come upon many of
his followers. In the death of Col. E. the loyal portion of the country has sustained a great loss;
but it may prove a dire calamity to the rebel section of our land, and to the leaders and authors of
this murderous spirit.” Likewise, the song “Ellsworth’s Avengers” called on Americans to
remember the sacrifice of “Gallant Ellsworth.” His death, “Down where the Patriot army / Near
Potomac’s side / Guards the glorious cause of freedom,” necessitated a response from all
Unionists. Indeed, the chorus encouraged all “freeman” to strike for the Union, “Sheath your
swords no / more. while remains in arms a / traitor on Columbia’s Shore.” Both of these
responses, two of many from the North during the war, took up Ellsworth’s memory and blood
much like that of James W. Jackson. If the Virginian had honored and sanctified the Confederate
flag with his death, Ellsworth’s assassination produced a similar effect for Unionists. The
response to the young Colonel’s death conveyed to Northerners the severity of the cause before
them as well as a definition of loyalty that they could use: active service and sacrifice for the
cause. Such a simple task, the removal of a flag, which gave Jackson a martyred status for
Confederates, conveyed to Northerners, in the words of the Raftman’s Journal, the “murderous
spirit” of the Secessionists. If the riot in Baltimore had not convinced them that the war would
require sacrifices to restore the Union, Ellsworth’s death at Jackson’s hand, laid the foundation
that destroying the rebellion required extreme measures. To tear down the flag of secession,
Union men needed to act like Ellsworth—bold and decisive, yet willing to give up their life in
defense of the nation.

96 Raftman’s Journal, May 29, 1861.
97 “Ellsworth’s Avengers” in Tanfield Family Papers Stern, Edward, 95th Regt. Pa Vol, 1861-1862, United States
Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
While the deaths of Ellsworth and Jackson did not divide the Mid-Atlantic, indeed the bloody day came several weeks after Virginians ratified secession, their western neighbors demurred, and Maryland begrudgingly stayed in the Union, they provided powerful symbols to both nations that solidified their division. Unionists and Confederates alike held up both men as emblems of how their nation should act as well as the barbarity of their enemy. Jackson’s defense of his home, a representation of the Confederacy, afforded Southerners the ability to claim him as a patriot. Jackson was no soldier, but rather an ordinary man who defended his nation and residence from Yankee intruders. On the other hand, Ellsworth’s decisive action to rip down the flag of treason to the Union, provided supporters of the United States with an example of direct action, breaking the Confederacy required breaking into the South (Jackson’s hotel) and tearing down professions of support for the illegitimate Southern nation. In both cases, loyalty required active participation, not just professions of allegiance. Further, Jackson and Ellsworth displayed oppositional loyalty in the purest form as they had struggled and died for symbols of their respective nations. This idea finalized the fragmentation of the Mid-Atlantic, as Unionists and Secessionist actively, and violently, came to assert their vision of the country as well as loyalty to those nations.

Actions by African Americans precipitated questions about the commitment of the Federal Government to protect Southern property and thereby called into question the reciprocal nature of loyalty for Southerners. Ellsworth’s entrance into and death in James Jackson’s hotel completed that mental fragmentation of the Mid-Atlantic. In the wake of the two deaths that dominated May 24, 1861 it was evident that Mid-Atlantic residents looked to protect two separate nations. An important question emerged for residents of the Mid-Atlantic: how would local residents make sense of their now divided region? Movement had broken their single nation
into two. Yet, as sentiments divided in Maryland and Virginia, as well as what would become West Virginia, the maps of the United States and the region no longer made sense. The Union and Confederacy, both with undefined boundaries, now occupied the Mid-Atlantic. To clarify this uncertain world that black and white Americans now found themselves in, with a binary vision of loyalty in hand, they turned to maps as a means to convey the boundaries of their nations and the now dominant oppositional definition of loyalty.
In early 1862, when Charles Hay passed below the Mason-Dixon Line into western Virginia, he tried to make sense of the new people and places that he encountered. Throughout his diary, he remarked on the faces, spaces, and loyalties of the those people he witnessed along the way. Although a sizeable portion of western Virginians, especially in the northwestern reaches of the state, supported the Union, Hay loathed most everything that he saw. Perhaps that was because he spent most of his time in the southwestern West Virginia, a part of the state that fiercely supported Confederate independence.¹ Born and raised in Ohio, he found the hilly landscapes that would become West Virginia backwards and traitorous. On one hand, Hay thought the “hills, hovels, and interminable forests,” of western Virginia were nothing like his native “Ohio’s fine farms and residences.”² While Hay found some of the buildings and homes in the region pleasant, he thought more broadly that towns like Fayetteville represented the fact that “Nothing exists here of society except the name.”³ Although he particularly disliked the town of Fayetteville, the entire region fell under his keen eye. Near Raleigh, West Virginia, the people all had “A shambling, awkward, striding gait, and that stolidity of countenance as next akin to the vacant stare of the idiot.”⁴ Throughout the state he likewise noted that most of the western Virginians were “unquestionably ‘secesh’ all over.”⁵ The interactions between Hay, the 23rd Ohio, and disloyal western Virginians, usually through the medium of partisan warfare, greatly

² Charles Hay, Diary, August 22, 1862, Civil War Diary of Charles Hay, 1861-1866 MSS 13925, Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia
³ Ibid., January 1, 1862.
⁴ Ibid., March 22, 1862.
⁵ Ibid., May 9, 1862.
disturbed the Union soldiers as they found themselves constantly under harassment in enemy country. In short, Charles Hay hated pretty much everything he encountered throughout his travels in western Virginia. That disdain makes his exceptions so worth noting, because he made sure to counter the darkness of treason with the light of loyalty.

On May 25, 1862, Hay recorded a chance meeting with two Unionists that clung to the American nation despite their proclivity of their neighbors to secession and disunion. The two men, former militia officers, Colonel Chambers and Colonel Little had remained faithful to the Union, “Despite the almost universal Secession sentiment which pervaded [their] neighborhood & county.” Overjoyed, Hay made sure to record his interactions with the two men. More importantly, he elaborated on his own observations and the necessity for them. “Such instances are indeed rare, but as I have heretofore given some opinions upon the disloyalty of Virginia, it is proper to record exceptional cases, as bright spots on a dark record.”

This observation provides a significant amount of introspection for Hay’s own commentary. He actively chose to record Chambers and Little, not because he had extensive engagements with either of them, but because they stood out to him as loyal individuals in a region awash with disloyalty. In doing so, Hay made it clear that in war he saw loyalty as an antagonistic relationship—for or against the Union. Furthermore, Hay participated in a process along with countless other individuals throughout the Mid-Atlantic where he used informal cartography to map loyalty.

Hay’s informal cartography matters because it offers a window to how Mid-Atlantic residents understood the divisions between Unionists and Confederates, in both terms of national loyalty and cultural conceptions of the other. In wartime cartography, their personal correspondences, as well as poetry and other forms of print culture, individuals throughout the Mid-Atlantic translated a familiarity with maps into a practice of cultural mapping. As the

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6 Charles Hay, Diary, May 25, 1862.
previous chapter revealed, movement helped unmake the United States and the Mid-Atlantic during the antebellum years. During the war, men and women in the region continued to move, more so than at any point previously. To confront the disruption caused by the war, Unionists and Confederates used cartography and maps in order to make sense of their newly divided nation and draw divisions between their warring nations.

Mid-Atlantic residents broke from the foundations of reciprocal loyalty with their new maps. If loyalty had been an exchange of faithful service for protection, with unclear definitions of what loyalty actually meant, in the midst of war, Americans needed a clear understanding of what it meant to be loyal. To make sense of uncertain allegiances in the Mid-Atlantics, residents observed the attitudes and actions of the people they encountered during the war. From their interactions and conversations with one another, Unionists and Confederates created mental depictions of where support for their cause and nation existed in the region. Additionally, they incorporated cultural values—visions of landscape and physical beauty—into their maps that further articulated differences between the two nations. Mid-Atlantic residents therefore practiced a cultural cartography, a natural development of their understanding of loyalty, based on the actions and expressions of other individuals, but also refracted through their own cultural visions. The maps that Mid-Atlantic residents put into their letters, diaries, and other forms of communication, allowed them to divide the region, but it also revealed a great deal about how they engrained loyalty in their daily, wartime lives.

An Affinity for Maps

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, Americans developed an affinity for maps and a desire to use cartography as a means to confront a variety of national issues. Following the Revolution, the production of cartographical tools in the United States changed
drastically from artisanal products originally published by Britons to American-made professional products and later mass produced maps. Americans not only produced an increasing number of maps, atlases, and charts between 1783 and 1860, but they altered the intended purposes of these products. For some, maps became a way to display refinement and sophistication as decorations. Others found maps a key scientific tool that enabled Americans, through rigorous study and consideration, to evaluate their social standing and solve problems across the country. Cartographical production denoted skill, but also enlightened thinkers who consumed these maps. Susan Schulten highlighted in her history of American cartography how U.S. cartographers applied the study of place and statistics to chart a number of different natural developments—disease, weather, climate, and slavery. Many Americans believed that if they could chart the outbreaks of disease, possibly connecting them to particular land features, they could combat or eradicate outbreaks of yellow fever and cholera. Not only did Americans use maps as scientific tools, but also the product had a physical presence in the nation. Middle and upper class citizens purchased them for home, artists deployed maps in their paintings to reveal refinement, and students encountered them in classrooms.

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8 Martin Brückner highlighted the ubiquity of maps as social instruments during the first half of the nineteenth century. They were tools that demonstrated refinement and sophistication, as well as items that could offer stories about the national past. Furthermore, if one considers the work of David Jaffee and early American history—with Jaffee’s attention to clocks, globes, furniture, portraits, and books, to indicate a shifting American consciousness towards consumption, it would be possible to fit maps into consumable products acquired by citizens North and South. Brückner, *The Social Life of Maps in America*, 123, 311-2; David Jaffee, *A Nation of New Goods: The Material Culture of Early America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

Maps therefore mattered to American citizens in the nineteenth century *and* had an elastic range of practices. They did not only serve as elements of geographical analysis, marking state or national boundaries and physical features, but also functioned as essential tools of understanding, defining, and controlling everyday life in the United States. Furthermore, maps traditionally cultivated nationalism throughout the western world.\(^{10}\) If maps were ubiquitous in American life, employed as a means of comprehending the world around them, and a tool for building nationalism, it makes sense that one would map a concept like loyalty.

In the Mid-Atlantic, with its regional divisions, the case for cartography of loyalty makes sense, as residents combined their fondness for maps with the act of movement during the war to interpret what they experienced. As they found themselves torn between two options—Unionism or Secessionism—Mid-Atlantic residents needed to interpret what side other individuals in the region supported, especially as soldiers, civilians, and slaves encountered one another on a daily basis. In this way, Americans used their actual cartographic skills and their words to chart where they found loyalty or disloyalty to their cause throughout the region. Moving from actual maps that depicted the divisions of the Mid-Atlantic and the nation from 1861 to 1865 to the private discussions of individuals, the prevalence of cartographical language becomes evident amongst individuals throughout the region, offering a range of observations. First, it demonstrates how Mid-Atlantic inhabitants broadly constructed national boundaries between the Union and Confederacy through their words and print culture. Second, they attuned their cultural assumptions to those same boundaries as well as the people and landscapes contained within either nation. Their maps revealed not only where they perceived the beginning of loyalty, but also what Northerners and Southerners believed about one another. Maps and the language of

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cartography enabled Unionists and Confederates in the region to articulate a divided, oppositional identity during the war. The maturation of cartography in the United States prior to the Civil War allowed Mid-Atlantic residents to adapt their fondness for maps into a practice that would help them understand their new, war-torn world and its divided loyalties. As the war began, Philadelphia, and Washington grew as centers of publication, but certainly not the only ones. Richmond, as the Confederate capital and an industrial center of the new nation, emerged as one of the centers of print production for the Confederacy. In the early months of 1861, printers North and South ran to produce maps that would help residents of the shattered Mid-Atlantic and across the nation, understand the location of distant battlefields as well as the unfamiliar towns and places that soldiers traveled through as they marched off to face their enemies. Take for example G. A. Aschbach’s “Pocket Map Showing the Probable Theater of War,” (Figure 1) from Philadelphia in 1861. Highlighting southeastern Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and parts of northeast Virginia, Aschbach provided residents of the Mid-Atlantic, at least those in and around Philadelphia, with a visual representation of where major battles of the war would probably take place. Two key pieces of information on the map provide an idea of its utility. First, the chart “Principle Distances,” offered readers a quick summation of the space between cities and prominent places throughout the region. This would offer observers of the map a sense of time and place on the map—giving them an idea of where Union and Confederate armies were in relation to the world they knew. A second salient feature is two sets of identifying lines: “Camps & Forts,” (red) and “Prominent Places,” (blue). Across the map, Aschbach highlighted prominent cities and Union camps. This feature drew an individual’s eyes to these key locations, but also demonstrated early in the war the reach of the Union military. Aschbach mapped where loyal
Union troops had set up their camps throughout the Mid-Atlantic, offering local residents a reference of the region, but also their first physical display of loyalty.

![Map of the Mid-Atlantic, Union, and Confederacy](https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3840.cw00011000/)

Other individuals and organizations also produced maps of the Mid-Atlantic, Union, and Confederacy along with Aschbach, demonstrating that cartography was an early product of both

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governments and its citizens. One of the prominent institutions that undertook the mapping of loyalty was the U.S. Coast Survey. Before and during the Civil War, the U.S. Coast Survey served as one of the most prolific cartographic institutions within the United States, which they in turn translated into a wartime project for the Federal Government. Originated in 1807 by Thomas Jefferson, the agency stood as one of the nation’s first scientific, governmental organizations. Over time, the organization expanded its activities to study the Gulf Stream, tides, and other aquatic features along America’s coasts. However, during the Civil War, the Coast Survey also produced maps of allegiance. Edmund and George W. Blunt sketched the “Loyal Part” of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. In the map below, (Figure 2), the thicker lines represented either the loyal territory of the Union states or the extent to which Union forces had gained control of the “Rebellious States” and their coastline. The demarcation here is clear, the Blunt brothers, working for the Coast Survey, mapped where the perception of loyal territory began and where the disloyal portion remained. They did so, in their words, to counteract “the exertions of Traitors at home as well as those abroad.” This act is important, because it went beyond the traditional parameters of the Coast Survey’s function. The organization charted coastlines, waterways, and natural events, but in the Blunt’s map, loyalty became a focus of the organization and its cartographical endeavors to reinforce the success of the Union forces. Was the map reductionist, distilling loyalty to lines on a map? Yes. However, the maps took on an overtly political message in countering anti-war Democrats at home. Beyond this political purpose, however, another important facet appears: the Blunt brothers mapped loyalty. They used cartography, with an admittedly political objective, to communicate where support for the Union or Confederacy existed along the coastline. Of course, these maps over-simplified the

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process of allegiance and cartography. Just because Union soldiers occupied Confederate soil did not make that area supportive of the Union cause, indeed in many cases the opposite was true. However, the Blunts’ map signifies an important shift for the Coast Survey specifically, and the Mid-Atlantic more broadly. Their transition signified a wartime change in the Coast Survey from an organization that recorded geographic and environmental features to a unit of the United States government and society that incorporated loyalty into the charts, maps, and prints they produced for distribution to the public. Mapping loyalty became an institutional endeavor that continued throughout the war.


13 Edmund and George W. Blunt, “Sketch of the Atlantic and Gulf Coast of the United States Showing the Loyal Part and the Parts of the Coasts of the Rebellious States in Actual Possession of the U.S. Troops,” accessed from
Beyond mapping loyal or rebellious territory on the coasts, the Coast Survey expanded its production of wartime maps with ones that directly tracked the progression of loyalty or at the very least the occupation of Confederate territory by loyal troops, on the interior of the United States and in the Mid-Atlantic. Henry Lindenkohl’s 1864 map of the United States for the U.S. Coast Survey is one of the latest in a series of maps that addressed the advance of loyal Union forces into Rebel territory.\textsuperscript{14} His “Historical Sketch of the Rebellion,” provided four lines of references on top of a national map. The first, blue line highlight the “Limit of Loyal States in July 1861,” while the red addressed the “Limit of territory controlled by U.S. Forces July 31, 1863, and the yellow line represented Union occupied territory on June 1, 1864.\textsuperscript{15} The fourth line, rows of small ships indicated the presence of the Union blockade. Lindenkohl’s map reinforces the idea that the Coast Survey and its workers paid careful attention to where Union forces—in their interpretation, loyal forces—existed during the Civil War. Such a map demonstrated the advancement of Union troops, but it also served several other, larger purposes. On one hand, Unionists and Confederates used print culture throughout the Civil War to communicate messages to their citizens: either to explain their patriotic duty, inform citizens of the war’s progress, instill a national identity, or attack political opponents.\textsuperscript{16} Lindenkohl’s map most likely attempted to encourage Union supporters with the steady progress of their armies and served to reinforce their commitment to a cause, which on paper, was winning the war. Like the Blunt brothers, though, his maps further demonstrate the integration of loyalty into print culture and physical maps.

\textsuperscript{14} Henry Lindenkohl, “Historical Sketch of the Rebellion (1864),” (Washington: U. S. Coast Survey, 1864).
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. See also Susan Schulten’s companion site to Mapping the Nation, (http://www.mappingthenation.com/index.php/chapter/index/2) for more examples of Lindenkohl’s maps.
Therefore, Lindenkohl’s “Historical Sketch of the Rebellion,” and the publications of the Coast Survey demonstrate that maps could attempt to sense out of war’s uncertainty by outlining where loyalty (or at least the perception of loyalty) to the Union existed. There are limitations to the works of the Coast Survey’s publications. They correlated the advance of Union troops with support for their cause, but that hardly reflected the opinion of Confederates on the ground. Yet, that misses their point—the Coast Survey published these maps to encourage Unionists with the progression of the men in blue. It also sidesteps the important point here—that loyalty became a part, if imprecisely, in the publications of a governmental institution. As Americans had developed a fondness for maps, they did so in part because it helped them approach problems scientifically and logically. Some had used maps to develop nationalism after the Revolution, others to chart diseases and other problems that faced the young nation. Considering that historians have demonstrated the fluidity and often the uncertainty that the Civil War brought to contested border regions during the conflict, mapping through prints or through descriptions of loyal places, could help make sense of the world around them. For residents of the Mid-Atlantic, the ability to define the socio-political uncertainty that emerged after Fort Sumter and Virginia’s secession would have been a boon to help them understand the contours of the war around them. Thus, men and women in the region turned to loyalty as a mark of distinction between their fellow supporters and their enemies. The Coast Survey mapped loyalty because they could use the maps as a tool to encourage Union supporters with the advancement of their cause or

17 Schulten, Mapping the Nation, chapters 1 and 3.
potentially to coerce reluctant secessionists with the continued success of the Union military.\textsuperscript{19} Together these maps demonstrate that Unionists used cartography to help chart the boundaries between loyalty and disloyalty, a process that other individuals adopted throughout the war.

While Lindenkohl’s maps and others from the Coast Survey physically demonstrated the advancement of loyal Union forces, later in the war, private individuals used loyalty and maps to present their own political arguments. Published in New York in 1864 by H. H. Lloyd & Co., “Our Country as Traitors and Tyrants Would Have It,” displayed a fragmented and divided American nation. The map showed that where once the United States had been a singular nation, the map portrayed four countries: the Confederate States, that included West Virginia and Maryland, as well as Kentucky, part of Missouri, Indian Territory, and New Mexico; the Pacific States contained all the land west of the Rocky Mountains; the Interior States ran from Ohio to the Rockies; the Atlantic States took the remaining territory from Pennsylvania through New England.\textsuperscript{20} The publication of this map before the 1864 Presidential Election aimed to counter the Democratic bid for the White House with George McClellan at the head of the ticket. Broadly speaking, Republicans accused McClellan and anti-war Democrats as willing to accept peace with the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{21} Such a peace, the map argued, would result in the dissolution of the remaining Union states into fragmented nations, aided by European powers in British-controlled Canada and French-influenced Mexico. For the Mid-Atlantic, the map laid bare perceptions of loyalty and division in the region. Not only did the publisher argue that traitors—Confederates and anti-war Democrats in this sense—would divide the nation, but the Mid-

\textsuperscript{19} Much of the scholarship on cartography highlights its use as a projection of power. From a military perspective, it is reasonable to understand that maps showing the march of loyal Union forces into the Confederacy such a demonstration of power—the Confederate nation (or map) literally crumbled over the course of the war. While true, in this case, the fact that the Coast Survey and others used loyalty as the marker for this depiction stands as the salient issue worth considering, while acknowledging the multiple purposes these maps held for their creators and interpreters.

\textsuperscript{20} “Our County as Traitors & Tyrants Would Have It,” (New York: H. H. Lloyd & Co., 1864).

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
Atlantic would return to its old division. This map argued that Maryland and West Virginia, because of their affiliation with slavery, would enter into the Confederacy, despite large portions of the population that professed their allegiance to the Union. Although not published in the Mid-Atlantic, this map illuminates two important points. First, that Americans broadly combined maps, loyalty, and a political message together during the war. Second, many saw the boundary of the Mid-Atlantic as divided at the Mason-Dixon Line.

Mid-Atlantic residents used other forms of print culture to depict the boundaries of loyalty, dividing the region between the Union and Confederacy in black and white terms. One of the ways that Unionists used print culture to chart loyalty is through envelopes that laid bare the distinctions between loyal and rebel states. A series of envelopes published by the Reagles & Co. of New York City, although devoid of physical maps, embodied the spirit of the cartography from the Coast Survey and other maps that used loyalty throughout the North. Depending on where they aligned, the structure of the envelopes followed one of two patterns. For those states that sided with the Union, like Pennsylvania and Maryland (West Virginia did not exist at the time of the envelopes print run), two basic images appeared on the envelope: the world “UNION” and the appearance of Columbia bearing an American flag and standing behind the state. These envelopes, those of “The Loyal States,” drew a direct connection between the protection that Union states, such as Pennsylvania or Maryland, offered the nation. By orienting the state seals between Columbia, the embodiment of the nation and an external threat, the envelope communicated how the residents of these places fought to preserve the Union.

In addition the Pennsylvania and Maryland envelopes discussed here, there are other examples held by the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. In particular, check out the Folder 17 of this collection for a wider variety of different envelopes. “The Loyal States, Pennsylvania” and “The Loyal States, Maryland,” Civil War Envelopes and Currency Collection, 1605, Box 1, Folder 22, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Comparatively, other envelopes highlighted the disloyal, or “Rebel States”23 Compared to the soft colors and image of Columba that ‘loyal’ envelopes bore, Northern printers placed the image of the Devil, wings spread wide and wielding a spear on the others. It takes little nuance to see the intention behind such a juxtaposition. The envelope argued that the Devil, an evil entity, wielded a weapon of war in the spear, sought to destroy the nation. These envelopes, regardless of the content of the letters they carried to loved ones, friends, or strangers across the Union (no equivalent seems to exist from Confederate printers), projected oppositional loyalty and individuals into one of two categories—godly Unionists or unholy Rebels. The envelopes and imagery set the stage, calling on the bible and religion to pit the Civil War as a struggle between two opposing forces. In such images, the envelopes “etherized” Confederates and enemies of the Union, painting them as foes.

While Unionists and the North dominated the printing of maps and other ephemera throughout the war, Confederates also used maps and print culture to define the boundaries of loyalty to their new nation. It is worth noting however that the Confederate practice of physical cartography had two distinct differences from their Unionist counterparts. First, as many scholars have noted, maps served as a way for individuals or nations to encourage nationalistic attachment to their country. For Americans, maps served this purpose after the Revolutionary War and into the nineteenth century as a unifying and nationalizing instrument.24 While Unionists certainly used maps to foster support for their cause, national maps for the Confederacy meant something different: they were an expression of their freedom and independence. For Unionists, cartographical depictions of loyalty gave them a sense of control

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23 The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, though holding a number of different envelopes, but lacked one for Virginia or West Virginia. “Seeing the pattern between other Confederate states (see Folder 17), it was clear a pattern had emerged. The Rebel States, North Carolina,” Civil War Envelopes and Currency Collection, 1605, Box 1, Folder 22. Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
24 Schulten, Mapping the Nation, chapter 1.
and advancement toward the restoration of the nation. Comparatively, Confederates used their maps to create a literal place for themselves in the world community writ large. By putting the Confederacy on paper, it existed in more than just name or sentiment. Second, before and during the Civil War, Southern turned Confederate printers lagged behind their Northern and Union counterparts in terms of production, available printing resources, and scale. Nevertheless, Confederates in Virginia and beyond used maps to make sense of their world and invoke loyalty to their new nation.

As Unionists wielded cartography to draw distinctions between where loyalty and disloyalty persisted in a once unified nation, Confederates turned to maps as a means of making physically and ideologically constructing their nation. For many Southerners, slavery (and Mason-Dixon’s Line) represented the clear division between the North and South as well as the boundary of the Confederacy. Take for example the 1861, “Map of the Seat of War,” published by E. Ezekiel of New Orleans.

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A few crucial points emerge from Ezekiel’s map of Confederate railroads and borders. First, Ezekiel obscured the internal boundaries of the slave states. While the names of each state, plus dashed lines representing the state borders exist, these divisions are less important than geographical differences between the North and South—such as the Ohio River and the Mason-Dixon Line. Such a juxtaposition argued to Southerners that the slave states were brothers (or sisters) in arms against the entirety of the North. Moreover, this portrayal argued for the unity slaveholding states as one nation, arrayed against the noticeably absent free states. In fact, the lack of the Union proves a second critical point of this map. Ezekiel’s map placed the war solely on Southern soil. By removing any free states from equation, the map additionally painted a clear
picture of the South as a unified region. Finally, the use of dashed lines to represent the internal boundaries of the Confederacy speaks to the nationalizing tendency of the map—no artificial divisions existed within the Southern nation. Rather, a single purpose, a single nation animated their desire for unity and that impulse appeared in this map.

Similarly, Confederates used songs, poetry, and stories to fill in their dearth of cartographical institutions and maps produced by the Confederacy in order to draw clear distinctions between themselves and the Union. After the clash in Baltimore in April of 1861 and the occupation of Maryland by Union forces, James Ryder Randall, a pro-secession, Marylander penned, “Maryland, My Maryland.” Randall’s poem called out the brutal oppression, as he saw it, forced upon his native state by Unionists. Two verses in particular clearly mapped loyalty. The song’s sixth verse noted that “Virginia should not call in vain” and that Maryland should meet “her sisters” on the plain of battle. Those “sisters,” the other slaveholding states that had formed the Confederacy, called for Maryland to join (in the seventh verse) “from hill to hill, from creek to creek—Potomac calls to Chesapeake” to join the Confederacy. 26 Randall’s song mirrored Ezekel’s map, portraying Maryland and all the slaveholding states as sisters united in a singular cause, throwing off Northern oppression and building a new nation. Similarly, other pieces of print culture spoke to Confederate nationalism and their own maps. In the poem “Ethnogenesis,” Henry Timrod, the South Carolinian poet lauded the separation of the South from the North in February. “At last, we are/ A nation among nations; and the world/ Shall soon behold in many a distant port/ Another flag unfurled.” 27 Timrod spared no flourish, his poem spoke directly to the fact that the Southern states stood as a nation distinctly separate from the

26 James Ryder Randall, “Maryland, My Maryland,” (1861).
Union. Further too, the publication of David Fanning’s account at the start of the war painted a clear picture of the Confederacy as the heirs of the Revolution. A Loyalist during the Revolution, the Confederate government published Fanning’s memoirs in Richmond sometime during 1861. As one of the Confederacy’s first official publications, the account aimed to demonstrate that the Federal government “brought about the re-enacting of scenes such as those disclosed by our veracious chronicler.”\(^{28}\) In 1861, despite the early success of the Confederacy, with “Virginia invaded, Maryland overpowered, and Kentucky divided against herself,” the South had come to realize “all the horrors of civil war as told by Fanning.” While Union men clung to the government of old, like Fanning’s Tories, “and in the name of loyalty rob and torture and lay waste the property of those who have dared to assert and endeavor to maintain their rights as freemen.”\(^{29}\) Fanning’s account, by compelling individuals to sympathize with the beset, but nameless and therefore situationally malleable ‘Rebels’ in the South, also mapped loyalty. It showed that individuals who blinded followed the government were fools, but it also portrayed that the real heirs of the Revolution and therefore the American nation, were the Rebels that Fanning had harassed, much akin to the way that Unionists beset Confederates with hardships in 1861.

These examples, from maps that set the stage for the war to other charts and print culture, illuminate the fact that Unionists and Confederates within the Mid-Atlantic used cartography to demonstrate the boundaries of loyalty and disloyalty to their respective causes. The proliferation of these maps demonstrated national boundaries between the two nations and framed the war on paper. For Confederates, as they attempted to build a nation in the midst of the war, these images

\(^{28}\) David Fanning, *The Narrative of Colonel David Fanning (A Tory in the Revolutionary War with Great Britain)* Giving an Account of His Adventures in North Carolina From 1775 to 1783, As Written by Himself, with an Introduction and Explanatory Notes, (Richmond, 1861), x.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.
and depictions of a distinct Confederacy encouraged the formation of nationalism and a separate identity by being able to point to country formed in a tangible way on a map. They redrew the boundaries of the continent, depicting loyalty to the Confederacy and in turn created a place for the Confederacy to exist. Unionists in the Mid-Atlantic likewise used maps to foster support for their cause and to locate where opposition to the Union rested. For Confederates, maps demonstrated how far they had come out of the Union. While Confederates used cartography to build a new nation, Unionists articulated the boundaries of loyalty as a guide to its restoration. Lindenkohl’s maps that tracked the advancement of Union forces or the Coast Survey’s work on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts divided loyalties by occupation. Thus, for Unionists, the map demonstrated where disloyalty remained and how far they needed to go in order to end the war. However, physical maps were far from the only way that Americans and local residents charted loyalty during the war years.

**Informal Cartography and the Presence Loyalty**

Collectively, these maps demonstrate that printers and cartographers throughout the Union and Confederacy used physical maps to chart boundaries of allegiance during the Civil War, but ordinary men and women also applied that penchant for mapping to their interpretation of the war. Of course, these soldiers and civilians did not wield the tools of professional mapmakers—woodblocks, engraving tools, or printing presses—but they did arm themselves with something mightier: the pen. Take George E. Stephens for instance: a free African-American cabinetmaker from Philadelphia, Stephens mapped loyalty throughout the Civil War as both a servant to a Union officer. At the start of the conflict, he tendered his service to the

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Union Army, but the government rejected arming black soldiers.\(^{31}\) Instead, Stephens became a cook and servant for Benjamin C. Tilghman, an officer in the 26th Pennsylvania. While following the 26th Pennsylvania through early 1863, Stephens also acted as a correspondent for the *Weekly Anglo-African*, a free black newspaper out of New York City.\(^{32}\) While the former cabinetmaker commented extensively on the hardships faced by slaves in Maryland, the brutality of Union troops toward escaped slaves, and the vileness of the Confederacy, he also noted the distinctions he saw between the two, warring nations. In December 1861, he drew a clear map between the Union and Confederacy. “Beyond the Potomac stands the proud, haughty Southerner, fighting for and dreaming of titles, dignities, and the annihilation of the vestiges of Liberty around him. Christianity and progressive civilization are the emblems that adorn [Union soldiers fighting for an end to slavery]; barbarism, ignorance, and moral imbecility disgrace the later.” Using the Potomac River, Stephens established a clear border between the North and South. He saw one side—Union soldiers from New England/Massachusetts, in particular—fighting loyally for freedom, while Southerners betrayed liberty and the purest ideals of American history. Like the maps of the U.S. Coast Survey, Stephens constructed boundaries of loyalty during the war. This point is significant when one considers that Stephens’ worked, if briefly, for the Coast Survey, before the war. Between 1857 and 1858, Stephens served on the USS *Walker* in an unidentified capacity. In that time, the vessel worked for the U.S. Coast Survey, mapping the Atlantic and Gulf coasts for the institution.\(^{33}\) While it is unlikely that Stephens conducted any cartography on the *Walker* or learned his penchant for descriptive mapping onboard the ship, his experience serves as a bridge from physical to descriptive maps of

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 15.
\(^{33}\) Ibid., “December 6, 1861, Near Budd’s Ferry, Maryland, published in *Weekly Anglo African*, December 28, 1861,” 150.
loyalty, highlighting that there was a short gap between professional mapmakers and amateur cartographers of loyalty during the Civil War.

Indeed, the centrality of the Mid-Atlantic as a theater of war brought hundreds of thousands of other individuals, like Stephens, into a region with divided loyalties, compelling them to record their evaluations of where they found loyalty or disloyalty. Soldiers proved to be some of the most prolific mappers of loyalty during the war. William Kinzer, who had attended Dickinson College in Pennsylvania before returning home to Virginia in the late 1850s, demonstrated a penchant for mapping early in the conflict. As a member of the Stonewall Brigade, Kinzer marched into Winchester, Virginia, occupying the prominent town in the Shenandoah Valley on November 22, 1861. Upon arriving, Kinzer recorded that “pretty soon little boys came around giving us tobacco….A most remarkable feature about the tobacco was that it was gratis—indicating the pleasure of the people of Winchester at our arrival in their midst.”

The people of Winchester were, in Kinzer’s telling clearly supportive of Confederate troops. The Virginian made other comments on the loyalty of the people he encountered. When the 4th Virginia marched toward Romney, Virginia, from Martinsburg (West) Virginia, he noted that the men would burn rail fences every half mile, because “we cared not for the country was all owned by union men.” When the 4th Virginia returned to Romney two weeks later, they passed six women who sang ““Dixie” with a vim and in good earnest.” Such a song came from the heart, he argued, and warranted three cheers from the men in grey. On a smaller scale than the mapmakers of the Mid-Atlantic, Kinzer emulated their process. He saw a need to record in his diary, perhaps to make sense of the war or to understand where division lay within the region,

36 Kinzer, Diary, January 15, 1862.
the actions and treatment different people offered to his regiment. In doing so, Kinzer mapped loyalty. He made a clear distinction between the space between Martinsburg and Romney, full of disloyal elements and the loyal support of Winchester residents.37

Kinzer was not alone, as other soldiers mapped loyalty in the Mid-Atlantic through their personal correspondences. Some observers provided the briefest commentary on loyalty and place. John C. Brock, an African-American from Philadelphia marched through Fairfax Court House in the summer of 1864. Brock passed through the “historic village,” noting “our boys seemed to fully appreciate the importance of marching through a secesh town.”38 Evoking the shorthand of Secession (secesh), Brock drew clear divisions between the townsfolk and the black soldiers. Other Unionists, like James Peifer provided a more prolific commentary on loyalty. As a member of the 46th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, Peifer served throughout most of the war and mapped loyalty frequently. According to Peifer, Pittsburgh had “people very loyal—cheering us all along,” so too did places like York, Pennsylvania and Madison, Georgia, while Cincinnati, Ohio, and Winchester, Virginia were all disloyal places full of “Secesh” citizens.39 Peifer provided little additional discussion on the loyalty of these places, but he paid enough attention to allegiance to chart where he found supporters of his cause and its adversaries. Like

37 Building off the works of a number of different historians, such as David Waldstreicher, Mary Ryan, and a number of other individuals, I fundamentally believe that Americans expressed their connections to their nation, government, state, heritage, or political party, through a variety of public displays and celebrations, before, during, and after the war. Jeffrey L. Pasley, “‘The Cheese and the Words: Popular Political Culture and Participatory Democracy in the Early American Republic.’” In Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic. Edited by Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson, and David Waldstreicher. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Ryan, Civic Wars; David Waldstreicher, In The Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
Brock and Kinzer, Peifer drew a clear distinction as he traversed the Mid-Atlantic, and beyond, between loyalty and disloyalty. Such comments might not be highly descriptive, but they are indicative of a broader pattern, where individuals in the Mid-Atlantic framed their discussion of the war in terms of geographic boundaries and divisions of allegiance.

Confederates and Secessionists likewise illuminated the boundaries between their new nation, its adherents, and its detractors, mimicking the nationalizing process of physical maps with their observations of loyalty on the ground. John Simmons Shipp, a Virginia planter noted that the “People of Maryland receive us with cool indifference, some take our money for what they have to sell others will not.”\(^{40}\) Maryland, for Shipp and other Confederates, proved problematic throughout the war and for the development of their national identity. As a slaveholding state before and during most of the war, many Southerners believed that the Old Line State naturally fit with the Confederacy and not the Union. Indeed, the song “Maryland, My Maryland,” advocated for the Union of Maryland to the new Southern nation. Despite strong secession sympathies though, Marylanders divided over secession and remained in the Union. Shipp also noted Maryland towns like Frederick and Middletown were “strong Union” places and in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania the “People all Union.”\(^{41}\) Such observations in Maryland lend insight into why Shipp found opposition in central Maryland. Despite the predominance of slavery in the eastern reaches of the state, central and western Maryland contained far fewer slaves and slaveholding planters than near Baltimore and the Eastern Shore.\(^{42}\) While slave-ownership did not necessitate loyalty to the Confederacy, the nature of Maryland as a slave state

\(^{40}\) John Simmons Shipp, June 24, 1863, Shipp Family Papers, Diary of John Simmons Shipp 1862, MSS 2 Sh 646b, Virginia Museum of History and Culture, Richmond, Virginia.

\(^{41}\) John Simmons Shipp, September 7, 1862 and June 27, 1863.

\(^{42}\) Barbara Jean Fields, *Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground*, 10-1.
and the unwillingness of a large portion of its population to support the South, confounded Shipp and other Confederates.\textsuperscript{43}

Civilians also engaged in these conversations about loyalty, addressing the allegiance of their neighbors, friends, or localities, to make sense of the war around them. Some civilians divided the Mid-Atlantic neatly between Union controlled territory and Confederate held space. In March of 1863, Anna Cadwallader, from Locust Grove, wrote to her brother John, reporting that the family remained “in Yankeydom” as the Union soldiers occupied the local area. They had “not seen a Southern soldier for an age, and it would be joy unspeakable if we could only have our Dixie boys back again.”\textsuperscript{44} The clear juxtaposition between Yankeydom and soldiers from Dixie highlighted the divergent nationalities at play in the occupation of Locust Grove, the Cadwallader home. Furthermore, Cadwallader’s depiction of Yankeedom beginning at the feet of Union soldiers illuminated the fluidity of the region. If the Mason-Dixon Line no longer stood as a boundary between the North (Yankeedom) and the South (Dixie) and the presence of armies provided this geographic division, it made sense for individuals like Cadwallader to map loyalty.

Other civilians also mapped clear depictions between Yankeedom and Dixie, revealing stark oppositional (yet fluid) boundaries in the Mid-Atlantic. Some individuals provided broad geographic divisions, pointing toward the vague concepts of Yankeedom and Dixie. For example, in 1862, Fabricius Cather, after his discharge from the Union Army, noted that he recovered his father and uncle’s horses that Confederate guerrillas had stolen from their farms. Most significantly, Cather noted that the horses “were stolen last night & run off in the direction

\textsuperscript{43} Patrick A. Lewis, \textit{For Slavery and Union: Benjamin Buckner and Kentucky Loyalties in the Civil War} (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2014); 2-8; J. Kelly Bennette, a Wythe County, Virginia native provided a copious amount of notations in his diary on loyalty, noting that places like Westminster had the “Secesh” residents come out to see the Confederate forces ride by, while Cockeysville, Maryland provided the first opportunity that he had to encounter a woman in Maryland that supported the Union, in Bennette, Diary, July 8 and 10, 1864.

\textsuperscript{44} Anna Cadwallader to John Cadwallader, March 30, 1863, Cadwallader, John N. Papers, 1860-1892, Letters to John N. Cadwallader, 1863, Virginia Museum of History and Culture, Richmond, Virginia.
of Dixie."\textsuperscript{45} When Confederates under John S. Mosby raided into Pennsylvania, Ida Powell Dulany argued that the civilians in “Yankeeland,” began to regret how poorly the Union Army had treated Confederate Civilians.\textsuperscript{46} Rebecca Davis, from Brookville, Maryland, a staunch supporter of the Confederacy also noted in her diary that a “Mr. Williams has been sent South charge disloyalty,” in June 1863.\textsuperscript{47} Later, in the summer 1864, as Confederate troops pushed through Maryland during Jubal Early’s raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, Davis also reported that the presence of Confederate troops around her family’s farm, placed them “virtually in Dixieland for several days.”\textsuperscript{48} In each of these examples, much like Anna Cadwallader, civilians who supported the Union or Confederacy, demonstrated the need to map boundaries. Stephen Ash argued that Union occupation of the South divided the region into three spaces: garrisoned towns, the Confederate frontier, and no man’s land.\textsuperscript{49} Cadwallader, Cather, Dulany, and Davis all highlighted two things. In one way, they saw national divisions between the Union and the Confederacy—to the south lay Dixie. However, these examples also addressed the fact that the presence of troops, in these instances, mostly occupying Union forces, altered the perceptual boundaries of the Union and Confederacy, shifting individuals or entire locations from one side of the divide between Yankeedom and Dixie into another.

While some residents of the Mid-Atlantic cast loyalty in this dichotomy between Yankeedom and Dixie, they also used maps to evaluate the perceived allegiance of their friends, neighbors, or people they encountered during the war, revealing the centrality of loyalty in their wartime lives. Henrietta Barr, a thirty-seven year old widow from Ravenswood, West Virginia

\textsuperscript{45} Fabricius Cather, December 21, 1862, Cather, Fabricius A., Soldier. Civil War Diaries A&M 3633, WVRHC.
\textsuperscript{47} Rebecca Davis, 8, 1863, Rebecca Davis Dorsey Diary, July 19, 1863-September 17, 1864 MS 2111, MDHS.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., July 16, 1864.
\textsuperscript{49} Ash, When the Yankees Came, 76-7.
watched the events of the Civil War from her small town alongside the Ohio River with a careful eye. Through her discussions of the conflict, as Union forces tried to maintain control of Ravenswood despite Confederate raids and guerrilla attacks, Barr weaved together a discussion of loyalty and morality. While Barr saw the Unionists who lived in or occupied her town as “bloodthirsty abolitionists” or “lower hireling Hessions” who lacked any sense of morality, she also articulated a clear vision of who was or who was not loyal to the Confederate cause. On a trip to Cincinnati, Barr recorded that she met with a “secesh shopkeeper” and she frequently noted the Unionists in town. Much like soldiers that passed through the Mid-Atlantic, recording the presence of Unionist and Confederates as they went, Barr also put this practice in her diary. Likewise, when serving as a nurse near Fredericksburg, Virginia in the summer of 1862, Bell Robinson, reported that in the area “Nearly all the people here are secessionists. We have one Union neighbor to go to see and we go in frequently.” Around the same time, Ida Dulany also commented on local loyalties in 1862, as the actions of the Union Army—from impressing supplies to the occupation of the region to the poor treatment of civilians changed the allegiance of many individuals around Fauquier County, Virginia. She reported, “that many persons in our neighborhood had been changed from Unionists to Secessionists by General Geary’s treatment, I had been from the moment I saw Lincoln’s war proclamation a Secessionist from the bottom of

50 Throughout her diary, Barr consistently painted her Unionist neighbors and the Union soldiers who occupied her town in a negative light. They were politically corrupt, thieves who stole from her and Secessionists in town, and who perpetrated great evils against the South and Ravenswood. Comparatively, Confederate troops, when they came to town were not only loyal, but true gentlemen. You can find a larger discussion of this in Charles R. Welsko “‘Like a dark cloud’: Secession Statehood, and Loyalty in Western Virginia, 1861-1863,” in West Virginia History: A Journal of Regional Studies Volume 10, Number 1, Spring 2016, 48-9; Henrietta Barr, The Civil War Diary of Mrs. Henrietta Fitzhugh Barr (Barre) 1862-1863, Ed. Mrs. Sallie Kiger Winn (Marietta, Ohio: Marietta College, 1963), February 26, 1862, May 2, 1862, May 30, June 23, 1863.
51 Barr, The Civil War Diary of Mrs. Henrietta Fitzhugh Barr, March 13, 1862.
52 Ibid., August 16, 1862.
53 Bell Robinson to Mother, July 14, 1862, Pardee-Robison Family, Bell Robison, Volunteer Nurse Correspondence, June 1862-June 1864, 1862-1864, USAHEC.
my heart.” Barr, Robinson, and Dulany, each reported on the loyalty of individuals around them. Thus civilians, like soldiers, charted broader distinctions between their two respective nations, but they also localized that process in order to make sense of their friends, family, and neighbors.

In the slaveholding portions of the Mid-Atlantic, the intersection of slaves, abolitionists, and differing national loyalties also prompted an attention to the loyalty of the enslaved populations. By mid-May 1861, Mary Eliza Caperton grew restless in Montgomery County, Virginia. With her husband George already off in the Confederate service, reports suggested that there was a strong “Union feeling in the county.” More importantly, roughly a mile and a half from her home was “settlement…composed of poor people” that local leaders feared were “inciting the slaves to rebellion.” The 2,217 slaves in Montgomery County constituted roughly twenty-one percent of the local population, making the possibility of a slave uprising a concern feature for the region as many white men marched off to war. Caperton provided two maps in her observations about her home and the county. First, like other residents of the Mid-Atlantic, she explored the boundaries of loyalty in her community, evaluating broadly who was and who was not loyal in her illusion to the strong sentiment of Unionism that pervaded Montgomery County. On the other hand, she also provided a cartographic evaluation of slave loyalty in her observation of the poor residents who prompted the enslaved to rise up against their masters. In doing so, Caperton was one of many slaveholders who commented on the potential limits of slave loyalty and attempted to map where those boundaries began and ended. Ida Powell Dulany made clear in April of 1862 the lack of fidelity from local slaves. She noted in her diary, “The

54 Dulany, June 21, 1862.
55 Mary Eliza Caperton to George Caperton, May 14, 1861, Caperton Family Papers, Mss 1C1716a, Section 8, Mary Eliza (Henderson) Caperton, 1836-1900 (at White Thorn and Joy Lodge), Virginia Museum of History and Culture, Richmond, Virginia.
slaves in Middleburg behaved admirably, much better than in this neighborhood, where they generally sided with the enemies of their masters. Many in Middleburg resist[ed] large bribes offered to induce them to leave their masters, [and] by their firmness and fidelity contributed greatly to the protection of property of the different families to which they belonged."

Similarly, Baltimore resident Annie Thomas wrote to her husband, J. Hanson Thomas, while he sat in prison on the grounds of disloyalty—first at Fort McHenry, then Fort Monroe—that a friend had told her “that every servant in our house was a spy, but none of it was so it does not give me one moments trouble.” From home to county, each of these women paid careful attention to the allegiance and actions of slaves. Similar to other cartographers in the Mid-Atlantic, these individuals made sure to observe where they saw or suspected loyalty to their side waned in the hearts of the African Americans.

These observations of African American loyalty demonstrate that black Americans, free or enslaved, also entered into the conversations about loyalty and likewise engaged in the cartography of loyalty. Like white Americans, blacks, had a keen sense of the nation’s geographic contours. They had, as discussed last chapter, charted a clear notion of the Mason-Dixon Line as a “fault line” between freedom and slavery. During the Civil War, as many African Americans came to understand the war and the possibilities it offered, they also provided their own maps of the nation as well as loyalty. George E. Stephens, reported while in Union Mills, Virginia, that African American slaves followed the Union Army where it went. “At the last battle of Bull Run [August 26-31, 1862], this whole region was depopulated of its slaves. None remain but the aged, infirm, young, and a few of that class of treacherous, pampered, and petted slaves, known as house servants. Large numbers are flocking around us here; they come

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57 Dulany, *In the Shadow of the Enemy*, April 5, 1862.
58 Annie Thomas to J. Hanson Thomas, September 20, 1861, Box 1, 1861, Sept. 13-18, Correspondence, Box #1 fol. #1 MS 3091, Dr. J. Hanson Thomas Manuscript Collection, 1861, MS 3091, MDHS.
from Fauquier Co.” Moreover, Stephens reported that Washington was “considered by every negro within the boundaries of the Old Dominion,” as a refuge from slavery and oppression.\(^5^9\) In addition to Stephens, the U.S. Coast Survey also illuminated the boundaries of slavery and freedom in Virginia that directly correlated the perception of loyalty with the density of slavery.

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associating the peculiar institution visually with the Southern insurrection. Not only did residents of the Mid-Atlantic map the loyalty of slaves, but they also turned these maps into pieces of propaganda during the war, driving home the malleability of loyalty and its usefulness as a tool to shape how residents of the region understood boundaries, allegiance, and the war itself.

This should not suggest that Mid-Atlantic residents—soldiers or civilians, black or white—came to an agreement on the boundaries of loyalty, as their observations often contrasted with the views of other individuals throughout the region. A number of towns, especially those near the Mason-Dixon Line or in areas of frequent turnover between Union and Confederate occupation, received mixed descriptions in regards to their allegiance. For example, Richard H. Morris described Frederick, Maryland as a place where “all the women flocked round [George McClellan] in crowds, kissing his horse” and generally praising the Union commander. Likewise, John Simmons Shipp, a Virginian planter, reported in September of 1862 that he found Frederick City a “handsome [sic] but strong Union place.” Comparatively, J. Kelly Bennette noted as part of his raid into Pennsylvania in 1864, that Frederick City was “said to contain a number of “rebel sympathizers” prior to the November Presidential election. Which interpretation of this Maryland town was true? Timing might have been a factor in Frederick. In the fall of 1862, the Civil War was relatively young and had not seen major transformations—Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation was still several weeks away from its announcement and the conflict itself had not transformed into a hard war yet. However, by 1864, Lincoln faced increased opposition to the destruction of slavery and blame for the deadly length of the war.

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60 Schulten, Mapping the Nation. 133.
61 Richard Henry Morris to unknown recipient, September 19, 1862, Paul Collection of Civil War Documents.
62 John Simmons Shipp, September 7, 1862, Shipp Family Papers.
63 Bennette, Diary, July 8, 1864.
Consider also the town of Winchester, Virginia, which changed hands dozens of times throughout the war. According to James Peifer was a city full of women “Secesh to the backbone” who refused to pass beneath the Stars and Stripes, while Anna Cadwallader reported, “the Yanks…are having quite a time with the fair sex in Winchester” seeing that “many of the Ladies are strong unionists.” The prolonged Union occupation of Winchester observed by Cadwallader, under General Robert Milroy from late December 1862 through mid-June of 1863, may have contributed to the actions of local women. When Peifer made his comments in 1862, it was early in the Union’s first occupation of the town. As a result, the women of Winchester likely opposed the arrival of their enemies. Later in the war, as Union occupation lengthened, perhaps the women grew more accustomed to the presence of the men in blue. While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons that these evaluations changed over time, the key is that individuals like Peifer, Cadwallader, or Simmons, paid careful attention to the actions and loyalties of individuals throughout the Mid-Atlantic. They demonstrated a lack of precision when evaluating the loyalty of others, but they also put that examination in the context of opposition.

Indeed, conversations from J. Kelley Bennette and Daniel Jones revealed places within each nation that challenged perceptions of clear boundaries between the Union and Confederacy. In September of 1861, Bennette, a member of the 8th Virginia Cavalry, wrote that he found the people of Lewisburg, Virginia, “the most stingy unaccommodating persons I have ever seen. They care no more for a volunteer than if he were an inmate of the Penitentiary.” After riding out and scouting about the town, Bennette returned to Lewisburg in the evening, tired, exhausted, and “almost starved” from his long ride, but the town folk were unwilling to part with “a mouthful…for love or money.” If “not for the principle involved” Bennette was “willing to

64 Anna to John Cadwallader, March 30, 1863; Peifer, *Bethlehem Boy*, April 10, 1862.
abandon this whole country to the tender mercies of the Yankees.” Not only was Bennette appalled at the lack of support for the Confederacy, but also the location of such unwillingness to sustain the Confederacy revealed the imprecise boundaries of allegiance in the region. Located on the boundary of the Shenandoah Valley, Bennette clearly expected that the people of Lewisburg would thoroughly support the Confederate cause. They were Virginians, but their lack of support showed how old conceptions of regional division, such as the Old Dominion’s boundaries or the Mason-Dixon Line, did not correspond with reality. Further, the fact that Lewisburg ultimately became part of West Virginia, highlights the fragmenting borders of Virginia.

Similarly, Daniel Jones found some of the residents in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania wanting after the titanic battle in and outside of town in the summer of 1863. Writing to his friend John Jordan, a lawyer in Philadelphia, Jones expressed a desire to have attended the creation of the national cemetery at Gettysburg in November of 1863. His enthusiasm for traveling with his friend was not only to celebrate the honored dead, but also “to point out the Rebels in the town.” One of which was a “Railroad President who cheerfully entertained some of the Rebel Generals when they occupied the place.” More importantly, Jones called attention to other people in the town, who when Union soldiers reentered Gettysburg after defeating Lee “took advantage of the occasion.” Those “rascals,” Jones asserted, charged wounded Union soldiers for a drink of water, something that even the most vile rebel would not seek to accomplish in the South. Similar to Bennette’s dissatisfaction with Lewisburg, Jones felt that disloyalty also existed in Pennsylvania. Throughout the Keystone State political debates between the Republicans and anti-war

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66 J. Kelly Bennette to Mrs. Graham, September 22, 1861, J. Kelly Bennette Papers.
Democrats, often-labeled Copperheads, dominated much of the state’s wartime discourse, with both sides arguing that their political opponents were disloyal to the ideals of the American Republic. While the political elements of loyalty will be discussed further in Chapter 4, Jones’ observations of allegiance in Gettysburg were different. They did not focus on political conversations, but rather physical actions—courting Rebel troops or charging suffering Union soldiers for supplies—that indicated disloyalty to the Union cause. Jones expected that Pennsylvanians in town would have supported their soldiers who had struggled through the battle with aid, but instead, some residents took advantage of the situation for personal, not national, gain. Collectively, along with the other examples of disagreement over loyalty, Jones and Bennette demonstrate how individuals throughout the Mid-Atlantic encountered uneven maps and unclear boundaries.

One possible answer to why these men and women disagree over the loyalty of these towns and their populations could be the people they interacted with as they passed through the area. Rebecca Davis indirectly addressed the fact that civilians under occupation often elected to avoid contact or confrontation with enemy troops. After singing “Maryland! My Maryland!” with her sister, Davis reported that three Union soldiers rode up to the gate of their property. She absconded into her parents’ home, “knowing such treacherous refrain would not be agreeable to their ears.” The soldiers brought a summons for Davis’ father, a lawyer, and they came in for a drink, but “Sister & I does not make our appearance when Yanks are in the house, entertaining no sympathy for them.”

Although this scene took place in the Davis household, it is telling on how individuals responded to the presence of those with divergent loyalties. For Davis, both her and her sister elected to retreat out of sight of the Yankees, even when they were in the home, rather than interact with them. Similarly, Sarah Jane Lough, in Morgantown reported in May 1863.

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68 Rebecca Davis, Diary, July 25, 1863.
1863, how during a Confederate raid into town, large portions of the local populace took horses and property out of town and North towards Pennsylvania to keep it away from the raiders.\(^6^9\) Removed from the home to a town or small community, it is possible to speculate that others in the Mid-Atlantic followed a similar pattern. Daniel Jones’ observations on the Gettysburg populace might provide another answer. The presence of Confederate forces in the town encouraged some individuals to celebrate or dine with the soldiers in grey, possibly to court favor or protection. The presence of an army might, therefore, illicit a variety of responses. Some civilians may have hid from the opposing armies, others may have attempted to befriend the opposing force, or they may have enthusiastically cheered for the arrival of the troops in their town or neighborhood. Unfortunately, it is difficult to corroborate the maps made by individuals in the Mid-Atlantic, though that should not devalue the maps that people made. Though they may have disagreed on the loyalty of people and places throughout the region, the cartography of loyalty helped shape how these men and women understood the war years.

**Beauty, Cultural Landscapes, and Loyalty**

The mapping of loyalty by Mid-Atlantic residents between 1861 and 1865 also affords the opportunity to evaluate how these people understood their enemies. As soldiers and civilians traversed the region during the war, they reflected on the familiar as they encountered new people and places. Historians have noted the centrality of home to Civil War Americans, often as a motivation to fight, defend, or return to during the war.\(^7^0\) In terms of loyalty, movement, and maps, home became a part of the otherizing process of the war. Evoking the language of beauty, Mid-Atlantic residents tied perceptions of beauty and national identity together. Individuals who


recorded descriptions of beauty tended to focus on two topics: the attractiveness of the opposite sex and the appearance of the local landscape. Soldiers and civilians from each of these four states commented extensively on both the appearance of other people and the places they visited. Their evaluations of beauty help us understand how they viewed loyalty and the cultural dimensions beyond mere political or sectional differences that influenced how men and women saw the world. Indeed the loyalty of the people in question or of the surrounding area often colored how individuals portrayed beauty.

When Confederate soldiers discussed the multitudes of women they encountered throughout the war, their allegiance often guided the ways in which men described the appearance and attractiveness of the opposite sex. J. Kelly Bennette, when returning from the destruction of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania in 1864, the 8th Virginia passed through the town of Winchester. While in town, Bennette stopped an unidentified Unionist home—he only referred to individuals in the home by their last initial, “Mrs. G.,” “Mrs. M. G.,” or “Miss H. W.” At the house, he also identified a “Mrs. M. G.” as beautiful and “a real rebel notwithstanding that atmosphere of Unionism she is now breathing.” More importantly, he also found Miss Jennie M., who played the piano, pretty, but “If it were not for her union sentiments I could have been somewhat attracted to her.” Bennette’s description here of two different sets of women paints an important picture. He found each of the women attractive in their own right, however, the loyalty of Jennie colored his evaluation of her. Whereas Mrs. M.G. was beautiful and a true Southern Rebel, Jennie’s Unionism made her appear less desirable to Bennette. In short, loyalty influenced how this one Virginian viewed members of the opposite sex, but he was far from alone, as other Virginians emulated this practice throughout the war.71

71 J. Kelly Bennette, Diary, August 24, 1864.
Other Confederates conflated physical attractiveness with the loyalty of the individuals that they encountered moving throughout the Mid-Atlantic. The three separate raids into Pennsylvania in 1862, 1863, and 1864, help illuminate this point. Tally Simpson, the brother of Dick Simpson, reported that in 1863 as he marched toward Gettysburg, that he had “not seen a really pretty girl since I have been in Penn[sylvania].” Many other Confederates, from privates to generals, who passed through Chambersburg or other locations at the tip of the Shenandoah Valley, often provided a rather critical view of the local population, though they tended to call specific attention to the unattractive women they encountered. Virginian Julian T. Edwards may have found the landscapes of Franklin County appealing, but noted that the ladies of the region, with their “round rosy faces, which though they betoken health, and good spirits, are sadly wanting in those qualities peculiar only to the southern girl, and which are so attractive to the southern youth.” Edwards’ comments are quite clear, the women around Chambersburg and in southern Pennsylvania paled in comparison to the more beautiful Southern women he cherished. He and Simpson provide a clear distinction of the women above the Mason-Dixon Line. They were not only unattractive, but they lacked the actual features that a Southerner man might find appealing. Both men laid bare the fact that Union and Northern women were different people than the Southern belles of the Confederacy. Yet, other Confederates were more blunt. G. C. Brown wrote to his sister that Chambersburg women were “very much uglier & coarser than ours.” This should not suggest that all Confederate soldiers found the women of Chambersburg and the vicinity unattractive. Individuals like Edward Porter Alexander, recalled encountering “a

72 T. N. Simpson to Caroline Virginia Taliaferro, June 28, 1863. ‘Far, Far From Home,’ 250-2
good looking stout Dutch girl.” Yet, as Confederates marched or raided into the “North,” they often found the people they encountered unattractive, due to their national commitments.

Union soldiers and civilians did in fact talk about the physical attractiveness of Confederate women or soldiers, but their observations of human beauty lacked the consistency and precision of their secessionist counterparts. Where Bennette, Simpson, Edwards, and other Confederates associated loyalty and beauty together, Unionists did not provide such clear description of loyalty and physical personal features. John Price Kepner reported in September of 1864 that Harrisonburg, Virginia had “pretty girls” in abundance but they were “detestable secesh.” Kepner may have found the women of Harrisonburg attractive, but their national loyalty to the Confederacy made them repulsive to him. Even more broadly, some Union soldiers, such as Rufus, an African-American soldier of the 7th USCI/USCT from Maryland spoke negatively of the Southerners he encountered in Florida. The residents of Jacksonville were “less a people than any” Rufus had seen. They were “the most God-forsaken looking animals on earth, and all miserable accordingly. They look mean; they live meanly, act meanly and they don’t mean to be anything but mean.” Residents of Jacksonville, presumably supporters of the Confederacy and opponents to the Emancipation of African-Americans most certainly treated Rufus and other black soldiers poorly. Yet his comment fits into a broader

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77 Although I am focusing on the Mid-Atlantic region, the lack of sources from African-American soldiers and civilians, be they enslaved or freed, requires the necessity of a more ambiguous boundary when considering sources. Many African-Americans served in the Union, nearly 200,000, but most of those operated in the Deep South. Since Rufus came from Maryland, his words can help illuminate our understanding of loyalty, even if he served outside the region.
discussion, one that ties appearance to physical descriptions. These people, like the women of Harrisonburg, were less than appealing because of their support of the Confederacy.

While none of these individuals, Unionist or Confederate, specifically articulated why they found particular individuals with opposing national sentiments unattractive, they revealed social and cultural differences, which might explain why Confederate emphasized personal beauty. On one hand, there is a societal difference when it came to farm labor between the North and South. With the institution of slavery as well as a culture that privileged separate spheres of responsibility, many southern men believed that the role of women remained firmly in the home. Of course, in the South, only the wealthiest families and largest slaveholding plantations could avoid having their females escape work in the field. However, these Confederate soldiers specifically criticized the women they found tending to crops on smaller, family farms in the North. The fact that northern women tended to the fields as part of their domestic and economic responsibilities may have made them seem less attractive because they failed to live up to southern expectations of domesticity as well as the simple act of physical exertion. Class also may have served as a factor influencing how these men portrayed the female population of Chambersburg. Several of the men, who commented on the beauty, or lack thereof, Tally Simpson and Julian T. Edwards specifically, in south central Pennsylvania came from wealthier family backgrounds. There is no guarantee that personal or family wealth directly influenced

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79 A clear example of the economic differences that developed between North and South can be found in John Majewski’s *A House Dividing*, where he argued that the presence of an urban center, like Philadelphia allowed the peripheral Cumberland County to grow in terms of its internal improvements. Unlike Virginia, which lacked a significant urban center to produce enough trade and products to warrant substantial, privately funded railroads or canals. Ayers also highlighted some of the geographic and economic differences between the North and South in his work. Ayers, *In the Presence of Mine Enemies*, 31-3; John Majewski, *A House Dividing: Economic Development in Pennsylvania and Virginia Before the Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1-7.

80 Taliaferro Simpson, the son of South Carolina Congressman Richard F. Simpson, attended Wofford College before the war on his path to become a lawyer, which he would accomplish after the war. Julian Edwards, from King William County, Virginia was the son of a doctor. Everson, *Far, Far From Home*, v; U.S. Census, 1860, for Simpson see: https://www.footnotelibrary.com/image/70870381?terms=Taliaferro%20Simpson; for Edwards see:
how these men viewed the women of Chambersburg, but collectively their expectations of how a woman should appear—as an elite, Southern belle—could have shaped their opinion. Lastly comes the fact that, as J. Kelley Bennette noted in his diary, after lamenting the destruction of Chambersburg in 1864, “We are in this war to defend the women” of the South and any action necessary to do so, was acceptable to him.\(^{81}\) If, as Bennette stated, Confederate soldiers fought for their women, an idea some historians have put forward, it is possible that they sought to devalue the appearance of the women from Chambersburg to strengthen their views of what they fought for back home.

Confederate men and women, Virginians, Marylanders, and other secessionists from across the South, portrayed their ideological/national opponents as less attractive throughout the war. The rationale behind such depictions comes from how Southerners understood their world and society. A number of scholars have noted a number of ideologies drove Southerners—including masculinity, honor, as well as a controlled structure to the plantation and individual household—that structured Southern society.\(^{82}\) These concepts are ‘human-centric,’ in that they relied on concepts directly connected to a person or individual. As Southerners throughout the nineteenth century continually defined themselves as morally, physically, and mentally superior to Northerners, it makes sense that they would aim to articulate their differences from Unionists through a human centered lens. By recording their observations of beauty, particularly that of

\(^{81}\) J. Kelly Bennette, *Diary*, July 30, 1864.

Northern or Union-supporting females, and undercutting their attractiveness, Secessionists vindicated their culture over that of the Union. They used maps and observations of beauty to confirm the superiority of their life and their cultural assumptions about their enemies. Therefore, for Confederates, and as Unionists make clear, maps not only helped residents of the Mid-Atlantic take stock of their new world, but it also helped them confirm that they were right about the war and in this case, the inferiority of their enemies.

It is possible to see a similar, but different, pattern in how Union residents of the Mid-Atlantic applied this pattern of beauty to physical landscapes during the war to confirm the supposed backwardness of slaveholding Southerners. The disloyal soil of the Old Dominion proved to be an element worthy of their criticism as a backward and desolate place. Admittedly, northern Virginia, particularly between Washington D.C. and Richmond suffered extensively as a battleground during the Civil War. The presence of hundreds of thousands of troops from both the Union and Confederate armies from 1861 through 1865 took a toll on the region. Yet from the start of the war, Unionists provided clear evidence of a negative impression of that sacred Virginian soil. Casper Gillingham recorded in his thin pocket diary as he moved through Brentsville and Centreville, Virginia that the towns were “perfectly deserted” and “entirely deserted” respectively. Other Union soldiers frequently reported on the damaged, deserted, or backwards nature of the Virginian landscape. Where Southern culture emphasized human-centric concepts such as honor and masculinity, Northern culture found purchase with other

83 William G. Thomas notes that other Civil War soldiers, especially Northern soldiers, looked upon white Southerners and the Southern landscape as decidedly different from that of the North. Thomas, The Iron Way, 82-8.
84 Casper S. Gillingham, June 15 and June 17, 1863, Gillingham, Casper S. Papers, MSS 2 G4159b, Virginia Museum of History and Culture, Richmond, Virginia.
85 R. R. Corson to Jarred Evans, August 2, 1862, R. R. Corson Letters, 1861-1864, #5263-z, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill.
concepts, such as the notion of progress and industrial advancement.\textsuperscript{86} While Northern residents also embraced concepts of honor and duty, they also possessed a seemingly greater desire for industrial and territorial improvement, in turn providing them with a lens to look at landscapes as well as people. Another example comes from Rufus S. Jones, of the 8th United States Colored Infantry, when he recorded his thoughts on Baldwin, Florida. The Pittsburgh native reported that he had heard great rumors about Baldwin and its importance as a town. He was not impressed. “In general appearance, a person would not take it for a town, in the North, nor even disgrace the name of town by applying it.”\textsuperscript{87} Collectively, African-Americans like Rufus S. Jones and other Union soldiers provided a negative description of Confederate territory, be it the sacred soil of Virginia or a shoddy town in Florida, in part because they were accustomed to looking at landscapes and improvement.

Not only did Union soldiers and civilians provide a careful and critical evaluation of Southern towns and terra firma, but they also linked these considerations to the location’s loyalty. James Uhler wrote on May 1, 1862 on his march near Yorktown, “the part of the country through which we passed is very wild and poor with very little farm land and very few buildings of account.”\textsuperscript{88} The Rebels in the region, “a very mean set of people,” he noted for their use of buried explosives around Yorktown, correlated the poor condition of the area with the disloyalty of the Confederate occupiers.\textsuperscript{89} Thomas A. Tanfield laid out a clear difference between his native Pennsylvania and the Virginian landscapes he visited as a soldier. Near Newport News/Warwick,

\textsuperscript{87} Letter 16: Rufus S. Jones, 8\textsuperscript{th} USCI, Jacksonville FL, March 20, 1864; CR April 16, 1864, \textit{A Grand Army of Black Men} edited by Edwin S. Redkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 38.
\textsuperscript{88} James Uhler, Diary, May 1, 1862, James M. Uhler Papers, Box 11, Folder 160, Typed Transcript of Diary in 2 Parts, USAHEC.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., May 8, 1862.
Virginia, Tanfield argued that there was no parallel between Virginia and Pennsylvania. While he acknowledged that war had desolated the Virginian countryside, forcing families into destitution, he argued that Virginia could “not be compared with Pennsylvania, [Virginia’s] large extensive farms are nothing but mud their large farm houses are nothing but small shantys hardly large enough for a family to live comfortably in I believe that we might travel the whole country over and not find in it as beautiful a place as we left in [Pennsylvania].”

Comparatively, George Daughtery noted that the vicinity around Romney, Virginia was beautiful and the “improvements where there are any left, are of the finest character, many of them present a stately appearance, and look much like the palaces we read about, especially those around Winchester, where live many of the most wealthy citizens.” While Daughtery found the area in good order, he also noted that it was the best place in the Shenandoah Valley, because in the area he found “the strongest Union people I have found in Va. even in the hot-bed of secession, where it costs a man some thing to have an opinion, there have been some who have had the firmness to stand the blunt of civil and military persecutions.” Where other individuals in Virginia suffered under the auspicious of Confederate despotism, the loyal individuals around Romney maintained their allegiance to the United States. In turn, for Daughtery, he viewed the landscape and internal improvements in the area as beautiful. Loyalty to the Union cause, not merely a place on a map, called attention to the beauty of these locations.

91 George W. Daugherty to Friends, January 22, 1863, George W. Daugherty, Company D 22nd Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry, Letters from camp near Romney, Virginia January 3 to June 7, 1863, George W. Daugherty Papers, 22nd PA Cav, 1863, USAHEC.
92 Other individuals provided similar commentary: Harmon Y. Beans to Mother, December 3, 1861, Harmon Y. Beans Collection, Harmon Y. Beans Collection, Box 1, Folder 1, Letters from Beans to Family Members Regarding Camp Life, Weather, Tentmates, the Countryside, Fredericksburg, Damaged Railroad track, Aftermath of a Battle, Buck Tail Regiment, Harrisburg, Guarding a House, and German Regiments, USAHEC; John Fisher Irwin to Father February 21, 1863, to Sister [probably Melissa], April 13, 1863, and to Father, June 19, 1863, John Fisher Irwin
Further, Levi Fritz provided a broader series of contrasts between the North and South. In the summer of 1863 as Fritz moved from Virginia to Maryland as part of the 53rd Pennsylvania in pursuit of Lee’s second northern invasion, he made careful comparisons between Virginian landscapes and those of Maryland. While Fritz found some of the land and towns south of the Potomac River attractive, the farms around Centreville, Virginia after all “looked livelier and fresher that the farms of the Rap[pannock] and the people did not have the care worn look.”93 Yet many other places in northern Virginia were “deserted as usual.”94 A clear break came when Fritz and the 53rd Pennsylvania crossed the Potomac on June 26. The next day, near Poolesville, Maryland, he likened the town to one in Pennsylvania, “quite the opposite of the burgs in Virginia.”95 Leaving Barnesville, there were “goods roads, splendid farms and farm house along and a number of pretty women” as well as the “beautiful valley” in which the city of Frederick rested, adorned with American flags and “fine family residences.”96 Broadly speaking, before the war, “Maryland must have been far ahead of Virginia in agriculture and other improvements. Now the contrast is marked indeed,” as Maryland appeared prosperous and Virginia was “the very reverse—it is but one frightful scene of desolation.”97 Indeed the local population, as other Union soldiers noted, treated the Union Army well, unlike in Virginia, with its displays of support and enthusiasm for the men in blue.98 Maryland’s place in the Union, even if, as the previous chapter demonstrated, Marylanders made that decision begrudgingly, changed how Fritz understood the soil. Broadly speaking, Maryland itself was loyal and even though it

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94 Ibid., June 22 and 25, 1863.
95 Ibid., June 27, 1863.
96 Ibid., June 28.
97 Ibid., June 29.
contained the institution of slavery, the central and western reaches of the state had a lesser
collection to the peculiar institution than points east of Barnesville. Fritz could then associate
the loyal support of the area, with its distance, if not complete separation from slavery, as a
beautiful location that supported him and his cause.

Broadly speaking, these descriptions of physical beauty point towards an important
cultural difference between Unionists and Confederates. Both juxtaposed loyalty and beauty, but
while Confederates and Southerners relied on the intersection of beauty and individuals,
Unionists centered much of their ideology on broader concepts, such as a “culture of progress”
and that of free labor. Collectively, these ideas prompted for Northerners the idea that
controlling one’s own work was essential for prosperity, individually and nationally. Further,
through such prosperity, Americans could control and even perfect the nation. Much akin to their
Southern neighbors, Unionists had often identified themselves in comparison with the South and
the institution of slavery. While residents of the free states did not universally loathe slavery or
share any enthusiasm for black slaves, many believed the peculiar institution ruined landscapes
and retarded the progress of the nation. Union observers, as they passed through Virginia and
other parts of the South, conflated slavery with disloyalty. By extension, they associated
disloyalty with backwardness, allowing them to confirm their assumptions about the failures of
Southern society. Again, just as maps and conversations about beauty allowed Confederates to
elevate Southern society over the North, Unionists inverted that formula. The cartography of

99 Fields, On the Middle Ground, 6-12.
100 Lisa M. Brady, War Upon the Land: Military Strategy and the Transformation of Southern Landscapes During
the American Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012); Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men:
The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), particularly
chapter 1; Carol Sheriff, The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of Progress, 1817-1862 (New York:
101 Brady, War Upon the Land, 17-19.
102 Susan-Mary Grant, North Over South: Northern Nationalism and American Identity in the Antebellum Era
103 Brady, War Upon the Land, 18-21; Sheriff, Artificial River, 172-8; Majewski, A House Dividing, 17, 171.
loyalty for residents of the Mid-Atlantic served a greater purpose than just the articulation of boundaries between two new nations (though certainly this was a huge part of it). Mapping loyalty allowed men and women throughout the region to articulate the boundaries of their society and how they viewed themselves in relationship to one another.

**Conclusion**

Charles Hay’s diary provides one last piece of information about the informal cartography of loyalty during the Civil War and the prevalence of cultural differences between the North and South. In the last entry of his diary, though he served throughout the war, Hay discussed John Pope’s disastrous battle with the Army of Northern Virginia between August 28 and 30, 1862. Hay wrote, “Our troops fought bravely on Saturday, and on the identical ground where McDowell was defeated thirteen months ago.” However, mismanagement and poor leadership had doomed the Union forces such that “All the territory they have fought for and won in Eastern Virginia they have had to yield, and withdraw under cover of the defenses around Washington. They have accomplished wonders, but all in vain, they are now where they started.”

Cartography still mattered to Hay, as it did to many in the Mid-Atlantic. He charted the progress of the Army of the Potomac in geographic terms that laid out the eastern reaches of Virginia as conquerable, and by extension enemy, territory. However, there is an unspoken conversation in Hay’s last existent diary entry: the name of the battle that took place in late August 1862. Hay never directly referred to the battle by either of its names, the Battle of Second Manassas or the Battle of Second Bull Run, but countless others did. Its commonplace that Northerners referenced battles by local rivers or physical features (Antietam or Bull Run for instance) and Southerners wielded the names of towns (Sharpsburg or Manassas). Such naming

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104 Charles Hay, Diary, September 21, 1862.
patterns however might reveal a bit more about the cultural cartography of how Northerners and Southerners saw the Civil War Mid-Atlantic.

Much like soldiers and civilians who wielded loyalty to make sense of people and places, names held cultural importance during the war. The fact that battles earned different names points to some mechanism for why Northerners and Southerners disagreed on the nomenclature of some battles. The informal cartography they built into their correspondences and its cultural connections also oriented how Mid-Atlantic residents understood the battles that defined the war. Their armies too elaborate this point. At Sharpsburg or Antietam, whichever one prefers, the Army of the Potomac fought the Army of Northern Virginia. Union armies often, but not exclusively, took on the name of rivers or physical features (Army of the Potomac, Army of the James, Army of the Cumberland, Army of the Ohio), while Confederate armies took on state or place names (the Army of Northern Virginia or the Army of Tennessee). Battles and armies gained names in a fashion similar to the writings of cultural cartographers in the Mid-Atlantic. Northerners and Unionists who focused on battles perhaps tied their names into how they viewed the nation: in terms of their ability to control or improve upon natural features. Southerners, on the other hand, with their deep fascination regarding individuals named their battles after the places people lived or states that necessitated people to exist, not physical features. This description is not perfect, nor should it be considered true for every individual, army, or battle. Rather, it should suggest however, that by approaching the Civil War through informal and cultural cartography of loyalty, such an approach might wield larger interpretive ramifications.

From the cartographical designs of the U.S. Coast Survey to the cultural depictions of physical beauty, Mid-Atlantic men and women painted clear maps of loyalty during the Civil War. While these individuals drew mental or physical maps to make sense of the national
divisions that broke the Mason-Dixon Line, they also poured part of themselves into their maps. In doing so, it is possible to glean two important aspects of the war from these maps. First, the cartography of loyalty attempted to reorder and draw clear boundaries in a region that the Civil War upset. Maryland’s begrudging decision to remain in the Union and West Virginia’s bid for their own freedom, necessitated new interpretations of the region during the war. Second, the descriptions Mid-Atlantic residents offered of beauty demonstrate how they applied these divisions between Yankeedom and Dixie to very personal aspects of the war. No aspect of their movements through the Mid-Atlantic went without consideration. Soldiers and civilians alike, regardless of their national allegiance, examined the people and places they encountered with a careful eye to their loyalty. How those locations and individuals appeared or acted, shaped how Unionists and Confederates understood these individuals.

Such an approach to the study of loyalty as contained with this chapter compels a revision of how one evaluates wartime allegiance. Loyalty was not just a mode of categorization for individuals in the Mid-Atlantic, but rather a living and breathing part of their wartime experience. Men and women encountered divergent interpretations of loyalty at home and abroad as they also experienced the vicissitudes of war. To make sense of that confusion they drew physical and mental maps. However, the disruptions of the Civil War Era did not come merely in the form of national allegiances. The actions of slaves and African Americans produced resounding reverberations throughout the Mid-Atlantic that further challenged how Americans understood their world. Emancipation, the death of slavery, and the erasure of the “loyal slave,” represented another, important change in how Unionists and Confederates experienced the war as well as the idea of loyalty.
Chapter 3: Poetical Justice: Slaves, Myths, and Loyalty in the Wake of Self-Emancipation

In the spring of 1864 George W. Hatton, an African American soldier from Maryland, wrote to the Christian Recorder about the capture of a notorious slave owner by Union forces. The arrest of William H. Clopton by pickets of the Union 18th Corps on May 10, 1864 prompted Hatton to evaluate the intersection of slavery, loyalty, and American history. On one hand, Clopton was “a noted reb in this part of the country, and from his appearance, one of the F. F. V.s [First Families of Virginia].”¹ General Edward A. Wild, Hatton’s brigade commander, noted that Clopton “had been actively disloyal” to the Union, but provided few specifics.² On the other hand, the proximity to Jamestown, the first permanent English settlement in North American, compelled Hatton to reflect on the origins of slavery. From the introduction of African slaves in 1619 to “the breaking out of the rebellion,” Hatton argued that African Americans had been “looked upon as an inferior by all civilized nations.”³ The institution of chattel servitude and pervasive racial ideologies had placed Afro-Americans at the bottom of the American social hierarchy for over two centuries. Yet the events of May 10, 1864 shattered traditional assumptions about the place of black men and women in the American nation.

When pickets from the 18th Corps brought Clopton into camp, General Wild and his staff quickly learned that several refugees and at least one Union soldier had once been the property of the Virginia planter. Moreover, half a dozen female slaves had recently escaped from Clopton’s

³ Letter 36: George W. Hatton, A Grand Army of Black Men, 95; Commander of a Black Brigade to the Headquarters of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, Wild to Davis, 96-7.
clutches and made their way to the Union position at Wilson’s Landing. Both Hatton and Wild noted that Clopton had provided those women with an “unmerciful whipping” prior to their escape.4 Wild, a strong anti-slavery advocate from Massachusetts, disdained Clopton’s treatment of his slaves. The Northern officer further disliked the fact that Clopton had stripped the black women to their waists prior to their lashings. Wild decided that the Virginian’s offenses were so egregious that he deserved punishment.5 General Wild ordered Clopton stripped to his waist and tied to a nearby tree. Taking the lash in hand, Wild turned the instrument of oppression over to a Mr. William Harris, the soldier who had once belonged to Clopton.

Harris gave Clopton “some fifteen or twenty well-directed strokes,” a reminder of “days gone by” with the whip. The blood ran from Clopton’s back as it had from those of black slaves since 1619. Then the whip passed from Harris’ hand to that of the women so ardently abused by Clopton prior to their self-emancipation. At least three of the six women took vengeance on their former master, as Hatton noted, “to remind him that they were no longer his, but safely housed in Abraham’s bosom, and under the protection of the Star Spangled Banner, and guarded by their own patriotic, though once down-trodden race.”6 Likewise, General Wild referred to the event as “the administration of Poetical justice.”7 Both evaluations are apt descriptions of the events that unfolded on May 10, 1864. They also illustrate the broader point that African Americans influenced conversations about loyalty in the Mid-Atlantic.

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4 Letter 36: George W. Hatton, A Grand Army of Black Men, 95 and Source 16: 5 Source 16: Commander of a Black Brigade to the Headquarters, Freedom, 96-7. 6 Ibid. 7 For the former slaves of the Virginian aristocrat, a measure of justice, a poetic reversal of roles came to fruition on that May day. While for Wild, the striking of Clopton landed the Massachusetts commander in military court and legal trouble for a short while—Wild’s superior, General Edward Hinks, brought charges of insubordination and accused his subordinate of not following the rules of war. Clopton, in a doubled sense of irony, went to Fortress Monroe after his whipping, an early site for escaped slaves, the seizure of contraband, and the earliest start of emancipation. Source 16: Commander of a Black Brigade to the Headquarters, Freedom, 96-8.
Hatton’s description of the encounter between the former slaves and their master illustrates how the rhetoric of loyalty and nationalism shaped the ways in which Mid-Atlantic articulated their wartime identities. Hatton’s evocation of African Americans firmly guarded in Abraham’s bosom by loyal black soldiers evoked language similar to that of white soldiers. Lincoln (Father Abraham) took on the role of a paternal figure at the head of the Union. Further, similar to many white Mid-Atlantic soldiers, black men like Hatton equated service with patriotism and allegiance. Hatton’s report reflects the changing circumstances of the Civil War Era Mid-Atlantic, both actively and passively. The presence of Union soldiers, the gradual adoption of emancipation as a war measure, and the opportunity for black volunteers, provided moments for enslaved or free African Americans to assert their own interpretation of loyalty. Their actions prompted political and social tensions between white Americans before the war, but between 1861 and 1865, the decisions of black men and women intensified oppositional opinions in the region. By breaking the Southern assumption that slaves faithfully supported their masters, black Americans prompted responses throughout the nation. For example, in the case of William Clopton, General Edward Hicks reprimanded Wild for his poor treatment of a white Southerner. While the former slaves received no punishment, it was poietical that black men and women, both those that were free or enslaved at the start of the war, had an impact on how Americans understood the parameters of allegiance during the Civil War.

The juxtaposition of the lash from Harris and Wild’s accounts, not in the hand of a master, but rather in the hand of Clopton’s former slaves evokes an important reversal of roles and a place to examine the intersection of race, slavery, and wartime loyalty. Just as they had before the Civil War, African Americans continued to upset the borders of the wartime Mid-Atlantic. Unionists and Confederates, black as well as white Americans, had mapped loyalty to

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make sense of the war’s physical and cultural contours. However, the actions of African Americans demonstrated that even the finely crafted maps of the U.S. Coast Survey or those articulated through the words of George E. Stephens or John C. Brock had their limitations. While maps of loyalty were a useful tool for individuals to interpret where support for their cause existed and to confirm their beliefs about their foes, the boundaries of the Civil War as well as ideas like allegiance, were far from static. Armies moved and took up new positions constantly, gaining or losing ground in the process. The actions of politicians or military forces forced individuals to reevaluate which side they supported in the war. Loyalty, maps, and borders were fluid in the Mid-Atlantic. African Americans through their enactment of poetical justice—dismantling slavery by fleeing their masters or fighting with the Union Army—compelled all Mid-Atlantic residents to debate the issue of loyalty as well as the ramifications of emancipation on both nations.

**Myth of the Loyal Slave**

To comprehend the forceful impact of the Emancipation Proclamation and the declarations of loyalty put forward by African Americans in the Mid-Atlantic, one must first explore how white Americans, particularly slaveholding Southerners, conceptualized their relationship with their human property. The presence of slavery in the United States was not just a development of economic necessity for Southern planters, but also the careful articulation and manipulation of reality, ideology, and language to justify the peculiar institution. Curtis Jacobs and other slaveholders before the war demonstrated this ideology with their resistance to runaway slaves, abolitionists, and events like the Christiana Resistance. Enslavers in the Mid-Atlantic and throughout the shattered Union relied on a variety of philosophies to justify their ownership of other human beings. In the years before, during, and after the Civil War, masters
constructed a myth of the loyal slave, who faithfully served their white owners, in peace and war. Alan Nolan noted, in the aftermath of the war and in the creation of the Lost Cause, two narratives emerged regarding pre-war slaves: “the faithful servant,” and “the happy darky stereotype.”

Three broad concepts guided the foundations of their beliefs in slavery and the loyal slave: cultural and religious practices that justified slavery, pseudo-sciences that stressed the inferiority of non-Caucasians, and the belief in the paternal, family structure of slavery.

For decades by the start of the Civil War, white Northerners and Southerners had used race as a means of social and cultural subjugation in the United States. Following the Revolution, Americans privileged their whiteness as a means of maintaining their inclusion in European intellectual circles. Kariann Yokota noted that in a new nation, still part of a colonial relationship, where the United States shared intellectual resources with British scientists, the newly independent nation leveraged their whiteness to maintain their place in an trans-Atlantic intellectual network.

Beyond post-Revolutionary networks of intellectual exchange, Americans also tethered depictions of manual labor, often performed by poorer classes of immigrants or African Americans, as less manly and less respectable. In turn, throughout the nineteenth century, conceptions of labor increasingly portrayed African Americans (and African American men in particular) as inferior to whites and incapable of independent, honest work.

Finally, as sectional tensions intensified, Southerners translated the accepted norm of African Americans inferiority into a religious practice, as they argued that God and the Bible ordained the institution of slavery. Using religion, slaveholders argued that a higher power compelled them to watch

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over African Americans. While many African Americans adopted Christianity and established their own churches, Southerners remained critical of African American religious practices. Before, during, and after the Civil War, Southerners advocated that God ordained the institution of slavery. In March and April of 1864, William A. Hall, a preacher from New Orleans argued in Richmond that the Confederacy’s “revolution clearly aims to vindicate the word of God, which approves that institution.” Hall further elaborated that slavery actually sustained the welfare of African American slaves. Thus, slavery represented a responsibility for God-fearing American citizens. Morally backward and uncivilized African Americans needed the strong, guiding hand of a master to make them productive as well as to take care of them.

During the nineteenth century, as philosophers and intellectuals attempted to gain a better understanding of the world, enslavers turned to emerging scientific trends to justify slavery. In the 1830s, George Morton, a Philadelphia naturalist, championed the practice of phrenology. Through the study of skulls, Morton’s *Crania Americana* charted a racial hierarchy of five different civilizations, placing Caucasians at the top and Africans on the bottom. Although Morton’s book sold relatively few copies and the pseudo-science of phrenology did not gain popularity until after his death, Southerners pointed to Morton’s work with glee. They had

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always known that Africans were inferior, but now they had physical and scientific “proof” to justify what they always knew to be “true.” The proliferation of phrenology offered slaveholders another tool to use against Northern anti-slavery advocates—facts proved the necessity of slavery. Southerners used Morton’s work to reinforce their perceptions of slavers as intellectually, socially, and morally inferior to white Americans.¹⁴

Finally, enslavers connected the perceived cultural and physical deficiencies of their human property together in order to argue that they needed to act like parents for their slaves. Historians have long noted and debated the extent that paternalism—the belief amongst Southern slaveholders that they created a reciprocal family relationship in the plantation household— influenced the peculiar institution in the South.¹⁵ Regardless of the historical debates over the extent of paternalism’s influence on Southern whites, many slave owners argued the necessity of slavery. They saw African Americans as morally and intellectually inferior. The only way many white Americans argued to make African Americans useful was through the institution of slavery. Before the Civil War Curtis Jacobs was at a loss when his slaves continually subverted his authority and sought to emancipate themselves from his ownership. He noted in the mid-1850s that slave mothers continually attempted to murder their children, plotted to harm his family, or planned for their escape. In utter befuddlement at their continual resistance, he wrote, “We had always treated them kindly and allowed them every reasonable indulgence.”¹⁶ Except freedom and human decency, Jacobs might have been right, he and his family could have offered

his property kind treatment and indulgences, but he failed to understand the humanity of his slaves. African Americans wanted their own lives, freedoms, and security. Jacobs’ words before and later during the war, speak of someone deluded by the falsehood that slaves owed him their loyalty.

Throughout the war, other slaveholders echoed the shock of discontent when their visions for a vast, slaveholding future received direct challenges from slaves themselves. When the war began, Virginia Ida Powell Dulany faced the challenges of running her family’s 850-acre plantation in Fauquier County while her husband, Henry, served in the Confederate cavalry.\footnote{Ida Powell Dulany, \emph{In the Shadow of the Enemy: The Civil War Journal of Ida Powell Dulany}, edited by Mary L. Mackall, Stevan Meserve, and Anne Mackall Sasscer (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2009), xvii.} Slaves were essential to the management and operation of the Dulany plantation, but with her proximity to Washington and Union forces, as well as the absence of her husband, it was difficult for her to maintain control of her slaves. One slave in particular, Uncle Billy, vexed her deeply. Come December of 1861, Billy, who functioned as a household servant asked Ida Dulany to hire him out to a local farmer as a field hand. “How strange it is,” she remarked in her diary, “that the most indulged servants should almost invariably prove the least faithful. No servant on the place has been so indulged as Uncle Billy and he of all has chosen this time when from his age and intelligence he might be a comfort to me to wish to leave.”\footnote{Ida Powell Dulany, December 9, 1861, \emph{In the Shadow of the Enemy}, 40.} Over the next few months, Dulany continually remarked on Billy’s lack of fidelity to her, including his complaints about his position and her attempt to rent him out to a Confederate Officer. She also scolded him for his son Richard’s fraternization with Union soldiers patrolling the area.\footnote{Ibid. On December 16 and 29, 1861, January 1, March 10, and 16, 1862, Ida Dulany highlights conflicts with her slave Billy.} Such conflict culminated in Billy’s flight from the plantation to Union forces around March 18th Ida reported, “It is no
great loss but I was surprised at his leaving.”20 Her shock, not Billy’s flight, is perhaps the most intriguing element of the entire exchange between slave and master.

Slaveholding Virginians’ convictions that slavery was right blinded them to their property’s autonomy. Upon reading Dulany’s diary, it is clear of the tension that existed between her and Billy between December 1861 and March 1862. It is also seems that her discontented slave did not merely abscond to Union lines on a whim; he and his family planned their escape. Late in 1861, with Union troops patrolling the region, Billy requested to work in the field of a neighboring farm. Prior to this request, Billy worked as a household servant. The transition to fieldwork was a calculated move to increase the likelihood for Billy to interact with Union soldiers in order to seek his freedom or to escape to Union lines. Inside the Dulany household, the matron of the house could shield Billy from the men in blue and exert her control over his life, while out in the field, the slave had fewer physical boundaries between him and the possibility of escape. Such a request challenges the assertion that African American slaves were incapable of thinking for themselves. Further, the fact that Richard, Billy’s son, interacted with Union soldiers implies that the entire family may have attempted to gauge the receptiveness of Union soldiers to assist with their escape. Dulany attempted to thwart Billy’s escape plans by renting him out to a Confederate officer during the winter of 1861-2, placing the slave in the continual presence of watchful Southern men, who could prevent Billy’s escape. However, upon his return to the Dulany household, Billy nevertheless made his bid for freedom and Dulany was shocked at his flight. Dulany provided little indication as to what happened to Billy’s family, but her shock and attempt to thwart her slave’s designs reveal the prevalence of the loyal slave myth. Despite evidence that the family communicated with Union soldiers, Billy sought a position away from Dulany’s control, and their clash over placing him under the supervision of

20 Ibid., March 18, 1862, In the Shadow of the Enemy, 71.
Confederate soldiers, reveal that Dulany was unwilling to admit her slave acted against her interest. Billy had formulated a plan to free himself and succeeded. Not only did Billy want to break free of his shackles, but he had also bested the ‘superior’ Confederate woman, lending credence to the possibility that African Americans were independent and capable human actors in the Mid-Atlantic.

**African American Action**

The possibility that Uncle Billy had enacted his own escape shocked Ida Dulany, but more importantly, his action was one of many throughout the Mid-Atlantic that highlighted how African Americans asserted their own definition of loyalty and identity during the Civil War. Reality demonstrated that long before the whipping of William Clopton, African Americans had challenged the presumption that they were loyal to their masters. In retrospect, this seems obvious to historians, yet the shock of black action during the Civil War is important for how it shaped the discourse on loyalty in the Mid-Atlantic. Although African Americans did not present a unified front in their confrontation of slavery before or during the Civil War, three broad actions provide the falsehood behind the myth of loyal slaves.\(^{21}\) Through the acts of running away, supporting Union troops, or displays of their own patriotism, African Americans continually undermined their dictated place in American society, proving the fiction of their inferiority and subservience to white masters.

Just like the years preceding the Civil War, flight from one’s master proved the most direct challenge to any assumption of black loyalty to white masters. As Union and Confederate

\(^{21}\) It is important to acknowledge that the resistance African Americans enacted against the institution of slavery was not entirely a collective action. As Anthony Kaye, Stephen Hahn, and other scholars of African American resistance have elaborated on, black communities, free or enslaved, were not unified before the Civil War. Rumors, neighborhood networks, and informal connections, allowed African American slaves or free persons of color, to share information, but they did not act as a single unit. Thus, the phrase “black action” might suggest a single action of all African Americans in the Mid-Atlantic. As this chapter unpacks, that is not true, rather it is to suggest that acts by black men and women mattered. Kaye, *Joining Places*, 6-12; Hahn, *A Nation Under Our Feet*, 51-82.
leaders laid out plans and preparations for military operations, slaves looked to the changing realities of the Mid-Atlantic for opportunities to escape. The buildup and movement of military units altered the boundaries of the region, bringing Union troops closer to Southern plantations. As a result, Virginia was one of the key sites for African Americans to seek out their freedom. As both a major field of battle for the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, the state was both center stage for military conflict as well as a location where Union military assets encountered enslaved populations with regularity. Perhaps the most popular example of early emancipation comes from May 1861, when three slaves escaped to Fortress Monroe on the Virginia Peninsula. Benjamin Butler, the fort’s commander, refused to return the escaped slaves to Confederate officers, citing his right to capture property in war.\textsuperscript{22} Butler’s decision laid the foundation for Lincoln’s decision to take African Americans from disloyal Southerners as contraband of war. Many in the North and the South protested such action as unconstitutional (or proof of Yankee barbarity), but the centrality of African Americans to the war would remain.

The cartoon “The (Fort) Monroe Doctrine,” published by an unidentified artist in 1861 appeared in newspapers and on envelopes throughout the Union. On the left hand side, a slave runs from the lash of his master on the right. The master calls out: “Come back you black rascal!” Yet the slave refuses, saying, “Can’t come back nohow massa Dis chile’s contraban.”\textsuperscript{23} That image told an important story.

\textsuperscript{22} McPherson, \textit{Battle Cry of Freedom}, 355-6.
At the heart of “The (Fort) Monroe Doctrine,” are two stories about the agency of slaves and how the Union viewed the self-emancipation of blacks from Virginia. First, the image puts the African American directly in the center of the image. Such a position conveyed the centrality of escaped slaves to Butler’s decision, but also their important role in the contours of the war itself. In short, slavery started the war and despite the demands of Confederate enslavers, as the one pictured above, African Americans ignored the will of their masters. Further, by invoking the Monroe Doctrine in its title, it perhaps spoke to one line of James Monroe’s declaration from 1823. When Monroe articulated his position on foreign affairs, he stated that the United States would not interfere with colonial possessions where they already existed. However, in those places where the people “have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny.”

existed when he took office, the cartoon gestures to that position. By invoking a standard American foreign policy, the political cartoon suggested the Union would not have interfered with slavery where it existed, but now, as slaves have declared their freedom, Union officials would intercede on their behalf.

While the flight to Fort Monroe by the slaves and Benjamin Butler’s response form a seminal moment in the history of the American Civil War, countless smaller moments of escape by African Americans proved equally important as they refuted the enslavers’ myth of loyal slaves. John Quincy Adams wrote after the war that at the start of the conflict he was a slave in Frederick County, Virginia owned by Mr. George F. Calomese.25 When fighting began the Confederate military took Adams off to the front for manual labor, but once he became sick they returned him home where his owner ordered the slave to take care of the plantation. Calomese’s sons had gone off to fight for the Confederacy and thus Adams remained behind to help take care of the Calomese matriarch and the farmland. Despite looking after the “old mistress” and property for some time, Adams and his family abandoned the plantation on June 27, 1862, making first for the Shenandoah Valley, but finding “The Rebels getting too hot in Winchester, we made for the old Keystone State, came to Greencastle,” before moving on to Harrisburg where he settled down.26 Other slaves echoed a similar experience. John A. Washington ordered several of his slaves to Bull Run in 1861. For Edward Parker, he received instructions to go to “Manassas to wait upon Washington and Gen. Lee. But instead of obeying the order, [Parker] came to Alexandria, and engaged in cooking for Union soldiers.”27 Joe and West Ford, two

26 Ibid., 34-6.
slaves of Fauquier County, Virginia hired to work for Washington, escaped around the time of First Bull Run, evacuating to the Union Army on the Virginia Peninsula. Eventually these three slaves, along with nearly sixty African Americans ended up as laborers at Mount Vernon working for Union occupying forces. These examples are but several of a long list of African American men, women, and children who escaped from the clutches of slavery during the Civil War. Some like Adams, Parker, or the Fords abandoned their owners near the beginning of the conflict. Other slaves had to wait for an opportunity to leave behind their owners. One common theme emerges in these experiences, the centrality of the Union Army as a beacon that offered slaves a tangible opportunity to escape their enslavement. George E. Stephens demonstrated that slaves saw the Union Army as a beacon of freedom from the earliest moments of the Civil War. In late 1862, Stephens noted how slaves in Northern Virginia followed the Union Army. When Union troops retreated from the front, slaves followed the men in blue. After the Second Battle of Bull Run, Northern Virginia “was depopulated of its slaves. None remain but the aged, infirm, young, and a few of that class of treacherous,” slaves that worked as house servants. Stephens articulated that large numbers of slaves flocked to Union Mills, Virginia, seeing the Union lines and more specifically Washington, D.C. as a beacon of hope and freedom. Stephens’ discussion of slaves that ran away from their masters to the Union military revealed a common experience throughout Virginia, as well as other portions of the

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29 Source 43: Statements of Virginia Freedmen, Freedom, Volume 1. Additionally, while Edward Parker and the Fords were at Mount Vernon, Jonathan Roberts, the Sheriff of Fairfax County reportedly leased the land to a Mr. George Johnson, who sent away Parker and the Fords in the winter. Their narratives come from testimony leveled against Roberts.
South that witnessed the presence of the Union Army during the war: slaves, when they could, ran to the Union Army as an agent of freedom.\textsuperscript{31}

Mid-Atlantic whites noted the willingness of African American slaves to strike out for freedom, when presented with the opportunity of escape. Similar to George Stephens, Anna Cadwallader reported to her brother John that local African Americans “have been flocking to Yankeedom by hundreds,” as local friends and neighbors lost many of their slaves as they ran off to the Union “to go to freedom.”\textsuperscript{32} Like the black cabinetmaker turned soldier, Cadwallader noted the common experience of African Americans abandoning their masters and seeking out freedom, in turn pledging their loyalty not to their owners, but to the Union and the opportunity to shatter their own oppression. In West Virginia, Martha Watson Dent highlighted a similar experience as a friend of her family vigorously tracked down Mary, an African American woman that he used to own.\textsuperscript{33} Each of these examples highlights the fact that African Americans left their owners in large numbers and as historians, such as Hahn, McCurry, and Glymph (amongst others) have noted, they left under their own free will. The words of the former slaves are hard to recapture due to their lack of education, though some certainly did provide their own accounts.\textsuperscript{34}

Although the war altered the boundaries of the Mid-Atlantic for African Americans, bringing Union troops closer and providing opportunities to escape, not all slaves could run away from their masters and therefore displayed their affinity for the Union in other ways. During the


\textsuperscript{32} Anna Cadwallader to John Cadwallader, March 30, 1863, Cadwallader, John N. Papers, 1860-1892.

\textsuperscript{33} Martha Dent Watson, Diary, January 8, 10, 12, 21, and February 9, 1864, Watson, Martha Dent (1837-1905) Diary, A&M 1798, West Virginia and Regional History Center, Morgantown, West Virginia.

war, Union soldiers reported how free and enslaved African Americans throughout the Mid-Atlantic provided assistance to them. Black families throughout Virginia and Maryland often provided food and shelter to Union soldiers as they marched through the countryside. For example, while foraging around Newport News, Virginia in the summer of 1861, Richard Henry Morris reported that he came across some “darkies” who provided him with a “hoe cake…very readily.” In addition to material comforts, African Americans in the South also provided intelligence to Union forces about Confederate troop movements, positions, or ambushes. C. B. Wilder, in his testimony about Fortress Monroe noted that most of the information that Union forces had received about the Confederate Merrimack came from African American slaves who passed along intelligence to the United States officials. The willingness of these African Americans is worthy of consideration. Although they provided meals and shelter to Union soldiers, it is difficult to determine how coercion factored into the equation. With an absence of their masters or authorities and the presence of armed Unionists, it is possible that many black slaves and free-persons felt compelled to offer material sustenance to the troops in their vicinity. Regardless of their overall willingness to support Union soldiers, the fact that many did provide supplies or offer some form of assistance illuminates how African Americans, as Stephanie McCurry has also highlighted, declared their loyalty without the risk of fleeing from their homes.

While many slaves showed their disapproval of slavery and their masters through flight, other African Americans directly challenged the faithful slave myth through their articulation of loyalty to the Union. Pittsburgh resident Rufus Sibb Jones, the captain of the black militia company the Fort Pitt Cadets, offered the unit to Edwin Stanton along with 200 recruits who

36 For example, see Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning, Chapter 6.
37 Document 12: Testimony by the Superintendent of Contrabands at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, Before the American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission, May 9, 1863, Freedom: A Documentary History Volume 1, 89.
would “be able-bodied and of unquestionable loyalty to the United States of America,” in May of 1862. 38 When Christian A. Fleetwood, a free African American from Baltimore, wrote about the death of a fellow soldier in the 4th USCT, he also invoked the idea of loyalty and added in patriotic imagery. Fleetwood wrote that the other black soldier had died “gallantly doing his duty” to the nation and now “He sleeps for the Flag, and may its stars shed pleasant dreams upon his loyal soul forever.” 39 Similarly, Thomas Morris Chester, an African American reporter for the Philadelphia Press, commented on the allegiance of blacks throughout Virginia. Chester cautioned readers that not all African Americans were loyal to the Union due to the government’s belated adoption of emancipation. Yet, those slaves who opposed the Union “are the exception, while the millions, whose faith has never wavered, are still praying that the old flag may ever be victorious.” Those loyal blacks had demonstrated “abundant instances of unfaltering devotion” to the Union. 40

Jones, Fleetwood, and Chester used the language of nationalism and loyalty to assure white Northerners that African American fidelity to the Union. They phrased loyalty in terms of active participation. Jones and Fleetwood used military service as the benchmark for demonstrating black allegiance to the Union. Chester, on the other hand argued that the flight of slaves to Union lines showed their support for the nation. Finally, the patriotic imagery in each example revealed that African Americans, like whites, connected the rhetoric of loyalty to the nation and its institutions. Jones’s militia company were an established tradition (if a faded on in the 1860s) that linked Americans to the idea of a nation through drills, patriotic orations, and

40 Chester, “The Slaves Not All Union Loving,” February 3, 1865, Thomas Morris Chester, Black Civil War Correspondent, 249-50.
public celebrations. Fleetwood and Chester’s allusions to the American flag evoked direct connections and affinity for the American nation as a bastion of hope, worth fighting and dying for during the war.

The profession of loyalty and patriotic imagery from African Americans offered context to the sheer numbers of slaves that made their way to Union lines throughout the Mid-Atlantic. A census of African Americans in Tidewater Virginia occupied by Union forces shows that roughly 26,110 African Americans lived in the area, but 8,460 were transient residents that came from beyond the region’s boundaries. Additionally, the testimony of the Superintendent of Contrabands at Fortress Monroe, C. B. Wilder in May 1863 noted that the fort was “the rendezvous” for slaves from all around the region—they came “from Richmond and 200 miles off in North Carolina” to escape their masters. While Wilder could not speak to the exact number present in and around the fort, he argued that they had contributed to the war effort. Slaves in this area did not fear their masters; they only hesitated to abandon their owners because they worried about how Unionists would treat them. The testimony of African Americans enslaved or free, as well as that of Unionists and Confederates demonstrated that slaves largely disregarded the interests of or affiliation to their masters. As George Stephens noted the connection of African Americans to the Union was a “relation to the government…of unflinching, unswerving loyalty.” Thus, Stephens reflected the fact that African Americans continually sought out their own freedom. Their abandonment of slave owners was the clearest

44 Ibid.
evidence, in his opinion and the minds of other African Americans, of their affinity for the Union. Scattered across the Mid-Atlantic, African Americans continually demonstrated their faithful support of the Union over their masters.

**African American Criticism of the Union**

However, despite this evidence of substantial support for the Union cause, it is important to illustrate that portions of the Mid-Atlantic African American population resisted committing themselves to the American government. Their reasons were numerous, but centered largely on the hesitancy of the Union to denounce the institution of slavery before or at the onset of the war. George Stephens serves as an important lynchpin between African American loyalty to the Union and their resistance to supporting a government that condoned slavery for years. Ultimately, Stephens would support the Union and its eventual emancipatory war measures. However, at the start of the Civil War, Stephens offered a considerably milder tone in his enthusiasm for war. Rejected for service in the Union Army, Stephens followed Union soldiers into Maryland, reporting for the *Weekly Anglo-African*. While there, as he reported on the actions of Union soldiers and their resistance to any possibility of emancipation, he acknowledged the years of injustice from Washington and the Federal Government. Such a tacit, if indirect, support of the peculiar institution by white soldiers compelled Stephens to ponder where African Americans should place their loyalties, with the Union or Confederacy. In retrospect, the answer appears clear, but in 1861, Stephens’ vision, and that of other blacks, was not. In the fall of 1861, Stephens reported that he would entertain supporting whichever side elected to free slaves. If the South freed their human chattel, “To whom would the four and a half millions, scorned and rejected by the Northern Confederacy, owe allegiance? I shall give my life to him who enfolds

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the scroll of emancipation, no matter who he may be, Northerner or Southerner. Eventually Stephens supported the Union—they had unfurled the banner of freedom. Yet his commentary in October 1861 underscores the fact that African Americans may have disdained the myth of slaves, but that did not mean they were blindly loyal to the Union.

Other black Northerners articulated a similar hesitancy, as they feared that the Union’s unwillingness to embrace emancipation indicated their continued disdain for black men and women. First, when the war began, Union officials rejected the service of African American volunteers, like George Stephens or Rufus Sibb Jones. Second, as Union forces moved into Virginia, many Union officers made it clear that they would not interfere with slavery. For example, Robert Schenck of the 1st Ohio Infantry reported in early July 1861 that Ohio soldiers were “indignant at the imputation that they have been “practicing on the abolition system of protecting runaway negroes.” As long as he commanded the regiment, Schenck would not allow it “to be made a harbor for escaping fugitives.”

Governmental and military policy, despite the pleas of African Americans to fight for the Union or escape from the Confederacy, fell unrecognized by most Unionists in the early part of the war.

48 Stephens, A Voice of Thunder, 14.
50 Over the last decade, historians have engaged in an extensive argument regarding the motivations of Civil War Era participants and the role of slavery. As the United States continues to debate and consider the legacy of the war, the peculiar institution, and the memory of the war’s participants, it makes sense that scholars of this era have turned their focus to central causes of the conflict. Part of the discussion revolves around Chandra Manning’s What this Cruel War Was Over and her assertion that slavery, in divergent ways, motivated Unionists and Confederates. Most historians agree that Confederates fought for the preservation of slavery and their institutions built around that institution. Fewer historians agreed with her notion that Union soldiers became vocal proponents of emancipation early in the Civil War and thereby helped spread such a sentiment to loved ones at home. Gary Gallagher, Jason Phillips, Jonathan White and a handful of other historians have criticized Manning for her overemphasizing the degree to which Unionists, soldiers and civilians, came to put emancipation at the center of their wartime experience. Other scholarship, such as David Blight’s Race and Reunion, Edward J. Blum, Reforging the White Republic: Race, Religion, and American Nationalism, Hannah Rosen, Terror in the Heart of Freedom: Citizenship,
In response, Northern blacks lamented the hostility of the government towards ending the peculiar institution. George Stephens and Henry McNeal Turner reported on the hesitancy of the Union government to help free black families held in chains. Stephens reported to the *Weekly Anglo-African* in late 1861 that the tendency of Union soldiers to return slaves to their owners had sullied the opinions of the enslaved such that “the slaves are almost their enemies.”⁵¹ Turner, similarly lamented the unwillingness of Lincoln and the government to follow its God-ordained call—freeing those in bondage. Lincoln’s unwillingness to free slaves, Irvin McDowell’s decree “that no negro should come within his military lines,” brought on a series of setbacks for the Union forces.⁵² Other African Americans took on a less divinely inspired, but nevertheless oppositional tone. Henry Cropper, a black militia captain, reported that he would refuse to offer his company’s service to the Union Government, unless the black men received equality with their white counterparts.⁵³ Throughout the Mid-Atlantic and the nation, African Americans debated the extent to which they should support the Union’s conflict with the Confederacy.⁵⁴ Ultimately, with the promise of slavery’s destruction, but not guarantee of equality, the most prominent demonstration of African American loyalty came in the form of military service to the

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Union Army. Over 180,000 black men from the North and South, free and enslaved, eventually fought for the Union Army. The enlistment and service of black men in the Union Army, coupled with the flight of slaves from their masters, not only demonstrated that African Americans had made their own interpretations of allegiance, but that they were also uniquely positioned to compel white Americans to respond to their version of loyalty.

**Debates Over Black Loyalty**

One of the ways that white Confederates and Unionists responded to the actions of African Americans in the Mid-Atlantic was to control the narrative of black loyalty. Through two different sets of language, both sides used fiction or the manipulation of black voices to reassert their control over black Americans *and* to demonstrate their loyalty to the appropriate cause. The use of language to control black voices presents clear evidence of how Mid-Atlantic residents discussed loyalty and how they tried to speak for African Americans. For Southerner slaveholders, who had justified slavery as a familial relationship that benefited slaves, their depictions of loyal slaves often came in the guise of family relations. Comparatively, Northerners published historical examples of black loyalty to the American nation or resistance to the institution of slavery. In doing so, white Unionists or Confederates attempted to reassert control over the narrative of loyalty and the place of African Americans in the nation.

In Virginia, Confederates responded to the large number of slaves who fled plantations by publishing or reprinting stories that portrayed African Americans as faithful members of the new Confederate family. Take for example two separate stories published in the *Boys and Girls Stories of the War* from the Richmond-based West & Johnson printing company in 1863. The first story centered on a refugee from the Shenandoah Valley who reported the horrors of war to her grandchildren. Although banished from her home by vicious Union troops, eventually
Stonewall Jackson and Confederate troops retook Winchester, Virginia to the adulation of the town’s residents. Strikingly similar to William Kinzer’s reception in Winchester November 1861, the narrator noted how “all the men shouted for [Jackson], and the good ladies rushed into the street and gave our soldiers all sorts of sweets and good things to eat.”55 In addition to the white residents of the town who rushed to celebrate, there were also “the little negro boys, Tom, Jerry, Pink and Rueb, [who] joined in the cry against the hated Yankees.”56 The familial structure of this story appears on two levels. First, as the narrator of the story, a grandmother, shared the story with her grandchildren, the story reveals the intended message of the fictitious story: white Confederates should take heart in the heroic soldiers of the nation as well as in the support from all walks of Southern life who enthusiastically supported their nation. More importantly, the African American children, as part of the cheering throng of joyful Southerners highlighted that they were part of the Southern family (the community) that enthusiastically supported Jackson and by extension the Confederacy.57 The use of children too is important, as their person suggested that African Americans naturally supported their masters. Only corruptive outside forces—Yankees, abolitionists, and traitors to Southern society—corrupted their loyal slaves.

The second story continued the family rhetoric to reinforce the message of loyal slaves. “The Mountain Guide,” focused specifically on “Uncle Ned,” an African American who lived in the Blue Ridge Mountains. The use of the familiar Uncle, a colloquialism for male slaves,

55 Edward M. Boykin, *Boys and Girls Stories of the War* (Richmond: West & Johnson, 1863), C.I. 3126, Confederate Imprints, Virginia Museum of History and Culture, Richmond, Virginia, 6. Also see: Kinzer, Diary, November 22, 1861, for his discussion of Winchester in late 1861.
immediately would have conjured upon the familial plantation relationship amongst Southern readers. When Stonewall Jackson’s troops passed near Ned’s cabin, the black man (the text never addressed his status as free man or otherwise) inquired as to the loyalty of the soldiers outside his home. Prior to the arrival of the men in grey, Union soldiers had ransacked the black man’s cabin, stealing a good portion of his food. Upon hearing that they were Confederates under Jackson’s command, Uncle Ned exclaimed with glee before “the faithful negro” led the Confederates secretly to the Yankee position.\(^{58}\) Ned even, according to the narrator, acquired a rifle and fought alongside the Southerners in the battle that followed. Union soldiers temporarily captured the black man. Yet shortly thereafter, when Confederates attacked Winchester, Ned managed to escape and take a Union soldier prisoner (as fate would have it, the same soldier who robbed his cabin months before). After dragging the confused Union soldier to Jackson’s tent, Ned reportedly celebrated the Confederate victory in town.\(^{59}\) By positioning Ned as an “Uncle” and someone harmed by Union soldiers, the story highlights trends in Southern paternalism. Southerners, not Yankees, had the best interests of African Americans at heart. They protected them, or in this instance, ensured Ned’s freedom by retaking Winchester. Further, by labeling Uncle Ned as a “faithful negro,” the story explicitly stated his affinity for the Confederacy (again represented by Jackson) and the common plight he suffered at the hands of Northern invaders, just like white Southerners.

Additionally, Uncle Ned’s experiences connect him with the plight of white Southerners and the vengeance many sought to redress at the hand of the Yankee invaders. The fact that Union soldiers plundered Ned’s home, helping themselves to his food and supplies was a common experience for Virginians and Confederate civilians by 1863. The Union’s transition

\(^{58}\) Boykin, Boys and Girls Stories of the War, 12. 
\(^{59}\) Ibid., 10-4.
from a conciliatory military policy that protected Southern property (placing guards on private homes, returning slaves, not taking food from civilians), to a harder war, enabled Union soldiers to live off the land, keep slaves as contrabands of war, and refrain from placing guards on Southern homes. These practices brought the harsh realities of war to the Confederate home front. Thus, Southern readers, in Virginia, Tennessee, or other corners of the South, could feel a shared connection to the plight of the fictional slave. Further, such fictional stories portrayed the Union war effort not as a moral crusade to free slaves, but as a vindictive war to punish Southerners. Ned was therefore not only loyal, but also relatable and an example of Yankee barbarity. Likewise, Ned’s enthusiasm for capturing the perpetrator of stealing his produce conforms to a romantic idea of justice that young Confederate children and even adults could connect with as desirable, given the presence of Union forces who conducted similar activities throughout the South.

Individual Confederates also highlighted the loyalty of their slaves in personal ways, aiming to convince their loved ones that family or local slaves remained ardently supportive of their masters and their new nation. The example of Dick and Tally Simpson from South Carolina, but who served in Virginia, provide one example of how Southerners manipulated the voices of slaves in their personal correspondences. Occasionally throughout the war, both men added notes from their slaves, Zion and Hester, to their letters home. These notes were simple, “Zion says he wants to know how master come on and has a pipe for him made of soap stone.

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taken from the battlefield Thursday.”62 Despite the simplicity of these postscripts, they reveal the familial nature of loyalty in Confederate conversations. Tally’s note conveyed Zion’s affinity for his master, highlighting the fact that far from home, the slave was still a faithful part of the family. Perhaps this was Zion’s true sentiment, but his voice only appears from the stroke of Tally’s pen. This makes it difficult to understand the slave’s true sentiment. Perhaps he did hold affection for his master, hence the carved pipe of soapstone. Alternatively, perhaps, under the careful eye of his master’s son, Zion felt compelled to offer up a statement or gift in support of the white master’s family back home. Regardless, Tally and Dick provided postscripts that spoke for Zion and Hester in an attempt to portray them as loyal slaves to the family and by extension the Confederate nation.

Other Confederates offer a similar discussion of their slave’s commitment to the master. For example, Anna Cadwallader wrote to her brother twice about their slaves. In September of 1861, she noted, “The darkies all enquire about you often especially John Cooper.”63 Much like Zion and the Simpson’s slaves, Cadwallader spoke for the family’s property in an attempt to portray them as curious about and supportive of their master serving in the Confederate Army. However, by March of 1863 that narrative had changed. While John Cadwallader believed the sight of slaves to be “good for sore eyes,” according to his sister, things had begun to change at the family’s Locus Grove plantation.64 While the Cadwallader’s still had “a good many [slaves] left,” Anna also stated, “they have been flocking to Yankeedom by hundreds,” depriving a series of local families, including the Chamberlains, the Rusts, the Bartons, the Magills, and “numbers

63 Anna Cadwallader to John Cadwallader, September 19, 1861.
64 The Cadwalladers seemingly have two residences: one in Newton (now Stephens City), Virginia below Winchester and the other at Locust Grove outside of Richmond.
of others” of their slaves. Although the Cadwalladers still had most of their slaves, Anna provided a key element to the discussion—“the Yankees do not take any but wishes to go.”

Although Anna Cadwallader used a similar formula to Dick and Tally Simpson—portraying their property as deeply interested in their owners’ well-being—there is an underlying tension in the text. As the Union Army drew closer to the family’s property (in terms of physical and human), the perception slaves’ who cared about a Confederate soldier or the Confederate nation seemed to waver as many willingly ran to the Union.

In addition to speaking for their slaves, white Southerners also portrayed black men and women they encountered as subservient to the interests of the Confederacy. J. Kelly Bennette addressed how slaves interacted with Confederates and their owners during the war. As Bennette and the 8th Virginia Cavalry passed through Liberty (now Bedford), Virginia in June of 1864, the Virginian recounted an interaction with an African American woman. Bennette recorded that this woman pleaded with the men in grey that the Yankees took “my beau, dey tucked ‘im off when dey was here,” and that she wanted the Confederates to retrieve her significant others back from his Yankee captors. In response, Bennette sardonically evaluated the scene as something “worthy the contemplation of a Stowe! it would move the heart of a stoic.” Bennette’s evaluation calls on a number of important aspects of loyalty and slavery. First, Bennette asserts the fact that this unidentified slave saw Confederate soldiers as her protector and sought their assistance in returning her lover. It is entirely possible that the woman was desperate to get her husband back from the Union Army, perhaps to help her survive or to shield their family from the throes of war. However, Bennette, much like the publications of loyal slave narratives by Southern presses, portrayed the slave woman as subservient to the Confederacy and antagonistic.

65 Anna Cadwallader to John Cadwallader, March 30, 1863
66 Ibid.
67 Bennette, Diary, June 19, 1864.
to the Union. It was a simple conversation, but one that allowed Bennette to affirm that this particular slave was loyal to her masters and the Confederacy. Second, Bennette’s allusion to Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* challenged Northern criticisms of the institution of slavery. In turn, slavery was not the harsh system Stowe portrayed in Stowe’s novel. Rather it was a benevolent institution African Americans relied upon to shield them from the outside world (Union soldiers in this instance) and they looked to Southern soldiers (representations of their masters) to sustain African Americans.

In their printed narratives and their everyday correspondence, Confederates attempted to manipulate the voice of African Americans so they appeared loyal members of their nation. Southerners spoke for slaves, through the auspicious of paternalism as their caretakers and protectors. There are clear parallels between Uncle Ned, who has his home ransacked by Union troops, and Bennette’s unidentified slave woman: Union troops had taken something from them and in both instances, they turned to the Confederacy to protect or reclaim what was lost to them. Similarly, the fact that Dick and Tally Simpson, Anna Cadwallader, and Ida Powell Dulany spoke for their slaves, expressing love and affection to soldiers in the field, both reinforced the subservience of African Americans to their masters as it robbed them of their voice and it demonstrated the familial structure of the planation household. If Confederates fought in large part to defend their homes and families from Northern invasion, they then translated that same narrative to slaves. By wielding African Americans as faithful members of the Confederate family, despite evidence to the contrary, these Southerners attempted to portray slaves as loyal to their cause.

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Comparatively, free African Americans and their white allies in the North advocated that black Americans had always been loyal to the United States, driving home the fact that slaves and free blacks who aided the Union were not an exception, but rather an established part of American history. For example, Osborne Anderson served as one of the members of John Brown’s Raid on Harpers Ferry in 1859. Two years later, after running from slave catchers and government agents who sought to capture the remaining members of Brown’s party; Anderson published A Voice From Harpers Ferry. He sought to save the facts of Brown’s raid from “oblivion,” but in the process distorted some of the basic details. In particular, Anderson’s narrative stressed the fact that slaves around Harpers Ferry flocked to the Virginia town in order to fight for their freedom. One African American woman had a positive response to the news of Brown’s assault, “This liberating the slaves was the very thing she had longed for, prayed for, and dreamed about, time and again.” Other slaves came into Harpers Ferry to take up arms and aid Brown’s mission of forcible emancipation. Yet, contemporary Virginian and later historical accounts suggest that few African Americans outside of those who travelled with Brown took part in the events of October 18 and 19, 1859. Anderson refuted such claims. He noted that reports from Virginia asserted that the slaves acted cowardly and abandoned Brown, as “they were really more in favor of Virginia masters and slavery, than of their freedom.” As a member of the party that took Harpers Ferry, Anderson was “prepared to make an emphatic denial of the gross imputation against [those slaves].” Why though, in the face of reports and contradictions did Anderson publish a monograph to save the facts of John Brown’s Raid?

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69 Osborne P. Anderson, A Voice from Harpers Ferry: A narrative of events at Harpers Ferry; with incidents prior and subsequent to its capture by Captain Brown and his men (Boston, 1861).
70 Ibid., 35.
In reality, Anderson sought to use *A Voice from Harpers Ferry* not as an entirely accurate record of the 1859 raid, but rather as a tool in the promotion of emancipation and African American loyalty to the Union. Timing is essential to Anderson’s publication. When *A Voice From Harpers Ferry* rolled off the print presses in 1861, the Civil War was in its infancy, but so too was support for the destruction of slavery. From the highest levels of the National Government to most Union soldiers, there was little interest in destroying slavery at the outset of the war. Recent scholarship on emancipation and its origins amongst ordinary Unionists differ on the pervasiveness of anti-slavery sentiment in the North before and during the Civil War and its ultimate traction as a war measure. Unionists remained considerably divided, as many, especially in Maryland and West Virginia wanted to preserve slavery. However, Anderson’s narrative of the Harper’s Ferry Raid fits into this larger debate on emancipation. His account of slaves flocking to Brown undermined the fallacy of slaves who ignored Brown or chose not to fight for their freedom, but also at the same time aimed to encourage white Northerners to accept the fact that black men were willing to fight for their freedom, long before the Civil War began.

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73 While recent interpretations, such as Chandra Manning’s *What This Cruel War Is Over* argued that Union soldiers became the vehicle for spreading the necessity of emancipation from the onset of the war, other scholars have heavily debated such a claim. Gary Gallagher and Jonathan White, to name two, have provided critiques of Manning’s conclusions, arguing respectively that the preservation of the Union and deep bitterness toward the policy of emancipation remained throughout the war for some soldiers. Perhaps Glenn Brasher’s *The Necessity of Emancipation* hits closer to the mark, asserting that the Peninsula Campaign and the continual evidence of slaves aiding the Confederacy helped promote the need for the destruction of slavery, as a military, not an egalitarian social, measure. See Glenn David Brasher, *The Necessity of Emancipation*, 5-7; Gary Gallagher, *The Union War*, 3-6; Chandra Manning, *What This Cruel War Was Over*, 12-4, 50; Jonathan W. White, *Emancipation, the Union Army, and the Reelection of Abraham Lincoln*, 77-9.

Portraying Virginian slaves as loyal to John Brown in 1859 offered a number of possible benefits to abolitionists and Unionists, making Anderson’s account not about truth or preservation of facts and more about undermining the myth of the slave committed to his master. First, it is important to note that for many Unionists, Brown took on the symbolic image of a martyr at the hands of the “slavocracy” before the war. While in 1859 Brown’s action may have been violent and severe, many in the Union came to see him as one of the first men who died fighting the Confederacy. Men in blue marched to the tune of “John Brown’s Body,” and cheered Brown’s legacy throughout the war. Second, Anderson’s account published in 1861 could help prime Union readers to accept the fact that slaves and African Americans writ large would fight against the slave powers in the South. From the very beginning of the war, by the many thousands, slaves used their feet or their heads to begin undermining the institution of slavery. Some fled to Union forces, others passed along information to Union forces. However, the opinion of most Unionists in the North was against the prospect of freeing slaves, rather they wanted to preserve the nation as it had been in 1860. By linking the support of slaves, a reference to Crispus Attucks, and John Brown himself, Anderson’s account sought to gain support for freeing and including slaves in the United States. It is impossible to tell how many individuals read or took this message to heart, but such a narrative worked to undermine the idea of slaves who supported the Confederacy.

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White Mid-Atlantic Residents Respond

One might be tempted to see such attempts at manipulation of black voices as simply an example of paternalism or white racial superiority, however it also highlighted the ramifications of African Americans asserting their own loyalty in the Mid-Atlantic. Whites above and below the Mason-Dixon Line reevaluated their own understanding of loyalty in the wake of black self-emancipation. Regardless of how black Mid-Atlantic residents came to support the Union cause, as most of them eventually did, their actions and the Union’s eventual adoption of emancipation as a war measure provoked a variety of white responses. In the Border States of Maryland and West Virginia, emancipation and the use of black troops, arguably the most direction expression of black loyalty and Union support for emancipation, unsettled the social conditions of both states. For conditional Unionists throughout the region, and especially Democrats in Pennsylvania, the deconstruction of slavery provided them evidence of Lincoln and Republican treason against the nation. Alternatively, ardent Unionists found emancipation a welcome tool to crush the Confederacy, if not as a means for social justice. Finally, Confederates throughout the Mid-Atlantic used emancipation as vindication of their commitment to independence. The conversations that emerged furthered the oppositional language of loyalty during the war.

The transition toward emancipation as a military policy deeply troubled Unionist slaveholders in the Border States, as its application had the possibility of disrupting the social and political fabric of Maryland and West Virginia. In September of 1863 Augustus Bradford, Governor of Maryland indicated part of the problem for his state in a letter to Postmaster General Montgomery Blair. The policy of recruiting free blacks or slaves from loyal Unionists was problematic. Bradford feared that it “sometimes really almost seems that there is a determination somewhere to get up if possible a Civil War in Maryld. just as we are about to subdue it every
Despite the boon of recent victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in the summer of 1863, Marylanders grew anxious over the departure of their black men from their state’s boundaries. The problem came because of the division of labor in Maryland, especially between the roughly 167,000 free and enslaved blacks in the state. In Baltimore and throughout the state, slaves and free laborers (white or black), worked in close proximity. Economically, this allowed exploitative hours, low pay, and inconsistent job prospects to flourish, especially in the port city of Baltimore. The departure of able-bodied males early and throughout the war, to fight in either army, followed by the flight of black men into the Union Army (or away from their masters) created a dangerous scenario in Bradford’s mind. The possibility of slaves from a loyal master abandoning his post for a position in the Union Army, with or without the consent of his owner, could anger moderate, slave owning loyalists. Further, there was the possibility that Confederate sympathizers could benefit from the departure of loyal African Americans.

Hugh Bond, a lawyer from Baltimore, saw the problem as one of conflicting economic and patriotic interests. The departure of free blacks from Maryland, he noted in August 1863, across “the seven comparatively free counties of the State and in the City of Baltimore,” threatened the city with a shortage of laborers for industrious pursuits. This was something that “no loyal man desires.” Bond believed that only Secessionists and Confederates at heart stood to gain from the recruitment of black volunteers. He argued that loyal men in the state, “by far the greater portion” of residents in Baltimore and across the state, should not be required, out of

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78 See Seth Rockman’s evaluation of capitalism in Baltimore, defining the city as a place torn between the North and South, but with a diverse labor pool, that allowed businesses, employers at the docks, and factory workers, to cycle through individuals and pay them low wages. The presence of slavery, where masters would rent out slaves to business, docks, and other institutions, deflated wages in the city. Seth Rockman, Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008).
economic necessity, to hire slaves from disloyal individuals.\textsuperscript{79} Bond proposed the conscription of blacks from across the state—free or enslaved, owned by a Unionist or Confederate.\textsuperscript{80} William T. Chambers, a recruiting agent in the Eastern Shore of Maryland echoed this stance, arguing that the enlistment of only free blacks in the state “bears very hard on a large majority of loyal men,” and inversely helped those opposed to the government.\textsuperscript{81} The intersection of economics and politics provides a quandary for an evaluation of Maryland’s wartime experience with emancipation. While it is hard to parse out if Bond and other Unionists in Maryland complained because they were losing money or because they truly disdained any benefit helping Secessionists in their state, there was a clear disdain for the government’s practice of forcible emancipation. Over time, Lincoln amended the policy of only taking free blacks in Maryland, as the Union began to recruit free and enslaved African Americans in late 1863, with compensation awarded to loyal slaveholders who volunteered their slaves for service.\textsuperscript{82} Additionally, by 1864, enough Unionists in Maryland embraced emancipation to adopt a new state constitution that outlawed the institution of slavery.\textsuperscript{83}

Unionists in West Virginian faced similar challenges to Marylanders, a Union state divided over the war, differing national loyalties, and slavery, but as a whole they faced an

\textsuperscript{79} Source 71: Baltimore Judge to the Secretary of War, Hugh L. Bond to Edwin Stanton, August 15, 1863, Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, Volume II.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{81} Source 72: Eastern Shore Recruiting Agent to the Secretary of War, Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, Volume II, 205-6.

\textsuperscript{82} Curtis W. Jacobs reported that “‘It is said all the [unclear] or loyal slaveholders will get $300 per [unclear] the others will get nothing,’” in October of 1863. Curtis W. Jacobs, MS 3036, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore. See also the 1864-1865 USCT Manumission Records at the Maryland Historical Society. These documents, five in all, highlight how several slave owners received $100 for each slave they enlisted in the Union Army. Eliza L. Townsend of Worcester County enlisted George W. Dennis and Joseph Townsend in the 7th USCT. Ellen Aisquith of Anne Arundel County volunteered Charles H. Morse. Lewis Grace, a slave enlisted in March 1864 and the money was paid to James Benson on April 13, though a James M. Seth contested ownership of Grace in 1865. Finally, Bruce Goldsborough, on behalf of William F. Goldsborough, received $100 for the enlistment of Robert Atkins, a slave of Dorchester County. 1864-1865 USCT Manumission Records, MS 1860, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore.

\textsuperscript{83} John T. Willis and Herbert C. Smith, Maryland Politics and Government: Democratic Dominance (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 37.
additional hurdle in the formation of their own state. Early in the Sectional Crisis, West Virginia leaders, like Waitman T. Willey, championed the cause of restraint and implored Virginians to remain in the Union. On March 4, 1861, he spoke to the Virginia Secession Convention in Richmond and noted that “that a dissolution of the Union will be the commencement of the abolition of slavery, first in Virginia, then in the border states and ultimately throughout the Union.”

Willey believed the protections of the United States offered Southerners their best opportunity of preserving their slave property. When Virginia voted to secede from the Union, Willey along with a large portion of northwestern Virginia balked at dissolution, forming the “Restored Government” of Virginia in Wheeling. Their location and economic situation, with railroads and river ways that connected the Northwest with the Union, made it logical, for men like Willey, that western Virginians should remained part of the nation. Furthermore, their eastern brethren had long ignored the concerns of western Virginia, providing fertile ground for a separation of the region. Many, but not all, West Virginians relished the idea of breaking away from the Old Dominion. Lot Bowen from Sycamore Dale in Hampshire County reported, “Our people are for a New State and free State.”

Henry Dering of Morgantown reported, “Separate from party interests, the people of Western Va have so long clamored for a division of the state and they are so thoroughly committed that they cant retract it.”

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86 Curry, A House Divided, 13-27.
87 Lot Bowen to Waitman T. Willey, July 24, 1862, Ambler, Charles H. (1876-1957). Papers, A&M 122/11/12—Willey Correspondence: 1862/6/15—1862/12/16West Virginia Regional History Collection, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia.
separation, based on past slights, perceived wrongs, and divergent national loyalties primed many West Virginians to embrace statehood.

Yet the Emancipation Proclamation proved problematic for the statehood movement, as its genesis came from Washington, not the spirit of most West Virginians. Historians have documented the dearth of slaves in West Virginia, but the required addition of emancipation caused many pro-Union, pro-new state advocates to balk. John Davis provides perhaps one of the strongest examples. From the start of the war, despite a pro-Southern fiancée, the Clarksburg lawyer and politician refused to support the Confederacy or the right of secession. In May 1861, Davis wrote his fiancée Anna Kennedy a quote he borrowed from the Great Compromiser Henry Clay. “I have a paramount allegiance to the whole Union, a subordinate one to my own state,” Davis wrote. Further, in the same letter, he assured Anna that while Virginia would leave the Union, the western part of the state would “vote against & resist secession to the bitter end.”

Combined with his support for the Union, Davis campaigned and won a position in the first state legislature as a proponent of severing the bonds between the eastern and western parts of the state. Yet, pro-statehood and firmly for the Union, John made clear that he was not a Republican or abolitionist. Even in June of 1861, John affirmed that “I am for the division of the State in a Constitutional way," not as a form of “revolution” carried out by Black Republicans. Furthermore, when in July of 1862 reports surfaced that the bill to admit West Virginia would come forward to the state legislature “provided it was first made a free state,” Davis told Anna “I would have taken strong grounds against it.” For Davis, like Waitman T. Willey, it was and had been possible to be loyal to both the United States and the institution of slavery. The nation had done so for decades without mortal injuries. Davis did not own slaves, but he supported that

89 John Davis to Anna Kennedy, May 2, 1861, John J. Davis Papers.
90 Ibid., June 13, 1861.
91 Ibid., July 17, 1862.
action as a Constitutional right and the potential abridgement of that right gave him pause on the possibility of statehood.

Davis’s hesitancy revealed in letters to Anna as well as in legislative sessions to the external imposition of abolition on West Virginians compelled the lawyer, like other West Virginians, to reconsider statehood. Pro-Union, pro-new state proponents in West Virginia lambasted Davis’s perceived treason. Anonymous letters in 1862 and 1863 warned Davis of potential threats to his life. Further, they noted that his “course is entirely repulsive to all true patriots and sensible men.” Davis had “deserted our just and holy cause by upholding John [Carlisle] in his Nigger Doctrines” and that Davis needed to “stand by the Union in any emergency.”92 Davis’ opposition to a separate state, because of emancipation alarmed others in the state. For proponents of West Virginia statehood, Davis transition to an opponent of their own sovereignty made him a traitor to their cause. Perhaps the clearest sign of opposition to Davis and those who opposed the new state was a roughly drawn political cartoon.

The Hypocrite Who Misrepresented His Constituent

The Secessionist.

You are the man who chuckles when the news
Comes o'er the wires, and tells of sad disaster:
Pirates on sea succeeding—burning ships and crews,
Rebels on land marauding, thicker, nay, and fester,
You are the two-faced villain, though not very bold,
Who would barter your country for might or for gold.

You may rain in alms and speak of abolition, and cry nothing
Of disunion to avenge a black-hearted traitor.
Figure 7 and 8: This cartoon portrays the transition of how pro-state individuals viewed Davis’ transition from a supporter of statehood to an opponent of the movement with the forced, if gradual, emancipation of West Virginia’s slave population. The image paints Davis’s opposition to statehood as a betrayal of West Virginians and an example of his treason against the Union. Cartoon of John Davis, in John J. Davis Papers, WVRHC.

The cartoon painted Davis as a traitor to the Union and West Virginian cause. He had been elected by and to represent “Union men” but instead, he “Represented Traitors.” In addition to the allegation that Davis was a “black hearted TRAITOR,” the cartoon also depicted him making a speech. In front of the crowd, Davis spoke to men depicted as devils and jackasses, representations of the anti-statehood movement. The correlation drawn by the cartoon was clear. Men like Davis, who opposed the new state because of the abolition of slavery, were a host of immoral men.93 Henry Derring, from Morgantown, supported emancipation because it met “with

93 John J. Davis Papers, “Political Cartoon, unlabeled, with handwritten notes.”
the hearty approval of all our loyall men.” Derring and others who embraced statehood without slavery defeated Davis and his anti-state allies. On June 20, 1863, West Virginia became the thirty-fifth state in the Union, providing for a gradual emancipation of the state’s limited slaves. More importantly, the debates over the inclusion or removal of slavery, with Davis as a focus, clearly set a bitter dichotomy: one was either loyal or disloyal. There was no room for a middle ground. In the midst of a civil conflict, there could be no compromise. In West Virginia that meant supporting the Union government and statehood.

As the experience of John Davis indicated, not everyone in West Virginia or Maryland supported emancipation, as Secessionists saw the destruction of slavery as vindication of the danger presented by Lincoln and Republicans, hardening their resolve to support the Confederacy. Curtis Jacobs, the slaveholder from the Eastern Shore of Maryland who failed to understand why his slaves attempted to flee his plantation before the war, struggled to prove his loyalty during the Civil War. This became an important as most of the male slaves left in early 1864 to join the Union Army. As a result, Jacobs sought to gain compensation for his slaves and their enlistment. Yet, his inability to prove his allegiance to the Union hindered him in this endeavor. Unable to get other men to vouch for his loyalty, Union officials offered Jacobs a solution. He merely had to attend a Union Party meeting and support candidates for the new state Constitution and someone would affirm his loyalty. Jacobs refused, noting “that I could not do

95 The Willey Amendment, put forward by Waitman T. Willey, ensured a slow transition for West Virginia into a free state. His amendment stipulated that the children of slaves born after July 4, 1863 would be free, all slaves under ten years of old on that date would be free on their twenty-first birthday, while slaves between ten and twenty-one would receive their freedom when they turned twenty-five. Slaves over twenty-one on July 4, 1863, would be free from that date and no slaves would be permitted to come into the new state for permanent residence as well. See “Willey Amendment,” West Virginia State Archives, http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/willeyamendment.html.
96 Curtis W. Jacobs, Diary, January 4, 1864 & Feb. 17, 1864.
so, that I was opposed to many measures in this Administration among which was the arming of negroes for the war.” Jacobs would not betray his allegiance to the Confederacy in order to receive financial compensation for his slaves’ emancipation. Likewise, Elenor Robinson, also from West Virginia, reported in her conversations with Benjamin Hammond, a Unionist, that the two “only differ in practical and we can never see alike on that respect.” In February of 1862, Hammond had told Elenor that he did not consider them enemies, rather, Northerners were merely “the bitter haters of that...institution that has caused you & us, so much misery.” It seems probable, based on their communication the practical difference between Elenor Robinson and Hammond was the institution of slavery. Indeed, in her undated letter, Robinson noted that with her sons in the Confederate Army, she knew they were “fightin for a good cause. Yes and raither then hear of their surrender I had rather heare that they had fallened so they die in the [front] most ranks in the fearest of the fight.” Robinson’s response to Hammond provided a stark view on how many Secessionists in the Mid-Atlantic Border States felt about emancipation. They loathed it. More precisely, Robinson echoed a sentiment similar to many Confederates in Virginia: that she and all true Confederates would go to whatever lengths to defend themselves from oppressive intrusions by Union officials and military personnel.

97 Jacobs, Diary, February 28, 1864.
98 To Mr. B Hammond from Elenor Robinson, undated, Box 2/Folder 2/3 Items 244-251—Letters, Civil War Period, Undated, Robinson Family. Letters, 1847-1883. A&M 2662, West Virginia and Regional History Center, Morgantown, West Virginia. Both Elenor and only are spellings from the original.
100 To Mr. B Hammond from Elenor Robinson, undated. All misspellings in the original.
101 Other examples of Secessionists in the Border States opposing emancipation include: Civil War Newspaper of Charleston, Virginia. "The Guerilla," Volume 1, Number 2, A&M No.: 4032, West Virginia and Regional History Center, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia; Letter to Martha from unidentified, June 15, 1863, Folder 9/items 83-92—Letters; 1863, Box 1, Robinson Family. Letters, 1847-1883. A&M 2662, West Virginia and Regional History Center, Morgantown, West Virginia; Susanna Warfield, Diaries, June 19, 1863, Folder 3: 1863-1885 Susanna Warfield Diaries, MS 760, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland—in this entry, Susanna Warfield highlights a Secessionist who vehemently speaks out against Abolitionists, wishing that they would all be hung.
Unionists in the Mid-Atlantic however considered emancipation an important war measure and those who ardently supported the restoration of the nation, whatever the cost, embraced Lincoln’s policy. They argued that through dismantling slavery, the Union would rob the Confederacy of black laborers that aided them in farm and military labor. Moreover, it could bring black men into the Union Army to fight against the rebels. Robert Kirkwood wrote to his brother in February of 1863 that he was strongly for putting down the rebellion, however possible. In his own opinion, if that “is to be done by arming all the dogs and cats and put them into the field they may call me an abolishonist or A republican but dont call me A seceshonist or A traitor to my country.” Kirkwood had no love of African Americans. In fact, he hoped “to see the day that not A negroe canot be seen within the bounds of the United States.” Kirkwood favored the restoration of the nation, whatever steps were necessary to achieve that goal. The Maryland Unionist had no love for slaves and free blacks, but he despised Southern Secessionists more as the demands of the war necessitated the Union to muster all available resources to defeat the South. James Peifer, while in a Union Army Hospital reported to his sister, “I heartly approve “Old Abe’s” Emancipation Proclamation, if it does anything towards bringing the war to a speedier close. I think enough blood has been shed on both sides. And I fear, it should never be settled, it will leave a blot of shame and disgrace upon us.” Such a concept extended beyond the Mid-Atlantic. For example, George D. Mathie from Michigan noted that he thought “it the duty of every one that is able to go to do so and crush this cursed rebellion at once and to drive the system of Slavery into oblivion which I think is the only thing which has caused this unholy

102 Brasher, *The Peninsula Campaign & the Necessity of Emancipation*, 4-7, 161-89.
103 Robert Kirkwood to Brother, February, 1863.
104 Ibid.
As a war measure, Unionists came to embrace emancipation as a means of destroying the Confederacy. This did not make them racial egalitarians—Robert Kirkwood’s disdain for black Americans clearly demonstrates that point. Yet, Kirkwood, Peifer, and Mathie, among others, illuminate the fact that a number of Unionists came to see emancipation as an important means to defeat the Confederacy.

Others in Pennsylvania, predominately Democrats, challenged emancipation as vindication of their earlier concerns about the Republican Party and Lincoln. During the 1860 Presidential election, Democrats in the Keystone State and beyond had labeled Lincoln as an agent of radical abolitionists hell-bent of dismantling slavery. Early in the war, they agreed to put aside partisan differences temporarily, in order to suppress the Confederate rebellion, but cautioned Lincoln and Republicans against taking any steps to upend the Constitution or the rights of Southerners. When Lincoln and the Federal Government embraced emancipation as a war measure, Democrats saw this as confirmation of their deepest fears. George Kramer put it succinctly when he discussed the differences between Republicans and Democrats in May of 1863. Writing to his friend Henry Hornbeck, who fought with the Union Army in South Carolina at the time, Kramer asked the other man what type of newspaper he wanted to receive. The question was an important one to Kramer, “because Saying this I mean Democratic because they want the Constitution As it is, and the Union as it was, but the Abolitionist Mean Contrary, the Union dissolved, and the “Nigger’s” Emancipated.”

106 Geo. D. Mathie to Dear Friends at Home, August 11, 1862, Civil War Letters, MSS 10694, Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.
108 Michael Todd Landis, Northern Men with Southern Loyalties: The Democratic Party and the Sectional Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 236-46. Additionally, the next chapter will deal with the political definitions of loyalty as well as the partisan conversations that surrounded such debates more closely.
109 George W. Kramer to Henry Hornbeck, May 7, 1863 in Diary of Civil War Service by Henry Jacob Hornbeck September 1862-June 1864, (Lehigh Valley Heritage Museum, Allentown, PA).
political discord between Democrats and Republicans in the North during the Civil War.

Emancipation served as the cornerstone of Democratic criticism of Republicans and Lincoln in the Mid-Atlantic because they thought it would allow them to sidestep accusations of disloyalty. By touching on ‘transcendent’ values that suggested white Americans were superior to African Americans, Kramer and Democrats aimed to demonstrate their fidelity to the most basic principles of the nation, something they believed Republicans betrayed.

Other Democrats throughout the Mid-Atlantic responded to emancipation by attempting to link their criticisms of Lincoln’s policy to the foundations of American society, thereby establishing their legitimacy and painting Republicans as dangerous demagogues in American society. In the political tract *Loyalty: What is it? To whom or what due?* an unspecified author argued that loyalty in the United States necessitated a devotion to the Constitution, as it represented the rights and values of the people. “*[T]o this and this alone, is loyalty due! As the standard of fealty, ruler and ruled, President and people alike, owe [the Constitution] allegiance.*”

According to the publication, Lincoln and those who supported his unjust war effort had done great harm to nation—its happiness, unity, and prosperity. At the center of the nation’s problems, he put the policy of emancipation. “A more enormous wrong and outrage could not be perpetrated against the poor negro, or the material interests of the North. The act is one of treason against the Constitution, against humanity, and against all that is just and right.”

In turn, the unnamed author called on Democrats to challenge and resist the Lincoln administration’s war, allowing passions to cool and responsible parties in both sections of the nation to reach a compromise. In Wayne County, Pennsylvania, Chauncey F. Black offered a similar understanding of emancipation and loyalty that same year. Speaking on behalf of the fall

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gubernatorial election between Republican incumbent Andrew Curtin and Democratic challenger George Woodward, Black noted that a fateful choice rested before Pennsylvanians. He noted that the election would determine “Whether we shall have Union and Liberty, or whether we shall surrender both.”112 Curtin, like the fanatics in Washington who supported Lincoln’s war, threatened the very government they loved. Indeed, Lincoln’s supporters “were determined that the old Constitution should be violated, and the restoration of the old Union made hopeless by and emancipation proclamation.”113 Black and the author of Loyalty: What is it?, echoed important elements of Democratic criticism toward Lincoln and Republicans. They believed that the adoption of emancipation as a wartime measure constituted disloyalty to the Union and its most sacred principles.

In comparison to Republicans and their unlawful abolition policies, Democrats had acted loyally to the nation’s interests as they tried to preserve the Constitution established out by the Founding Fathers, or at least their vision of the nation as designed by Jefferson, Washington, and others. Moreover, these conversations highlight how the actions of Africans Americans influenced the discussion of loyalty amongst whites in the Mid-Atlantic. Through their own actions, black men and women forced Lincoln and Union officials to respond to the place of African Americans in the nation. As Lincoln embraced emancipation as a war measure, which he did because he grew convinced that it was necessary to end the war and because African Americans had compelled the Union to deal with slavery, Democrats put forward their own vision of allegiance: one that did not include African Americans or slavery as a necessary element of the war. In conversations about loyalty, emancipation fractured any tenuous pace

112 Chauncey F. Black, “Black, Chauncey F., Political Speech to Democrats at Hawley, Pennsylvania, September 21, 1863,” 1, in Smith-Kirby-Webster-Black-Danner Family Papers, 1547-1900, Box 1 of 2, USAHEC, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
113 Ibid., 5.
between political partisans in the Mid-Atlantic, allowing Republicans and Democrats to accuse one another of disloyalty and political malfeasance.

This should not suggest that all Democrats criticized the Lincoln Administration or openly worked against the government.\footnote{114} In John Campbell’s tract, *Unionists versus Traitors*, the self-proclaimed Douglas Democrat demanded that all Pennsylvanians, and by extension all Americans, should pledge themselves to defeating the Confederacy. Any question of inappropriate behavior by Republican leaders was a matter for after the war. If Lincoln or any official should commit an inappropriate act, such as advancing abolition policies, they should be removed from office “so soon as the traitors are beaten; but we cannot afford to haggle now, when the very life of the nation is at stake.”\footnote{115} By prioritizing the destruction of the Confederacy over the repudiation of Lincoln, Campbell put loyalty to the Union above adherence to party. This did not mean that he supported emancipation or all of Lincoln’s policies in 1861, rather that he argued to fight one “battle” at a time. Campbell highlights the complexity of responses in the Mid-Atlantic to emancipation and black action. As a number of historians have debated, Democratic conflict with Republicans was real and heated, but they were, as Campbell and other War-Democrats show, were never open enemies of the United States.\footnote{116} As the next chapter will expand upon, there were deep political divisions over the meaning of loyalty in the Mid-Atlantic,


\footnote{116} Historians from Frank Klement and James McPherson through Jennifer Weber, Robert Sandow, and most recently, Mark Neely, have debated the threat that anti-war Democrats posed to the Union. Some, like McPherson and Weber, have argued that Copperheads proved to be the most dangerous threats to the Union’s success against the southern Confederacy. Klement, Sandow, and Neely, among others, disagree, arguing that Democrats were neither disloyal nor a serious threat. Rather, they had different interpretations of the Constitution and nation that put Democrats at odds with Republicans. I think that the answer falls somewhere in between these approaches to anti-war Democrats.
yet the point here is to illuminate the fact that much like conditional Unionists in Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia, the actions of blacks throughout the region forced Democrats to confront and adjust their understanding of loyalty to the Union. Most Democrats maintained that they were loyal to the nation, while Republicans sought to dismantle the country through abolitionist policies, Campbell and War Democrats were an important subset of Democrats in the Keystone State, but not a majority of their party. As such, most Democrats throughout Pennsylvania, along with conditional Unionists in Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, shared a similar experience. Faced with challenges that threatened their way of life or conflicted deeply with their vision of the nation, they redefined their expression and interpretation of allegiance, which in turn brought them into conflict with staunch Unionists who supported emancipation as a necessary step in the war to reunify the nation.

For Confederates, particularly the residents of Virginia, the most populous and influential member of the Southern Confederacy, the arrival of emancipation as a war measure increased their devotion to independence. As Union forces, increasingly filled with white and black soldiers, threatened the homes of Confederate families, Southerners looked to bolster their resolve against the Union onslaught. Despite the confusion and uncertainty that rocked slaveholders throughout the Mid-Atlantic as their slaves fled to Union lines, most Southerners saw emancipation a desperate act of the Lincoln Administration.117 This is not a new argument. Historians have well documented how Southerners fought with increased devotion for the Confederacy as the war progressed. They cited a desire to protect their families, homes, rights, and freedoms, from an increasingly destruction Union military.118 Yet in the Mid-Atlantic this

117 For example see the Civil War Newspaper of Charleston, Virginia. "The Guerilla," Volume 1, Number 2, A&M No.: 4032, West Virginia and Regional History Center, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia
118 Gallagher, The Confederate War, 62-3; Jason Phillips, Diehard Rebels, 55; Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Fought, 1-10,117, 132-5; 184.
increased support corresponded with the actions of black Americans declaring their own loyalty and the Union embracing those definitions. African Americans played a vital hand in shaping how other residents of the Mid-Atlantic responded to their actions.119

The actions of slaves, escaping and dismantling the faithful slave mythos and the Union’s embrace of black freedom drove Southerners to pledge themselves more deeply to their bid for independence from the nation. The language of emancipation—or oppression in Confederate eyes—appeared frequently in the discussion of Confederate loyalty. In 1862, Virginians called on their compatriots to resist the changes wrought on their people by Lincoln and radical abolitionists in the North. In Enlist! Enlist!, a tract published by Charles LeRoi of the Evangelical Tract Society in Petersburg, placed the Confederate cause in the hands of God. The tract called on all able-bodied Confederate men to enlist and choose sides in the conflict to save the Confederacy. Moreover, the publication noted that Confederates fought for the “establishment of Truth, Justice and Mercy—for the rescues of the gracious King’s subjects from the tyranny of a cruel oppressor.”120 LeRoi’s references to oppressors, frequent throughout Enlist! Enlist!, also cautioned Confederates that refusal to serve would “resign yourself to everlasting chains and slavery.”121 The connection between oppressors and the prospect of chains and slavery clearly highlighted Southern fears of economic and social retardation at the

119 If we return to considering traditional scholarship on Civil War loyalty, emancipation appears as a policy enacted by Lincoln and Republicans. This in turn angered Democrats who increased their criticisms of the Lincoln Administration as well as Confederates who grew increasingly determined to secure their independence. The key here is that the animosity and contention emerged from white action (Lincoln and the Union adopting emancipation) by other white actors (Democrats and Confederates). I am suggesting instead that the actions of African Americans prompted Unionists and Confederates to respond to their definition of loyalty. In turn, Lincoln embraced emancipation as a war measure, which then led to increased Democratic discontent and firmer commitments by Southerners for their own independence.
121 Ibid., 5.
hands of the North.\(^\text{122}\) In other words, if defeated, the Confederacy could expect to take the place of their slaves. Further, the tone of *Enlist! Enlist!*, while not one of desperation in 1862, forcefully called attention to the need for Confederate citizens to fight for their new nation. The use of the term oppressor and the threat of enslavement served an important point here. Published in 1862, a year into the war, LeRoi’s words speak to common fears in Southern culture regarding the reversal of roles between white freedmen and enslaved African Americans. Despite the myth of the loyal slave, uneasiness had always pervaded Southern life in regards to their chattel.\(^\text{123}\) As slaves provided evidence of their resistance to enslavement during the Civil War, the specter of free slaves lauding over their former masters combined with images of Northern abolitionists marching in the Union Army, provoked responses similar to LeRoi’s publication. Confederate/Southern fear over the upending of their social system compelled them to demand service and enlistment from all able-bodied white men—a sharp response to the fear of disloyal slaves and abolition-inducing Union soldiers.

From the office of Virginian Governor Letcher in late 1863, the fears of emancipation and the tension in the Confederacy appear more evident. In a communication to the state legislature regarding the administration of loyalty oaths to Union deserters and prisoners, Letcher lamented the dangers of such a policy. The process, he argued, was a decentralized mess. Letcher could not identify who or where these former Union soldiers had received their oaths. The problem for Letcher was the corruption of the Lincoln Administration. Led by a “despot,” who sought “the blood of the men, women and children of the South,” Letcher feared that this was all part of some grand, Union plan to destabilize Virginia. With the Emancipation Proclamation already in effect, Lincoln could have “no better plan,” than to have Unionists turned “loose in the


community where they can mingle with our negro population, and they can advise them of the wishes of Lincoln and his adherents, and will be able to persuade them of the policy he wishes adopted for their benefit. The result must necessarily be discontent and dissatisfaction amongst our slaves.”

Again, the central point here is that actions, by Union officials and African American slaves, prompted Confederates to respond with an increasingly determined mindset in relation to the war. Similar to the language found in Enlist! Enlist! Letcher played on the trope of slave insurrection and corruptive outside influences. Without external pressures, in this instance Lincoln, the Union Army, and paroled Northern soldiers, he implicitly argued slaves were loyal to their masters and the Confederacy by extension. By resisting or refusing to free Union deserters and prisoners into their communities, Letcher looked to keep the nation safe, while also advocating a more aggressive type of war against the Union.

Similarly, the presence of black soldiers on the battlefield, a direct result of emancipation, also motivated Confederates to dedicate themselves to the cause of independence. In April of 1864, in the days before Ulysses S. Grant initiated the Overland Campaign in Virginia, John Quincy Adams Nadenbousch noted the decisiveness of the upcoming military operations—he knew the coming campaign would decide the fate of the Confederacy. He wrote confidently “Our troops are in the best condition and much more determined than ever known. The negro

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125 In his work, Flush Times and Fever Dreams, Joshua D. Rothman highlighted how slaveholders along the Mississippi, when the rumors of slave insurrection spread through the region, many whites came to believe that abolitionists were behind the plotted uprising. Rothman, Flush Time and Fever Dreams, 281-7. Consider also Curtis W. Jacobs’ suspicions that abolitionists aided and influenced his slaves in their attempted flight from his plantation in 1856. Jacobs believed that some local individuals and “several regular abolitionists who have been traveling amongst us” had convinced his slaves to attempt their escape. Lastly, Edmund Ruffin, and others in Virginia viewed John Brown’s Raid in 1859 as a “a “long-concocted and wide-spread Northern conspiracy, for the destruction by armed violence and bloodshed of all that is valuable for the welfare, safety, and even existence of Virginia.” Edmund Ruffin, “Resolutions of the Central Southern Rights Association,” November 25, 1859, and Anticipations of the Future, June 1860 in The Tribunal: Responses to John Brown and the Harpers Ferry Road, edited by John Stauffer and Zoe Trodd (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2012), 263.
Like Letcher and LeRoi, who advocated enlistment in the Confederate military or a suspension of paroling Union soldiers because of emancipation, Nadenbousch directly stated that the ramifications of the North’s policy motivated Confederate soldiers to continue fighting for their nation. Confederate print culture also followed this sentiment and attempted to spin the attempts to destroy slavery as a motivation for unwavering resistance to the Union.

To do so, Confederates published accounts of loyal slaves to challenge the success of emancipation but also as a call to arms for white Southerners. The Southern Women of the Second American Revolution, Their Trials, &c. Yankee Barbarity Illustrated, Our Naval Victories and Exploits of Confederate War Steamers. Capture of Yankee Gunboats, &c., related news and information from around the Confederacy. Published by Henry W. R. Jackson in Atlanta, Georgia, the piece was far from a singular narrative, rather a combination of reports, newspaper articles, and stories from across the war-torn South. Published in 1863 the final few stories focused on the experiences of faithful slaves. In New Orleans, a drummer named Jordan, a veteran from the War of 1812, declared his allegiance to the Confederacy while “Ten thousand of those citizens of New Orleans” opted to sign the oath of allegiance “for the purpose of saving their property.” Jackson noted that Jordan’s example should make residents of that city “blush from shame.” Two clear examples from Virginia also drew attention to the loyalty of slaves, while berating white Southerners for their lack of commitment to the war. An article titled “Negro Patriotism” discussed four of Benjamin Marrable’s slaves from Halifax County,

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Virginia, who after laboring on defensive works outside of Richmond returned home briefly. When offered “warm clothing, excellent shoes and socks made for them, they generously declined them, on condition that their master would send them to the suffering soldiers who, they said, needed them much more than they did.”129 The Milton Chronicle, that provided the story to Jackson, asked if some members of the Confederacy with white skin would do the same. The rhetorical question calls into question the meaning of the Southern nation and war. As the conflict progressed, dissent appeared in a number of forms throughout the South—white Unionists who opposed the war or reluctant Confederates who grew weary of the conflict. This question intended to prompt white Confederates into loyal action supporting the Confederacy and to put aside their political dissent. Similarly, a freed African American, Robert Butt, from Portsmouth, Virginia, according to the pamphlet, turned down an opportunity to run for the 37th Congress of the United States. Butt stated that he would “leave this position to some one who is more anxious to act the traitor” and that Butt preferred the “true motto of his mother state—“Down with the tyrant.”130 If black men were loyal to their master’s nation, than white Southerners had no excuse for not providing wholehearted support of the Confederacy.

Similar to some of the print culture discussed earlier, these stories attempted to portray slaves of the Confederacy as loyal members of the nation. More importantly, each of these stories instructed white Southerners how to act in the war. The articles used shame as a point of comparison and motivation. It argued that black men, who had refused the oath of allegiance to the Union, a position in the enemy government, or comforts offered to them, had been true examples of fidelity to the Confederacy. These individuals, portrayed as loyal to allay fears of unfaithful slaves, had sacrificed their own personal comfort to support the Southern nation in its

130 Ibid., 107-8.
time of need. These stories not only demonstrated the support of slaves for the Confederacy, but it instructed all Confederates on their responsibilities and duties to the nation in its time of need.

**Conclusion**

Throughout the Mid-Atlantic, the actions of African Americans, enslaved or free, prompted Unionists and Confederates to reevaluate their understanding of loyalty. Just like before the Civil War, the actions of black Americans directly shaped the contours of events in the Mid-Atlantic. The Underground Railroad had allowed dissatisfied slaves to aggravate tensions along “Freedom’s Fault Line,” by crossing into Pennsylvania and seeking freedom. During the Civil War, that fault line grew its own legs as it stalked the Union Army through Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. Numerous whites opposed emancipation in the Confederacy as well as those occupants of the Free States, yet the support enslaved and free blacks offered to the Union war effort, required residents of all colors in the Mid-Atlantic to reinterpret how they understood the war. Maps had allowed Americans to reinforce their ideological and cultural differences during the Civil War. Emancipation, another outgrowth of the bitter conflict, likewise prompted Mid-Atlantic residents to reorder their interpretation of loyalty.

In conjunction with the actions of black Americans that prompted change, the decisions made by white men and women, in particular the Union’s adoption of emancipation, challenged black Americans to adjust their loyalties. For decades, African Americans, even free blacks in the North, had pondered just how they should support the United States government, a nation that had condoned the enslavement of millions of black men, women, and children. While some prominent black figures, like Frederick Douglass, championed the opportunity of the Civil War

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as a liberating moment from the beginning of the war, many other African Americans remained reluctant to trust a government that condoned slavery. Emancipation, regardless of the political turmoil that rippled out from Lincoln’s adoption of it as a central Union war measure, encouraged black Americans, either held in bondage or free, to pledge their loyalty to the United States.

In short, the actions of black as well as white residents of the Mid-Atlantic in a period of emancipation sharpened the divides of the region. Nationally, both Unionists and Confederates provided clearer distinctions over their visions for the future because of emancipation and the war. Of course, these changes not only pulled the Union and Confederacy further apart, but it also produced internal divisions within each state. In the North, political rifts grew between Democrats and Republicans grew prominent, while in Maryland and West Virginia, loyal slaveholders reeled from the dramatic changes wrought by such a policy. Supporters of the Confederacy likewise faced internal conflict, but most intensified their efforts to secure their independence and remove their nation from the corrupting influence of dangerous Yankees. The erosion of the loyal slave myth, though tediously rebuilt by white Southerners after the war, enflamed tensions within the Confederacy while it also directed a stronger sense of Confederate resistance to Union intrusion.

Mid-Atlantic residents carried these intensified divisions, their now impassioned loyalties, into the final years of the Civil War. Increased political rhetoric coupled with ideological confrontations over the dismantling of slavery directly shaped how the war finished. Political campaigns in the North during 1863 and 1864 revolved increasingly around the issue of emancipation as well as the un-Americanness of Republicans who embraced emancipation and threw aside the Constitution. Republicans on the other hand, saw Democrats as increasingly
dangerous political enemies who practiced disloyalty to the Union via their opposition to the war effort. In the Confederacy, the policy of forced emancipation as well as the betrayal of their slaves, prompted many to increase their devotion to independence. Thus the actions of white and black Americans during the war, as they fundamentally redefined life in the war-torn Mid-Atlantic, directly influenced what came next.

It was poetic, perhaps, that black men and women, discounted by most whites as non-members of the American or Confederate nation in 1861, asserted their own, influential interpretations of loyalty during the war. Their vision of loyalty and attachment to the Union, compelled all those in the region to re-interpret how they understood their own visions of allegiance and their attachments to either nation. For a people so long acted upon or otherwise manipulated by enslavers, government agents, or whites regardless of class, the destruction of the faithful slave myth proved a significant moment in the Mid-Atlantic, as everyone had to confront and reevaluate their understanding of loyalty because of how African Americans defined their allegiance to the Union.
“By the by,” John Davis wrote to his fiancée Anna Kennedy in the summer of 1862, “The bitter feeling existing in society here growing out of politics, makes it extremely difficult to tell who are ones friends & who are not.”¹ Davis penned his confusion as western Virginians debated the formation of their own state and the resulting political complications. Davis and many other West Virginians had fervently supported the Union and statehood when their pro-secession neighbors carried out the dissolution of the nation in 1861. Yet, by the middle of 1862, Davis and other politicians in western Virginia, like John S. Carlile, tempered their enthusiasm for statehood with the added provision of gradual emancipation.² Davis deplored what he saw as the “degrading terms” that abolished slavery and imposed the will of the Federal Government on his native soil against the wishes of many West Virginians.³ Despite his disdain for emancipation, Davis considered himself a loyal supporter of the Union, just not its current policies. New State proponents saw Davis as a traitor. His dissent toward West Virginia’s creation and Union wartime policy made Davis unfaithful to the nation in their eyes, alienating him from friends and loved ones in Wheeling and Clarksburg.

Similarly, Anna Kennedy faced her own political troubles as a pro-Southern resident of Baltimore early in the Civil War. As highly publicized arrests swept through Maryland,

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¹ John Davis to Anna Kennedy, July 22, 1862, Davis, John J. Papers, A&M 1366, WVRHC.
² Charles Ambler, A History of West Virginia (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1933), 312-29; Otis K. Rice, West Virginia: A History (Louisville: The University of Kentucky Press, 1985), 146-8. Ambler, Otis, and other scholars of West Virginia debate why exactly Carlile transitioned from a fervent proponent of the immediate creation of West Virginia in May 1861 to an opponent of the state in 1862. The scholarly consensus suggests that Carlile anticipated the creation of a slave state and he demurred when Congress stipulated, through the Willey Amendment, the gradual removal of slave from the eventual Mountain State. See also Carlile’s speech “Speech on the Bill to Confiscate the Property and Free the Slaves of the Rebels,” Southern Unionists Pamphlets and the Civil War edited by Jon L. Wakelyn, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), 82-104.
³ John Davis to Anna Kennedy, May 17, 1861 and December 10, 1862; John Davis, Diary, March 9, 1863, Diary, 1863, Box 6, Davis, John J. Papers, A&M 1366, WVRHC.
including that of John Merryman and Baltimore city police chief Robert Kane, the pro-Southern
Kennedy felt encircled by abolition usurpers and Republican opponents to the Constitution.\(^4\)

Constrained by traditional gender roles, she did nothing but lament the state of the country and
city. Kennedy wrote to Davis, “If I were a man I expect I would be sharing the quarters of
Merryman and Kane,” as she possessed the same sentiments as the two prominent Marylanders.
Despite her professed “conservatism” and a desire for a peaceful separation of the nation,
Kennedy found the arrests of local citizens and other injustices heaped upon Marylanders too
much to bear. Kennedy wished “it made some difference what women think and say I never feel
insignificant so much as now that it relieves me from danger to which men are exposed. Next
time you hear of me you may expect that I will have adopted the Bloomer dress and commenced
making stump speeches.”\(^5\) Kennedy clearly understood her place in the Civil War Mid-Atlantic
body politic or perhaps her lack thereof. Constrained by gendered divisions of public and private
spheres, Anna Kennedy desperately wished to be part of the conversation on the break-up and
dissolution of the Union. Like John Davis, her soon-to-be fiancé and later husband, Kennedy
disagreed with many of her neighbors and local acquaintances.\(^6\) It is unclear if her political
opponents targeted or directly addressed her as disloyal, like Davis’ New State rivals did.
However, it was probably difficult for her to find friends in the midst of war, just as it was
difficult for her to engage a wider audience politically.

The wartime experiences of John Davis and Anna Kennedy offer a window into how
individuals of the Civil War Mid-Atlantic conceptualized the political dimensions of loyalty as

\(^4\) Anna Kennedy to John J. Davis, June 27, 1861.
\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Politically Baltimore was a divided city during the Civil War, between Unionists and Pro-Secessionists. See for example: George William Brown, \textit{Baltimore and the Nineteenth of April, 1861: A Study of the War} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Frank Towers, \textit{The Urban South and the Coming of the Civil War} (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004); Jonathan W. White, \textit{Abraham Lincoln and Treason in the Civil War: The Trials of John Merryman} (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011).
an oppositional dichotomy between 1861 and 1865. Many political leaders and regional citizens advocated for a singular version of loyalty—faithful support of their nation required absolute, unquestioning devotion. Yet, as the preceding chapters have demonstrated, Unionists and Confederates did not agree upon one monolithic interpretation of loyalty. The movement of slaves, soldiers, and civilians across the porous borders of the Mid-Atlantic prompted frequent discussion on who was loyal to one cause, what that loyalty meant, and where allegiance could be located in the populace. Davis and Kennedy present different avenues of dissent that appeared in the region. Davis, a male and a political figure, openly criticized what he saw as unfaithful governments, first in the Virginian turned Confederate government that produced secession and then in the Federal Government that violated property rights with its demand for compulsory emancipation. As a result, Davis received censure from unidentified individuals and backlash from other politicians in the Mountain State. Kennedy on the other hand addressed the crackdown in Baltimore aimed at potential secessionists or opponents of the Union war effort. Her words bristled with resentment at her isolation from political forums as well as the extent to which governments would go to punish those they deemed disloyal. In short, the dissents of Davis and Kennedy, like that of others in the region, came when their expectation of the government failed to match the reality of wartime definitions of loyalty.

Perhaps the problem from Davis, Kennedy, and other Mid-Atlantic residents in general came from the flexibility of loyalty before the Civil War. While Americans had faced a range of challenges in the decades before—contests over slavery, nullification, states’ rights, economic issues, and a changing society—they rarely found the need for a firm definition of allegiance to their nation. The most obvious example from American history was the Revolutionary War, where Americans divided by commitments to their former country and the prospects of a new
nation fought their first civil conflict. Other conflicts in 1812 and against Mexico from 1846 to 1848 had produced tensions and conversations over loyalty, but never with the stakes of an internal war. During the Civil War, definitions of loyalty, absolute, relatively inflexible standards for faithful support of the Union or Confederacy carried weight. Mid-Atlantic residents inserted a singular version of loyalty into their wartime political culture. They relied on an established system that used symbols (such as flags), public orations, and the American past to convey political messages. During the war, they used that system to sanctify their definitions of allegiance and argue for why citizens should support their cause. However, when citizens produced conflicting interpretations of allegiance within the Union or Confederacy, dissent and internal conflict arose that jeopardized both the Union and Confederate war efforts. In the Mid-Atlantic, residents made the Civil War about choosing sides, incorporating that choice into symbols and ceremonies, into rhetoric and religion, so that it became increasingly difficult to

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pick a middle ground between either nation. If war was politics by other means, then in a region with porous borders, marching soldiers, and two nations vying for survival, every action became a political comment on loyalty that left no room for disagreement.

Although dissent was a constant part of the Civil War, it is worth noting, that individuals like John Davis, labeled by New State proponents in West Virginia as disloyal, saw themselves as individuals loyal to the Constitution and the nation itself. Therefore, any conversation of dissent and politics in the wartime Mid-Atlantic must explain not which groups were loyal or disloyal. Rather, any political discussion of allegiance should center on how individuals did two things. First, it should explore how men and women sought to justify appropriate, loyal behavior during the war. Using secular and religious dialogue as well as gendered definitions of action, Mid-Atlantic residents attempted to conceptualize the appropriate meaning of loyalty. Second, an examination of politicized loyalty should address how dissent (and the response to dissent) changed over time in the Mid-Atlantic. As political divisions grew more intense and internal discontent rose within the Union and Confederacy, divergent interpretations of loyalty came to the surface along with increasingly coercive measures to force loyalty upon friends and political foes alike.

Sanctification

From the earliest moments of the Civil War through its conclusion, Mid-Atlantic residents sought to prove the righteousness of their cause. Regardless of the nation they supported, men and women throughout the region pushed to legitimize their nation and subsequently their vision of loyalty. In such a region as the Mid-Atlantic, their reasons for doing so were legion. Both nations existed in close proximity to one another, with fluid borders that remained unclear throughout the war. Further, sizeable portions of the populations in the Union
(anti-war Copperheads and Border State Secessionists) and Confederacy (Unionists and African Americans) opposed one or both of the nations during the war. Thus individuals attempted to prove that their cause was worthy of support and the legitimate form of government in the region.

One of the first ways that Unionists and Confederates in the Mid-Atlantic attempted to sanctify their cause was with the exhortation of a vibrant civil culture. Civic ceremonies had long served an important part of public life in American history. Dating back to the Revolutionary Era, a host of displays—from speeches and sermons, print culture and parades, picnics and celebrations—all offered Americans the opportunity to connect ideas and beliefs with the nation itself. Building out from this rich heritage, Mid-Atlantic residents labored through their language to demonstrate that their nation stood as the heirs of the American past. Chief among these ideas was that of the Revolution. By invoking the Revolutionary generation, one of the most revered elements of national culture, both Unionists and Confederates argued that they were the appropriate stewards of the nation’s legacy and thereby worthy of a citizen’s loyalty.

Confederates had the easiest time connecting their bid for independence to the act of rebellion that underscored the actions of Americans during the Revolutionary Era. Of course, they did not champion any act of civil uprising—the long fear of slave insurrection prevented Southerners from openly supporting all violent attempts to secure freedom. Rather,

10 Waldstreicher, In The Midst of Perpetual Fetes, 3-16.
12 A number of historians have highlighted the fears and tensions of potential slave insurrection. Two recent works that capture that fear in the Southern slaveholding states are: Joshua D. Rothman, Flush Times & Fever Dreams: A Story of Capitalism and Slavery in the Age of Jackson (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2012); Ashli
Confederates in the Mid-Atlantic made sure to call on the fact that Revolutionary Americans had fought nobly for their rights, unlike African American insurgents who rebelled against their proper masters and the accepted social hierarchy. The memoir of David Fanning is illustrative of such attempts to highlight connections between the Revolutionary generation and the Americanness of rebellion. Fanning was a veteran of the Revolution, long dead by 1861, when the Confederate government published his recollections.\textsuperscript{13} A Loyalist to King George in North Carolina during the Revolution, the introduction to Fanning’s account cited his infamy during the conflict.\textsuperscript{14} The new account went on to add that “records of heroism and instances of suffering on the part of those who in the Southern States offered up their all as a sacrifice to secure the independence of the American colonies.”\textsuperscript{15} In a melancholy turn of events, now the North lifted the same sword of oppression wielded by the British, “And alas! their mad efforts to subdue those who now stand in the attitude of rebels towards them has brought about the re-enacting of scenes such as those disclosed by our veracious chronicler.”\textsuperscript{16} The Confederates, now in the midst of a second American Revolution, found a great deal of similarity with the individual Southerners oppressed by Fanning and the British. The American Rebels, pursued and attacked by Loyalists, persecuted for the defense of their rights, would have resonated with a Southern audience in late 1861. Using the villain, someone who began the war as a patriot, but ultimately pledged his loyalty to the British government, Confederates argued that any American citizen could become misguided and support an oppressive government. Further, by championing the

\textsuperscript{13} White, Encountering Revolution: Haiti and the Making of the Early Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).
\textsuperscript{14} The Narrative of Colonel David Fanning (A Tory in the Revolutionary War with Great Britain) Giving an Account of His Adventures in North Carolina From 1775 to 1783, As Written by Himself, with an Introduction and Explanatory Notes, (Richmond, 1861), ix.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., v.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., ix.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., x.
plight of the Rebels as the active part of the Revolution, the account praised the acts of ordinary individuals who resisted a ‘loyal’ government.

Other Secessionists called on the memory of the Revolution, especially a recollection that highlighted the rebelling Americans, to conjure support for the Confederacy during the war. From Fairfield, Virginia, one young Virginian at Washington College wrote to his aunt, calling on the memory of the Revolution to inspire Confederate success. Nearly a century after patriots shed blood in Lexington Massachusetts, Virginians from Lexington, Virginia assembled to defend their state, “not from a foreign foe but the descendants of those whose sides our forefathers fought at Bunker Hill, Saratoga, Yorktown & other places of historic renown, now no longer our brothers but our avowed & open enemies.”

In 1863 reverend J. H. Thornwell, from South Carolina argued while the Northern States destroyed the Constitution by their creation of a despotic government that arrested dissidents and erased the rights of its citizens. His sermon, distributed throughout Virginia by the Evangelical Tract Society, argued that Confederates were not acting contrary to the Founders. Rather they fought to uphold the “great principles which our fathers bequeathed us, and if we should succeed, and become, as we shall, the dominant nation of this continent, we shall perpetuate and diffuse the very liberty for which Washington bled, and which the heroes of the revolution achieved.”

Not to be out done, in Maryland, Secession pamphlets called on the sons of Maryland, the “inheritors of her Revolutionary glory,” to take up arms and join the Southern Army. The act of taking up arms, like the Americans of 1776 echoed specifically through these assessments. From Fanning’s account through secession

17 Neph Frank, to Eliza A. Wilson, from Fairfield Virginia, Washington College. Apr 26, 1861. Correspondence of the Houston and Wilson Families 1831-1926, MS 38-490. Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.
19 “Exhibit 1: Circular from Heard,” John Wilson Heard (Military Trial and Notes) 1863, MS 2132, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland.
pamphlets in Maryland, the key actor in the memory of the Revolution are the rebels themselves—nameless, faceless, images of patriotic individuals who fought to preserve their freedom from the hands of an unjust government. The idea of a vast, nameless, but American, group of rebels provided Secessionists with a viable framework for their rebellion. By painting broadly about the connections between the soldiers of the Revolution and the men clad in Confederate grey, they could transplant the loyalty of those individuals onto the new Confederate nation and their rebellion.

Other Confederates called on the names of influential Virginians and Revolutionary leaders to demonstrate the link between the Confederacy and the Revolution. For example, Dick Simpson spoke directly to Thomas Jefferson’s (assumed) evaluation of the Southern Rebellion. While visiting Monticello, in Charlottesville, Virginia Simpson took a reprieve near Jefferson’s tomb to ponder what the “signer of the Declaration of Independence” would say about the war ravaging his nation. Dick Simpson had a ready answer: Jefferson would tell the Confederacy, “Go on brave men, we have severed the bonds of oppression once, now for the second time throw off the yoke and be freemen still.”20 Other Confederates would call on the memory of George Washington and the “Sacred Soil” of Virginia, the birthplace of the nation, to justify their revolution.21 Confederates looked to the Revolutionary Era for justification of their actions in rebellion. Dick Simpson’s account is perhaps the most revealing indication of the justification that Confederates sought. The young soldier from Fairfield, Virginia and the sermon by Thornwell reveal how the language of the Revolution entered into their observations on the war and the righteousness of their cause. However, Simpson reveals the necessity for this assurance.

His imagined conversation with Jefferson belies an uncertainty, even for a South Carolinian fighting in Virginia, over the act of rebellion. By having the specter of Jefferson assure him that Southerners had taken the proper course, Simpson, like other Confederates, could rest easy that they had walked along a path similar to their Revolutionary ancestors in becoming rebels against oppression.

Where Confederates claimed the right of revolution handed down by the Founders, Unionists focused on the sacrifices made by the Founding Generation as the mortar that held the nation and the liberties of its people together. The key ingredient of the Revolution that made the United States was the blood of soldiers and leaders that secured America’s independence from British tyranny. Sacrifice had united the disparate colonies into a nation and Unionists needed to commit themselves to offering up their lives wholly to the Union, or witness the invalidation of their fathers’ sacrifice. From Charleston, West Virginia, the Knapsack, a pro-Union paper, called on the memory of the Revolution to justify “a vigorous prosecution of the war.” While the paper offered mild respect to rebel soldiers, as they were open about their hostility, it also targeted anti-war Democrats. The Copperheads, they argued, sought “to destroy that precious inheritance which the fathers of the revolution have secured to us by a seven years war and a free offering of their blood.”22 Both Confederates who openly attempted to break the government and Democrats who offered half-hearted support to the Lincoln Administration, were disloyal and threats to the future of the nation. By focusing on the nation created by the Founding Fathers, loyal Unionists aimed to show that they had an unbroken succession from the Revolution to the present. Such a depiction permitted Unionists to target their opponents as threats to the survival of the nation, be those foes Confederates or anti-war Democrats. Others expanded upon this rhetoric.

Pennsylvanian James Parley Coburn assured his mother that if he would die he did so in the

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22 The Knapsack, Gauley Bridge, West Virginia, September 3, 1863.
memory of all that fell “in defence of those blood bought privileges which generations have enjoyed—priviledges which war worth the sacrifice of thousands of better lives than mine.”

The imagery of blood and sacrifice offered Unionists a motivation for defending the nation by protecting the memory of earlier Americans. It also provided a litmus test for loyalty—true patriots during the Revolution gave up their blood to secure freedom, now Americans needed to offer up their life essence to preserve the Union.

Similarly, Unionist prioritized the institutions that the Founding Fathers had created as pillars of the nation, worthy of protection offered by Unionists. The sacrifices of Revolutionary sires had made a nation, but they labor had also created entities that allowed the nation to function as an embodiment of the Revolution’s ideals. In a survey of West Point graduates involved in the war, the author Edward Chauncey Marshall concluded that 621 graduates had remained loyal to the Union while 197 had turned disloyal—most of which were from slaveholding states. Such a distribution suggested that Americans should find “confidence in this noble nursery of soldiers, which was the child of the Revolution, and was planned by George Washington, Timothy Pickering, Henry Knox, and Alexander Hamilton—the purest and best of the patriot sires of the Republic.”

Institutions like the Federal Government or the national military were offspring of the Founders, serving as both an extension of the nation’s heritage and a symbol to defend.

Unionists throughout the Mid-Atlantic emphasized the depiction of national institutions as symbols worthy of their protection and loyalty. James Uhler emphasized this point in May 1864 in the face of political tensions between Democrats and Republicans in Pennsylvania. He

23 James Parley Coburn to Mother, September 22, 1862, James Parley Coburn Papers, USAHEC, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
disdained partisan discord and believed that in the face of trouble, with “our Country’s Flag is at stake now and our rights and Liberties that our fore Father fought for is what we as true men ought to try and maintain and support as long as there is a s star on Flag or even two stripes of it together.” The national flag, long used as an emblem of the nation, the blood of patriots, and a physical representation of the states was an embodiment of America’s legacy for Uhler. By defending or remaining loyal to the flag, Mid-Atlantic residents would help preserve the legacy of the Founding generation. Even at the heart of the political conflict that Uhler addressed, as Democrats lambasted Republicans for their abuse of power, was the legacy of the Founders. Throughout the North, Democrats attempted to garner support for their candidates by declaring that loyal Americans needed to defend “the Constitution as it is, the Union as it was.” While Democrats used this language to disguise their rhetoric of white supremacy and challenge emancipation as it swept like fire across the South, they grounded their call for loyalty in the memory of national institutions. These larger entities, like the blood flowing through the veins of Americans came from past generations and were therefore worthy of protection. Compared to Confederates, Unionists wielded the physical creations of the American Revolution, not just the actions that created the United States. The institutions created by America’s independence required Mid-Atlantic residents to crush the infant slave republic as the Confederacy represented a threat to the past and future of the nation.27

Northern Democrats continued this pattern as they echoed the memory of the institutions created by the Founding Fathers in order to support their interpretation of loyalty that championed the status quo of the Union. Throughout the war, in Pennsylvania and across the North, Democrats rallied anti-war or anti-emancipation Unionists to their party with the slogan:

26 James Uhler, Diary, May 21, 1864.
“The Union as it was, the Constitution as it is.”

In response to the emergence of Emancipation as a wartime measure, as well as the social policies of Lincoln’s administration that arrested dissidents, overrode court decisions, and shutdown printing presses of questionable loyalty, Democrats called for a romanticized version of the United States. Historians have rightly acknowledged the racist and political tones that under rode the use of this partisan slogan, as they sought to restrict the freedom and rights of African Americans. Yet, it also offered Democrats a way to vindicate their interpretation of loyalty by looking backward. Similar to Republicans and Secessionists in the Mid-Atlantic, Northern Democrats in the Border States and Pennsylvania, used this slogan and conversations about the foundational document of the American Republic to criticize the war effort. The fact that Lincoln and Republicans were willing to alter the Constitution to win the war concerned Democrats. On one hand, their fears were practical. William Heyser, a farmer from Franklin County, Pennsylvania, feared that “abolitionists are so wild they would change our Constitution,” which would in turn create more enemies for the Union, rather than help end the war. For Pennsylvania Democrats the alteration of the nation’s foundational text invalidated the nation and proved Confederate accusations of how Lincoln and Republicans would usurp the national administration. On the other, their concerns were rhetorical. Like Confederates and Republicans, anti-administration Democrats aimed to validate their interpretation of the war by using the Constitution as a fixed, guiding principle.

The chords of the Revolution also seeped into the language Unionists and Confederates wielded to discredit the cause of their opponents. Once again, for Confederates, the Revolution

28 *Easton Sentinel*, October 23, 1862; *The Reading Gazette and Democrat*, October 18, 1862; *Valley Spirit*, October 22, 1862.

29 See also the work of Jennifer Weber, where she notes the extensive use of this slogan as a Democratic refrain throughout the war: Jennifer Weber, *Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ix, 6, 67.

provided a strong framework for them to discredit those citizens who remained loyal to the
government as un-American. Confederates often argued that Unionist Virginians or Northern
soldiers were the equivalent of Tories from the Revolutionary War. In July 1861, Jedediah
Hotchkiss wrote to his wife near Beverley, Virginia, that some of the Southern soldiers were
camped “in the yard & occupying the houses of a Mr. Crane who is in the Wheeling Tory
Convention.”
Likewise, George Schreckhise noted in a letter to his son, that the Dunkards of
Virginia, who resisted service and support for the Confederate military were a pack of “cowards
and torys.”
From Ravenswood, West Virginia, Henrietta Barr the avid Secessionist, saw Union
soldiers as “low hireling Hessions” who polluted the soil of the town. Comparatively,
Confederate soldiers, on the few occasions when they gained control of the town upon the Ohio
River were true gentlemen.
In reference to the traitors of America’s founding, these individuals
enacted a process similar to the publication of Fanning’s memoir about the Revolution—
Confederates were the individuals loyal to the ideals of the Revolution, whereas supporters of the
Union functioned like despotic, liberty destroying British soldiers.

Unionists in the Mid-Atlantic also used nicknames to target disloyal persons, sometimes
calling on the rhetoric of the Revolution, but more often they inserted a broader set of nicknames
that delegitimized Confederates. A few Unionists attempted to use the Tory moniker aimed at
Democrats in the Union. Union soldier George Daugherty wrote his friends from Virginia that he
hoped the Union government would allow “loyal citizens (our soldiers) a chance to vote” like the
“mean, contemptible, low-lived, tories who sit around their fires and enjoy the blessings of

31 Jedediah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hochkiss, July 5, 1861.
32 George Schreckhise to James M. Schreckhise, March 5, 1862.
33 Henrietta Barr, *The Civil War Diary of Mrs. Henrietta Fitzhugh Barr (Barre) 1862-1863*. Ed. Mrs. Sallie Kiger
Winn. (Marietta, Ohio: Marietta College, 1963), September 4, 1862.
secureity” offered to them by the Union Army. John Campbell, a War Democrat in Philadelphia, argued that vocal opponents of the war effort inside the Union were the “tory allies of foes of our country,” as they sought to destroy the nation in cooperation with Confederates. Similar to Confederates, Unionists in the Mid-Atlantic wielded the memory of the Revolution to conjure the idea that their internal political opponents, Democrats, subverted the nation and worked directly with its enemies, as British loyalists did during the War for Independence. The nation itself remained at the heart of how Unionists criticized their opponents.

This focus also appeared in how Unionists used nicknames to attack Confederates—as destructive belligerents that would unmake their nation. For example, Northerners frequently referred to Confederates as “Secesh,” a shortened formed of secessionist. Soldiers, civilians, and newspapers incorporated this nickname into their daily conversations, perhaps as a way to shorten the longer name and make it a more palatable and quick to reference form of nomenclature. For example, George Stephens, the black cabinetmaker from Philadelphia, reported in early 1862 that Union troops brought “A couple of “Secesh” ladies” into camp and arrested them for comforting the enemy. When Orlando Desh went off to serve in the Union Army, he noted that the passage through Maryland brought out some civilians from homes adorned with Union flags, while others there were “no demonstration of any kind was made I suppose they were Secesh.” Numerous other Unionists referred to Confederates and other opponents throughout the region as Secesh. The use of Secesh was not just a shorthand

34 George W. Daugherty to Friends, January 3, 1863.
35 John Campbell, Unionists versus traitors: The political parties of Philadelphia; or, The nominees that ought to be elected in 1861 (Philadelphia, 1861), 5.
36 Stephens, January 29, 1862, 175.
37 Orlando Desh to Paents, August 24, 1862, Desh Family Papers, PP Desh 6.3, Moravian Archives, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
38 Siren Bunten, Diary, April 25, 1863, May 9, 1863, June 18, 1863, Siren Bunten, We Will Know What War Is edited by Stephen Cresswell (Buckhannon: West Virginia Wesleyan College Press, 1993); Jesse Cheuvront, September 4, 1861, September 5, 1861, February 25, 1862, April 17, 1862, May 3, 1862, Box 67 Folder, Journal—
moniker for convenience sake, but it also conveyed the destruction nature of those who opposed the Union. While such a nickname conveyed the fact of separation, or a desire for separation from the Union, it also carried the implication of destroying the heritage of the Revolution. Since Unionists invoked the memory of the products of the Founding Generation as a claim to their legitimacy, they would also attempt to delegitimize the Confederacy and its supporters by continually reinforcing the fact that their actions were not the patriotic rebellion of the American Revolution. Rather Confederates had broken faith with the North and sought to destroy the most important product of the Revolution: the nation itself. \(^{39}\)

Unionists also relied on a modified religious and secular language that targeted their enemies as anathema to the nation and nature itself. Throughout the war, Unionists used the imagery of snakes to condemn anyone they deemed disloyal—Confederates and anti-war Democrats. Early in the war, Union print culture made it clear that Secessionists were equal to snakes that slunk around in an attempt to destroy the nation. On Union envelopes, images

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\(^{39}\) Varon, Disunion!, 328–47.

In addition to the Unionists who used the word “secesh” a handful of Confederates also recorded that word in their conversations about the war. Where Northerners/Unionists used the word as a mark of derision to discredit Confederates, the Southern use of the word often seemed to mock the term itself. When J. Kelly Bennette used the term, he frequently wrapped it in quotations. So too did Henrietta Barr in Ravenswood, West Virginia. While Rebecca Davis used the term once to delineate between Unionists and Secessionists. Barr, The Civil War Diary of Mrs. Henrietta Fitzhugh Barr, June 4, 1862, July 16, 1862, August 1 and 16, 1862, September 3 and 20, 1862, October 2 and 4, 1862, June 26, 1863; Bennette, Diary, July 9 and 31, 1864; Rebecca Davis, Diary, July 16, 1864.
displayed a figurative representation of the Union, either Uncle Sam or Columbia, destroying a serpent with “Secession” written across its body. The clear message distilled the act of secession down into something that Unionists, in fact many humans, could readily identify as evil: a snake. A letter from an unidentified Union soldier stationed at Camp Griffin, Virginia in the winter of 1862 drew this comparison more clearly. The paper bore a banner beneath a cornucopia and eagle that read:

Columbia’s step was proud and gay  
Peace smiled upon her bowers,  
Till treason, like a poisonous snake,  
Crept in among the flowers.  

The parallel between image and text is important here, as the bounty visualized by the cornucopia contrasts with the idea of a poisonous snake that crept amongst the healthy nation. A venomous snake (erroneously noted as poisonous here), representing secession would have ensured that supporters of the Union would have been able to readily understand that the act of secession, the act of creating the Confederacy, was lethal to Columbia, as the dangerous snake had snuck into the nation’s garden.

Unionists certainly saw secessionists as a threat to their nation, but they also accused anti-war Democrats of representing a barrier to reunification, and consequently applied a snake-inspired moniker on their partisan opponents. Throughout the war, anti-war, anti-administration Democrats became “Copperheads,” another serpent that posed a threat to the nation. Some in Pennsylvania, like Captain J. J. Horn of 12th Pennsylvania Reserve Corps believed that “there

40 “Uncle Sam’s Recipe for Traitors,” Civil War Envelopes and Currency Collection, Box 1, Folder 18, Pennsylvania Historical Association, Philadelphia; Unlabeled Envelope, Civil War Envelopes and Currency Collection, Box 1, Folder 21, Pennsylvania Historical Association, Philadelphia.  
41 “Union Soldier,” Camp Griffin Virginia, January 15, 1862, Civil War Letters, MSS 10694, Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.
are still worse traitors [in Easton] than here” at the front, in response to an anti-Democratic Party riot that took place in Northampton County in August 1861. Other pro-administration Unionists in the Mid-Atlantic echoed similar concerns, finding Copperheads a dangerous element of wartime society. Democrats too attempted to throw snake-centered language back at Republicans, when they referred to “Black Republicans” as “Blacksnakes.” The question though, is why were snakes such an acceptable representation of disloyal evil for Unionists? One possible answer comes from the Bible and religious sentiment.

For Christians, the story of Adam and Eve resonates as one of the earliest examples of an externally corruptive and evil force in the form of a serpent. Additionally, throughout American history, the specter of snakes has often invoked fear. From the investigation of the continent by explorers to religious sermons, Americans frequently called on the image of a snake to represent danger in the nation. Few historians though dwell on the fact that Copperheads and snakes appear as central figures in the language of loyalty during the Civil War Era. Yet, the snake was a fixture in how Unionists interpreted their definitions of loyalty. The use of serpents was a double-edged sword. On one hand, it played on physical fears of snakes that seemed alien to Americans. Snakes, without legs, that crawled on the ground, and were venomous, often made individuals feel uncomfortable. Additionally, the religious connotations of snakes as the

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42 At the Democratic County meeting on August 19, 1861, Northampton County Democrats passed resolutions that blamed Republicans for the war, called for peace, and affirmed the loyalty of the Democratic Party. After a speech by the local congressional representative, Phillip Johnson, a fight broke out between soldiers and meeting organizers. After the fight, a pro-Union mob marched through Easton with an image of Johnson in effigy and damaged two Democratic printing presses. That evening’s events appear again in this text, but warrant mention here, because they prompted Horn’s letter and concern about the loyalty of his home county. *Easton Free Press*, August 22, 1861 and September 19, 1861; *Northampton County Journal*, August 21, 1861; *Reading Democrat and Gazette*, August 24, 1861; *The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 1861-1865*, (Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980), 73.

43 *Easton Argus*, April 2, 1863; *Easton Sentinel*, March 26, 1863.

harbingers of sin and immorality added onto the fear created by the presence of snakes. By associating personal feelings of disgust or revulsion with snakes on political groups, be they Confederates/Secessionists or anti-war Democrats, the goal was the same: to delegitimize them. In doing so, Unionists attempted to underscore the base immorality of opponents to their version of loyalty. Just as Confederates tried to pack the meaning of treason to Founders of the Revolution into their use of Tories, Unionists wielded snakes to highlight how Southerners threatened and corrupted the nation. Where Americans had once used the image of a snake to symbolize unity during the Revolutionary Era, Confederates now slunk a dangerous serpent into the bed made by the Founders with the intent to destroy the Union.

Unionists also deployed the language of religion and God’s favor to sanctify their cause as a divine quest to preserve a nation anointed by a higher power. Throughout the nineteenth century, religious institutions served as viable pieces of American culture and threads of community connection. Often at the center of life in most towns or communities, religion shaped how many Americans interacted with one another as well as how they connected to the world outside of their homes. The pervasiveness of religion makes it logical that Mid-Atlantic residents would turn to it as a means of sanctifying their cause.¹⁴⁵

Both Unionists and Confederates believed that a higher power had ordained their cause to succeed, making it not only a political, but also a moral imperative for Mid-Atlantic residents to support their nation. For example, In June of 1862, James Uhler clearly laid out this vision when

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he wrote about the sacrifice of “our fathers.” The blood spilt by American patriots in the past helped established the United States as a free, prosperous nation. More importantly, that sacrifice created a compact with God. Uhler argued that their “Sacrifice was accepted of God and he sealed it with the blood of our fathers and what God hath joined together let no man put asunder.”46 Uhler’s use of language from wedding ceremonies signifies how he envisioned the national union of the states as a holy compact blessed by God. If the blood of Revolutionary soldiers had sanctified the Revolution and the nation, the product of the American union was an indivisible, holy marriage. Uhler asserted that Southerners could not break their connections with the North just as a wife or husband could not dismantle their marriage. Other Union supporters echoed Uhler’s view of the United States as a compact between God and its citizens.47 It is possible to see such a connection in Union print culture. One envelope, bearing the image of Columbia wielding a Union flag held the following poem underneath:

Take this banner, and beneath
The war-clouds encircling wreath,
Guard it till our homes are free—
Guard it—God will prosper thee. 48

If one does their duty, that is if one loyally defended the nation, then God would ensure the success of the individual and the nation. In Uhler’s account, God had helped forge the United States, but it was up to men, soldiers and civilians, to prevent the destruction of the nation. Similarly, in this piece of print culture, God would prosper Unionists, but only if they fought as

46 James Uhler, Diary, June 2, 1862.
the war clouds gathered and defended their homes. Such a depiction reinforced the idea that individuals had to contribute to the nation—loyalty, as ordained by God in his creation of the Union, required an active contribution from its citizens.49

Confederates also used religious language to sanctify their cause in opposition to the Union, while they simultaneously demanded service and support from their citizens. One of Elenor Robinson’s sons noted after he joined the Confederate Army, “our cause is Just and our Heavily Father will prosper us.”50 In “Enlist! Enlist” a tract distributed by the Evangelical Tract Society of Petersburg, Virginia, the unidentified author calls upon soldiers for the Confederate Army. The author was “commissioned by the King of Kings to procure [recruits] for his army” and he sought to enlist all the young men he could find. Echoing the political uses of loyalty used throughout the Mid-Atlantic, the tract implored, “There is no neutrality” either you were with God, fighting a war “for the establishment of Trust, Justice and Mercy” rescuing the South from “a cruel oppressor” or you were against God and the Confederacy.51 An Address to Christians Throughout the World, signed by over one hundred ministers from the Southern States, argued that the rebels were not, as the Unionists call them, “traitors,” “rebels,”” but rather they were being “persecuted for truth and conscience sake” by a government that wanted to subjugate them.52 Instead of trying to destroy the government, Southerners had attempted to defend themselves with secession, while only desiring peace, even though “a conflict of opinions between the North and the South, in church and state, of more than thirty years” grew more

50 Letter to Elenor Robinson, August 29, 1861, Robinson Family Letters, 1847-1883, West Virginia and Regional History Center, Morgantown, West Virginia.
52 “Address to Christians throughout the World,” (Philadelphia, 1863), 2.
difficult every day.\textsuperscript{53} The use of violence and the rise of fanatics in the North, according to these measures necessitated the separation of the two sections. Moreover, “We regard the Confederacy, in the wise providence of the Almighty, as the result of causes which render its independent existence a moral and political necessity.”\textsuperscript{54} In each example, and many others, Southerners turned to the cross to vindicate their cause.\textsuperscript{55} Of course, this makes sense across the wide scope of Southern history. Although Southern communities experienced a modified version of the Second Great Awakening, by the time of the Civil War, and especially during the conflict, religion was an important part of their daily lives. Mid-Atlantic Confederates though had a tendency to turn to God in moments of uncertainty. They did so to justify slavery, and if their war for independence was an extension of protecting a God-given institution like slavery, than it would also make sense that they found the protection of faith around their war of secession.

Invoking the memory of the American Revolution or religious frameworks to justify one’s cause was part of an extended political-cultural framework for nineteenth century Americans. Since the end of the Revolution and throughout the century, American citizens had incorporated civic and religious imagery into their public displays. During the Civil War such presentations of political and popular culture continued—from flag presentations to sermons to other public orations. Throughout the war torn Mid-Atlantic, residents used such events as a means to publically display their attempts at sanctification and serve a number of other purposes.\textsuperscript{56} Furthermore, if political and religious ideologies demanded that Americans adhere to

\textsuperscript{53} “Address to Christians throughout the World,” 3.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{55} See for example: Jason Phillips, Diehard Rebels, 9-39.
one call for loyalty, it made all others invalid. The oppositional definition of loyalty exacerbated national and internal dissent throughout the war years.

Public celebrations also revealed how gender shaped conversations about appropriate behavior and allegiance. When Mary Hornbeck, of Lehigh County Pennsylvania, publically displayed her affinity for George McClellan in the fall of 1864, she shocked her male acquaintances. On November 6, 1864, Mary Hornbeck wrote to her brother Henry that during a “torch-light procession” in Bethlehem, she stood on the balcony of a hotel as she watched men pass below, begging her to wave a handkerchief for them. When a friend offered to lend a piece of cloth, Hornbeck recalled that she “politely declined, having noticed Lincoln’s phiz—on some of the banners.” Yet, “soon another procession passed and I seeing “Little Mac’s” face, waved until my arm was tired, then you ought have heard them blow. I didn’t care.”

The shock of Hornbeck’s male friends probably came from two places. First, she made a clear rejection of their political preference, casting her lot with McClellan and presumably to them the anti-war plank of the Democratic Party. Secondly, Mary Hornbeck, a woman denied political power in mid-nineteenth century America much like Anna Kennedy, had clearly inserted herself into the public realm with her spontaneous gesture. Hornbeck’s action, along with the experiences of men and women throughout the Mid-Atlantic prompted an important question: how should both sexes act in the face of civil conflict and how should individuals who stepped outside of those norms be treated?


57 Mollie (Mary) Hornbeck to Dear Brother (Henry), November 6, 1864, Diary of Civil War Service by Henry Jacob Hornbeck September 1862—June 1862 2 years and 9 Months, Lehigh Valley Heritage Museum, Lehigh, Pennsylvania.

58 Mary’s preferences for the McClellan and Democrats in general are clear from her records with her brother, however, she never explicitly supports Copperheadism in her writings.
Gendered Behavior

Unionists and Confederates attempted to form definitions of acceptable, loyal behavior for both genders during the war modeled after societal norms for men and women. In his 1860 book *The Sunny South*, Joseph Holt Ingraham provided a letter from Kate Cumming that noted how “Soldiers fight the battles of our country, and the least [women] can do is to cherish them in their helplessness, and bind up their wounds, and all true women will do it, who love their country.” Ingraham’s published his work, a collection of letters that attempted to paint a picture of Southern life, in Philadelphia on the eve of the Civil War. Cumming’s letter spoke to the notion of contemporary public views on gendered roles for public spaces—and nothing interjected itself into public space more than war. On the surface, this approach to gender specific roles might seem simple, appealing to antebellum cultural norms. Men would take on public, active roles in the defense of the nation—through military service, political speeches, or through rallies meant to sustain the cause. Women would act privately and passively—serving as nurses, gathering supplies for loved ones, or allowing their male family members to march off for war. Yet, the nature of the Civil War in the Mid-Atlantic, with political discontent and fluid boundaries, prevented permanent distinction between male and female (active and passive) participants/roles during the conflict.

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60 *The Sunny South; or, The Southerner at Home, Embracing Five Years of a Northern Governess in the Land of the Sugar and the Cotton* edited by Joseph H. Ingraham (G.G. Evans Publisher: Philadelphia, 1860), 152.
In Virginia, the continual proximity of both Union and Confederate armies to civilian populations prompted careful articulations of gendered loyalty. Late in 1861, an address by James Barron Hope highlighted this concept in clear detail. Hope, a lawyer from Norfolk spoke on behalf of a group of women who donated a flag to the Virginia Defenders.\(^6^1\) In his speech, Hope noted that the women had “hallowed [the flag] by the touch of their fingers.” The banner, on one side the new national flag and the “escutcheon of Virginia and Virginia’s motto,” on the reverse, indicated their “duties as free citizens of the Confederate States, the other teaches you that “resistance to tyrants is obedience to God. The one suggests a future splendid with hopes of national greatness, the other a past rich in unnumbered glories.” For Hope, the work of these women offered a clear demonstration of their loyalty to the new nation and there state. It further allowed Hope to clarify the responsibilities of men and women. God, he noted, would “smile on a just cause and ours is the noblest for which a soldier ever fought or woman prayed.”\(^6^2\) Just as Mid-Atlantic residents used political culture and religion to sanctify their cause, they also used that language to determine how they saw the world. Not only was fidelity to the nation important but so too was acceptable behavior. By acting appropriately—serving in the Confederate Army or sustaining the men with prays and passive support—Confederate citizens could ensure the success of their nation. Hope argued subtly that loyalty demanded both direct support of the cause through appropriate, gendered action.\(^6^3\)

Other Virginians reinforced the idea of loyalty as an expression of proper, gendered behavior throughout the war. William Montgomery saw his action in the Confederate military as an extension of his manhood. He noted that in a letter to his mother that “I have grown to

\(^6^1\) For background information on J. Baron Hope, see “Inventory of the James Barron Hope Papers (1) 1790-1965,” https://ead.lib.virginia.edu/vivaxtf/view?docId=wm/viw00061.xml.

\(^6^2\) J. Barron Hope, in “Presentation and Address,” from The Daily Transcript (Portsmouth, VA), November 2, 1861, Confederate Papers, MS259, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland.

\(^6^3\) Bruce Dorsey, Reforming Men & Women: Gender in the Antebellum City (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
manhood and my assistance is needed to defend our cause and rites.” He left home and comfort to go off and defend the newborn Confederacy. As someone who loved the nation and its cause, Montgomery felt that his duty/loyalty as a man, demanded service in the military. Women also contributed to this discussion of gender and loyalty. Even after the fall of Richmond in April 1865, the demands of faithful allegiance remained clear to some Confederates. In particular, Harriet Boswell Caperton wrote to her son John Caperton from the fallen capital, “I must go to work and show the enemy and traitors, that with all their success they can never break the spirit of southern women.” Though Robert E. Lee, the Army of Northern Virginia, and the Confederate government had fled from Richmond, Caperton still noted that she remained loyal to her cause and that she would continue to function as gendered stipulations required Confederate women: firmly supporting the men in the field by continuing to work cleaning homes and doing her duty as a firm supporter of the crumbling nation. Montgomery, Caperton, and many other Confederates drive home the point that they had clear views on what constituted loyal support for their nation and appropriate behavior.

It is clear, that for many Confederates, loyalty, gender, and responsibility, all combined during their wartime experience, yet Union residents from the Mid-Atlantic, also framed conversations of responsibility, duty, and allegiance in terms of gendered language. The intersection of allegiance and gender allowed individuals throughout the Mid-Atlantic to attach an idea of acceptable political and gendered behavior to actions. Like Virginians, most Mid-Atlantic residents believed that men should fulfill their duty to support the nation. For some, that came in the form of fighting in the military. James W. C. Pennington, a former Maryland slave

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65 Harriet B. Caperton to John Caperton, April 9, 1865, Caperton Family Papers, Folder: John Caperton, 1844-1867, MSS 1 C1716a, Virginia Museum of History and Culture, Richmond, Virginia. Although the letter is unaddressed, the handwriting, wording, and context of the letter suggest that it comes from H. B. Caperton, John’s mother.
tied together religion, commitment to the United States, and manhood in the aftermath of the New York City draft riots. He noted that African Americans, like the Founding Fathers, fought for the United States. “In this struggle” for their freedom, black Americans, could “know nothing but God, Man, and American Nationality.” Proper behavior, acting like a man, fit perfectly in line with both one’s faith and nationalism. Appropriate behavior, in this instance manly support of the government, not cowardly, riotous behavior, would provide black Americans with an avenue to freedom. In March 1864, John Price Kepner acknowledged the joy he found upon returning home to “the hearty welcome” of friends and family while on furlough from the Army. He thoroughly enjoyed his time at home so much he contemplated refusing to return to the front lines. Yet he ultimately decided to don the Union blue again. As he argued that “I must act manly [and] report at the proper time. Pleasure and enjoyment, farewell.” For Kepner, masculine duty and loyalty required that he act in a specific fashion, though he resented the departure from his loved ones. Ultimately, his commitment to the Union and the prevailing expectations of manly behavior drove him to return to the war. Not all men however, acted like the idealized soldiers of Pennington and Kepner.

When individuals in the Mid-Atlantic operated outside the boundaries of acceptable behavior, those missteps allowed others in the region to discredit them as unfit for the benefits of citizenship or disloyal elements of society. Pennsylvanian Elsa Gilmer wielded model behavior when he instructed his sister Saluma on her choice of male companions. When Gilmer learned that his sister had been spending time with a former member of the 174th Pennsylvania, John Wildonger, he warned her to stay away from the man. Wildonger had “Skedaddled at Camp” in Philadelphia before their unit left for the front lines. Gilmer argued that Wildonger “isant worth

69 J. W. C. Pennington, “Not the first of its kind, and it may not be the last,” in Freedom’s Journey, 81.
A good woman.” Rather he was “A coward and A Damned black Lyer for he Never [saw] Suffolk Virginia he run A way at philadelphia at broad and prime street depo." Wildonger’s desertion was definitive proof of his lack of manhood and any claim to the benefits of his inclusion in proper society. Gilmer did not call Wildonger disloyal (though perhaps the implication is there), but more importantly, Gilmer believed the other man had failed to live up to his manly obligations of serving the nation. Military service was not the only mode of serving the nation—men also needed to tend the fields and factories at home. However, Wildonger had invalidated his manhood by proving unfaithful to the nation. He was therefore unworthy of any benefits of being a citizen and an unsuitable partner for Gilmer’s sister. Similarly, James Wickes linked a lack of manhood with political disloyalty. While he served at the 18th Corps’ hospital in October 1864, he reported, “Copperheads are scarce down here. What there are belong to heavy artillery regiments – the regiments that cowards always pick for when they are forced into service.” In a play on Gilmer’s accusation, Wickes leveled a serious allegation against anti-war Democrats. Copperheads eagerly selected units that garrisoned forts and saw (until late in the war) relatively little combat. Thus, they were “serving” in the Union Army to maintain the fiction that they were manly men and gain the rights to citizenship for their service, but consciously avoided placement near major action. In both instances, a lack of manhood served as the primary critique to potential internal enemies or undeserving elements of society. The use of this gendered rhetoric allowed Unionists to discredit their political opponents in the region. By questioning the manhood of deserters or Copperheads, Unionists attempted to remove their claim to participation in the government. If men were supposed to be active in the public sphere, unworthy men like

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68 Elias Gilmer to Saluma Gilmer, January 24, 1863 and February 23, 1863, Civil War Documents Collection, Box 46, Folder 6, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
69 James H. Wickes to Judge Bond, October 20, 1864, Hugh Lennox Bond, Papers, ca 1850-70, 1864 Oct. 20 Wickes, James H. to Judge (Bond) MS 1159, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland.
Wildonger and in the heavy artillery regiments had shirked their duty. By forfeiting their manly obligations, such men did not uphold the compact between citizen and nation—invalidating any claims to participation in the governance of the nation and the fruits of faithful service, such as relationships with respectable women.

Confederates in the Mid-Atlantic similarly targeted those who challenged the policies of the government in terms of gendered language. Take for example the Richmond Bread Riot of 1863. As the Confederacy faced a shortage of food supplies in the Old Dominion and beyond, civilians at home felt the strain of empty stomachs. Women left increasingly isolated at home as white men entered the Confederate military, faced mounting difficulties to support themselves, sustain the war, and maintain slavery. As the prices of goods skyrocketed in Richmond and throughout almost every Southern city, women asked for help. They petitioned the government and loved ones for assistance. Some women begged their husbands to throw down their weapons and return home. Others demanded that government officials, locally and nationally, remedy the situation, but rarely saw their pleas answered in any positive way. By April 1863, many women in Richmond determined to take matters into their own hands. A crowd of white women took to the streets of the Confederate capital, demanding an adjustment of prices, while also breaking into stores and plundering supplies. After the crowd looted stores and demanded food, Jefferson

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70 Gallagher, Confederate War and Becoming Confederates; McCurry, Confederate Reckoning; Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Fought. This is not to suggest that historians have completed neglected the political aspects of the Confederacy and the issue of loyalty. In particular, Stephanie McCurry’s work on African Americans and women, along with Amy Murrell Taylor’s attention to petitions from the Southern home front, indicate the politics of allegiance to the Confederacy. However, these works are, in comparison to the broader range of scholarship, exceptions rather than rules to the coverage of the Civil War South and Confederate loyalty. Amy Murrell Taylor “Of Necessity and Public Benefit” Southern Families and Their Appeals for Protection,” in Southern Families at War: Loyalty and Conflict in the Civil War South, ed. Catherine Clinton (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 77-100.
Davis arrived to disperse the crowd with a patriotic speech. He called on their patriotism and shared sacrifice with the men in grey, a response garbed in gendered rhetoric.\textsuperscript{71}

Other responses, in addition to Davis’s comments, appeared in rhetoric of acceptable behavior and gender. William Wilson, a West Virginian Confederate spoke with derision of the women who participated in the Richmond riot. “A crowd of Women and rowdies collected in the Capitol square and forthwith proceeded to break open the dry goods stores and appropriate such articles as they needed,” but Wilson noted that the mob paid careful attention to “fancy” stores and took clothes or other material goods, “which gave the lie to their pretenses of starving.”\textsuperscript{72}

While Wilson advocated the use of violent means, bayonets and cannons, to punish the rioters, his tone carries a message of discontent for the women at home. They should have remained quiet and resisted the temptation to complain about the war effort. By juxtaposing “women and rowdies” he deemed that women had stepped far from their expected, passive, place. John Beauchamp Jones, a clerk in the War Department in Richmond also noted the riot, though his interpretation varied slightly from Wilson’s portrayal of events. Jones hoped that the women had found some support, but also acknowledged that “aliens”—outsiders from beyond Richmond’s borders had constituted a large majority of the mob as well as the perpetrators of the looting that took place.\textsuperscript{73}

Furthermore, he stated how Jefferson Davis’s speech to the crowd that urged them to disperse, so the military forces brought in to protect the stores “might be sent against the common enemy” who served as the “author of all [their] sufferings,” rather than remaining at


\textsuperscript{72} William Wilson to Mother, April 17, 1863, Wilson, William Lyne (1843-1900). Papers. A&M 1694, West Virginia and Regional History Center, Morgantown, West Virginia.

\textsuperscript{73} John Beauchamp Jones, Diary, April 2, 1863, \textit{A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary at the Confederate States Capital, vol. 1}. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1866), 284-6.
home to protect merchants and the city’s streets.\textsuperscript{74} Jones highlighted that the women had acted inappropriately but that the real threat came from beyond Richmond. Jones’s reflection of Davis’s speech implied that the Confederate nation was a home threatened by external forces.\textsuperscript{75}

While John Beauchamp Jones, Elisa Gilmer, and others debated the meaning of gender-based responsibility, it is worth noting that in the Mid-Atlantic, the boundaries between male and female definitions of responsibility were somewhat flexible. Although society laid out clear social norms for women in the midst of war, not all females agreed with their domestic lot. In July 1863, after Rebel forces raided Buckhannon, West Virginia, a small village of around 600 residents, Siren Bunten lamented her inability to fight back against the Rebels. West Virginia was, in her opinion, infested with “rebels in it trying to destroy it.” They would fail and the Mountain State would remain the thirty-fifth star in the beautiful American flag. She noted despondently, “if I were only a man to help fight for it. I believe I could fight.”\textsuperscript{76} Bunten was not alone, other women, often Confederate women, acknowledged their willingness to take up arms against their enemies and act as men. John Beauchamp Jones noted that if the North sought to free slaves, they would see “The Southern people, in such a cause, [sic] fight to the last, and when the men all fell, the women and children would snatch their arms and slay the oppressors. Without complete annihilation, it is the merest nonsense to suppose our property can be confiscated.”\textsuperscript{77} Early in the war, Anna Kennedy walked a fine line between wishing to bear the service of male Secessionists in Baltimore. Although she wrote “I don’t think I am quite enough

\textsuperscript{74} Jones, \textit{A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary}, 285-6.
\textsuperscript{76} Siren Bunten, July 1, 1863, in \textit{We Will Know What War Is} edited by Stephen Cresswell (Buckhannon: West Virginia Wesleyan College Press, 1993), 1 and 43.
\textsuperscript{77} Jones, \textit{A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary}, December 7, 1862, 206.
of a secessionist myself to join the Southern army but I think I would die before I would march a step to oppress those who were once fellow-countrymen. If I were a man I mean of course don’t laugh at me now will you? In these instances, Bunten, Jones, and Kennedy highlighted the fact that women recognized the boundaries of their roles in the war. While many women, especially Southerners under occupation disdained the presence of Union forces and wished to fight back against their occupiers, they conformed to gendered expectations. Rumors however, spread by Union soldiers and newspapers, and suggested the Southern women violently challenged Union forces as they moved into Confederate territory — a potential crisis that Union soldiers had to face and that some argued demonstrated the commitment of Secession women to their cause.

The potential proclivity of Southern women to act unlady-like in their resistance to Union soldiers prompted debate over how women should act to support a nation. The pamphlet, “A Few Words in Behalf of the Loyal Women of the United States” compared the devotion of Northern women to their Southern counterparts. The unidentified author, only identified as a loyal woman, acknowledged that many in the North questioned the loyalty of Union women to their cause. She notes that many Unionists believe “the women of the North have not equaled those of the South in patriotic interest, labors, and sacrifices.” This ‘loyal’ author argued, was untrue. Unlike Southern women, who received attention throughout the Union and Confederacy for their resistance to occupation, Northern women had been “especially careful not to get into the

78 Anna Kennedy to John Davis, May 30, 1861, Davis, John J. Papers, WVRHC.
81 Silber, Daughters of the Union: Northern Women Fight the Civil War, 1-6, 9.
82 One of Themselves, “A few words in behalf of the loyal women of the United States,” (New York: Loyal Publication Society), 2, PAM C. W. 280.10, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland.
newspapers, whether for good or evil.\textsuperscript{83} While Southern women actively resisted attacks or poisoned Union soldiers, loyal women from the North avoided headlines. Instead, “loyal women set about doing whatever was required to be done, without passion except of sorrow, without words or noise; calling upon nobody to notice or admire them.”\textsuperscript{84} In short, the author argued, Northern women acted along accepted gendered behaviors and yet still received derision for their loyalty. Not only did they do what the government asked of them and refrained from physical violence, but they also supported the side of liberty and not that of slavery.\textsuperscript{85} In many ways, this defense of Northern women mirrors the actions of soldiers and civilians from across the Mid-Atlantic who claimed that God supported their cause. As the author explained to the reader, loyal Northern women acted appropriately, according to gendered standards of the time. By policing the behavior of American women, the author asserts that Northern females had done what society expected of them: serve as supporters of their male counterparts and by extension of the nation working behind the scenes. Southern women, on the other hand, had broken traditional norms, inserted themselves into the public sphere, and complicated the martial conflict between men. By following the ‘rules’ of mid-nineteenth century society, Northern women found themselves punished and their violent Southern counterparts received praise for acting counter to the traditional norms of the day.

Organized sanitary fairs offered Northern women an opportunity to challenge the accusations of disloyalty along gendered norms in the Mid-Atlantic. In June of 1864, residents of Philadelphia, with assistance from across Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware hosted a Grand Sanitary Fair/Great Central Fair to raise money and supplies for Union soldiers. A letter from the executive committee of the United States Sanitary Commission, Philadelphia Agency,

\textsuperscript{83} One of Themselves, “A few words in behalf of the loyal women of the United States,” 4.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 11, 16-7.
noted that the fair organizers expected generous contributions from Pennsylvanians, in particular women. They appealed to them “in the interest of no party, radical or conservative, Republican or Democratic, Administration or anti-Administration. We know only this, that to send our national soldiers in the field supplies to supplement those [the] government undertakes to give them, but which they sometimes fail to receive” is a “work of Christian charity.” Indeed, the committee held “every confidence that our loyal countrywomen” were ready to make sacrifices for the men in arms. 86 Asking for donations in the amount of “One Day’s Labor, One Day’s Income, or One Day’s Revenue,” the Sanitary Commission appealed to men and women to contribute whatever they could to aid the Union Army. 87 Other Union women noted the contributions of their sex to the war effort along gendered terms. For example, Bell Robinson noted that one female resident of Washington spent “more than half their time working for the Soldiers she is receiving supplies almost daily and is also receiving money from different places which she uses for the soldiers, she is going to gill a box for us to take along they are in need of much at Fredericksburg.” 88 While women in the North were not as directly involved in the contact between Union and Confederate forces, many applied themselves to sustain the cause through gendered expectations.

Perhaps the dichotomy between Union and Confederate women emerged not because one was more loyal than the other was, but because of different circumstances. While many Union women along the borders of the Union and Confederacy experienced frequent contact with Confederate sympathizers, either in the form of partisans or the Confederate Army, they

87 Great Central Fair for the U.S. Sanitary Commission, Committee on Millinery and Dressmaking, April 11, 1864, FemSem 459.5 Great Central Fair 1864, Female Seminary Records, Moravian Archives, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
88 Bell Robinson to Sister, July 4, 1862, Pardee-Robison Family, Bell Robison, Volunteer Nurse Correspondence, June 1862-June 1864, 1862-1864, US Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
were more of an exception than a majority of Union citizens. Southern women on the other hand had extensive contact with Union soldiers as they continually occupied and moved throughout the Confederacy during the war. The result was that Confederate females, feeling that their cause was righteous disdained the presence of Union soldiers who threatened their loved ones and nation. Southern women had the opportunity to express their opposition to Unionists, while most Northern women never really got the chance to confront the enemy on a frequent basis. Regardless of the differences between Union and Confederate women, residents of the Mid-Atlantic used gender, civic memories, and religious language to justify their cause. However, as this chapter and the preceding chapters have made clear, not everyone within the Mid-Atlantic supported the government that called for their fidelity.

**Dissent and Discontent**

By understanding the ways that Mid-Atlantic residents tried to prove that their interpretation of loyalty was correct and build standards for appropriate action, it is possible to conceptualize how those same individuals would react when they faced dissent. Combined with the external conflict between the Unionists and Confederates, who possessed different interpretations of loyalty, internal passions in the Mid-Atlantic let to discontent. Both sides (especially on the national level) believed that there was only one true definition of loyalty. Historically, it is clear that numerous divisions existed in the Mid-Atlantic, from African American slaves who abandoned their masters to disheartened Democrats who resisted the Lincoln Administration. However, the fact that wartime participants sanctified their cause and laid out strict behaviors along gendered lines, suggests that they saw loyalty, especially during a period of civil strife, as a binary choice between allegiance and disloyalty. Most Mid-Atlantic residents understood loyalty in its singular form, therefore dissent prompted internal conflict as
those with different visions of the nation’s direction professed their commitment to the nation but opposition to its direction. What protections did individuals like John Davis, who saw himself as a loyal American who opposed statehood and emancipation, deserve in a civil conflict? How did his disagreements with the government differ from those who found themselves beset by an occupying force, like Anna Kennedy or Virginians surrounded by Union forces?

Partisan conflict between Democrats and Republicans throughout the Union states of the Mid-Atlantic best represents how political disagreement led to conversations over the treatment of dissidents. Throughout the war, supporters of both parties argued that their opponents had violated the expectations of loyalty, in turn, invalidating their right to rule the Union. Two key elections, in the 1863 Gubernatorial Election in Pennsylvania and the 1864 Presidential Election, enabled Mid-Atlantic Unionists opportunities to argue that partisan opponents were a threat to the survival to the Union.\(^9^8\) Democrats presented the Gubernatorial Election in Pennsylvania as a battle over the Union’s survival. “The Democratic Party must gain power,” in October to “unite what fanaticism has disunited—to heal the deep cut thrust by Abolition traitors,” J. D. Mendenhall, editor of *Doylestown Democrat* wrote in September 1863.\(^9^9\) Comparatively, Republicans offered a similar thought: on Andrew Curtin’s reelection rested “the question of whether we shall be a free people…whether we shall be one nation or not.”\(^1^0^1\) For the Presidential election in 1864, Democrats and Republican likewise saw the challenges of destruction or triumph of the Union war effort in different candidates. Joseph Gottschall wrote to Charles Weirick from Mifflinburg, Pennsylvania that “we must try and Perswade Every man to vote for

\(^9^8\) In 1863, Democrats in Pennsylvania nominated state supreme court justice George Woodward to run against Republican incumbent Andrew Curtin. Woodward, a strong opponent of Federal wartime polices, including coercion and conscription, was a strong choice to challenge Lincoln’s ally in Curtin. Arnold Shankman, *The Pennsylvania Anti-War Movement*, 123-36.  
\(^9^9\) *Doylestown Democrat*, September 29, 1863.  
\(^1^0^1\) Easton *Free Press*, August 27, 1863.
George B. Mac And I think Everry man that will vote for him will vote the Rite ticket.”

Gottschall believed McClellan offered the Union the best chance at peace, as “Old Abraham Split the Union” and had left the United States in a poor “condishion.” Conversely, Thomas Jackson, a rope-maker from Reading argued that on Lincoln’s election rested the query of the Nation’s existence—“whether there is, or ever will be again, a united states or not.” Such sentiments are the logical extension of how Americans sanctified their cause during the Civil War. Unionists argued that their cause, the preservation of the government handed down by the Founding Fathers, was right and proper. However, they saw the actions of their political opponents as dangerous to those institutions. Democrats believed that Lincoln and his policies threatened property and individual rights. Republicans believed that the hesitancy of Democrats to sustain their cause endangered the unity of the nation.

African Americans made it clear that they saw Democrats as disloyal elements of American society for their tangential support of the nation as it was—with slavery and Southern rights still intact. An unidentified black soldier wrote with delight regarding the return of General William Birney to the 25th Army Corps. Birney, a strong proponent of African American soldiers, had endeared himself to African American troops, especially from Maryland. Despite this, Democrats in the army looked down upon Birney’s return, especially those that hoped to take over his command. As such, the anonymous author expected resignations from some of the officers. “The General has at his back hosts of military admirers, and he can spare the Copperhead fraternity, I think, and fill their places with men who are loyal (black men).”

92 Joseph Gottschall to Charles Weirick, October 20, 1864, Unidentified Folder, contains Civil War Letters of Charles Weirick, 12th Pa. Cav. To his sister Mrs. Isabella Henry, Ronald D. Boyer Papers, Collection of Civil War Papers, USAHEC.
93 Jackson, Letters, November 8, 1864.
the reporter may have hoped for black officers to take the place of Democrats, he more realistically affirmed the devotion of black men to Birney and the Union cause. Similarly, from Point Lookout Maryland, “Africano” wrote to the *Weekly Anglo-African* in 1864 to speak on the nomination of George McClellan for President as a Democrat. If McClellan and the Democrats won in the November election, “the horrific enmity of the slave oligarchs will again spread its dire effects over the whole of the country,” wasting the struggles of loyal white and black men during the war.95 As an officer, McClellan had “pampered” traitors through the return of slaves to their masters. “Africano” encouraged “the great mass of loyalty Union people of the North” to challenge the Democrats by nominating a candidate for their party that would be “more capable of sustaining the national honor by enforcing submission upon traitors.”96

African American soldiers understood the political terrain of the Mid-Atlantic and the contours of acceptable behavior that came with the use of loyalty. On one hand, black men portrayed themselves a firm and faithful supporters of the Union. On the other, they used the language of sanctification, or rather its absence in Northern Democrats, to demonstrate their unfitness for power in the Union. Democrats were Copperheads, which conjured the despicable images of snakes, and further, their leaders—both military officers and political candidates, acted dishonorably throughout the war. Such action demanded that loyal Northerners support Republicans. Such support would carry over into the post-war world, as many African Americans looked to the Republican Party to secure their reward—political rights—for loyal support during the war.97

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96 Ibid., 61-2.

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For the most part, Democrats and Republicans, white or black, wanted the Union restored, though they felt that the other party posed a threat to that restoration and the nation’s longevity. With this idea of survival present in the conversations of Democrats and Republicans, both parties argued that the other side did not deserve protection of the government. This is evident in how both groups attempted to curb the speech and control of the other partisan entity. For example, during a Democratic county meeting in Northampton County in 1861, a fight broke out between Union soldiers and the organizers of the meeting. After the meeting broke up, a group of unidentified Republicans marched on Congressman Philip Johnson’s home, where they demanded he demonstrate his loyalty to the Union. They accepted the Congressman’s cheers for the Union and his waving of an American flag. From there, the mob moved onto Democratic newspaper offices in town. When no one was around at two of the presses, the mob broke in and damaged the printing equipment. At a third office, the editor was there waiting, with an American flag and cheers for the crowd, which halted the mob. This scene is significant as it demonstrated two key things. There had been tensions in the county between local Democrats and Republicans leading up to the confrontation in Easton, but the ‘Republican Riot’ also reveals how Mid-Atlantic residents placed an emphasis on newspapers (and print culture more broadly) as epicenters of disseminating information about the war and loyalty.

For many in the Mid-Atlantic, the targeting of disloyal speech, allowed individuals to revoke the protections of the government for those they deemed traitors to the cause. In most cases, this occurred when the Republican government attempted to dismantle Democratic

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influence. For individuals like Archibald Campbell, editor of the Wheeling *Daily Intelligencer* and a Republican from West Virginia, he argued for the closure of disloyal printing presses. Campbell argued that “as long as such papers were permitted by the government to circulate through the country and poison the minds of its people, inciting them to resist its conscription act and denouncing [the] policy of govt,” it fuel “disloyal acts & words” to follow. 98 Throughout the Mid-Atlantic, Republican officials arrested editors and shut down newspapers that criticized the Lincoln Administration. 99 These arrests and the discontinuation of printing offices often came in Maryland and West Virginia, where the Union government argued that disloyalty threatened the safety and the security of the war effort. However, when combined with the actions of Northampton County Republicans and their assertions that Democrats were a dangerous threat to the Union, the language of disloyalty also carried with the weight of a political tool. Republicans wielded their power through the control of the government to deny or curtail the ability of those they deemed disloyal to participate in the body politic. 100

The suppression of disloyal voices also appeared in the Border States, as Unionists and Secessionists battled for control and the hearts of the divided populaces. Unlike in Pennsylvania, where Mid-Atlantic residents incorporated the tensions over loyalty into an existent political framework, citizens of the Border States and Virginia lacked an atmosphere that would allow individuals to channel discordant opinions over allegiance into partisan conversations. On one hand, this difficulty emerged from pre-war trends in the political structure of the South. While

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98 Archibald Campbell to Montgomery Blair, March 24, 1863, 14/b1/F8—Correspondence; December 14, 1861-1863, Campbell, Archibald W., (1839-1899) Newspaperman. Papers, A&M No.: 14, West Virginia and Regional Collection, Morgantown, West Virginia.
enclaves of the Republican Party appeared in Wheeling, Morgantown, Baltimore, and few scattered hamlets along the Mason-Dixon Line, by the time of the Civil War, the South along with the Border States had become home to a single organized political party. On the other hand, the shifting boundaries of the Border States, with the presence of both the Union and Confederate militaries, as well as partisan elements, provided fertile ground for disruptive conflict between Unionists and Secessionists. This should not suggest that Marylanders and West Virginians did not take part in partisan activities during the war—they certainly did through debates over statehood, emancipation in both states, and the Presidential Election of 1864. The battle for control of the Border States, ideologically and physically, allowed for the direct punishment of those deemed disloyal.

While in Pennsylvania Democrats and Republicans debated who was loyal and the government tried to curb dissent as best it could, along the border, the conflict was more direct, as the authorities often imposed their will to punish dissidents. While in most Northern States, the Union government wielded a careful hand, in Maryland and to a lesser extent West Virginia, they used arrests and expulsion to punish disloyalty. During February of 1864 in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, when Yankees “again infested” the town, a local resident, Jim Lane Towner, charged with “not being “loyal”” lost control of his store and was eventually “sent through the lines south.”\textsuperscript{101} The same diary, although published years after the war ended, also noted that Union troops would frequently appear in Shepherdstown to arrest individuals in town suspected of spying for the Confederacy or who could not prove their fidelity to the Union.\textsuperscript{102} In other

\textsuperscript{101} “Fragments of a Diary of Shepherdstown Events During the War of 1861-1865.” January 14 and February 10, 1864, Shepherdstown (W. Va.) Civil War Diary, A&M No. 76, WVRHC.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., January 16, 1864, January 19, 1864, February 15, 1864, April 28, 1864, November 24, 1864, December 13, 1864, December 18, 1864, February 6, 1865, February 13, 1865, February 23, 1865.
instances, Union officials expelled disloyal citizens.\textsuperscript{103} For example, Rebecca Davis reported in her diary during August 1863 that a friend told her that “Mr. Williams has been sent South, charge disloyalty.”\textsuperscript{104} The proximity of Maryland and West Virginia to the geo-political divisions of the Mid-Atlantic may have made it easier to remove those of suspected disloyalty out of one nation and into the other. Arresting or expelling potentially disloyal citizens offered the Union government the ability to deny citizens the rights of the government and purge the area of disloyalty.

The use of loyalty oaths reveals how the Union government connected rights and expressions of loyalty. Early in the war, Union officials or private individuals demanded loyalty to the nation or face some form of restriction to their rights as citizens. For William Patrick Willey, a student at Dickinson College from western Virginia feared that the school would force Southerners to leave if they did not sign an oath of allegiance. Later in 1861, a Provost Judge threw out the testimony of a slave owner in Maryland that led to his incarceration for mistreatment of a slave. The African American woman was allowed to present evidence of abuse, but her owner could not because, in the Judge’s opinion, “any person who declines to take the oath of allegiance to the U. States will not be allowed to take an oath, or give testimony in said Court.” In the first year of the Civil War, government officials and private individuals attempted to use the oath of allegiance as a tool to enforce compliance and support for the Union, by rewarding individuals with basic rights, as part of a reciprocal definition in the war. As such, loyalty oaths can help chart the progression of punishment for dissent (expressed or implied)

\textsuperscript{103} At Harpers Ferry, General Roberts’ order in March 1863 required that those individuals who failed to take an oath of allegiance would be removed from their homes and the limits of the town. Further, in June 1863 Susanna Warfield noted that Maryland women who expressed “their sympathetic opinions with the South” were sent to join the Confederates beyond Union lines. Headquarters Defences Upper Potomac, General Order No. 4, Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, March 17, 1863, Broadside 1863: 35, VHS; Susanna Warfield, June 19, 1863, Susanna Warfield Diaries, MS 760, MDHS.

\textsuperscript{104} Rebecca Davis, Diary, August 8, 1863, MDHS.
throughout the war. At the start of the war, Unionists used oaths as a carrot and stick. For Willey, the carrot was that he could have remained in Pennsylvania for his schooling—despite not signing an oath, Willey remained at Dickinson College anyway. Yet, for the Maryland example, the stick was the inability to defend one’s self in court, reaping the damages of someone who could present evidence in court. Throughout the Mid-Atlantic, but in particular throughout Maryland and Virginia, as the war intensified after 1861, so too did the punishments for disloyalty.105

Later in the war, the punishment for disloyalty by Union officials grew more deliberate with deeper ramifications. When General Benjamin S. Roberts ordered all residents of Harpers Ferry, West Virginia to take a loyalty oath in March 1863, he noted that they had the choice “make their oath of allegiance to the Federal Government of the United States, or to pass in the Confederate lines” and not return to their homes until the conclusion of the Rebellion. Where William P. Willey had faced a return to his family’s home, the residents of Harpers Ferry faced exile with their whole family. In addition to expulsion, Union authorities used the perception of loyalty to control citizens at the polls. Curtis Jacobs, the slave owner who was both dismayed at his slaves’ opposition to the peculiar institution and hated the Union action of emancipation nevertheless tried to gain economic benefits from his slave’s departure as well as to oppose the Lincoln administration in 1864 political campaigns. Yet, Jacobs’ inability to prove his support for the Union, either through the testimony of loyal Unionists or by voting for the right candidates in 1863, prevented him compensation for his slaves or political participation in

1864—either on the new Maryland constitution or in the 1864 Presidential Election. Jacobs argued that the Union carried through its new agenda in Maryland on the back of “soldiery at the polls, refusing most men opposed, the right to vote, myself amongst others.” Jacobs’ experience conforms to the findings of other scholars, who have noted that Union officials, citizens, and Republican army officers attempted to influence one’s access to political participation based on one’s suspected allegiance to the Union or partisan affiliation.  

Of course, as Union soldiers often noted, loyalty oaths were worthless, as many pro-Secessionists or Confederates would take the oath and then immediately return to their treasonous ways once Union forces left the area. Nevertheless, loyalty oaths help explain how Union officials used a carrot and stick in an attempt to enforce allegiance. There is a clear expectation that by pledging their allegiance through an oath, that these individuals would faithfully support the Union and thereby receive the benefits of society. Further, by forcing former Confederates to take an oath, or even use American currency, that such actions would erode and weaken loyalty to the rebel government.

The divided nature of Border State communities allowed citizens to enforce their own vision of loyalty and deny the benefits of inclusion to those they deemed disloyal as well. In March of 1865, Martha Dent Watson noted how loyalty influenced the residents of Fairmont, West Virginia. First, she reported how local Republican leaders wanted to deport the “rebel Syeranes [sirens]” who observed Confederate soldiers passing through town and cheered for them. Even late in the war, community leaders advocated for a continued policy of evicting those

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deemed disloyal from their homes and sending them into the enemy’s country. Residents of Fairmont enacted their own version of this exile. Watson noted how the “The Taylors” had “turned “Yankee,” though she was not surprised at their defection. Two days later, when a member of the Taylor clan returned to Fairmont, the residents of the town chased the man away. Though Unionists drove Mr. Taylor away, Watson supported their decision, as she reported that ever since he went South, the man “Never shouldered a musket for the Confederacy. He left Dixie in disgrace and instead of being a loss his going is rather a gain for there will be one less to feed.” Taylor’s shifting loyalties from Southern sympathizer to Yankee, as well as his lack of contribution to either cause made him a pariah to everyone in town. Watson’s observation that he had not acted loyally for the Confederacy and that his departure meant there was one less mouth to feed draws together the fact that his removal from town also denied him access to local support networks—things that he could have earned if he hand been a faithful steward of one nation.

Virginia although the chief Confederate state—economically, and politically—also shared the feel of a border state, but faced deeper confrontations over loyalty. As the previous chapter demonstrated, African Americans served as one of the most vocal opponents of the Confederacy in Virginia. While most white Virginians, excluding the state-forming secessionists in the northwestern reaches of the Old Dominion, supported the Confederacy, there were sizeable pockets of white dissent. That opposition came in a number of forms in Virginia: Unionists or pacifists who opposed supporting the Confederacy (or in some cases, actively fought against it), families that longed for the return of their loved ones and asked for assistance, or slaves who rejected the idea of secession.

109 Martha Dent Watson, Diary, March 13, 1865.
110 Ibid., March 15, 1865.
When militiamen in Rockingham County, Virginia, resisted conscription into the Confederate Army, Stonewall Jackson dispatched forces to quash the resistance. Watkins Kearns reported in April 1862 that “The Rockbridge Company ordered off to Harrisonburg as a portion of a force to quell the rebellion among the Dunkards in Rockingham.”\footnote{Watkins Kearns, Diary, April 2 and 3, 1862.} Jedediah Hotchkiss further added that Jackson’s course was right and proper as they needed to “be an example made of some of those who failed to come” and support the Confederacy.\footnote{Jedediah Hotchkiss, Journal, April 2, 1862 in \textit{Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson’s Topographer} (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1973), 17.} Confederate troops crushed the Dunkard’s resistance, with minimal casualties, as they overwhelmed the militia with artillery and superior numbers.\footnote{Jonathan M. Berkey, "Rockingham Rebellion." \textit{Encyclopedia Virginia.} Virginia Foundation for the Humanities, 12 Apr. 2011.} The short-lived Dunkard resistance had to do with conscription, but the religious connection must have rankled Jackson and political leaders in Richmond. If the Confederacy was ordained by God and the sacrifices of the Founders to forge a new nation, the opposition of a religious group could undermine the singular vision put forward of God’s favor. Should the special mission of the Confederacy be no longer proscribed by a higher power, could Confederate leaders count on the commitment of other Virginians? If open resistance to the power of the government went unchallenged, how would that dilute the Confederacy’s ability to wage war for its holy purpose? Virginians could not risk the chance and snuffed out the Rockingham Rebellion as quick as they could, as they tried throughout Virginia during the war.\footnote{Peter S. Carmichael, “So Far from God and So Close to Stonewall Jackson: The Executions of Three Shenandoah Valley Soldiers,” \textit{The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography} Vol. 111, No. 1 (2003), 50.}

The scene of resistance to conscription and the arrival of Confederate troops to enforce service in the Southern military occurred repeatedly throughout the war. In counties like Floyd and Dickinson, portions of the local population, including both Union families that openly
disdained secession or Virginians who grew tired of the war, increasingly resisted the intervention of the Confederate government in their daily lives. One might also look to tensions between citizens along Virginia’s periphery (in what became West Virginia or along the Maryland border), for examples of tensions between supporters of the Union and Secessionists, that required intervention by Confederate forces. Numerous factors pulled Southern communities away from the Confederacy—from concerns about family and kinship ties to religious differences or even a general disdain for the progress of the war. When Virginians failed to offer faithful service to the Confederate government, they forfeited their right to protection by the Confederate army. The Confederacy demonstrated this forfeiture by authorizing troops to enforce compliance with its need for soldiers and supplies.115

The internal conflicts, to say nothing of the discontent between the Union and Confederacy, created social disruption that placed citizens of the Mid-Atlantic at odds with one another. Social disruption came in numerous places throughout the Mid-Atlantic and not just in the Border States, as political divisions divided individuals and communities. For instance, in Reading, Pennsylvania, a party held by former minister J. Clancy Jones highlighted some of the ways that politics and conflicting interpretations of loyalty affected individuals in the streets. One Republican, John H. Rhoads confided to a friend that he and many other “Union folks” failed to attend the party hosted by Jones on April 23, 1863. The reason was simple for Rhoads—“we can account for the absence of so many persons, here it is—the Copperheads were there, and the Union people stayed away.”116 In another scene from July 1863, when Rebecca

116 John H. Rhoads to Dear Doctor, April 23, 1863.
Davis and her sister sang the pro-secession song “Maryland! My Maryland!” at the gate to her home, three Union soldiers approached the abode. “We retreated to the house knowing such treacherous refrain would not be agreeable to their ears,” but further, she added “Sister & I doesnot make our appearance when Yanks are in the house, entertaining no sympathy for them.”

Virginians and Border State Secessionists too noted social disturbances, especially in regards to the feelings of animosity that emerged between their enslaved populations and white Confederates. As noted previously, some enslavers reacted with shock as African Americans asserted their own interpretation of allegiance and nationality. Loyalty, not only influenced how governments attempted to interact with their citizens, but also how individuals interacted with one another in the Mid-Atlantic.

Conclusion

If students of the Civil War Era understand the political dimensions of the conflict as the culmination of a relationship between citizen and state, as well as attempts by citizens to justify their support (or lack thereof), it helps reveal the importance of loyalty as a central element of the war. By sanctifying the Union and Confederate causes, citizens attached their visions of their nations to their daily lives. They found references to their cause in church and in the community, at parades and in their civic symbols. Of course, participants on both sides faced internal opposition to their causes—from Democrats, African Americans, or Southern Unionists. Like it or not, virulent disagreement had been, and has become, an inseparable part of American politics. At least for the Civil War Era, the ways in which Mid-Atlantic residents tied loyalty to their civic and political culture and then fought over those definitions, laid the foundation for the future.

117 Rebecca Davis, Diary, July 25, 1863, MDHS.
The years beyond April of 1865 appeared grim to many Confederates. Although Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia had surrendered to Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House, the jubilant fervor that followed did not last long. Martha Dent Watson, from her home in Fairmont, West Virginia, recorded the joy of Unionists at the victory that signaled the final moments of the war. In her diary, Watson wrote, “The bells have been ringing here the greater part of the day in harm of the good (?) news and now as I write the town is brilliantly illuminated that is the loyal portion of it, and cannons are being fired. Our blinds are down, and I have not seen the illumination, but I cannot shut out the horrible dins of the bells and the noise of the cannon-how I wish it would all cease.”

The ringing of the bell that sang out victory to the loyal Unionists in town certainly elated them. Watson, of course, as a firm supporter of the Confederacy, felt downtrodden. “It is over at last, or nearly so. The terrible struggle is ending and we have not gained our independence! It is hard, so hard. To think that all the sacrifices and suffering of our people have been in vain.” There was not much time for Watson to mourn the death of the Confederacy or the loyalists in town to savor their victory.

Five days later, Abraham Lincoln was dead, and sizeable portions of the nation lamented his murder at the hands of John Wilkes Booth. Watson did not know Booth’s name yet, but she reflected on the turn of events. “[T]o think,” she wrote, “that last night the town was illuminated in honor of the firing of the first gun at Ft. Sumpter and this morning the bells have been tolling for the death of the man who brought so much misery on the lands.” She pondered if Northerners would contemplate all the death and destruction Lincoln had leveled against the South, along with all the Union soldiers laid into shallow graves because of his war. With pride,

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118 Martha Dent Watson, Diary, April 10, 1865, Watson, Martha Dent (1837-1905) Diary, A&M 1798, West Virginia and Regional History Center, Morgantown, WV.
119 Ibid.
120 Watson, Diary, April 15, 1865.
she observed, “Vengeance belongs to God. Yet after all the suffering he has brought upon the country, I am not surprised at his fate.” "121 The disdain that dripped from Watson’s pen on April 10 and April 15, 1865, underscored a vision of the future that the Civil War had etched in her mind and the hearts of others throughout the Mid-Atlantic. Watson believed that her cause had been righteous, but it had failed nonetheless. Northerners, fit only to have a “drunkard” like Andrew Johnson leading the nation, were murderous neighbors who enforced their will upon Confederate citizens and murdered their holy cause. It was perhaps fitting that the bell that rung in the joy of the Union’s victory, a civic performance that marked the triumph of loyalty over treason, ushered in the contested memory of allegiance that would follow in the years to come.

121 Watson, Diary, April 15, 1865.
Chapter 5
Remembering the Mason-Dixon Line:
The Memory and Uses of Loyalty in the Post-War Mid-Atlantic, 1865 to 1900

“We Yankees will be proud of you,” Brantz Mayer wrote to his friend Mary Bayard Devereux Clarke in 1866, “if you can only be Luther enough in the South to reform your sex—your sex will soon bring ours into line once more.” Writing from Baltimore to his North Carolina acquaintance, Mayer’s comparison to the famed Protestant Reformer, Martin Luther, spoke of the important role he saw for Southern women after the Civil War. Coded in the gendered language of Republican motherhood, Mayer consoled Clarke on how best to return the defeated Confederacy to their rightful, loyal place in the Union. The Marylander believed that women could exert considerable influence over former Confederates, helping them to accept defeat, cooperate with the federal authorities, and restore relationships between freedmen and devastated white Southerners. Mayer cited the need for help from Southern women because “the stiff-necked race South of ‘Mason-Dixon’s line’ had proved resistive to a resumption of cooperation between the North and South.” Perhaps Mayer spoke to the wartime themes of loyalty unintentionally, because four years of civil conflict had engrained the ideas of maps, race, and gendered politics into his head, but his letters to Clarke reflected many of the ways Mid-Atlantic resident discussed allegiance from 1861 to 1865. In order to return the South to its proper position, Mayer reflected on the importance of appropriate behavior, the geographic and cultural divisions between Northerners and Southerners, and the importance of race to conversations about loyalty. By noting that loyalty remained an important and unresolved part of the post-war

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1 Brantz Mayer to Mary Bayard Devereux Clarke, April 16, 1866, 1866 April 16 Mayer, B[rantz] to Mrs. [Mary Bayard Devereux] Clarke MS 2287, Brantz Mayer Papers, MS 2287, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland.
world, Mayer acknowledged the central role it would play in the memories of Mid-Atlantic residents after the war.

Mayer’s attention to the Mason-Dixon Line as a regional division highlighted his belief that sectional antagonism remained in the Mid-Atlantic after the spring of 1865. His description highlights the need to find a new interpretation of loyalty in the region. Reciprocal definitions of loyalty from before the war had proved ineffective to preserve the Union. The antagonistic vision of loyalty that dominated the war years also would hardly serve after the war. While postbellum historians have offered plenty of attention to the struggle for freedom amongst the formerly enslaved, detailed the rise of the Lost Cause, and the cultural transformations that reshaped the nation from 1865 to the early 1900s, few have specifically addressed how Americans understood loyalty after Appomattox. Historians have often deployed loyalty as akin to identity, especially in the Border States as they highlighted the new Confederate memories or identities slaveholding Unionists and Secession sympathizers articulated after the conclusion of hostilities. Others have addressed the political uses of loyalty after 1865, when Republicans waved the “bloody shirt” of disloyalty as a justification to punish Copperheads and exclude Confederates from political

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power in the years after Appomattox. Yet, such examinations only viewed loyalty as a benchmark for political access, not as a concept that ordinary individuals incorporated into their lives and understanding of the war’s aftermath.

While political access and power certainly mattered to residents of the Mid-Atlantic, the story in Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia is not solely one about electoral rights. Rather, this narrative is about how Mid-Atlantic residents reformed their understanding of loyalty beyond 1865. Between the end of the war and the early 1900s, most Mid-Atlantic residents rejected the pre- and wartime definition of loyalty that rewarded citizens for faithful service to a government. Victorious Unionists, especially African Americans and Republicans, tried to wield reciprocal loyalty after the war, but this was a short-lived endeavor. However, loyalty as a reciprocal compact opened the definition of citizenship to an expansive group of individuals: former slaves, prominent female leaders, and possibly the burgeoning number of immigrants flooding American shores. In place of old notions of loyalty, many, but certainly not all Mid-Atlantic residents shifted the foundation of the connection between citizen and government from a reward for service to the blessings of heritage. Loyalty, in other words, became about who defended or best represented the ideals of the American founding generation, not necessarily who had labored in defense of the nation during the Civil War.

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5 Similar to the preceding chapter, I treat politics as more than voting rights in this discussion about memory and loyalty. I borrow from Caroline Janney’s discussion of politics, envisioning it as, in her words, the “ability of individuals or groups to wield influence in their communities, state, or region.” Caroline E. Janney, *Burying the Dead But Not the Past: Ladies’ Memorial Associations & the Lost Cause* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 5.


While this is an examination of the Reconstruction period and the last quarter of the nineteenth century, that period played out differently in the Mid-Atlantic as compared to other parts of the nation. The slaveholding states of the region did not share in the experiences of other Southern slave states from 1865 through 1877. Despite the loss of the peculiar institution, Maryland and West Virginia never experienced military occupation or extensive Federal control of their day-to-day operations, as did the Deep South. As loyal wartime Union states, they were exempt from such direct oversight. Virginia too had a divergent postbellum experience with Reconstruction rather than the rest of the former Confederacy. The largest pre-conflict slave state and Confederate capital returned to the Union in 1870, devoid of excessive violence as well as the resumption of former Confederates in positions of power throughout the state. These former Rebels met with hostility and objection from Unionists within and without the Old Dominion, but Virginia’s experience with Reconstruction was light. Eventual alliances between white and black Virginians as part of the Readjuster Movement also provide another level of complexity that sets Virginia and the region apart from the rest of the South. In the Mid-Atlantic, the years after the Civil War tethered loyalty to the reconstruction and reunion of the nation.

The post-war period in the Mid-Atlantic was a contest over the right to define the memory of wartime loyalty. Unionists and Confederates, black as well as white, argued that they had been loyal to some aspect of the United States. For Republicans, African Americans, and many Unionists, they held the most direct path to claiming the definition of fidelity: they had won the war, asserted the supremacy of the national government, and dismantled the institution

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9 Carmichael, The Last Generation, 229.
of slavery. This victory did not stop ex-Confederates and anti-war Democrats from attempting to claim their own version of allegiance to the ideals of a white American nation, rather than the wartime definitions of active support for the nation-state. Through such manipulation, the ‘traitors’ of the war could point to the sanctification of their endeavors—their attempts to maintain the lineage of the Revolutionary Generation or the Constitution itself—as proof that their true loyalties were to the ideological underpinnings of the United States. In time, through weariness over sectional divisions, disinterest in racial equality, and a compelling desire to move forward as a unified nation, white Mid-Atlantic residents reshaped the definition and memory of loyalty to exclude those who clung to its wartime definitions of support for the Union government. Mid-Atlantic residents slowly moved the vision of loyalty from its connections between government and citizen, toward a ubiquitous fidelity to the national heritage—specifically a legacy that was white and rooted in the Founding Generation.

**Loyalty after Appomattox**

In the aftermath of Lincoln’s assassination, the former Tennessee Democrat turned wartime governor and Vice President Andrew Johnson, took over the reins of Reconstruction. Despite an early belief by Republicans that he would prosecute a vigorous crackdown on the defeated Confederates, Johnson proved willing to allow white Southerners—Confederate or Union alike—to return to former positions of political power. Republicans in Congress and throughout the North increasingly resented the limited restrictions placed on the defeated Confederates under Presidential Reconstruction. African Americans in Virginia and throughout the Mid-Atlantic proved to be some of the most vocal proponents of a wartime interpretation of loyalty to secure their rights and punish former Confederates early in Reconstruction.¹⁰

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¹⁰ Varon, *Appomattox*, 244-5.
As African Americans had helped precipitate the conflict between North and South through their discontent with slavery, they also proved to be the most forthright in their defense of loyalty as a reciprocal relationship between government and citizen after the war. In Virginia, between May and August of 1865, African Americans in Norfolk and Alexandria held a series of community meetings to assert their need for voting rights. In May and June of 1865, Norfolk blacks gathered at the Catherine Street Baptist Church to assert their loyalty to the Union and ask for the protection of the government from white Virginians. African American members of Norfolk and Alexandria argued that they had been faithful to the Union since the death of Crispus Attucks, but lacked the rights of citizens. Comparatively, former Rebels, who now professed their rekindled allegiance to the Union, were free to commit “outrages on the most faithful friends that Union can ever have:” free African Americans. In Alexandria, free blacks passed a resolution in August 1865 that echoed a similar message: white ex-Confederates lied about their loyalty to the Union. Even though the Union had denied the humanity of African Americans for centuries, black men and women, “espoused your cause, and watched, and prayed, and waited, and labored for your success.” In return, all they asked was the reward of the ballot box in order to protect themselves from white Southerners. Wartime loyalty and more importantly the traditional interpretation of loyalty—protection for service—dominated how African Americans understood loyalty in the immediate aftermath of the war. They had faithfully served the Union war effort with their blood, information, or prayers, and in return, like white men who returned home to peace, they deserved their rights and protection from Confederates.11

11Equal suffrage. Address from the colored citizens of Norfolk, Va., to the people of the United States. Also an account of the agitation among the colored people of Virginia for equal rights. With an appendix concerning the rights of colored witnesses before the state courts (New Bedford, Mas.: F. Anthony & Sons, Printers, 1865), 1-2, 4. https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=rbaapc&fileName=08500/rbaapc08500.db&recNum=0&itemLink=r?ammem/rbaapcbib:@field(NUMBER+@od1(rbaapc+08500))&linkText=0&presId=rbaapcbib; “Address of a convention of Negroes held in
Other Mid-Atlantic blacks echoed this vision of loyalty and they would continue to do so throughout the remainder of the postbellum period. In Pennsylvania, the State Equal Rights’ League gathered in Harrisburg, where they argued “That loyalty should be the test of citizenship, because those who endure enough in the nation’s peril, without the hope of reward or promotion,” would know how to maintain the “purity” of the nation and its institutions. In Maryland three years later, delegates from across the Mid-Atlantic, Border States, and the North gathered in Baltimore for a “Colored Men’s Border State Convention.” With representatives assembled from Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Tennessee, Missouri, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, they argued that black men still lacked equal inclusion in American society as well as at the polling places. As they beseeched Congress to defend their rights, these freedmen called on their rights as citizens, who deserved protection because of “our devotion to our common country, contributing, as we have done, to its wealth in peace, and standing for its defence in time of war,” throughout every American conflict from the Revolution to present.

Mid-Atlantic African Americans, as well as those from across the lower North and Border States, shared the desire for equality. Despite slavery and mistreatment, black Americans asserted that they had remained loyal to the United States from the moment of its inception through its most recent trials. Such devotion established the legitimacy of African Americans as members of American society. They had fought in every conflict on the side of the Union. Just like white citizens who justified their position in the Civil War based on their history with the Revolution, the freedmen of the Mid-Atlantic likewise argued that they were the heirs of the Founding Generation.  


12 “Proceedings of the Annual Meeting Of The Pennsylvania State Equal Rights' League. Held in the City of Harrisburg, August 9th And 10th, 1865,” in Foner, Philip S. and George E. Walker, eds. The Proceedings of the
In 1871, this memory persisted in black Mid-Atlantic minds as Frederick Douglass defended the legacy of the Civil War, African Americans, and reciprocal loyalty at the graves of Union soldiers. Gathered at Arlington National Cemetery, Douglass lashed out at the appeals for forgiveness toward Southerners in his speech, “The Unknown Loyal Dead.” Recently, he admonished the crowd, Southerners had asked Unionists, “in the name of patriotism, to forget the merits of this fearful struggle, and to remember with equal admiration those who struck at the nation’s life and those who struck to save it, those who fought for slavery and those who fought for liberty and justice.” Ex-Confederates asked for a new memory of the war that applauded the valor of both sides, with little division between loyalty and treason. Douglass despised the early foundations of the Lost Cause and the attempts of ex-Confederates to rewrite the narrative of the conflict based on racial divisions, not wartime loyalties. He encouraged Americans to remember the meaning of the war: “Victory to the rebellion meant death to the republic. We must never forget that the loyal soldiers who rest beneath this sod flung themselves between the nation and the nation’s destroyers.” The soldiers buried in Arlington, the Union soldiers entombed in earth, obscured from the eyes of the living world, had fought nobly and honorably to defend the nation and destroy slavery. Their cause was radically different from former Confederates who sought to eviscerate the former and perpetuate the latter. The site of Douglass’ speech offered an important and physical backdrop to his message. While Southern and Northern Democrats called for reconciliation between the two sections of the country, Douglass advocated for a lack of distinction between loyalists, white or black. The unknown, loyal, men buried near him could be

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14 Douglass, “The Unknown Loyal Dead,” 610.
black or white—the lack of certainly prioritized loyalty, not race as the essential feature of how Americans needed to remember the war. The dead men buried at Arlington had given their lives as a testament to their loyalty, in return, the nation owed these men the honor of commemorating their sacrifice and punishing the men that made such a sacrifice necessary.

Douglass and African American communities across the Mid-Atlantic highlight the persistence of how black Americans remembered and communicated their shared loyalty to the Union, but they also reveal the threat to African Americans that existed after the war’s conclusion. Former slaves and freed persons of color pushed for recognition of their loyalty because they sought protection from vindictive Confederates. Inside and out of the Mid-Atlantic, ex-Confederates sought to curtail the rights of African Americans in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. Recent scholarship on the Reconstruction Era demonstrates how black Americans faced sexual and physical violence as challenges to their rights as citizens of the nation. However, African Americans also relied on their integration into the body politic to ward themselves from such assaults. To do so, as Douglass and other freed persons from the Mid-Atlantic displayed, they relied on the wartime use of loyalty: as a reciprocal relationship between the government and individuals. During the Civil War, African Americans had disassociated themselves from their masters, while they labored, bled, and fought for the Union. After the conflict ended both expected and frankly needed the government to uphold their end of the unspoken arrangement behind loyalty—protection for fealty. For African Americans they wanted inclusion as citizens in a nation that had denied their humanity. Further, they astutely realized the limited interest of many white Americans to support African American inclusion in the body of the nation.  

15 Gregory P. Downs, Declarations of Dependence: The Long Reconstruction of Popular Politics in the South, 1861-1908 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Susanna Michele Lee, Claiming the Union:
Arlington’s location on the former Lee family’s property allowed Douglass to
demonstrate how black Americans needed the maintenance of a reciprocal loyalty, while the
consecration of the cemetery also reflected how Mid-Atlantic whites maintained wartime
definitions of loyalty after 1865. White Unionists conveyed a similar language to Douglass in
reference to Arlington and the sacrifices of the loyal Union dead buried there. Samuel S. Fisher,
Commissioner of Patents, spoke at the Memorial Day ceremony in 1869, argued that anyone who
further contemplated treason should look at the grass-covered graves around the cemetery. The
person who contemplated damaging the government should “look upon the shadowy forms of
these soldiers of freedom and of the Republic, as they form ranks again” to charge and defeat the
enemy. These men had been faithful to the Union to the point sacrifice and though Fisher
believed it time for peace, he heartily encouraged all Americans to remember the sacrifice of
these men and their faithful commitment to the nation. They had given their lives for the country
and in turn deserved the respect of the American people. Further, the graves of Union soldiers at
Arlington served as a reminder of how the Lee family, through their disloyalty to the nation, had
surrendered their rights to citizenship, in this case property rights. At the start of the war, blue
clad soldiers quickly captured the mansion that overlooked Alexandria and the nation’s capital.
By turning the grounds into a cemetery starting in 1863 and 1864, Union officials ensured that
the Lee family would not be able to return home without the ever-watchful eyes of men who
gave their lives to restore the nation. In time, after suing the government, the Lee family
reacquired the land in 1882 before selling back to the United States government that same. While
the return of Arlington to the Lee’s conveyed the limits of white Northerners interest in

_Citizenship in the Post-Civil War South_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Erik Mathisen, _The Loyal Republic: Traitors, Slaves, and the Remaking of Citizenship in America_ (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2018). In a sense, where Downs argues that African Americans (and white Southerners) articulated a language of dependence throughout Reconstruction, that ‘dependence’ in this case is filtered through loyalty.
punishing former Confederates ad infinitum, the continual presence of the National Cemetery at the home of the South’s grandest hero, remained a subtle reminder to the Union victory in the Civil War.¹⁶

The actions of white leaders and individuals throughout the region demonstrated the need for governmental assistance, as white Northerners either ignored or former Secessionists, attempted to curtail, African American rights. For example the actions of the “Ladies Freedman’s Aid Society” from Bethlehem, Pennsylvania highlight the apathy of white Northerners for African Americans freed during the war. Founded in 1861 as the “Ladies’ Soldier’s Relief Association,” the women of Bethlehem sold homespun materials and solicited donations to raise funds for the Union war effort as well as local veterans throughout the war.¹⁷ By November of 1865, they had $991.68 remaining in their organizational purse after four years of activity. That same month the organization transitioned formally into the “Ladies Freedman’s Aid Society.” Of their remaining funds, the organization transitioned over $46.06 to the new organization, without record of where they dispersed the other funds.¹⁸ The organization functioned in a similar capacity until January of 1869 when it became the “Ladies’ Sewing Society.” From late 1865 to early 1869, the group never had more than $163.57 on its books and concluded functioning as an organization for the support of African Americans with less than ten dollars in its purse.¹⁹ One can draw a few conclusions from this account book. First, the fact that the society only transitioned over forty-six dollars from its soldier relief activities to its African

¹⁷ “Account Book for “Soldiers’ Relief Association,” 1, Beth Cong UB, Moravian Archives, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. This collection is in the process of cataloguing at the Moravian Archives.
¹⁸ Ibid., 17.
¹⁹ Ibid., 19 and 23.
American aid activities indicates limited interest in aiding freed black Southerners. Second, the fact that the organization, which had raised hundreds, if not thousands of dollars for local white soldiers during the war, took in relatively minimal donations after the war reveals the disinterest of the local community in aiding freed blacks. Together, it is evident that there was some interest in assisting African Americans freed from bondage, but that desire did not run deep.20

White Republicans in the Mid-Atlantic also maintained the historical, reciprocal use of loyalty, but they did so not to protect their person or communities, nor that of black Americans, but for the preservation of their political hegemony. One of the chief ways that Republicans kept wartime notions of allegiance alive after 1865 was to continue to use the rhetoric of the war years. Unionists continued to label Democratic as Copperheads in the aftermath of the war. In May 1866, Siren Bunten from Buckhannon, West Virginia reported “At the copperhead meeting in [Buckhannon] the Union party came off victorious, conservatives leaving in disgust.”21 Robert Kirkwood in Baltimore noted the prevailing tone of loyalty in Democratic politics. Not only did they urge “the late Rebelious states to except the constitutional Amendment” ending slavery in 1866, but they also complained about the fact that their party did not “nominate loyal men for the first time any how in place of all the darned Copperheads and Rebels.”22 Moreover, Republican leaders continued to refer to former Confederates or their sympathizers as Secesh, Rebels, or traitors following the war.23 The use of these nicknames illustrates what other scholars have

21 Siren Bunten, We Will Know What War Is edited by Stephen Cresswell (Buckhannon: West Virginia Wesleyan College Press, 1993), May 7, 1866, 89.
22 Robert Kirkwood to Brother, October 1866, 860-1868 Robert Kirkwood Outgoing Correspondence MS 2797, Kirkwood Family Correspondence, MS 2797, MDHS. See also newspapers, such as: Bucks County Intelligencer, April 25, May 9, July 18, September 26, October 17, 1865; Easton Free Press, May 4, 11, July 27, September 28, 1865; Easton, Sentinel, June 29, August 17, August 24; Northampton County Journal, August 23, 1865, September 13, 27, 1865; Reading Gazette and Democrat, May 13, July 22, August 26, October 14, 1865.
23 Wallace A. to Judge Bond, April 25, 1866, 1159, Hugh Lennox Bond, Papers, ca 1850-70, MS 1159, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore; Charles S, Green, Thrilling stories of the great rebellion : comprising heroic
called “waving the bloody shirt,” where Lincoln supporters maintained the specter of wartime
disloyalty to discredit Democrats and ex-Confederates for years after the war. However, it also
addressed the limitations of preserving African American rights. Black men in the Mid-Atlantic
were useful not because they were loyal or worthy of citizenship, but because they could help the
Republican Party maintain control over the nation.

For many years Republicans in the Mid-Atlantic and throughout the nation, waved the
“bloody shirt” and blamed Democrats for their disloyalty, which they argued, had caused the
hardships of the war years. The National Republican Congressional Committee used loyalty and
political records to expose the treason and wartime difficulties caused by Democrats. Writing
broadly to African American voters, as well as white allies, the Congressional arm of the
Republican Party highlighted the accomplishments of their organization since the onset of the
Civil War. Democrats they noted, repeatedly throughout the pamphlet *Emancipation!*
*Enfranchisement! Reconstruction!*, had threatened the Union, its institutions, and the idea of
freedom for years. Not only did “the slaveholding Democracy” begin “their causeless rebellion,”
as Alexander Stephens had argued, to perpetuate the institution of slavery, but Northern
Democrats had continuously challenged any sound wartime policy of dismantling slavery.

While the document provided a record of congressional votes on policies that undid slavery,
highlighting how Democrats always opposed such measures, they also made direct connections

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*adventures and hair-breadth escapes of soldiers, scouts, spies, and refugees; daring exploits of smugglers,
guerrillas, desperadoes, and others; tales of loyal and disloyal women; stories of the negro, etc. etc. With incidents
of fun and merriment in camp and field, (Philadelphia: John E. Porter, 1865), 92-3; Letter 73: William B. Johnson,
University Press, 1992); “Old Jeff and the Union,” Broadside 1865:43, Virginia Museum of History and Culture,
Richmond, Virginia.

University Press, 2009), 139-40.

25 *Emancipation! Enfranchisement! Reconstruction! Legislative record of the Republican party during and since the
war*, (Union Republican Congressional Committee, Washington, DC , 1868), https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/rbaapchib:@field(NUMBER+@band(rbaapc+24210)).
to the postwar use of loyalty. The pamphlet argued that Republicans were the only true patriots in the nation, and therefore, the only political entity worthy of support from loyal men.\textsuperscript{26} Republicans and Unionists not only highlighted the conflict that remained between them and their political opponents, but through their discussions of politics, they continued to label the Democrats, North and South, as disloyal elements of American society.

West Virginia provides another example of Republicans who used the issue of loyalty to protect their political interests after the war. According to Martha Dent Watson, Unionists in Fairmont tried to ban any residents who had fled the town and fought for or supported the Confederacy from returning home at the end of the war. Union residents of Fairmont wished to hold a meeting that mirrored one in Clarksburg, to prevent “those persons who went South” from coming home and requiring local residents to take an oath that promised to “do all in my power to prevent them,” from returning.\textsuperscript{27} Throughout the entire Mountain State, Republicans emulated a similar process, as they tried to prevent the return and repatriation of Southern sympathizers. Their fears were solely political in motivation. Roughly forty percent of the West Virginian population supported the Confederacy. If ex-Secessionists returned, gained the right to vote, and allied with anti-war Democrats (or Conservatives as they were locally known), Republicans rightly feared that they could unseat Unionist officials throughout the state. To challenge this, Republicans endeavored to prevent the reentry or ex-Confederates into the state, wielding wartime loyalty as the benchmark for political participation. By 1872, they had succumbed to a wave of former Confederates, Southern sympathizers, and anti-war/anti-Lincoln Democrats who never wanted the Mountain State to exist in the first place.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Martha Dent Watson, Diary, May 11, 1865.
\textsuperscript{28} Richard Orr Curry, \textit{A House Divided: A Study of Statehood Politics and the Copperhead Movement in West Virginia} (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964); \textsuperscript{28} Ken Fones-Wolf, “A House Redivided: From
Mid-Atlantic Republicans and Unionists had good reason to be suspicious of those they deemed disloyal during and after the war, as their opponents continued to challenge their definition of loyalty. Further, in the years after the war the meaning of the conflict with its forced dismantling of slavery and the resulting deaths of more than 700,000 Americans remained in question. In retrospect, it is clear how Democrats and Southerners led the way in forging a memory of the Civil War that forgave Southerners, ignored slavery, and the contributions of African Americans. The certainty of that narrative provides a chilling view to contemporary audiences, but the uncertainty of what could happen, troubled many of those loyal to the Union during the war. Following the Civil War, Republicans and other Unionists certainly feared an alliance between their former political and martial opponents—as was the case in West Virginia, Democrats (Copperheads) and ex-Confederates made natural allies that undermined their control over the government and limited Republican control. Moreover, Democrats and former Secessionists in the Mid-Atlantic shared similar strategies to thwart Republican management of the nation and loyalty through their discussion of racial loyalty and the insignificance of wartime allegiance.

Opposition to the wartime definition of loyalty during Reconstruction took many forms in the Mid-Atlantic, as Mid-Atlantic Democrats and ex-Confederates forged a cooperative challenge to the Unionist vision of the war and future. Critics of Republican rule wielded a number of rhetorical and ideological challenges to counter the radical changes thrust upon the


Curry, A House Divided; Stealey III, West Virginia’s Civil War-Era Constitution.
region and nation. Two major themes, in reference to loyalty, emerged as the primary critiques of Republican visions of loyalty after 1865. The first was that wartime definitions of loyalty, in a post-war society, no longer mattered. Democrats and Secessionists also challenged Republicans and former Unionists on the issue of race, asserting that Republicans threatened the white race with their racial disloyalty.

As black and white Unionists asserted the continued importance of wartime loyalty, Southerners and Democrats responded that the conclusion of the war robbed any meaning from one’s allegiance between 1861 and 1865. Defeated Confederates asserted that they accepted defeat and a return to the Union. According to the Richmond Whig in August 1865, “The people of the South are quiet, peaceable and loyal, and propose to continue in that frame of mind the remainder of their days on earth.” Likewise, when courts reopened in Augusta County, Virginia, judge Lucas P. Thompson noted that Virginians were again “loyal citizens of the United States, having in the most perfect good faith returned to their allegiance and resumed their former status, as true and loyal citizens of the United States and the restored government of Virginia.” Further, they reformed this attachment to the Union based on the shared “hereditary attachment to the Union, transmitted to us by our revolutionary ancestors.” Virginians offered two counterpoints to the issue of wartime loyalty. By asserting that they were now loyal and had taken oaths of allegiance to the Union after the war, former Confederates argued that they were again part of the nation again. That meant they should receive the right to vote and participate in the governance of their state as well as the fact that no real distinction should exist between them and wartime Unionists in the eyes of the law. Such a depiction was an attempt to justify the return of white Southerners to political control and protect their institutions from Republican and
African American control. They also laid the foundations for the shared heritage of white Americans that would help undermine the memory of wartime loyalty, by calling on the specter of the Revolution and the Founders.\textsuperscript{33}

Where some ex-Confederates aimed to prove their return to loyalty, other antebellum Unionists and Northern Democrats downplayed the issue of wartime allegiance altogether. Some, like Alexander H. H. Stuart campaigned to represent Charlottesville, Virginia in Congress after the war by dismissing the importance of his wartime activities. While Northerners proclaimed that Stuart was unfit for the post because of support for the Confederacy, the Virginian argued that throughout his life he labored to protect the Union. “For two years before the rupture, I devoted all my energies to the great work of preserving the Union.”\textsuperscript{34} When he signed the document condoning secession, which he personally opposed, Stuart stated that he did so because he was obligated to authenticate the will of the Secession Convention as one of its members. Further, when Stuart made his way home in 1861, he argued that he had sought no political office, rather he only offered his sympathies to his community, and “gave aid, countenance and encouragement, in every way I could, to my gallant though misguided countrymen.”\textsuperscript{35} Stuart’s response read of a conditional loyalty. Yes, technically he had helped his community, which happened to support the Confederacy and Secession. However, those individuals were wrong and he did so only because they were his friends and family, not because he loved the Confederacy. He had personally labored for peace and the preservation of the Union. Regardless of where Stuart fell in relationship to support for the government, he had been loyal to his people and done his duty to protect them—that alone qualified him for a position in the government. Similar to other Confederates who highlighted the shared connections between

\textsuperscript{33} Rubin, \textit{A Shattered Nation}, 146-8.
\textsuperscript{34} AHH Stuart, Broadside 1865: 47 oversize, Virginia Museum of Culture and History, Richmond, Virginia.
\textsuperscript{35} AHH Stuart, Broadside 1865: 47 oversize, Virginia Museum of Culture and History, Richmond, Virginia.
Southerners and Northerners in the Mid-Atlantic, Stuart portrayed himself as a good American, who faithfully supported his community and labored for peace, a carefully crafted message that could allow Unionists to accept him back into the body politic.

Democrats conversely approached the issue of loyalty with the attention of sidestepping the issue of wartime allegiance, at least to some limited degree in 1865 and 1866. Where Confederates had to prove that they were again loyal and could hardly avoid the subject, Northern Democrats attempted to turn political conversations away from direct comparisons of wartime loyalty. Democratic Party leaders in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, south of Pittsburgh, urged their local officials to “Be firm, active and discreet, and use every honorable means to rescue our beloved country from the clutches of the Abolitionists” in a July 1866 circular regarding registering voters for the upcoming election. The discretion advocated by Democratic operatives suggests that open confrontation with Republicans was unadvisable. Why? It is most likely because Republicans would and did use the success of the Union war effort to bolster their political campaigns in 1865. To combat the issue of wartime loyalty, Democrats made sure to invoke the issue of race. The Easton Argus instructed residents of eastern Pennsylvania that “If you are in favor of negro equality” or “going up to the ballot box by the side a wooly-headed negro” or are “in favor of admitting the negro into your family circle…vote the Abolition ticket.” Yet, if they favored the maintenance of “the Constitution, the Union and the cause of the white man” then Pennsylvanians should vote the Democratic ticket.

37 Foner, Reconstruction, 487; Sandow, Deserter County, 139-46.
38 Easton Argus, 6, 1865.
allowed Democrats and former Confederates who adopted a similar process to counter how
Republicans invoked loyalty.39

Race proved an effective counter to Republican uses of wartime loyalty, as it forced
white Unionists to justify supporting African American elevation at the expense of other white
Americans. As black Americans increasingly advocated they were loyal and therefore worthy of
protection, white Northerners grew increasingly uncertain about Reconstruction. Did black men
and women, the social, cultural, and intellectual inferiors of white society really deserve
inclusion within the country? While many Mid-Atlantic residents justified the war through its
destruction of slavery, as Democrats distanced themselves from conversations about loyalty, it
became harder for Republicans to besmirch the actions of Copperheads and Confederates.
Democratic challengers would further change the narrative of the war, loyalty, and its memory,
through the manipulation of social spaces.

Loyalty in Social Spaces

Outside of the political realm, Southerners and other challengers to Unionist visions of
loyalty found that they could package an acceptable vision of the nation to white audiences
through social control. In October of 1865, Washington Bowie, a resident of Montgomery
County, Maryland, endeavored “to divert the minds of many of the best young men of the
country from the bloody scenes they had witnessed for the past four years.”40 He attempted to do
so through the revival of an old tradition: the ring tournament. Jousts, race days, or ring
tournaments, all represented terms for similar equestrian events that dated back to at least 1840

39 Easton Argus, 6, 1865.
40 “The First Tournament in Maryland,” October 12, 1865,” Miscellaneous, 1837-1925 and undated, Bowie Family
Papers, 91-223, Special Collections, University of Maryland Libraries.
in the South, but had faltered during the war.\textsuperscript{41} In the summer and fall of 1865, Marylanders and Virginians organized dozens of these tournaments throughout the Mid-Atlantic.\textsuperscript{42} The tournaments usually consisted of anywhere between eight and twenty-five ‘knights’ attempting to capture metal rings (or strike a replica knight off a wooden horse) with a wooden lance.\textsuperscript{43} Whoever demonstrated the most skill with his lance by gathering the most rings, would earn the honor of selecting “Queen of Love and Beauty,” a woman from the audience they deemed the most beautiful.\textsuperscript{44}

Ring tournaments helped Southerners cope with the shock of defeat by controlling social spaces where they portrayed themselves as idyllic knights from the forgotten past. Through the spectacle of tournaments and festivals Southern men styled themselves as knights and belles as maidens evoking the Middle Ages and the popular literature of Walter Scott’s \textit{Ivanhoe}. In doing so, Southerners hoped to prove the reality behind the depiction of their men as gentlemanly cavaliers.\textsuperscript{45} Orations and reports of the tournaments printed in newspapers frequently described

\begin{itemize}
\item G. Harrison Orians, “The Origin of the Ring Tournament in the United States,” \textit{Maryland Historical Magazine}, Vol. 36 (1941), 269-72. According to Orians, in his discourse on the foundations of the Ring Tournament in Southern culture, he locates the start near Baltimore in 1840, by William Gilmor Sr., at the Vineyard. Orians suggests that a variety of interpretations existed as to the start of the tournaments across the South—such as an impetus from literature (such as Walter Scott’s \textit{Ivanhoe}) or an unbroken succession of events from the beginning of Colonial America, carried over by English gentry. He suggests that not enough information exists to support either of those postions.
\item Orians, “The Origin of the Ring Tournament in the United States,” 270.
\item Ibid., 266.
\end{itemize}
the Southern knights as honorable, gallant, and chivalric. These reports and speeches drove home the superiority of Southerners. The tournaments also become a place for Virginians and Marylanders to present a message about the end of the war where they accepted defeat and advocated for reunion. In November 1868, at the Augusta County Fair, former Confederate General John Echols gave the Southern knights a clear charge about their manhood and loyalty. The knights gathered for the tournament were the “representatives of the youthful manhood and chivalry in Virginia,” tasked with the redemption of their state, not by politics, but by uplifting the resources and wealth of the Old Dominion. More importantly, these men had a “duty to forget the past, and now only to remember that we are citizens of a great government.”

Echols intended that message, published in the *Staunton Spectator*, to resonate with Northern audiences and cast Virginians in a positive light. The men were honorable, worthy individuals, who could redeem the state and nation through the improvement of industry and natural resources—ideals that would appeal to industry-minded Northerners, as it made the South appear progressive. Similarly, it encourages Northerners that Virginians had forgotten wartime loyalty and now embraced fidelity to the nation. Echols appealed to what made Virginians worthy of inclusion back in the nation (they were progressive and honorable) and that the issue of wartime loyalty no longer merited any serious attention in the state.

The act of forgetting the Civil War and loyalty was just that, an act, and the ring tournaments served as a way for Virginians and Marylanders to control the narrative about post-war loyalty and contrast themselves with their Mid-Atlantic counterparts. In September and October of 1865, Virginian papers reported on the attempts of African Americans in Alexandria,

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46 For instance, see: *Alexandria Gazette* July 23, 1868; *The Aegis & Intelligencer* September 4, 1868 and January 7, 1870; *St. Mary’s Gazette*, June 7, 1866; *Staunton Spectator and General Advertiser*, September 5, 1865; *Staunton Spectator*, November 3, 1868.
47 *Staunton Spectator*, November 3, 1868.
Virginia to organize their own ring tournament. The Norfolk Post and the Alexandria Gazette and Virginia Advertiser both openly mocked the prospect of black knights. The Post sardonically noted that African Americans had held the reigns for the First Families of Virginia “long enough,” and they would not have their own tournament, in their “mailed steel, (“mail-ed” in two syllables, if you please)” and with “their tortuous trotters in real greaves.” The short article concluded, bidding the African Americans “Go on, gentle colored Knights, and show the white folks what you can do.” In October, after the event, the Alexandria paper reported on the event in a similar, condescending tone, ultimately noting that “The American Eagle evidently has his tail curled,” as a result of the black tournament. The ridicule leveled at African American tournaments demonstrates that the events were an attempt by former Confederates to control social spaces and the narrative about respectability.

In the aftermath of the Civil War, white Southerners manipulated social spaces as a means to control the appearance of both white and blacks to Northern audiences. At circuses, in taverns, and throughout other public forums, white Southerners cast themselves as honorable, respectable citizens. Southerners used the ring tournament in Alexandria, and at other settings throughout the region, to cast African Americans as unfit for social places, either as unsuitable for participation in the body politic. The use of American patriotic imagery, in this instance the American eagle, also highlighted the shared connection between white Americans. The invocation of an ashamed American eagle at the spectacle put on by African American “knights”

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49 *The Norfolk Post*, September 4, 1865.
50 Ibid.
51 *Alexandria Gazette and Virginia Advertiser*, October 18, 1865.
suggested that white Southerners and Northerners shared a common connection that should feel uncomfortable with the introduction of African Americans into proper, respectable society. As Southern whites attempted to portray themselves as virtuous and honorable gentlemen, this worked best when it elevated former Confederates, but downplayed the abilities of African Americans to integrate into American society, thus driving home the limitations of any changing status for black Americans.

Virginians also used the tournaments as a venue to challenge Reconstruction and assert the memory of the Confederacy. Where Southern knights held gentlemanly qualities and acted as honorable individuals, Radical Republicans Virginians argued and their process of rebuilding the nation was an affront to all Americans. Wielding the language of the tournaments, the *Staunton Spectator* noted in 1867 that Radical chivalry “consists first in putting your adversary at your mercy, next plundering him, and then pummeling him whilst he is down.” Whereas knights in legends went out to do good, a subtle nod to the idea of Southern knights looking to better the nation, Republicans mistreated and belittled the Southern people. When any good man would stand up to such mistreatment, “he would be instantly denounced as disloyal” and “his frankness of speech would be used as an argument for the further oppression of himself and his people.”

Radical Republicans portrayed themselves as loyal Americans and stewards of the republic, yet their actions, including the mistreatment of honorable Southerners as well as the elevation of African Americans, proved that Radicals deserved no place in determining the course of the nation.

The ring tournaments also served as an early step in how Southerners reworked loyalty after the Civil War. While speakers at the tournaments encouraged the young men to forget the past and sectional divisions, the events themselves did not necessarily practice the act of

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53 *Staunton Spectator*, May 28, 1867.
forgetfulness. These tournaments usually concluded with an evening of music and dancing at a nearby home or barn.\textsuperscript{54} On at least one occasion, in Maryland, D. Sterett Gitings recalled that upon crowning the “Queen of Love and Beauty” the woman rode around the arena as the crowd sang the pro-secession song, “Maryland, My Maryland.”\textsuperscript{55} Other tournaments, like one held at Manassas in 1868, offered more explicit Confederate connections. On the anniversary of the war’s first battle, the Memorial Association of Manassas hosted the tournament to help raise money “to erect a suitable monument for their former brothers in arms.”\textsuperscript{56} As Caroline Janney has demonstrated, ladies’ associations, like the one at Manassas played a vital part in building the origins of the Lost Cause.\textsuperscript{57} The rings tournaments were a part of that legacy, as it gave women the opportunity to gather support for memorials to the Confederacy, presented a platform to suggest common unity between Northerners and Southerners, and presented white Southerners as virtuous citizens of society. Further, the origins of the Lost Cause at ring tournaments also appeared in direct ways, as at least one Southern rider styled himself the “Knight of the Lost Cause” and rode at the Manassas tournament.\textsuperscript{58}

The tournaments also highlighted how former Confederates subdued their national loyalty to the Confederacy in exchange for a palatable, ‘American’ loyalty that was respectable, honorable, and most importantly, white. When Marylanders performed a ring tournament at the 1876 Centennial in Philadelphia, they not only displayed their chivalric nature, but they also portrayed themselves as respectable members of American society. The event attracted a large

\textsuperscript{54} Orians, “The Origin of the Ring Tournament in the United States.”
\textsuperscript{55} D. Sterett Gitings, “Recollections of Brooklandwood Tournaments,” \textit{Maryland Historical Magazine}, Vol. 36 (1941), 279-80.
\textsuperscript{56} Alexandria Gazette, July 23, 1868.
\textsuperscript{57} Janney, \textit{Burying the Dead But Not the Past}, 1-12.
\textsuperscript{58} At least two men rode under the mantel of the “Knight of the Lost Cause” in July 1868, J. R. Brawner at the Manassas and Jason Legg in August at Carlin’s Spring. A third appearance comes in November of 1868, but there is no clear name associated with the knight. Alexandria Gazette, July 23, 1868; Alexandria Gazette, August 25, 1868; \textit{The Daily Dispatch}, November 12, 1868.
crowd—according to the *New York Times*, the second largest crowd of the Centennial events at that point. After a rider from Baltimore won the affair and the crowning of the Queen of Beauty, there was a celebration of dancing and prizes. While it is unclear who sat in the audience to watch the ring tournament, the *New York Times* reported on the event favorably. Yet, the presentation of knights, riding and collecting rings with a lance challenged the proscribed depiction of the Centennial as an event that reinforced America’s progress over its first hundred years of freedom.\(^59\)

Between May and November of 1876, the city of Philadelphia hosted the Centennial exposition in order to highlight the material production and expansion of the United States. The Centennial events in Philadelphia were the highlight of the 1870s, where Americans reinforced their progress and unity to the world. Americans endeavored to present a unified front for European investors especially. Through the creation of exhibits, displays, and performances, the nation could celebrate its freedom, its material progress, and the unity of the nation, finally putting the Civil War behind them. A ring tournament, steeped in medieval imagery and literature would have hardly seemed appropriate for the event. Northerners who controlled the Centennial commission excluded Southerners from the planning of the affair as well as equal opportunities to provide displays, exhibits, or products. The theme of an industrial republic on the rise would then make riding knights an unwelcome sight, unless a deeper message was at play amongst the white organizers of the fair.\(^60\)

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Throughout the United States, local and national celebrations of the Centennial reinforced the racial hierarchies and memories of American history a century after the Revolution. Community-based festivities across the United States became an important means of connecting communities to the nation writ large, but also served as a means of gaining acceptance as an American citizen for underrepresented populations, such as immigrants and African Americans. Historian Craig Bruce Smith referred to the Centennial celebrations in Boston from 1870 to 1876, between Yankees (white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants) and minority groups (Irish immigrants and African Americans), as a contest between claims of Americanness through “blood ancestry” or “symbolic inheritance.”61 Yankees in Boston claimed a direct blood link between their ancestors who fought in the Revolution and minority groups who could not claim direct connections to the early American nation, but could claim a symbolic support of the nation’s ideals through their race’s participation in the Revolution (recently the Civil War).62 The fact that Americans could and did exclude others from inclusion in the boundaries of society during the Centennial points to an important interpretative trend of the 1870s: white Americans, North or South, used a connection to the Revolutionary past to exclude specific groups. Additionally, the era of World Fairs that emerged out of the Centennial celebration often focused on white hegemony and control of non-white populations.63 The ring tournament might have seen antagonistic to the purpose of the Centennial on the surface, but underneath, just as Southerners controlled social spaces for blacks, the Centennial affirmed the idea that all white Americans maintained influence over the nation and defined what it meant to be a part of the country.

62 Ibid., 7-53.
Ex-Confederates, along with an increasingly large portion of the white Unionists in the Mid-Atlantic, came to define loyalty based on an ‘American’ interpretation of the nation’s past. During the war, Unionists and Confederates had sanctified their respective national causes and definitions of loyalty within a framework that gloried the Revolutionary Era. After the war, white Mid-Atlantic residents shifted the broader definition of loyalty away from action and to legacy. Through literature, the sanitization of slavery, public orations, and other sources, whites throughout the Mid-Atlantic changed how they understood loyalty, which, in the end, delegitimized the claims of African Americans for their participation in society because of their wartime loyalty.

Despite the attempts by white Virginians to manipulate social spaces to curtail African American participation in the body politic, economic difficulties produces a temporary biracial alliance between dissatisfied whites and blacks. The Readjuster Movement in Virginia led by William Mahone forged an alliance between white and black Virginians, while highlighting the fact that the issue of loyalty after 1865 remained fluid in the Mid-Atlantic. Dissatisfied by their respective political partners—Democrats for some white Virginians and Republicans for African Americans—and plagued by economic discontent, middle and working class white Virginians allied with black voters to create their own political party. Although short-lived, the cross-racial cooperation during the late 1870s and early 1880s, shows that decades after the Civil War the wartime understanding of loyalty had suffered serious setbacks. There were plenty in the Mid-Atlantic who still advocated the memory of a reciprocal definition of loyalty, but changing political landscapes weakened the unity of white Republicans and African Americans that had helped preserve the wartime vision of allegiance. In the Mid-Atlantic, the dismantling of the
Republican guard who preserved the reciprocal definition of loyalty allowed larger transformations to take root.  

**A New Memory of Loyalty**  

Over time, Mid-Atlantic residents blurred their national wartime loyalties and accepted a version of history put forward by defeated Southerners that refashioned the idea of the war and loyalty into something that white Americans could enjoy together. In addition to vindicating the cause of Southern soldiers, proponents of the Lost Cause also privileged the shared culture that connected them with white Northerners along racial lines. Many of these individuals worked to dismantle the firm dichotomy that Republicans had put in place during and after the war—that loyalty was an either-or paradigm. Instead, ex-Confederates articulated the fact that they had remained true to the earliest American ideals and the North had wronged them, through an unjust war and unwise policy of emancipation. Arguing that the Lost Cause removed slavery as a cause of the war and the North was wrong, is nothing new to the scholarship of the Civil War’s memory. Yet, by examining the history of loyalty after the war, it is clear that Southerners attempted to change how people remembered their loyalty. In the end, they managed to do so successfully, but not without their detractors. The key is that former Rebels did not forsake their identity as ex-Confederates or their loyalty to the beaten Southern nation, rather they transformed it into something more palatable for the reception of white Northerners.

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65 As David Blight has argued, the Lost Cause put forward the notion that, “a glorious, organic civilization [the South was] destroyed by an avaricious “industrial society” [the North] determined to wipe out its cultural foes.” Blight, *Race and Reunion*, 257.

66 This is far from a new argument posed here. However, it is a necessary element of the narrative of loyalty, one that followed the articulation of how Americans viewed and understood their attachment to the Union and Confederacy following the end of the Civil War.
This transformation appeared in a number of forms, from literature to political debates and monument dedications, but they were not unilaterally Southern changes to the memory of the war. In post-war literature, Northerners and Southerners relied on two common themes to push a reconciliationist agenda and emphasize the American loyalty of white Northerners and Southerners. First, post-war writing tended to downplay the intelligence of African Americans and the role of slavery to the coming of the Civil War. At the start of *The Hoiden’s Triumph*, *Virtus In Arduis*, an unpublished novel about the antebellum and Civil War eras by James McFadden Gaston, a South Carolinian who served as a surgeon in the Army of Northern Virginia, the story’s protagonist beats one of his slaves as he shouts “There, you imprudent dog. Now will you learn not to answer back when I speak to you? Take the horse back and clean him properly, I’ll teach you your place.” Gaston’s intention was rather clear, that his novel put those who had disrupted Southern society, African Americans and by extension Northerners, in their place. Gaston and other authors highlighted the inadequacies of African Americans as simple individuals who needed Southern masters to guide them through life, stated that slavery had nothing to do with the, or that emancipation hindered African Americans. Post-war literature also presented a romantic depiction of the war, where Northern and Southern characters fell in love before or during the conflict. These novels usually concluded with some form of reconciliation between the separated lovers and their marriage (or promise of marriage) to signify the reunion of the nation. Both of these themes helped convince white Mid-Atlantic residents, that their differences were far less extensive than the gulf between white and black Americans. Further, the sentimental nature of the reunions in novels pushed for sectional reunion as well.\(^{67}\)

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In other public orations and conversations, white Mid-Atlantic residents continued to rework the post-war narrative of loyalty. The case of Julius L. Powell offers a compelling example of the shift brought on by Mid-Atlantic residents to loyalty after Reconstruction. In 1878, the *New York Tribune* lamented the state of affairs in Congress. Democrats proposed the appointment of Powell as an Assistant-Surgeon in the United States Army. The proposal rankled Republicans, including George F. Edmunds, who vehemently spoke out against the proposal because “Powell had served in the Confederate Army, and was consequently ineligible for the position” based on Federal laws.\(^{68}\) Citing *The World*, the *Tribune* reported that Edmunds opposed the appointment and further took the chance to offer “a few mean things about the Confederates and the rebellion and the Army.”\(^{69}\) Democrats ignored Republican objections and passed the bill anyway. This, *The Tribune* argued, must be part of the new Democratic “programme, which consists in immediate reduction of the army on the score of the economy; then the repeal of this offensive statute [preventing Confederates from serving in the U.S. Army]; and the reinstatement of the Southern army officers who in 1861 betrayed their trust and went into rebellion.”\(^{70}\) Powell’s postwar experience highlights the continuing gulf between how white Southerners and Northern Democrats portrayed wartime loyalty—as a non-issue—and Republicans who attempted to maintain the idea that wartime allegiance and the reciprocal nature of that ‘agreement’ still mattered. Virginians would help drive a nail into that coffin with the maturation of the Lost Cause.


\(^{69}\) Ibid.

\(^{70}\) Ibid.
Ex-Confederates in Virginia, and the South writ-large, expanded on this carefully coordinated transformation that subsumed their Confederate loyalty behind the mask of the Lost Cause. Southerners did not lessen their commitment to the Confederacy or what it stood for from 1861 to 1865, they remained vehemently attached to their former nation. Instead, they shifted the focus of their allegiance, from that of a national attachment to the Confederacy towards a loyalty to the South and its culture as part of the larger nation. At the dedication of Jefferson Davis’ “White House” in Richmond on February 22, 1896, a series of speeches made clear this new sense of loyalty. Charles O’Ferrall, governor of Virginia during the dedication, argued that the women of the Confederate Memorial Literary Society who helped create the house museum to Davis and the Confederacy did so not “in any spirit of disloyalty to our reunited land,” rather “while we intend ever to be true to ourselves, to our martyred dead, and to our heroes, dead and living—to our traditions and civilizations, to everything that characterizes a brave and chivalrous race—we proclaim ourselves loyal sons and daughters of this Union.” O’Farrell pledged the loyalty of the South to the Union, despite their work to preserve the memory of the Confederacy, or as he put it their “traditions and civilizations.”

Bradley T. Johnson, a former Confederate general, followed up O’Farrell’s remarks with a further evaluation of Virginia’s loyalty to the South. While Johnson rallied against the “incessant protestations of loyalty to the victors,” he asserted the righteousness of the Southern cause. Moreover, he argued that the Civil War was a clash between the invading North and Virginia, as well as the South, whom the Unionists wrongly invaded. Virginia, in Johnson’s opinion, “never seceded from the Union. She resisted invasion as her free ancestors for eight

72 Charles O’Ferrall, “Address,” as recorded in In Memoriam Sempiternam (Confederate Museum: Richmond, Va., 1896), 42.
hundred years had done with arms and force.” Virginia had never committed treason, Johnson argued, rather the North had done so by its invasion of the South. Furthermore, Virginia, the birthplace of the nation and Washington, had suffered at the hands of the North that grew hostile to the superiority of the South.

The emphasis on loyalty to the white South as part of the United States, not only afforded ex-Confederates a platform to speak as obedient members of the American Union, but it also gave them the ability to redraw the map of the nation. In the Mid-Atlantic this meant a reemphasis on the Mason-Dixon Line as a division between the North and South. Brantz Mayer had detected contention in Maryland as early as 1866, as did Robert Kirkwood with the clashes between Unionists and Confederates in the streets of Baltimore, but former Confederates made the division rather clear late in the nineteenth century. At the dedication of the Confederate “White House” as a museum of the Confederacy in 1896, the publication of the event, In Memoriam Sempiternam, listed all the states of the old Confederacy and their date of entrance into the Southern nation. It included three additional states beyond its eleven recognized, wartime members: Missouri (August 20, 1861), Kentucky (December 10, 1861), and Maryland with no date provided. On one hand, the commemorative volume noted with an asterisk, that Maryland “Unable to speak for herself through the regular appointed methods, the sovereignty of Maryland found representation in the strong arms of the fifteen thousand or more who gave their service to the South, and in the loyal hearts and heroic deeds of her women.” Additionally, the creation of individual rooms in the mansion, one for each state of the Confederacy, including a Maryland Room with a bust of Robert E. Lee, provided by the Confederate Society of the Army

74 Ibid.
75 Confederate Memorial Literary Society, In Memoriam Sempiternam (Confederate Museum: Richmond, Va., 1896), 12.
and Navy of Maryland.\textsuperscript{76} By acknowledging Maryland as part of the Confederacy, in both the official program of the dedication and the museum itself, Confederate Memorial Literary Society reshaped the cartography of loyalty. With the inclusion of Maryland within the Confederacy, the Mason-Dixon Line returned as a regional division between two parts of the United States.

Adjacent to these attempts at reshaping loyalty was the way in which Southerners and ex-Confederates attempted to alter the loyalty of slaves through the creation of the loyal slave myth. In his speech at the Confederate museum in 1896, Bradley Johnson reported that emancipation was “The great crime of the century.”\textsuperscript{77} More importantly, Johnson believed that the African American had gained freedom “against his will, without assistance, he has been turned loose in America to do the best he can in contest with the strongest race that ever lived.”\textsuperscript{78} A key element of the Lost Cause was its dual denials of slavery as a cause of the war and African American agency. Johnson’s view that enslaved African Americans did not desire freedom before, during, or after the Civil War, robs them of a proud moment, as well as the claim that they offered for their political rights—their loyalty. Denying African Americans any control of their world, other than serving their masters faithful, would undercut any claims of black heritage and support for the Union that African Americans could offer.

From Petersburg, Virginia, John Herbert Claiborne, wrote a book on African Americans in 1900 that supported this dual denial. Not only did African Americans enjoy slavery, learn from Southerners of “good quality, and culture and education,” but also they improved morally and committed no crimes as slaves.\textsuperscript{79} More importantly, Claiborne argued that:

\textsuperscript{76} Confederate Memorial Literary Society, \textit{In Memoriam Sempiternam}, 56.
\textsuperscript{77} Johnson, “General Johnson’s Address,” \textit{In Memoriam Sempiternam}, 50.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 51.
\textsuperscript{79} John Herbert Claiborne, “The Negro: 1. His Environments as a Slave. 2. His Environments as a Freedman” John Herbert Claiborne Manuscripts, MSS 4572, Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.
During the Civil War, when the Southern plantations were left almost exclusively in charge of the negro slaves, the few ladies of the family were as safe as if under the care of a body of soldiery. There was not a colored man who would not have sacrificed his life to save the honor of his mistress. Faithful, honest, and true, he was their support in the day, and in the night time their sentinel; and this whilst under full knowledge of the fact that the master was away fighting to fasten the chains of slavery upon his neck.80

Claiborne argued that African Americans remained faithful to their masters, even as they knowingly battled to preserve the institution of slavery. While this sentiment flies in the face of how free and enslaved African Americans acted, during the war, it did not prevent Southerners from diluting their participation in the war, as well as their loyalty to the nation.

There were, of course, Union veterans that accepted their former enemies as friends along with a new vision of the nation and allegiance. Such instances of recognition highlighted the common connections between white Northerners and Southerners. Captain R. H. Cochran, of the Society of the Army of West Virginia, stated in his speech to Union veterans in 1871, “He who was our foe is now our friend.” While the veterans met to renew their social relationship, Cochran compared their reunion with that the connection the North and South: “Our American hearts are touched with a common impulse, they vibrate as a single chord; with a common pride our eyes behold a common country and a single flag; as citizens, we worship at a common shrine.”81 Like proponents of the Lost Cause, Cochran called on the shared history of the United States to anchor the connections of former Unionists and Confederates. His language as well stirred to mind the similarities of white men—their common beating heart, the single thread that connected them together, a solitary national flag, and a shared religion spoke of heritage, not wartime actions. Comparatively, while Cochran addressed the destruction of slavery as a positive

good of the war, African Americans hardly fit into this equation of the war’s memory. The erasure of the African American experience as well as the idea of reciprocal loyalty grew louder.

Others throughout the Union Mid-Atlantic states offered up a similar language of reunion and loyalty. In 1879, Colonel R. L. Nye spoke to West Virginia veterans, noting, “The true soldier, in a just cause, knows no enmity,” and indeed, even in the darkest hour of the war, there was not a moment when “returning rebel would not have been received with joyous hospitality in the camps of the Union.” Union soldiers were always prepared, in Nelson’s account to accept Confederates and rebel citizens back into the nation. This message, after the end of Reconstruction, levels an off-handed challenge to Republicans, as their actions after the war had divided the nation unnecessarily.

Perhaps the best example of forgetting national differences and loyalties comes from the “Shepherdstown Diary.” Provided to the Shepherdstown Register by a former Confederate, the diary offered detailed information about the war years in the town. The edited edition of the diary, published in 1925, offered a “somewhat inside view of those terrible days,” according to the volume’s editor. In fact, the view of Shepherdstown, while illuminative of events that occurred during the war and the hardships residents of the town experienced, felt the heavy hand of time and distorted memory. The diary editor reported that he “omitted in the main the names of many for considerate and obvious reasons…The mantle of charity of more than sixty years should and does hide the former animosity and ill feeling,” as the United States now stood as a joyous, united country. Yet, as a former Confederate, Gallaher hoped that despite this peace “there may be some who will neither forget nor forgive.” Such a depiction of a wartime diary

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83 “Fragments of a Diary of Shepherdstown Events During the Civil War of 1861-1865,” “Preface,” Shepherdstown (W. Va.) Civil War Diary, A&M No. 76, WVRHC.
84 Ibid., “Note.”
and the editing of the document, suggests two things. First, despite Gallaher’s removal of names from the record, wartime loyalty remained a crucial issue for the veteran. As the diary continuously demonstrated outrages against supporters of the Confederacy, there was a clear intention that Southerners and ex-Confederates should not forget the actions of those loyal to the Union government. Secondly, the Shepherdstown Diary also highlights the residents of the Mid-Atlantic re-established solid divisions between the North and South. Loyalty remained in the text of the diary—divisions between Unionists and Confederates were strong, however so too was the air of removing the specifics of loyalty. The fact that the editor had removed most of the names of the Unionists or Confederates from the tale expunged the personal connections of loyalty, instead, it depersonalized the acrimony of the conflict. Actors who stole from or killed one another during the war now appeared as crossed out names in a general history of Shepherdstown wartime experience. The division of loyalty remained, but only as an abstract background to the drama of the town.

Perhaps the acceptance of a reconciliationist memory took hold amongst West Virginian and Maryland veterans more easily because of the divided nature of their states during and after the war. From the attempts of Republicans in West Virginia to prevent supporters of the Confederacy to return to their homes to the violent political discontent in Baltimore, divisions permeated the region well after Mid-Atlantic residents left the battlefields. The Civil War had compelled Americans to think nationally in a way they had failed to do before 1861. Where local considerations had once dominated their understanding of life inside the United States, they had to articulate their national identities with the urgency of war, disunion, and the specter of
‘national’ disaster looming just over the horizon.\textsuperscript{85} The aftermath of the Civil War, especially as time provided distance to ease the passions of civil strife as well as the convenient fact that they only had one nation to support beyond 1865, allowed for Mid-Atlantic residents to return to a semblance of their prewar lifestyles. Of course, the Civil War had changed the people and the region, but without two different nations to argue over, individuals in the border region could compromise for the sake of family and community.

Not all residents of the Mid-Atlantic accepted these changes to the narrative of loyalty put forward in literature or Confederate memorialization. Many Unionists (especially Republicans) and African Americans labored hard to maintain the distinction between their nation and the former Confederacy. Furthermore, not all Confederates agreed with the idea of hiding their national distinctiveness underneath a guise of reconciliation. For many Unionists and Confederates, loyalty remained a dividing issue in the Mid-Atlantic, despite the efforts of their counterparts who wrote and labored against such divisions. John S. Mosby noted in 1907 that he found the speeches at a recent Confederate Veterans reunion unacceptable and disingenuous. “According to the \textit{Christian} the Virginian people were the abolitionists & the Northern people were pro-slavery.”\textsuperscript{86} While some old Virginians did speak out against slavery, Mosby confessed, the article in question failed to cite what Civil War Era Virginians had said in defense of slavery. Despite a stated personal opposition to slavery, Mosby noted, “I am not ashamed that my family were slaveholders. It was our inheritance,” and as such, people should be judged on their standards “of their own age. If it was right to own slaves as property it was right to fight for it.


\textsuperscript{86} John S. Mosby to Samuel Chapman, June 4, 1907. Italics added to emphasize the newspaper the \textit{Christian}.  

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The South went to war on account of slavery.”

Mosby wrote in contempt of the individuals that attempted to rewrite the memory of the Civil War for personal or political gain. A former Confederate officer, along with other veterans like James Longstreet, there was not universal acceptance of a reconciliationist narrative, though the chorus of opponents grew increasingly smaller in the 1880s and 1890s, confined predominately to the ranks of Union veterans.

Despite these challenges, Union veterans remained some of the most stalwart defenders of the reciprocal nature of wartime loyalty long after Appomattox. In 1879, General [Robert P.] Kennedy addressed the Society of the Army of West Virginia at its third gathering in Marietta, Ohio. He bluntly asserted, in opposition to other speeches offered that day, the fact that while he could forgive the nation’s enemies, “I do not think we are called upon either directly, or indirectly, to recognize or honor the cause for which they fought.” Moreover, while others might plant flowers upon the graves of the Confederate dead, Kennedy, would “plant no roses upon the grave of a dead rebel! I will put mine only upon the grave of the boy in blue!” The Grand Army of the Republic chapter in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, passed a similar sounding resolution in March of 1880 that stated their association. Not only did they aim to improve the fraternal feelings of soldierly brotherhood developed during the war, make those who took up arms against the Union ineligible in their ranks, but also they wanted to “maintain our true allegiance to the United States of America.” In doing so, they sought to honor the men “who

87 John S. Mosby to Samuel Chapman, June 4, 1907.
88 Blight, Race and Reunion, 293-4.
89 Janney, Remembering the Civil War, 5-9, 11; Brian Matthew Jordan, Marching Home: Union Veterans and Their Unending Civil War (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), 1-7, 193-4.
91 Ibid., 45.
united to suppress the rebellion” and not the Confederates who tried to destroy the nation. In this argument the Civil War had shattered the United States apart, the perpetrators of that crime required no special sanction or consideration. Rather, Kennedy and Pennsylvania veterans made it clear that refused to accept any version of honor amongst former Confederates.

Other Unionists agreed with the idea of a permanent division between the Union and Confederate definitions of loyalty and the memory of the war. A circular from the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States in Pennsylvania in 1910 echoed the earlier veteran organizations. In an article titled “Losing Our Standards,” the paper asked the reader if the legion members had lost their standards to “a flux of good feeling?” The Civil War it argues was a conflict waged over democracy, liberty, and Christian principles. “Both sides cannot have been right” in regards to the conflict. Rather:

To insist now that there was no difference in the ideals and purposes of the two forces of 1861 is to reduce history to the plane of the mobing-picture shows, to make light of the greatest sacrifices ever offered in this or any country for principle or patriotism. It is to decry the men who saved the Union if we declare that there was only a chance difference between their views and those of their opponents, or to assert that time has wiped out all the principles for which Lincoln and his followers stood.

Where former Confederates and their empathizers in the North called on the old version of the United States, harkening back to the Antebellum period, the Revolution, and the old patriotism of the nation as a single unifying trend, a portion of Union veterans called on the memory of the new nation. Lincoln, the patron saint of the Union Army after the war, had secured his vision of

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a united nation, with the destruction of slavery, and with a nation-state that protected the
supporters of the blue clad Union soldier, while punishing those in butternut or grey.

African Americans also maintained their challenges to the white transformation of
loyalty, maintaining, that they deserved inclusion in the nation because of their wartime loyalty.
For African Americans, the specter of bondage remained ever present in their recollections of the
past. Some black leaders argued that African Americans should forget the years before slavery
and focus on the prospect of racial uplift, while others argued that freedmen and women needed
to celebrate their place in American without ignoring the hardships of slavery. While white
Southerners increasingly restricted the rights and opportunities of African Americans, black
communities continued to celebrate emancipation, the Union victory, and Lincoln on holidays
throughout the late 1880s and 1890s. Outside of those days, however, African Americans in the
Mid-Atlantic demonstrated that the landscape of loyalty had changed as Reconstruction faded.
When the Supreme Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875 through the case United States
v. Stanley in 1883, African Americans lamented the decision. Henry McNeal Turner wrote in the
Christian Recorder that the court’s decision “absolves the negro’s allegiance to the general
government, makes the American flag to him a rag of contempt instead of a symbol of liberty.”
White Mid-Atlantic residents had compromised over the issue of loyalty to the point where
African Americans no longer felt the need to proclaim their allegiance to the Union and its
memory.

Conclusion

Siren Bunten summarized the memory of the Civil War in 1901 when she returned to
write in her Civil War diary for the first time in thirty-four years. Time had worn on Bunten, but

94 Blight, Race and Reunion, 300-37.
she recalled the war and the “many soldiers in this book of my life yet now they are nearly all
gone out of my life. Crippled and old some remain on earth. But many are sleeping beneath the
sods of the valley—deaf to the drum beat” of war that swept the nation during the war with
Spain. While Bunten contemplated what the twentieth century would bring the United States, she
recorded that “I have lived in stirring times and times that have made much history.”96 Yet by
1901 the memory of that history, the memory of Bunten’s family and friends who had marched
off to fight in the Civil War no longer appeared the same as when she put pen to paper decades
earlier.

Like Bunten’s twisted flashbacks to her youth, Mid-Atlantic residents had transformed
loyalty into something different by the dawn of the twentieth century. The concept of allegiance
remained important to former Unionists and Confederates, but white Americans had altered their
stance on loyalty, and so had African Americans too. Where Americans had once envisioned
loyalty as a reciprocal relationship between government and citizen, now white Mid-Atlantic
residents wielded it as an adherence to the distant past. Such a vision looked beyond the horizon
of the Civil War itself and to the early foundations of the United States. Led by ex-Confederates,
eventually accepted by most white Unionists, resisted by African Americans and their dwindling
allies, this new version of loyalty allowed Mid-Atlantic whites to side step the issue of race,
emancipation, and the troubling aspects of American history. Of course, Americans still believed
that loyalty connected them to the nation, but rather than focus on wartime attachments to the
Union or Confederacy, a paradigm that gave African Americans access to the victorious federal
government and excluded former Confederates, the new nation was an idealized one that stood
the test of time in the Civil War.

96 Bunten, We Will Know What War Is, April 5, 1901, 103-6.
Thus, the American nation forged by the Revolution and the blood of patriots past found new life in the aftermath of the Civil War. Through literature and their memories, Mid-Atlantic residents shifted the scope of what the nation was. By removing slavery as a cause of the war, the conflict from 1861 to 1865 was a white man’s burden. It happened to include African Americans in its wake, and the nation was better for the destruction of slavery (if perhaps this was a begrudging admission from some Southerners). Yet, that only happened as an extension of the conflict between white Americans who disagreed about their interpretation of the American past. The war resolved those differences by the turn of the twentieth century it was time for all loyal Americans to march onward together.97

Of course, this was all a lie. Unionists and Confederates had forged different nations in the fires of the Civil War. They labored long and hard to accomplish the national visions of union or a slave-holding republic. When one failed, the victors conceded the final battleground to their former enemies—the terrain of memory, cooperating with them to create a palatable recollection of the war that ignored the divisive and troublesome issues of American history that seemed inescapable. In doing so, Mid-Atlantic residents and Americans writ large ignored the centrality of slavery, the loyalty of African Americans, and laid the foundations, drenched in blood, idolized in marble, that left open an unending discourse on the nation’s most divisive era.

97 Blight, Race and Reunion, 338-97.
Conclusion:
Civil War Loyalty and the Twenty-First Century

Since this project began in one form or another a little more than five years ago, Americans have witnessed a great deal of change and tumult in their politics and culture. A contentious presidential election in 2016, followed by a raucous political culture as well as debates over identity, citizenship, and equality have shaped contemporary conversations along with historiographical thinking. The ideological, social, and cultural descendants of the Civil War Era have come home to roost in this atmosphere—or perhaps it is better to suggest that they never left, while having found room to flourish amongst these larger debates. In particular, recent events connected to the Civil War Era, directly or indirectly, have sparked an intense interest in the legacy of the Confederacy, the Lost Cause, and the war itself. From Charleston to Charlottesville, from Richmond to New Orleans to Chapel Hill, monuments, protests, violence, and murder have shaped how Americans engage the memory of the most destructive conflict in their history.¹

It would be foolish to suggest that this project escaped these larger national conversations about decorum, identity, and memory. While Americans have debated the meaning, persistence, and legacy of the Civil War since Appomattox, this project had, at its inception, little to do with the memory of loyalty. Recent events shaped the broader contours of this project and I think, its

contributions to the study of the second half of the nineteenth century. My examination of Civil War loyalty in the Mid-Atlantic began out of a personal fascination with the different ways that Americans understood and used that concept during the war years. I personally felt that historians had approached the study of wartime allegiance in an engaging and interesting, but ultimately incomplete, manner. Their questions often explored how different segments of the American population understood or defined loyalty, but did not explore the similarities and differences between how Unionists, Confederates, and African Americans used that language during the war years. When I started my research, I studied the Mid-Atlantic to explore how different groups and individuals employed loyalty to interpret the war around them and articulate their vision of a nation. To borrow from J. R. R. Tolkien, as I wrote this dissertation, its narrative grew in telling over the past few years. In doing so, this project offers two broad conclusions about the Civil War Era and American history.

First, this project demonstrates that the language of loyalty framed how Mid-Atlantic understood their national identities before, during, and after the Civil War. Using loyalty in their daily lives, Mid-Atlantic residents formed divergent visions of what constituted nationalism and nationhood. This fragmentation allowed them to support two nations and engage in a brutal, if restrained, civil conflict. Loyalty not only helped these individuals articulate their national support, but it also influenced how they connected to the war and world around them between 1861 and 1865. They used loyalty to draw physical and imaginary maps of both nations, charting the blurred boundaries between loyalty and disloyalty. Further, they debated who was a member of their nation through conversations about allegiance. Such discussions also defined how Mid-Atlantic residents should punish those who opposed their rightful interpretation of national
identity. Loyalty guided how Mid-Atlantic residents understood and refracted their experiences of nation building, war, and identity in a century where all three shaped the western world.2

Second, this dissertation shows that Mid-Atlantic residents altered the meaning of loyalty between 1850 and 1900. Before and during the Civil War, Mid-Atlantic residents viewed loyalty as an unspoken contract between government and citizen. For service to the nation, citizens received protection and assurance of their rights in the body politic. Yet, the war itself changed the face of what had been predominately a white nation and how Americans understood loyalty. The actions of free and enslaved African Americans compelled Southerners to plant themselves in opposition to a government they saw as uncooperative and antithetical to their peculiar institution. This division prompted Southerners to form their own nation and to fight for what they saw as their rights. Comparatively, Unionists waged war for the preservation of the Federal Government. War necessitated the positioning of loyalty as an oppositional force—Federals against Confederates, Democrats against Republicans, Southerner Unionists across from Confederates, and African Americans against their oppressors. The nearly 200,000 black men who fought for the United States, demonstrated their loyalty to the nation, and the disloyalty of Confederates who, by the traditional definition, had broken their compact with the Federal Government. After 1865 and the end of the war, this allowed African Americans to claim the reciprocal definition of loyalty that had once dominated the nation. The new construction of American citizenry disturbed white Southerners, and a fair amount of white Northerners too. In the end, Mid-Atlantic whites reinterpreted loyalty, with a new version that prioritized an individual’s heritage. In particular, they ignored the reciprocal nature of loyalty that defined antebellum allegiance, thereby eliminating African Americans from inclusion in society based on

their wartime service and dissipating the acrimony of the oppositional loyalty that defined the war years.

Today we still feel the reverberations of the Civil War Era and the use of loyalty from the conflict. The Civil War occurred because Mid-Atlantic residents and all Americans developed and acted upon an oppositional understanding of national identity. Men and women supported national visions that allowed for war and conflict, death and destruction. In the process, they remade America and the definition of loyalty. If national loyalty was not about actions (for example, rebellion against a legitimate government), but rather was about one’s heritage, then Southerners were never disloyal to the American nation. As the legitimate heirs of the Republic and its earliest foundations, they had only fought for a different interpretation of that past than their Northern counterparts. The oppositional nature of the Civil War therefore remained, as did the grief and resentment of war, but such a reinterpretation of loyalty allowed white Mid-Atlantic residents to exclude African Americans from claims to citizenship. This transformation made it difficult for Americans to reconcile Confederate identities with the rest of American history. By their own admission, Confederates deemed the Union a failure and fought to vindicate their own national identity. They failed. By the pre- and wartime definition of loyalty, then they should have no place in American history as they did not offer faithful service to the government and had declared Unionists their direct opposite, their other, their enemy. However, if Confederates were never disloyal to the heritage of the American past, then they are part of American history and removing their monuments is destroying history. That argument only works if there was an unbroken connection between the Revolution and the present day, where Southerners always remained an integral part of the Union and never sought to fragment the United States through their loyalty to another nation.
According to Philosophy Professor Mathew A. Foust, in his study of loyalty and morality, “in order for our lives to have sense and meaning, and in order to live genuinely moral lives, we must be loyal—and, indeed, loyal to loyalty.”\(^3\) This project cannot claim to assert that loyalty can make you a moral individual if you have a firm belief in a cause that betters humanity, as Foust would argue. However, we might be able to borrow obliquely from Foust. If Americans are able to understand how Civil War Era Americans understood loyalty as a national concept and how they transformed their use of that idea over the course of the nineteenth century, then it might be possible to appreciate the aftermath of the war as a struggle over identity and loyalty.

A better understanding of pre- and wartime loyalty will not serve as a panacea to contemporary clashes over Confederate monuments or the national divisions over the Civil War. As David Blight noted in *Race and Reunion*, “As long as America has a politics of race, [it] will have a politics of civil war memory.”\(^4\) Blight is right, of course. Moreover, while this dissertation cannot overcome the mountain of contention that exists in American society over the war, it might serve as a roadmap for how Americans reached this point in its national history. Loyalty allowed Americans to construct divergent national visions for themselves in the nineteenth century and it served as the foundation for reconciliation that distorted the war years to solidify white socio-political hegemony over the nation.

By focusing on four states in the Mid-Atlantic, this project reveals how historians might begin to approach loyalty more effectively in the future. Loyalty was an important factor to Americans in the Civil War Era as it colored how citizens, regardless of their race or national preference, envisioned their relationship to the nation. Of course, loyalty was more complicated

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than the connection between nation and citizen that took central stage in this dissertation. This project subsumed local, state, regional, familial, and organizational loyalties in order to frame national loyalty as a contested and influential topic throughout the Civil War Era. Traditionally, historians have positioned loyalty as a category of analysis or a rhetorical tool wielded by political partisans. *Breaking and Remaking the Mason-Dixon Line* shows that national loyalty was a deeply felt concept that pervaded how Americans interpreted their place in the nation before, during, and after the Civil War. Further, it is possible to see that a wide array of Americans engaged with and debated the meaning of loyalty. By stretching across the Mason-Dixon Line, this research highlighted the shared experiences that framed definitions of loyalty as well as the differing interpretations of what it meant to Northerners and Southerners. The future of loyalty research should explore how Americans understood allegiance and how the Civil War reformed that concept. The growth of this project into a monograph will follow that trajectory by expanding on how different loyalties—local, state, familial, religious, and organization—intersected and influenced national loyalty.

Two final examples offer a final glimpse at the persistence of Civil War loyalty the legacy of the conflict after the end of the war. In September of 1865, Garland H. White, a Chaplain with the 28th USCT, who had been sent to Texas on occupation duty, wrote to the *Christian Recorder* to address the inequality of political rights that he witnessed in the lead up to the fall election. Black men, who had loyally served the Union, struggled to the right to vote, while “traitors and rebels, who waged war against the general Government,” in Texas quickly regained the right to vote. Even in the months after Appomattox, race, not loyalty began to shape who had access to the body politic. A few months later, Brantz Mayer wrote to his friend

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Mary Clarke. In 1866, as the pair debated the meaning of the war, the possibility of prolonged sectional discontent loomed large in their exchange. Mayer assured his Confederate-sympathizing friend that he only wanted a return of the South to its proper and loyal place in the Union. Clarke, however, seemingly assured the Marylander that such a change was impractical, as Americans would continue to fight over the Civil War along sectional lines for another century. Mayer lamented that possibility. He wrote in April 1866, “for God’s sake dont let us go on, like simpletons making war over & over and over ‘for the 100 years’ you predict, in conversation & on paper, in speeches and in politics.”

Undoubtedly, Mayer would find little comfort in the fact that Clarke was wrong—Americans did not debate for another century as they never stopped. For Garland White, African Americans would eventually be rewarded for their loyalty, if only for a short period, before the end of Reconstruction removed black Americans from their place as citizens, loyal or otherwise, in the Union.

Years after the sesquicentennial, Americans remain divided over the issue of wartime identities and the persistence of the Lost Cause in the United States. One dissertation can hardly assuage the century and a half of monument building, memory shaping, and lingering discontent within the nation over the war. However, this project can be a small step toward understanding how loyalty shaped the experiences and memories of the Civil War Era with the an eye towards finally proving Brantz Mayer right, that Americans will not debate the war for another century.

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6 Brantz Mayer to Mrs. Mary Bayard Devereux, April 23, 1866, Brantz Mayer Papers, MS 2287, MHS.
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