Downgrading Superprecedents

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I. INTRODUCTION

It is widely believed that some judicial cases should qualify as superprecedents. This Article considers the idea of a judicial superprecedent at the level of broad legal theory, as well as at the level of the particular superprecedent cases themselves. As it turns out, the apparently reasonably clear idea of a superprecedent is actually remarkably unclear in a variety of often conflicting ways. Beyond the definitional conflicts, however, lie what we might
call the paradoxes of superprecedence, with these paradoxes themselves taking various forms. These paradoxes of superprecedence take our understanding of the idea of a precedent in surprising directions. And then in turn, beyond these paradoxes of superprecedence, are a range of unresolved important problems plaguing the very idea of a judicial superprecedent.

The latter problems begin, first, with the familiar understanding of a superprecedent as somehow a “foundational” or “bedrock” case. This metaphor may seem apt and even uncontroversial. But as it turns out, the metaphor of a superprecedent’s foundational or bedrock status is as importantly misleading as it is otherwise helpful. And then secondly, there is the crucial problem of whether the idea of a superprecedent is, or should be, primarily descriptive; is instead already primarily normative or evaluative in character; or else is some interesting hybrid of both of these distinct approaches. Third, and finally, there is the problem of the sheer range and variety of the possible critical responses to any current judicial superprecedent. What sorts of judicial or legislative treatments of a case are compatible with that case’s retaining its superprecedent status? This is a further important question that has been left widely under-discussed.

Ultimately, this Article concludes that unless the paradoxes and then the fundamental unresolved problems referred to above are satisfactorily addressed, we should subordinate, if not dismiss, the idea of a judicial superprecedent as we seek to understand and normatively steer the case adjudication process.

II. WHAT IS, OR SHOULD BE, A JUDICIAL SUPERPRECEDENT?

The idea of a judicial precedent in general, whether super or not, and whatever its complications, is a familiar one. Whatever one’s preferred

304 (1816), on the Supreme Court’s ultimate authority over state courts in matters of federal law. Or perhaps a case might qualify as a superprecedent, in part, on either of the above theories.

6 See infra Part III, discussing paradoxes of the sheer logical impossibility of overruling certain doctrines; paradoxes of the inevitable reassertion of a case principle in the face of any overruling; paradoxes of otherwise clearly iconic superprecedents with chronically disappointing effects; and paradoxes of apparent superprecedents whose core holdings were arguably unnecessary and, in practice, do little jurisprudential work.

7 See infra Part IV.

8 See infra Part IV.

9 See infra Part IV.

10 See infra Part V.

11 See generally BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT (2016); RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017); Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367 (1988); J. L. Montrose, Distinguishing Cases and the Limits of Ratio Decidendi, 19 MOD. L. REV. 525, 526 (1956) (“[I]t is inadequate to point to distinctions between cases without referring to the principles which make those distinctions significant.”); Frederick Schauer,
interpretive judicial method, the question of a role for case precedent in general inevitably arises. We must at some point ask the broad questions posed by Professor Frederick Schauer: “When precedent matters, just how much should it matter? If we are to be shackled to the past and beholden to the future, just how tight are those bonds, and what should it take to loose [sic] them?”

A familiar part of many attempts to answer just such general questions invokes the idea of a judicial superprecedent. The term “superprecedent” was used more than 40 years ago by Professors William Landes and Richard Posner. Landes and Posner invoked the idea of a case that is “so effective in defining the requirements of the law that it prevents legal disputes from arising in the first place.”

The term “super—stare decisis,” used in a related sense, was later adopted by then—Fourth Circuit Judge Michael Luttig. Judge Luttig interpreted the Court’s plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey as an attempt to definitively resolve basic controversies set in motion by Roe v. Wade, securing thereby “a woman’s fundamental right to choose whether or not to proceed with a pregnancy.” Judge Luttig thus understood the Casey plurality opinion as consciously seeking superprecedent status for Roe, if not also for itself.

The idea of a judicial superprecedent has gained wider public exposure through debates over the status of Roe and Casey in the context of Supreme Court nominations. Roe’s status as a possible judicial superprecedent has been the

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13 Schauer, supra note 11, at 571.


15 Id. at 251.


18 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

19 Richmond Med. Ctr., 219 F.3d at 376.

20 See id. at 376–77.

21 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5–9 (2017) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
subject of high-profile discussion. For the moment, though, we can say merely that Roe clearly illustrates the need for reflection on what should, or does, make a particular judicial case into a superprecedent. This broader, multi-dimensional question is pursued herein at some length.

An initial concern is what to make of the fact that Roe has withstood numerous judicial challenges, as well as attempted statutory limitations, and continuing public critique and debate. Some theory is needed if we are to take these circumstances into proper account in determining the nature and application of superprecedent status. If an important case has been, and continues to be, repeatedly but unsuccessfully challenged, should that count in favor of superprecedent status? Against superprecedent status? Could there be more than one kind of “superprecedent”? Matters of definition, in this context, seem crucial.

Commentators have variously accorded and denied superprecedent status to a number of well-known judicial cases. Lists and individual examples of presumed superprecedents, on one definition or another, have been provided by writers with diverse interpretive methodologies and political perspectives. Thus, we have non-exhaustive lists from Judge Amy Coney Barrett and from Professors Michael Gerhardt, Mark Kende, and Michael Sinclair, among others, with a number of particular cases making multiple appearances.

See infra note 135 and accompanying text.

See infra Parts II–IV.

See infra note 135.


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29 See Barrett, *supra* note 25.

30 See id. at 1734.

31 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review of congressional statutes).

32 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (validating Supreme Court review of federal question determinations by state courts).

33 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (constitutionally validating the Social Security Act).

34 79 U.S. 457 (1870) (constitutionally validating the Treasury’s issuance of paper money as legal tender).

35 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause).


37 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (requiring a showing of state, as distinct from mere private party, action under the Fourteenth Amendment).


39 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (providing a rationale for the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine).

40 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (defining the scope and limits of the political question doctrine regarding equal-protection challenges to state legislative apportionment).

41 79 U.S. 457 (1870).

42 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (delimiting the roles of strict and minimum scrutiny in racial equal protection context).

43 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (presenting an analytical framework for delineating the scope of presidential executive authority).

44 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (emphasizing educational diversity goals as tested by a strict scrutiny standard).

45 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (narrowly rejecting a state statute limiting the use of contraceptives by married couples and more broadly invigorating privacy or autonomy-oriented substantive due process).
Roe v. Wade\textsuperscript{46} but considers Marbury and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins\textsuperscript{47} to be clearer instances of superprecedents.\textsuperscript{48}

These cases do not exhaust the roster of arguable superprecedents. Other cases certainly might be added.\textsuperscript{49} All such superprecedent candidates contribute something both toward formulating one or more definitions of a superprecedent as well as toward other ways of usefully characterizing superprecedents. As it turns out, a number of proposed alternative characterizations are currently available. The proposed alternative characterizations vary in their focus and stringency, but there are certainly some recurring themes among the possible understandings of a judicial superprecedent.

Perhaps the most widely discussed account of the idea of a judicial superprecedent is that offered by Professor Michael Gerhardt.\textsuperscript{50} Professor Gerhardt’s most concise formulation of the idea of a superprecedent refers simply to “prior case law which is practically immune to reconsideration.”\textsuperscript{51} He then adds that the immunity from reconsideration must reflect the

\textsuperscript{46} 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a substantive due process abortion right with regulations subject to strict scrutiny).

\textsuperscript{47} 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (disempowering federal courts from establishing a general federal law when sitting in diversity jurisdiction).


\textsuperscript{51} Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of Precedent, supra note 50, at 1292.
“well-settled”52 status of the case in question.53 At least a necessary condition for superprecedent status, Professor Gerhardt continues, is that the case “has been widely and uniformly accepted by public authorities generally, including the Court, the President, and Congress.”54 The “precedents which are the least likely to be reopened because of the practical impossibility of finding compelling reasons to reopen them are, effectively, superprecedents.”55

A bit more elaborately, Professor Gerhardt then argues that superprecedents are those constitutional decisions in which public institutions have heavily invested,56 have repeatedly relied upon, and have consistently supported over a significant period of time. Superprecedents thus seep into the public consciousness57 and become fixtures of the legal framework. Superprecedents are the clearest instances in which “the institutional values promoted by fidelity to precedent—consistency, stability, predictability, and social reliance—have become irredeemably compelling.”58

Crucially, Professor Gerhardt consistently refers to superprecedents as “foundational” with regard to legal practices, or foundational with regard to doctrine, or foundational with regard to other decisions.59 The foundationalist

52 Id. at 1293.
53 See id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1295. The mere practical unlikeliness of a case being reopened, however, tells us little about superprecedent status. A broadly cited case might be secure because its very openness, if not near emptiness, is compatible with a range of case outcomes, generally, or in any given case. See, for example, the general balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
56 There may also be precedents that are especially unlikely to be reopened, and which no one wants to reopen, but only because those precedents have no contemporary relevance, and have receded in history’s wake. Such cases, as now practical irrelevancies, are not superprecedents, but close to the opposite. And some cases may be practically irreversible merely because of the distribution of political power, rather than from a consensus as to the merit or authority of the case decision.
58 Gerhardt, Super Precedent, supra note 26, at 1206.
59 The characterization of superprecedents as thus foundational recurs throughout Gerhardt. Id. For important problems with the “foundation” metaphor, see infra Part IV.
metaphor has been, importantly, taken up in this context by others.\textsuperscript{60} As we shall see, however, the foundationalist metaphor, even if otherwise illuminating, is also crucially misleading.\textsuperscript{61}

Other writers and judges have offered a range of alternative understandings of the idea of a superprecedent. Consider, for example, the approach advocated by now-Seventh Circuit Judge Amy Coney Barrett and by her colleague Professor John Nagle.\textsuperscript{62} Judge Barrett suggests that “[s]uperprecedents are cases that no justice would overrule, even if she disagrees with the interpretive premises from which the precedent proceeds.”\textsuperscript{63}

A case’s exceptional unlikelihood of being overruled may, however, be due to considerations that would actually call the case’s status as a superprecedent into question. For example, long-standing and unquestioned precedent may address merely once-important matters that no longer have legal relevance.\textsuperscript{64} More controversially, some important open-ended multi-factor balancing tests may, precisely because of their manipulability to a broad range of ends, avoid meaningful challenge, but at the price of not really controlling legal outcomes in a large number of cases.\textsuperscript{65}

Judge Barrett then indicates that the force of superprecedents crucially “derives from the people, who have taken their validity off the Court’s agenda. Litigants do not challenge them. If they did, no inferior federal court or state court would take them seriously, at least in the absence of any indicia that the broad consensus supporting a precedent was crumbling.”\textsuperscript{66} Or, as otherwise put by Barrett and Nagle, superprecedent status for cases flows not from the Court’s decision to afford them precedential strength, but from “the People’s choice to accept them.”\textsuperscript{67} This suggests both that a court cannot successfully bootstrap a controversial case into superprecedent status by its own declarations\textsuperscript{68} and that

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{60}] See infra Part IV.
\item[\textsuperscript{61}] See infra Part IV.
\item[\textsuperscript{62}] Barrett, supra note 25, at 1734; see also Barrett & Nagle, supra note 25, at 2–3.
\item[\textsuperscript{63}] Barrett, supra note 25, at 1734. As a possible corollary, there may be cases such that disagreement with the outcome or basic thrust thereof would disqualify Supreme Court nominees. See Kende, supra note 27.
\item[\textsuperscript{64}] Consider, for example, broad constitutional or regulatory case holdings as to once dominant but now completely obsolete technologies or methods of communication.
\item[\textsuperscript{65}] For example, \textit{Mathews v. Eldridge} has been cited, per a Westlaw case search, more than 14,000 times, emerging largely unscathed. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The \textit{Eldridge} three-part balancing test embodies evident common sense, but at a level of generality, and of manipulability, too high to meaningfully constrain the outcome of seriously contestable cases. See id. at 335.
\item[\textsuperscript{66}] Barrett, supra note 25, at 1735.
\item[\textsuperscript{67}] Barrett & Nagle, supra note 25, at 3.
\item[\textsuperscript{68}] See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
we should not think of a case with elite and institutional level support as a superprecedent if that case lacks popular support.

Barrett and Nagle thus follow most writers in assuming that what typically distinguishes a superprecedent from a non-superprecedent is a matter of a case’s insusceptibility, or likely insusceptibility, to overruling. Whether a case could lose superprecedent status only through increased vulnerability to overruling is a crucial question taken up below.

A number of writers think of superprecedence through the “entrenchment” or “embeddedness,” in some distinctive way or degree, of the case in question. Beyond the idea of some form of embeddedness, observers also raise questions as to whether, for example, the case in question counts as a “landmark,” or has seen “repeated reaffirmations.” Perhaps, on this latter view, a case whose stature has discouraged any challenges, and has thus had no occasion to be reaffirmed, would count necessarily as a “landmark” case.

It is also possible to characterize superprecedents partly in terms of the process leading up to the decision in question. Thus Matthew E.K. Hall recommends asking whether the case in question was “the product of a protracted political struggle that engaged the public in a period of higher lawmaking.” Of course, we may be likely to dispute whether any given decision really reflects some extraordinary process of vaguely defined higher lawmaking. And if we

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69 See Barrett, supra note 25; see also Barrett & Nagle, supra note 25, at 2–3.
70 See infra Part IV.
71 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 12 (“These precedents seem deeply embedded in current institutional practice, such that overruling them would wreak much social disruption.”) (adding the condition that “no one wants to see them overturned”); Glen Staszewski, Precedent and Disagreement, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 1019, 1037 (2018) (referring to “entrenched legal principles that are . . . no longer the subject of serious deliberation, even though reasonable minds could potentially differ on their validity or whether they provide the best solution to a problem”) (reviewing Kozel, supra note 11); Daniel Solove, The Problem with Superprecedent, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Oct. 30, 2005), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/10/the_problem_wit.html (“The notion of superprecedent is that there are cases that are so firmly entrenched that they ought not to be overturned despite being in error. Roe v. Wade is the superprecedent that most have in mind.”).
73 Id.
74 See id. “Landmark” status is presumably achieved, in typical cases, only over a period of time, whether the case is repeatedly reaffirmed, or left essentially unchallenged and in that sense not reaffirmed.
decided, for example, that Marbury was not the product of a prolonged public political struggle amounting to higher lawmaking, we would then have to choose between excluding Marbury as a superprecedent and revising Hall’s recommended understanding thereof.

Other creative approaches are possible as well. Colin Starger thus suggests that a case does, or should, have superprecedent status when not only its own rule is widely accepted, but when the second-order rules for interpreting and implementing that case are also agreed upon, such that overruling the underlying first-order case “has become unthinkable.” This approach thus might be considered one of focusing on multi-layered entrenchment.

This implementation-oriented approach to superprecedent status, however, seems to be in tension with yet another intriguing approach to defining superprecedence. Allison Hayward has thus suggested that “perhaps the true test of a superprecedent is not whether there has been substantial reliance on it, . . . or whether it settles a question for all time, but whether it can be cited in support of conflicting conclusions.” One ironic implication of Hayward’s approach seems to be that superprecedent status can be associated with the case’s own lack of constraining power on later judicial outcomes, perhaps through vagueness, manipulability, or indeterminacy of implication and inference.

We might instead think of a typical superprecedent as exerting control over a broad range of legal outcomes, as perhaps in Marbury’s firmly establishing judicial review over congressional judgment on matters of constitutional interpretation. Marbury thus dictates outcomes at that level of generality. We know in advance whether Congress or the Supreme Court will win such a conflict in a given case. But it may also seem, as Hayward suggests, that some candidates for superprecedent status are not far from mere formulaic injunctions for judges to take the relevant factors into account and strike a sensible balance. Such cases are thus often citable on either side of the case.

Finally, consider the suggestion of Professor Mark Kende that superprecedent status may reflect a case’s vitality and impact on the law and on the practices of lay institutions and persons. Particularly in light of Bakke’s

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78 Id.
79 See supra note 71.
80 Hayward, supra note 49, at 205.
81 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
82 See Hayward, supra note 49, at 205.
83 See, for example, the discussion of the three-factor balancing test in the procedural due process case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See also text accompanying supra note 65.
84 See Hayward, supra note 49, at 205.
85 See Kende, supra note 27, at 18.
apparent fragility, Kende refers in particular to the initially isolated opinion by Justice Powell in the Bakke case. We can easily see how a case’s current vitality and its effects on case law and daily practices might well bear upon the question of superprecedent status. It is less clear, though, why superprecedent status should be associated with initially vulnerable but now flourishing opinions as opposed to unanimous opinions. Perhaps the idea is that initially vulnerable but now widely influential opinions have shown a distinctive hardiness that bodes well for the future of the opinion.

There is thus a wide variety of partly conflicting understandings of what a superprecedent is or should be. The lack of a complete consensus on such definitional matters is not, however, as disturbing as the unresolved and typically unrecognized fundamental issues unavoidably raised by the idea of a superprecedent. We address several of these fundamental issues below. But first, we should consider whether a focus on specific commonly proposed superprecedents themselves, as distinct from theoretical accounts of superprecedents in general, meaningfully contributes to our understanding of superprecedents. As it turns out, at the level of individual case candidates for superprecedent status, we encounter a series of distinct paradoxes. These various case-level paradoxes should, even if they are surprising or counterintuitive, inform our understanding of the idea of a superprecedent.

III. UNDERSTANDING THE IDEA OF A SUPERPRECEDENT THROUGH COMMONLY PROPOSED CASES: THE PERVERSIVENESS OF PARADOX

Given the inadequacies of and conflicts among the above accounts of superprecedence, it is natural to consider the situation on the ground in the form of particular cases typically proposed for superprecedent status. In the absence of any more systematic approach, we now briefly consider some of the lessons to be drawn from the cases, presented in roughly chronological order. As it turns out, paradox in one form or another is a recurring theme. Among the most obvious early candidates, on mainstream theories, for superprecedent status are the cases of Marbury, establishing, roughly, judicial review for the

86 See id.
87 See id.
89 See id.
90 See, for example, the unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
91 By loose analogy, we might credit the Powell opinion in Bakke with having a more robust “immune system” than that of a typical unanimous judicial opinion, all else equal.
92 See infra Part IV.
constitutionality of federal statutes,\(^{93}\) and \textit{Martin}, establishing the Supreme Court as typically the final judge of state court decisions as to federal law.\(^{94}\)

\begin{itemize}
  \item[A.] \textbf{Marbury v. Madison}
  
  \textit{Marbury} is especially distinctive in that there is a sense in which it would, remarkably, be logically impossible for the Court to overrule \textit{Marbury}’s basic principle. There is thus something of a paradox here. To see this, think of the \textit{Marbury} holding as that the Supreme Court has the final authority on constitutional questions, including those of separation of powers. The \textit{Marbury} Court ironically arrogated to itself this authority in the context of disclaiming the power to hear a particular case.\(^{95}\) More ironically, though, the general power of judicial review is, in a sense, not disclaimable through ordinary adjudication. For the Court to overrule, and deny, a principle of judicial review would be inescapably—however paradoxically—to retain and reassert that very principle at a higher but still ultimately authoritative level.

  Thus, the \textit{Marbury} Court famously declares that above and beyond the views, oaths, and proper functions of the other branches, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department\(^{96}\) to say what the law is.”\(^{97}\) For the Court to reverse itself on this point would, ironically, merely reassert at a higher level its own continuing final authority on such matters. The Court would still have the final word. We might thus think of the Court’s hypothetical overruling of \textit{Marbury} as saying something like “we lack final judgment on such a question, and that is our universally binding, higher-order final judgment on just such questions.”

  Of course, we can easily imagine alternative constitutional regimes with any and all variations from our familiar form of judicial review, including weak and strong forms, subject matter limitations, differences in institutional arrangements, or having no judicial review at all.\(^{98}\) There is obviously a broad

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  \item[93] See generally \textit{Marbury} v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
  \item[94] See generally \textit{Martin} v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
  \item[95] See \textit{Marbury}, 5 U.S. at 176–77.
  \item[96] And, ultimately, the Supreme Court in particular.
  \item[97] \textit{Marbury}, 5 U.S. at 177.
  \item[98] From among the vast literature of the merits and disadvantages of one form of judicial review or another, see, for example, \textsc{Larry Kramer}, \textsc{The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review} (2005); \textsc{Mark Tushnet}, \textsc{Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts} (1999); \textsc{Larry Alexander}, \textsc{What Is the Problem of Judicial Review?}, 31 \textsc{Australian J. Legal Phil.} 1 (2006); \textsc{Erwin Chemerinsky}, \textsc{In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer}, 92 \textsc{Cal. L. Rev.} 1013 (2004); \textsc{Richard H. Fallon, Jr.}, \textsc{The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review}, 121 \textsc{Harv. L. Rev.} 1693 (2008); \textsc{Jeremy Waldron}, \textsc{The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review}, 115 \textsc{Yale L.J.} 1346 (2006); \textsc{Michael J. Perry}, \textsc{A Theory of Judicial Review} (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 16-396, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624978; \textsc{Mark Tushnet}, \textsc{Against Judicial Review} (Harvard Law Sch.,
spectrum of alternatives to a Marbury-like judicial review regime, along any number of dimensions, with a nearly infinite number of possible gradations along the spectra.\textsuperscript{99} There is no paradox involved in imagining any such variation in operation. Some viable alternatives will be closely akin to the Marbury holding itself. Other alternatives will be more distant from Marbury in principle and practical effect.

This raises the broader question, addressed further below,\textsuperscript{100} of what it means to not follow, or to no longer follow, a supposed superprecedent. Legal writers commonly refer, without any of the necessary clarification, to something like the difficulty or impropriety of overruling, reversing, overturning, or somehow not following a purported superprecedent. But this might refer to anything from the extreme of figuratively standing a superprecedent on its head or adopting some diametrically opposite approach, to vaguely undermining, to significantly modifying the holding, or else to doing what amounts to fine-tuning, adjusting, or perhaps to merely qualifying or minimally limiting the purported superprecedent. The basic problem here is one of whether any, if not all, of these varied responses to a case are compatible with the case’s continuing superprecedent status.

\textbf{B. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee}

In contrast, the case of Martin, as a purported superprecedent presents a looser but still quite real form of paradox. Let us assume that Martin held, however oversimplified, that the Supreme Court can serve as a court of final appeal on significant questions of federal law, including questions of constitutional law, even if those questions are raised and decided initially by state courts.\textsuperscript{101}

We can imagine a judicial decision, in the form of an “anti-Martin,” that instead allowed each state to be sovereign and unreviewable in its own interpretation of the federal Commerce Clause, and in that respect restoring something like the obvious deadweight efficiency losses suffered under the

\textsuperscript{99} See the various international and hypothetical examples discussed in supra note 98.

\textsuperscript{100} See supra Part II; infra Part IV.

Articles of Confederation.\footnote{102} But in practice, over time, the basic \textit{Martin} rule would, unlike most other overruled precedents, have an especially strong “buoyancy,” or a systematic, predictable, and persistent tendency to reassert itself in one way or another.\footnote{103} Rules that are patently and generally inefficient, in substantial measure, from all relevant parties’ perspectives, strongly invite their being somehow contracted around or otherwise negated.\footnote{104}

The basic \textit{Martin} principle and its hypothetical replacement are thus not essentially two different ways of slicing up a fixed distributional pie. \textit{Martin} is not so much about winners and losers at the level of individual states or commercial enterprises as it is about avoiding tempting, but ultimately generally self-defeating, economic behavior. The “deeper” that any anti-\textit{Martin} case sought to “sink” the basic \textit{Martin} principle regarding commerce, the greater the tendency for that principle or something akin to \textit{Martin} to rise again in the surface. Obviously much more efficient and collectively beneficial rules tend, especially, to thus somehow reassert themselves.

Professor H. Jefferson Powell has already argued that “\textit{Martin}’s holding that the Supreme Court may constitutionally review state court holdings on federal law matters is so foundational\footnote{105} an element of the American legal system that it is difficult for us to take rejection of it seriously.”\footnote{106} Our point is that \textit{Martin} is not simply quite popular, taken for granted, off the agenda, or supported by powerful groups. Rather, to change the metaphor, any attempt to do away with the basic \textit{Martin} principle would predictably boomerang for independent and inescapable basic reasons, as recognized in part by the \textit{Martin} Court itself\footnote{107} and, then, to at least some degree by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.\footnote{108} The distinctive “buoyance,” or the distinctively strong

\footnote{102} For discussion of the obvious costs of allowing each state to read the federal Commerce Clause to its own initial advantage, to the prejudice of other states generally, and ultimately thereby to its own prejudice, see \textit{H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond}, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
\footnote{104} See id.
\footnote{105} But for critical discussion of this popular metaphor, see \textit{infra} Part IV.
\footnote{107} \textit{Martin} itself observes that “[t]he Constitution has presumed . . . that . . . state interests . . . might some times obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice.” 14 U.S. 304, 347 (1816); see also David P. Currie, \textit{The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts}, 1801–1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 682 (1982).
\footnote{108} Justice Holmes declared:

\begin{quote}
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several states. For one in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who are not
“boomerang quality,” of Martin is thus not reducible to merely the popularity or elite-level support of Martin at the time of its hypothetical overruling.

To briefly review, then, Marbury is in an important sense logically not judicially overruleable, whatever the results of any judicial turning away from the Marbury holding.109 Martin is in an entirely different sense not practically overruleable over time, given the monumental and unavoidable structural incentives to reassert and restore a uniform commerce regulation rule at least strongly akin to that of Martin.110

C. Brown v. Board of Education

Brown, in contrast, presents yet another kind of paradoxical complication as a presumed superprecedent. Brown has itself divided over time into, on the one hand, a non-overruleable symbolic and expressive public message and, on the other, a legal rule with shifting, disputable, and perhaps only quite limited purchase on the actual circumstances of public-school education.

Thus, in a sense, Brown is the epitome of what many writers have in mind when they suggest that some cases are, or should be regarded as, superprecedents.111 But while a broad rejection of the symbolic or expressive dimension of Brown would be to invoke something akin to a secular equivalent of the taboo,112 there can also be serious question as to how different patterns of public-school racial segregation would be today if Brown itself had been written differently, in any number of respects. We understand today that at minimum, an earnest judicial proclamation of a constitutional principle may not be successfully translated, even over time, into daily social and cultural in

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109 See supra notes 93–100.

110 See supra notes 93–108.


112 See supra note 111; see also Taboo, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (2018), www.oed.com/view/Entry/196824?rkey=EkeZVI&result=1#eid.
constitutional practice. Proclamation is not implementation. And without entering here into the merits of the debate, it is clear that 60 years after segregationist “massive resistance,” the realistic impact of Brown on public-school racial segregation may be surprisingly modest.

Brown might thus reasonably qualify as both the quintessential superprecedent and as a remarkable disappointment with regard to its practical execution and impact. Here, the paradox thus takes the form of a symbolically important case opinion often taken to be among the clearest of superprecedents, but which has, arguably, only a remarkably limited gravitational influence on the real world events most central to its purported scope. We would hardly expect this latter inefficacy to be characteristic of any superprecedent, let alone a purportedly central such superprecedent.

D. Griswold v. Connecticut

Finally, there is a fourth kind of paradox that may attend purported case superprecedents. It is possible for a purported superprecedent to govern, again

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116 See supra note 115.
however paradoxically, an area of the law where no Supreme Court or other precedent, let alone a superprecedent, was or is genuinely required. Consider, in this regard, the substantive due process case of *Griswold*.117 *Griswold* is known for Justice William O. Douglas’s citation of a number of distinct enumerated constitutional rights118 as collectively implying the unconstitutionality, under a substantive due process concern for privacy or autonomy,119 of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the marital use, for the particular purpose of preventing conception,120 of contraceptives.121 Justice Douglas’s opinion emphasizes in particular the nobility and significance of the “bilateral loyalty”122 involved in marriage as an institutional relationship.123

We may quite reasonably assume that the influence of *Griswold* on later jurisprudence, and even on the broader culture, suffices for superprecedent status.124 Opposition to *Griswold* might tend to derail a nomination to the Supreme Court.125 But the actually necessary holding or ratio decidendi126 of *Griswold* is narrow and indeed uncontroversial at the level of contemporary morality and politics, as applied to direct violators rather than to accessories.127

Thus Justice Douglas asks in *Griswold* whether we would “allow” the police to search “the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives.”128 To deny the police this general authority, however, does not require any creative aggregation of only loosely related constitutional

117 381 U.S. 479 (1965); *supra* text accompanying note 45.
118 See *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 484–86.
119 See *id.*
120 See *id.* at 480.
121 See *id.*
122 *Id.* at 486.
127 As to the complications of accessory liability in *Griswold*-type cases, see the remarks of Harriet Pilpel reported in Lewin, *supra* note 125.
128 *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 485.
rights. Much more narrowly, the law could simply presume that officially invading the marital, or any other, bedroom under *Griswold*-type circumstances would be considered unconstitutional as an unreasonable search. And even this rule would be far broader than is actually necessary, given the relevant statute’s unpoliceable distinction between the use of a contraceptive for the particular purpose of contraception and use for any other purpose, including preventing disease.

Thus, the *Griswold* case does not leave us with a choice merely between *Griswold* as a broad substantive due process privacy precedent and denying relief to the defendants. *Griswold*-type enforcement against principals would almost inevitably violate some provision explicitly enumerated in the Constitution. The statute in *Griswold* was inescapably unconstitutional on prosaic and uncontroversial search and seizure grounds. *Griswold* may be deemed a superprecedent in view of its sustained influence and expansion in important contexts. But this has little to do with what would be reasonably necessary in order to hold typically unconstitutional the statute in question. Thus, *Griswold* offers yet another form of paradox to those forms already encountered above.

Overall, then, neither the major theoretical approaches to superprecedent status nor the typically cited purported superprecedents themselves leave us with any clarity as to the idea of a judicial superprecedent or of its jurisprudential value. Below, this Article explores three important underlying reasons for the continuing lack of clarity and genuine usefulness of the idea of a superprecedent. Unless and until these underlying problems can be successfully addressed, we

129 See id. at 484.
130 For a start, see id. at 485.
131 See id. at 480.
133 See *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (The statute may be “uncommonly silly,” “obviously unenforceable,” “unwise, or even asinine” but, as supposedly in *Griswold*, not unconstitutional.).
134 See id. at 484–85; supra note 130 and accompanying text. The possibility of a testimonial marital privilege further limits the need for a broad holding in *Griswold*.
135 See *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a sense of the debate over whether *Roe* does, or should, qualify as a superprecedent, see, for example, Fallon, supra note 72, at 1149; Sinclair, supra note 28, at 408; Hatch, supra note 21; Rosen, supra note 21.
136 See *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 484–85 (majority opinion); supra note 130 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 93–116.
138 See supra Part II.
139 See supra Part III.
are best advised to, at a minimum, downgrade the significance of claims to superprecedential status.

IV. SUPERPRECEDENCE: THREE CRUCIAL UNDERLYING PROBLEMS

The first underlying problem to be recognized is that our general “picture” of superprecedents is incomplete, if not crucially defective. This is because our mental image of a superprecedent relies, often explicitly, on such a case as being considered “foundational.” Even when we do not describe a superprecedent as somehow “foundational,” we commonly substitute the near synonym of the superprecedent as “bedrock.” The description of a superprecedent as somehow “foundational” may seem uncontroversial, and even inevitable. This metaphor, however, is at least as misleading as it is helpful.

Consider, by way of loose analogy, the ongoing dispute among philosophers as to whether knowledge must ultimately rest upon some foundational, bedrock, or literally basic truth. Some philosophers are indeed in this sense foundationalists. But certainly not all philosophers rely in this context on the idea of foundations, or of bedrock. In particular, many philosophers “favor a holistic picture of justification which does not distinguish between basic or foundational and non-basic or derived beliefs, treating, rather, all our beliefs as equal members” or as members of a “web of belief.”

140 See, e.g., Barrett & Nagle, supra note 25 (multi-dimensional foundationalism); Gerhardt, supra note 26, at 1206–17 (focusing, respectively, on foundational institutional practices, foundational doctrines, and foundational decisions); Hayward, supra note 49, at 202; Sinclair, supra note 28, at 402; Jack M. Balkin, Don’t Talk to Me About Superprecedents, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 30, 2005), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/10/dont-talk-to-me-about-superprecedents.html.

141 See supra note 140.

142 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1180–84 (2006) (referring to “bedrock precedents”). Professor Farber then defines “bedrock precedents” as “precedents that have become the foundation for large areas of important doctrine,” and thus relies on the metaphor of a foundation. Id. at 1180. For discussion of Professor Farber on this point, see Barnett, supra note 12, at 1235–38.

143 For background in the context of the idea of a justified belief, see Ali Hasan & Richard Fumerton, Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 24, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/ (citing, classically, the thought of Aristotle and Descartes). See also William Alston, Two Types of Foundationalism, 73 J. PHILOS. 165 (1976); Timm Triplett, Recent Work on Foundationalism, 27 AM. PHILOS. Q. 93 (1990).


145 Actually, not all members of the set of mutually coherent beliefs need be equal, in the sense of being as directly linked to as many other beliefs, or to as many diverse beliefs. Similarly, not all judicial case precedents need be directly linked to as many others, or as many diverse precedents, as others.

146 See Olsson, supra note 144 (quoting W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (1970)).
this opposing coherentist approach, “what justifies our beliefs is ultimately the way in which they hang together or dovetail so as to produce a coherent set.”

None is foundational, basic, or bedrock.

This analogy suggests that in order for a case to be unusually secure and unusually influential, as we might expect of a superprecedent, the case need not be more “foundational” than other cases, or amount to judicial “bedrock.”

Without foundational or bedrock status, a case might instead still be both directly and indirectly linked to a large number and variety of cases deemed to be of significance, in a network of overall collective validation. While we might say that the networked superprecedent “supports” other cases, other cases may in turn crucially contribute to the creditability, vitality, influence, and persistence of the presumed superprecedent case.

Coherentism thus allows us, by analogy, to view the problems of superprecedence quite differently. Merely for example, consider the controversy over whether Roe is or should be a superprecedent. A focus on whether Roe is “foundational” or “bedrock,” as these terms are typically used, is crucially misleading. Roe is obviously no more “foundational” than many other cases, in that is in the relevant sense itself crucially based on the foundation of prior cases, including Griswold and the more equal protection-oriented contraception case of Eisenstadt v. Baird. Arguably, without Griswold, Eisenstadt, and other cases, Roe would not have then been decided as it was. But if we say that Eisenstadt was foundational with respect to Roe, we clearly must also say that Griswold was in turn foundational to Eisenstadt. Of all these cases, we might find Griswold, perhaps, to be the most structurally important. But then, similarly,
we must say that *Griswold* was constructed on the “foundations” of numerous privacy-related cases.\(^{157}\)

If *Roe* is not foundational because it rests on the layered foundations of supporting cases, and cannot therefore be a superprecedent, then we must also say that *Griswold*, as similarly resting on the foundation of other cases, also cannot be a superprecedent. Now, one might in the end want, for other reasons, to deny superprecedent status to either or both of *Roe* and *Griswold*. But for most practical purposes, it seems too easy, if not otherwise inadvisable, to deny superprecedent status to both *Roe* and *Griswold* even partially on this dubious basis.

In particular, if we choose to deny superprecedent status to, say, the *Griswold* case, we should have something to say not only about *Griswold*’s largely unchallenged status, but about *Griswold*’s dense network of strong mutual connectedness and mutual supportiveness\(^{158}\) among the expanding range of obviously important substantive due process, privacy, and other sorts of cases. Reliance, in general, on images of foundations, or bedrock status, in order to determine superprecedent status is thus grossly misleading.

The second basic problem that plagues discussions of superprecedent status is the typical indifference, in such discussions, as to whether superprecedence is primarily a descriptive matter, or primarily a normative matter, or some alternative thereto.\(^{159}\) There is, clearly, often an important difference between the processes of describing and of normatively evaluating.\(^{160}\)

We can easily imagine someone who argues that a personally preferred case is, or should be, recognized as a superprecedent, where that person’s motivation is purely strategic or political in nature. The logic in so arguing would be that the case’s being widely recognized as a superprecedent would further enhance the prestige and legitimacy of the case and reduce the chances of the case’s being further challenged, let alone overruled. On such an agenda, the point


\(^{158}\) For an exploration of the related phenomenon of “cumulative case” arguments, see R. George Wright, *Cumulative Case Legal Arguments and the Justification of Academic Affirmative Action*, 23 PACE L. REV. 1 (2002).

\(^{159}\) As of September 11, 2019, a Westlaw search indicates that *Griswold* has been cited by more than 1,663 federal court cases, in various subject matter areas, including, for example, the housing ordinance occupancy limits case of *Moore* v. *City of East Cleveland*, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977), and the public school library book free speech case of *Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico*, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982).

of a recognized superprecedent status would be to immediately and inescapably enhance the status and protection afforded to a preferred case precedent.

This political strategy might be less helpful, however, if we think of a superprecedent instead in primarily descriptive terms. Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, we think of a superprecedent merely in terms of the extraordinary persistence of its influence. Persistence and influence may, possibly, in the end be somehow associated with positive normative value. But one would need some separate, additional theory establishing that association. The bad can persist. The bad can be influential. In the meantime, we would have to acknowledge that important, but morally unjustified, judicial precedents have also held sway for many decades.\(^{161}\) A case could be influential for good or for ill. The broad question is thus how much, if any, normative luster should be built into the very idea of a superprecedent.

The very rough analogy to this judicial problem from philosophy is to the philosophical distinction between evaluatively “thin” concepts and evaluatively “thick” concepts.\(^{162}\) The important idea for our purposes is that some concepts seem to straddle a presumed line between their function in merely describing and their function in normatively evaluating, thus partaking of both descriptive and normative elements. Consider, for example, the idea that someone has acted “courageously.”\(^{163}\) We might initially think of this as largely descriptive of what someone has done. We think that we can “see” courage in action. But to describe an act as courageous also seems inescapably to convey an evaluative judgment of approval or admiration, at least in some respect or to some degree.\(^{164}\)

The problem in this respect with superprecedence status is that little attention has been paid to whether, or how much, the idea of a superprecedent is like that of acting courageously. Are we to first settle upon whether a given case is a superprecedent, and only then begin the normative task of deciding whether to strongly and distinctly respect the superprecedent in question? Or are we to instead believe that once we have settled upon a definition of “superprecedent,” and properly classified some case thereunder, most of the crucial normative

\(^{161}\) As merely one example, note that Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), remained the law of the land, even as to public schools, for 58 years until Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Chae Chen Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).


\(^{163}\) See, e.g., Vayrynen, supra note 162.

\(^{164}\) This may partially explain why some of us are unwilling to describe as “courageous” an act in the service of what we deem an evil cause.
questions regarding the case itself have thereby been already answered? Otherwise put, is the main jurisprudential and political struggle over what does or should count as a superprecedent, or does much of the crucial jurisprudential and political struggle remain to take place even after a particular case has been classified as a superprecedent?

The third and final crucial problem that plagues discussions of superprecedent status involves the typical indifference to, or neglect of, the wide range of possible judicial and other responses to a presumed superprecedent. Even an unanimously endorsed superprecedent may see important fluctuations over time in its “gravitational field” between lesser and greater influence on other cases and contexts. That a case remains a superprecedent tells us little about these important possibilities.

More important, though, is the lack of attention generally paid to the range of the possible critical responses to purported superprecedents. Unless we choose to define a superprecedent in such a fashion that it can never be subject to any future critique, we must attend to the fact that there is no unique single way to critically respond to an established precedent. Even the idea of “overruling” a precedent, super or otherwise, can take various forms, with varying effects. It would only minimally overstate matters to say that every “overruling” of a case is unlike any other. Even a superprecedent could be overruled, while leaving the world much as it is. But overruling a superprecedent might instead enshrine a diametrically opposed world-view, or perhaps leave the future of the relevant law open, to one degree or another.

Of even greater significance, though, is that a superprecedent can be limited in any of various ways and degrees without being overruled. A superprecedent could thus be distinguished, “chipped away” at, confined to its facts, somehow undermined, bypassed, occasionally ignored, conspicuously or

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165 If not also its proper reach, or extension, in practice.
167 Note the range of paradoxes explored in supra Part III.
168 While Bowers was hardly at any point a superprecedent, note the degree of value inversion implied by its rejection in Lawrence. See supra text accompanying note 166. Consider also the remarkable “flipping” of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), by West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), on the question of a public-school student’s constitutional right to not salute the flag.
169 Thus, Brown itself, on Brown’s own reasoning, does not tell us much about the constitutional viability of Plessy’s separate but equal doctrine outside the context of education. See Somin, supra note 50. But see Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (tersely applying the Brown outcome to municipal golf courses).
170 See Solove, supra note 71 (distinguishing a strategy of “chipping away” at a superprecedent from seeking its radical reversal).
inconspicuously not invoked in a later context,\textsuperscript{171} or variously adjusted\textsuperscript{172} at the margins.\textsuperscript{173} And there is as yet no clear theory as to when any of these more incremental changes may be appropriate with respect to a presumably continuing superprecedent. Relatedly, there is also no reasonably clear theory as to when a case’s superprecedent status is or should be lost as a result, cumulative or otherwise, of any of the various limiting responses to such cases.\textsuperscript{174}

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\textsuperscript{171} Thus, the well-known and widely discussed free speech “fighting words” case of \textit{Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire}, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), while never overruled, has apparently also never formed the basis of any later Supreme Court holding. For criticism of \textit{Chaplinsky}, see, for example, Burton Caine, \textit{The Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled}, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 443 (2004).


\textsuperscript{174} One general, if also rather vague, possibility would be that at least some superprecedents have the important role of symbolically expressing who or what we are, or what we aspire to collectively, as a people. We can certainly imagine, for example, someone pointing to \textit{Brown} and saying that this is, in one respect, who or what we are, and that \textit{Plessy v. Ferguson} is “not who we are.” A problem here is that in some cases, declaring that this is “not who we are” may implyly concede that this is indeed who we too often are. See Tim Dowling, \textit{“This Is Not Who We Are” Is American for: “This Is Sort of Who We Are”}, GUARDIAN (London) (Mar. 10, 2015, 4:40 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/10/this-is-not-who-we-are-american-lindsay-graham. More crucially, declarations as to who we are, or who we are not, may be question-begging, preemptive of (further) discussion, or an elevation of established tradition over criticality or the pursuit of more objective truth. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, \textit{Truth and Politics: A Symposium on Peter Simpson’s Political Illiberalism: A Defense of Freedom}, 62 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 1 (2017).
V. CONCLUSION

The idea of a judicial superprecedent has assumed an important role in constitutional theory and in judicial politics. Unfortunately, there remains an unusual degree of uncertainty, dispute, and sheer unresolved conflict over how a superprecedent should be characterized. As it turns out, paradoxically, one or more of the mostly commonly proposed superprecedent cases are either technically not overruleable, or remarkably “buoyant” in that any overruling would inevitably generate irresistible systemic pressures to reassert something like the prior status quo, or more important for symbolic or expressive purposes than for any actual impact on the broader culture, or, finally, may represent viewpoints, as to their actual holding, with whom few persons would disagree.

Beyond the variety of these paradoxes associated with superprecedence, however, lie an array of unresolved crucial problems. In particular, the idea of a superprecedent has been unfortunately tied to the simultaneously helpful but crucially misleading metaphor of a “foundational” or “bedrock” judicial case. Second, there has been little progress on the practically important question of whether superprecedence is primarily a descriptive concept, or primarily a normative or evaluative concept, or some other interesting hybrid. And finally, little attention has been paid to the important variety of ways in which a case, including a presumed superprecedent, could be meaningfully limited or constrained in its influence without being in any sense overruled.

Relatedly, one might try to think of superprecedents as, most prominently, what are called “constitutive” rules, as distinct from “regulative rules.” See John Searle, Speech Acts 33–34, 50 (1969); Christopher Cherry, Regulative Rules and Constitutive Rules, 23 Phil. Q. 301, 302 (1973). Very roughly, constitutive rules might establish (and then regulate) an institution, whereas a regulative rule would merely govern a pre-existing practice. Rights, as well, might also be thought of as either constitutive or regulative. See Eric J. Mitnick, Constitutive Rights, 20 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 185, 185–86 (2000); Ernest A. Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions: A Research Agenda, 10 J. Const. L. 399 (2008). It would seem, however, that many candidates for judicial superprecedent status will be difficult to classify as either primarily “constitutive,” in any sense, or as primarily “regulative.” And a heavily regulative, or de-regulative, case precedent could presumably also speak to who we are, or (ought to) aspire to be as a people.

175 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 101–110 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 111–115 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 117–136 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 140–158 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 160–165 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 166–174 and accompanying text.
Until at least some of these important problems are satisfactorily addressed, it seems best to downplay, and thus to broadly subordinate and downgrade, any reliance on the idea of a judicial superprecedent.