Understanding transnational advocacy groups: A case study of the effectiveness of the Committee to Protect Journalists in the promotion of press freedom in the Philippines

Mayuri Mukherjee

West Virginia University

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd

Recommended Citation

Mukherjee, Mayuri, "Understanding transnational advocacy groups: A case study of the effectiveness of the Committee to Protect Journalists in the promotion of press freedom in the Philippines" (2011). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 4758.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/4758

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu.
Understanding transnational advocacy groups: A case study of the effectiveness of the Committee to Protect Journalists in the promotion of press freedom in the Philippines

Mayuri Mukherjee

Thesis submitted to the
P.I. Reed School of Journalism
At West Virginia University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science
In
Journalism

Steve Urbanski, Ph.D. Chair
Scott Crichlow, Ph.D.
Kelley Crowley, Ph.D.
George Esper, Ph.D.

Department of Journalism

Morgantown, West Virginia

2011

Keywords: Transnational advocacy groups, journalists, the Philippines, Committee to Protect Journalists, Campaign against Impunity
Copyright 2011 Mayuri Mukherjee
ABSTRACT
UNDERSTANDING TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY GROUPS: A CASE STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS IN THE PROMOTION OF PRESS FREEDOM IN THE PHILIPPINES.

By Mayuri Mukherjee

Given the increasingly crucial role of the media in forming popular opinion, policymaking and the conduct of democratic institutions, there has been a severe, often lethal, backlash against individuals who exercise this power through their craft. This study examines the effectiveness of international advocacy groups in protecting journalists and promoting press freedom through a case study of the Committee to Protect Journalists, a non-governmental international advocacy group, in getting justice for killed journalists in the Philippines – one of the world’s most deadliest places for journalists. The study attempts to provide a detailed insight into how transnational advocacy groups work on the ground to bring about real change in the international sphere. The micro-level approach that has been undertaken in this project allows for a nuanced understanding of the basic problem which is essentially about how a relatively small, non-governmental organization like the CPJ manages to put its issues on the national and international agenda, influence discursive positions and impact state behavior. The study is based on ethnographic fieldwork, qualitative interviews with CPJ employees, and historical archive research. It uses Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s theory on the effectiveness of transnational advocacy networks and the norm socialization process to evaluate the effectiveness of the CPJ in defending journalists and press freedom in the Philippines.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of the 32 journalists and media workers who lost their lives in Ampatuan on November 23, 2009. They were killed because they had dared to do their job and in the process, serve their country.

Never Forget.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis would not have been possible without the invaluable guidance of my committee chair and department head, Dr. Steve Urbanski. Thank you for being so unbelievably patient and tremendously supportive of my work even as I travelled across continents. Many thanks also to my committee members, Dr. Scott Crichlow, Dr. George Esper and Dr. Kelley Crowley, without whose expertise this project would have been incomplete.

I am also extremely grateful to CPJ’s Asia Program members for their unstinting support to this project. Program Coordinator Bob Dietz and Senior Researcher Madeline Earp took me in as an intern and introduced me to a whole new world of dedicated advocates and professionals committed to improving the lives of others, each of whom has served as an inspiration for this project. Thank you CPJ for making this an experience of a lifetime.

I would also like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my family in New York and Kolkata for seeing me through the most difficult phases of this project. Without your love and support, I would not have been able to finish this at all. And finally, a big thank you-hug to Topaz – I don’t think I could have written this thesis without you by my side.
Table of Contents

Abstract.................................................................................................................................................ii
Dedication................................................................................................................................................iii
Acknowledgment..................................................................................................................................iv
Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................................v
Chapter 1: Introduction.............................................................................................................................01
Chapter 2: Literature Review....................................................................................................................05
Chapter 3: Methods..................................................................................................................................22
Chapter 4: CPJ’s Background and Organizational Structure.................................................................30
Chapter 5: CPJ’s Advocacy Activities.....................................................................................................39
Chapter 6: Profile of the Philippine Press...............................................................................................48
Chapter 7: Major Cases Review..............................................................................................................55
  2004.......................................................................................................................................................56
  2005.......................................................................................................................................................64
  2006.......................................................................................................................................................73
  2007.......................................................................................................................................................81
  2008.......................................................................................................................................................86
  2009.......................................................................................................................................................92
Chapter 8: The Global Campaign Against Impunity.................................................................................97
Chapter 9: Conclusion.............................................................................................................................104
Bibliography..........................................................................................................................................111
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The critical role played by the media in forming popular opinion and influencing policymaking affords it unparalleled importance and tremendous power in the conduct of our daily lives and democratic institutions. Consequently, there has been a severe, often lethal, backlash against individuals who exercise this power through their craft. As Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author, Carl Bernstein explains, “This backlash is premised on the use of whatever means are necessary to force self-censorship upon journalists who would challenge the status quo or reveal discomfiting truths -- whether reporting on environmental degradation in China, drug gangs in Mexico, corruption in the Philippines, fundamentalist terrorism in Iraq and Pakistan, secret policies in Putin’s Russia, or economic failure in communist Cuba” (Bernstein, 2008).

In other words, journalists and media persons have been targeted worldwide simply because they have had the extraordinary courage and unwavering determination to seek the truth, even if it meant that they had to put their very lives, as well as those of their loved ones, at stake.

Systematic violence, intended to create a climate of fear and self-censorship that will suppress the truth, is increasingly the basic strategy employed by criminal regimes, drug gangs, local despots, authoritarian cultures, and movements who wish to destroy an independent press (Bernstein, 2008). This, then is an attack on the manifestation of the purest ideals of journalism; ideals that have now, often been threatened with the terrifying consequence of abduction, assault, bludgeon, torture and murder.

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that works to protect press freedom and ensure the safety of journalists, worldwide. It monitors
attacks on journalists in particular and press freedom levels worldwide in general. It gathers information on such cases of abuse and attack, and aims to publicize that information so as to mobilize popular opinion. CPJ also has a Journalist Assistance Program that provides direct legal, medical and financial aid to journalists at risk, and their families, worldwide.

The Project:

This study explores how the CPJ facilitates improvements for journalists and press freedom in what is currently the world’s deadliest nation for journalists, the Philippines, according to the CPJ. The study is based on my year-long ethnographic fieldwork as an intern at the CPJ headquarters in New York, qualitative interviews with CPJ employees and members of the Board of Directors, and historical archival research.

The Philippines is currently, the world’s deadliest nation for journalists, as reported by the CPJ as well as the Reporters without Borders and home to one of worst attacks on the media in recent times wherein more than 30 media persons were ambushed and murdered in a single incident of election relation violence. Further details on the situation of press freedom in the Philippines are available in the literature review section.

It may also be noted that since 2007, CPJ along with the Knight Foundation, run a Global Campaign against Impunity that specifically focus on the Philippines and Russia since these two are the most unsafe countries for working journalists, and have the highest rates of impunity (CPJ, 2007). The project takes a closer look at the functioning of such a campaign and its effectiveness.
**Justifications:**

More than 30 journalists and media workers were ambushed and killed in an election-related massacre in Ampatuan town in The Philippines on November 23, 2009. This was the single deadliest event for the press since 1992, according to CPJ. In fact, the Philippines has maintained a steady presence on CPJ’s Impunity Index which puts the spotlight on countries where journalists are slain and killers go free, and this is a reflection of the nation’s abysmal press freedom record.

The Committee, on the other hand, has also been monitoring press freedom in the Philippines since the late 1990s. More recently, it has forged stronger alliances with local Filipino networks and the Global Campaign against Impunity, with focus on the nation, makes for a strong case study to look into the effects of transnational advocacy work.

Moreover, this is possibly one of the earliest efforts dedicated entirely to understanding the effectiveness of transnational advocacy groups that work for journalists. Previous research on the improvement press freedom has either kept the spotlight on intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or on the protection of general human rights by transnational advocacy groups such as Amnesty International (Perkins, 2001; Scoble & Wiseberg, 1974). However, there has been only one other study that examines the role of a transnational advocacy organization with a sole focus on the protection of journalists in promoting these issues. This study will help fill that gap.

As Adams (2004) notes in her work on the CPJ,

Research on the CPJ and its activities is valuable for a number of reasons. First, it is important to explore all efforts to improve press freedom and human rights. These two rights are essential for the stability and success of democracy in societies. Secondly, it provides insight into how nongovernmental organizations are organized, how they
communicate within and without their organization, and how they work against more powerful groups in their attempts to make change (p.3).

Overview of contents:

To provide a better understanding of CPJ’s role in the Philippines as well as the role and function of transnational advocacy networks, Chapter 2 will conduct an in-depth review of the press freedom situation in other Asian countries as well as the Philippines, it will look into the material available on democracy and free speech as well provide the theoretical basis of the study. Chapter 3 will delineate the research methods undertaken for the study while Chapter 4 will look into CPJ’s background and organizational structure, Chapter 5 will study in details CPJ’s advocacy activities and Chapter 6 will provide a profile of the Philippine press. Chapter 7 will look into CPJ’s activities in the Philippines between 2004 and 2009. It will be divided into six sub-chapters (A-F) for every year that is being analysed. Chapter 8 will be dedicated to CPJ’s Global Campaign Against Impunity and Chapter 9 will the final chapter summarizing the entire project and providing answers to the research questions delineated at the start of the study.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This section aims to provide background and context to the analysis of the CPJ’s effectiveness. By providing snippets of information from the Asian continental region in general -- and the Philippines in particular -- it presents an overall view of the level of press freedom in the region. Additionally, it also reinforces the vital need for democracy as an ingredient for a free and safe press.

This section reviews the relationship between free speech and democracy, and finds that a wide variety of socio-political and economic issues leads to attacks on journalists and these issues not only impede the functioning of a free press but also hampers the quality of democracy in the country. A variety of efforts have been undertaken to overcome these barriers on behalf of journalists and promote press freedom. These involve the work of governments, local press freedom organizations, transnational advocacy networks, and many other groups.

There is a clear indication that transnational advocacy groups such as CPJ can make a significant contribution to defending press freedom ideals even though common wisdom ordinarily associates such power only with governments and economic institutions. Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that within the theoretical framework of the transnational civil society, advocacy groups can contribute to the situation by raising issues and placing them on the international agenda, and by affecting discourse, institutional procedures, policy, and state behavior concerning press freedom. This study uses Keck and Sikkink’s model to evaluate the effectiveness of the CPJ in defending journalists and promoting press freedom in the Philippines.
Press Freedom in Asia

This section will present a general review of press freedom conditions in various Asian countries so as to facilitate a comparative context for the Philippines case.

Freedom House’s Annual Survey of Press Freedom in 2009 rated only 15 (a vast majority of which were in the Pacific Islands, Australasia and some parts of East Asia) of 40 countries in the Asia-Pacific Region as free, 11 (including Fiji, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Philippines and Thailand) as partly free, and 14 (including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, China, North Korea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Vietnam) as not free.

Both the CPJ and Freedom House report that Asia is home to some of the worst-rated countries in the world. In 2008, it was Burma, North Korea, China and Vietnam -- all of which feature extensive state or party control of the press, and last year it was Pakistan and Sri Lanka -- countries that suffered civil strife. Interestingly, the Philippines is neither a state-controlled political entity nor one that is currently in a state of war.

China: While the state does control all media, it still allows leeway for independent coverage of stories that are not perceived as threats to the Communist Party. Similarly, on one hand it also has a thick sheaf of government regulations that guide who can post news online and overall news content and on the other, the government is committed to expanding Internet access nationwide for modernization purposed (CPJ, 2008a). In 2008, authorities tightened the reins on both domestic journalists and Internet portals, attempted to manipulate online content and block access to Tibetan areas. Journalists who did not adhere to party dictates were harassed, fired, or jailed, and the year also featured the first murder of a citizen journalist in the country (FH).

Vietnam: CPJ reports that since both China and Vietnam are ruled by Communist parties that do not tolerate organized political action, both share a remarkably similar approach towards
controlling the media. Today, all Vietnamese media is bound by law to a state-run organization or an arm of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Similarly, even though Vietnam had a vibrant print media in the 1990’s, press freedom quickly disappeared as the nation found a spot in the global trade club in 2007 – “… clear parallels to Beijing’s broken promises to the international community to allow greater press freedom in exchange for hosting the Olympic Games”, says Bob Dietz, Director of the Asia Program at CPJ. OpenNet Initiative, an academic partnership that studies Internet censorship, found Vietnam engages in “pervasive” filtering of the Internet for political issues—but considerably less censorship when it comes to social issues (CPJ, 2008b).

_Burma_: Long home to one of Asia’s most repressive media environments, it has also taken Internet censorship cues from China, its staunchest international ally, says CPJ. Analysts say Burma’s security police have received Internet censorship and surveillance training from experts in China—training they have used to monitor online journalists and bloggers and launch cyber-attacks on exile-run Web publications, according to CPJ reports (CPJ, 2008c).

_Cambodia_ slipped into the “Not Free” category as a result of increased violence against journalists, particularly ahead of the July elections, reports Freedom House. A veteran reporter for an opposition newspaper was also killed during the year, the first murder of a journalist in the country since 2003. (CPJ, 2008a)

_Thailand_: Once considered to have a reasonably free media, has also, like China, enacted and enforced some of the strictest Internet legislation in the world, reports CPJ including possible jail terms for Web users who use proxy servers to access material the government has banned. Web sites that criticize the Thai monarchy and/or support the Muslim insurgents in the country’s restive southernmost region are common targets (CPJ, 2008d).
Afghanistan: The security situation has worsened, says CPJ, as reporters have come under increasing threats, both political and criminal in nature. At least three foreign correspondents and two local reporters were kidnapped across the country, not only in the provincial areas that became exceedingly dangerous after the U.S.-led invasion in 2001 but also in the area surrounding the capital, Kabul, which had once been considered safer (CPJ, 2008e).

Sri Lanka: The press freedom score declined in large part because of a deteriorating legal and political environment that included the charging of a journalist under the Prevention of Terrorism Act for the first time in 30 years, mounting restrictions on coverage of the war and the military, an increase in self-censorship, and a reduction in the diversity of views as criticism of the government is increasingly excluded, explained Freedom House reports. (CPJ, 2008f)

Fiji: Official pressure on media outlets and journalists were major issues for journalists here as authorities deported two foreign-national editors and the Fiji Times was held in contempt for publishing an unflattering letter about three judges

Press Freedom in the Philippines

On November 23, 2009, 29 journalists and two media workers were ambushed and brutally murdered in an election-related massacre that snuffed the life out of 57 civilians, in Maguindano province, in the Philippines. Their bodies were then unceremoniously dumped in mass graves in the town of Ampatuan in what is widely considered to be the deadliest event for the media ever recorded by the CPJ (CPJ, 2009a).

Today, the Philippines is “the most deadliest country” for journalists worldwide, and is the second most dangerous overall since 1992, according to the CPJ’s annual survey (CPJ, 2009b). Since 1986 when the People’s Power Revolution toppled the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and re-established democracy in the nation, a hundred and twenty-eight journalists have
been killed in the country, more than 50 percent of whom were killed in the line of duty, notes the Centre for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) – a Philippines based private, non-profit organization that upholds press freedom, promotes responsible journalism and encourages journalistic excellence (CMFR, 2009)

“Even before the Maguindano massacre, the Philippines’ impunity ranking was the highest in the world for a peacetime democracy, behind only war-ridden Iraq, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Colombia,” says Shawn Crispin, CPJ’s Senior South East Asia representative. In the past two decades, 65 journalists have been murdered in the Philippines, a death toll trailing only Iraq, yet the convictions have been obtained in just five murder cases during this time, Crispin points out in his article in the, Makings of a Massacre that was recently published CPJ’s annual survey (CPJ, 2010).

Free speech and democracy

While the debate on how to truly define, categorize, and compare democracies continues, there is widespread agreement regarding at least one criterion that is imperative for stable democracies: Governments must guarantee the right to free speech, or the right to express ideas freely without censorship from the government or society, if the government is going to be ruled by the people (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002; Henry, 2001; Wiarda, 1980). Much of the modern view regarding free speech, democracy and libertarian thought can be attributed to John Milton who has categorically said that one of the most fundamental freedoms is the liberty of conscience which is contingent upon the free exchange of information and ideas. The space where this exchange occurs is often described as the “marketplace of ideas,” and it is here that man will eventually be able to discover truth. It stands to reason than that any activity that jeopardizes the
exchange of information in the marketplace of ideas will also threaten the liberty of conscience and ultimately damage the freedom of the people (Flannagan, 2002).

Locke in his work argues that it is the duty of the government to protect the individuals’ political and religious rights. He also clearly states that the government cannot choose to grant or not grant these rights since these are every individual’s inherent rights. However, it is the primary duty of the government to protect these rights (Thomas, 1995). In conjunction with the arguments put forward by Milton, Locke’s ideas are believed to have influenced the American Constitution and its First Amendment, which guarantees freedom of speech and expression to the American people (Vivian, 2003).

As mentioned before there is a multitude of ideas about democracy and an equal variety on the role of the press that exists in the academic literature. For example, Habermas (Calhoun, 1992) recommends an open platform for citizens to express their views and share their opinions which would allow for greater individual participation in the matters of the community through discourse and deliberation. These activities, he said, would be crucial for the functioning of a participatory democracy and therefore must be guarded.

Literature also reveals that most any list of essential elements that make up a functioning democracy is incomplete without a mention of the Freedom of Speech and Expression. A widely respected theorist on democracy, Dahl (1998) prescribes two important characteristics: contestation, which he defines as competition, and participation. A manifestation of these two attributes would thus include voting equality, enlightened understanding, equal control of the agenda, and adult suffrage. In other words, if the citizenry has to genuinely participate in the functioning of its government and have any control over public agenda, then it is mandatory that it be guaranteed the freedom of speech and expression.
Evidently, the idea of a vibrant democracy is incomplete without the existence of a free press. A democratic state must allow its citizens to speak their minds, engage in public debate, and be well-informed if they are to make a significant contribution to society. According to Milton’s theory, the marketplace of ideas will thrive only as long as there are multiple, and independent sources of information. Attacks on the press, especially in the case of murder, represent the ultimate form of censorship. They limit freedom of expression, reduce the availability of information, discourage public deliberation, and ultimately reduce the quality of democracy in societies (CPJ, 2008g).

*Efforts to Improve the Protection of Journalists and Press Freedom Ideals*

There are a large number of groups working to protect Asian journalists, improve their safety and promote press freedom ideals. At the international level, organizations like Freedom House, support democratic change, monitor freedom, and advocate for democracy and human rights by combining analysis, advocacy and action (*Freedom House, 2010*).

Other organizations that work actively to promote press freedom ideals include the Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), Article 19, World Press Freedom Committee, and International Federation of Journalists (IFJ).

Additionally, press freedom groups have also come together to form integrated networks such as the International Freedom of Expression eXchange (IFEX) network. Founded in 1992 in Montréal, Canada, IFEX is the result of leading free expression organizations coming together to create a coordinated mechanism that would expose violations to the right to free speech around the world. More than 80 independent organizations globally, including CPJ, make up the IFEX network which is widely recognized as a highly credible and effective global network that is
bringing about real change in a global situation wherein more than half of the world’s nations violate the principles of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (IFEX, 2010).

Also, non-governmental advocacy organizations that focus on human rights in general, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, take interest in attacks against the press. These groups work in consortium with each and have indeed created an elaborate network of organizations that are working to promote press freedom and protect journalists worldwide.

Theoretical Framework

A Basic Description of The Transnational Advocacy Network

Keck and Sikkink (1998) define networks as “forms of organizations characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (p. 8). Transnational advocacy networks essentially communication networks that “plead the causes of others or defend a cause or proposition” across international state boundaries. They are defined as organizations bound by shared values, “dense exchanges of information,” and “common discourse” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 8) that try to raise issues, influence policy, change discourse, and improve state behavior (Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink, 2002).

Advocacy networks have been found to most commonly focus on human rights issues, environmental causes, and women’s rights. In 1993, 27 percent of the 544 advocacy networks (as reported by the union of international associations) dealt with human rights issues, 14 percent dealt with the environment, and 10 percent dealt with women’s rights (Smith, Pagnucco, & Chatfield, 1997). The other remaining groups were concerned with education, health, ethnic conflicts and animal rights among other issues (Boulding, 1997). These transnational networks may consist of media organizations, research foundations, churches, trade unions, professional
groups, multinational organizations, government organs, and amongst individuals, it may include politicians, intellectuals, lawyers, scientists, economists among others (Wiseberg & Scoble, 1981).

The entire network of organization then embarks upon a common campaign that aims to firstly, draw attention to an issue, secondly, place it on the international agenda, and ultimately persuade the norm violating body, through pressure and socialization, to make changes for the oppressed. These campaigns may be directed at specific public officials or may be aimed at the public as a whole (Boulding, 1997).

According to Keck and Sikkink (1998), there are four types of politics that make up the campaigns: information politics, symbolic politics, accountability politics, and leverage politics. Transnational advocacy networks mostly focus on gathering information as the first step to raising awareness of issues, and this constitutes information politics. The manner in which the information is distributed is includes symbolic and accountability politics. Advocacy networks will infuse meaning into anniversaries, icons, stories, converting them into symbols that will then frame an issue in a so that it ‘resonates’ with the audience. Unlike social movements, advocacy groups have been known to use symbolic politics in more subtle but equally powerful ways (Khagram, et al., 2002; Sperling, Ferree, & Risman, 2001).

For example, dramatic footage of Brazilian rainforests burning in the hot summer of 1988 went a long way in convincing people that global warming and tropical deforestation were inter-connected environmental issues. And when, bundled with the assassination of Brazilian rubber tapper leader, Chico Mendez at the end of that year, it confirmed that something was seriously wrong in the Amazon (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
Transnational advocacy groups will also rely heavily on accountability politics to remind governments, especially Western ones, of their own domestic and international commitments and pressure them to take appropriate action. In fact, these groups spend considerable time trying to convince governments to make publicly change their stand on contentious issues. Some dismiss these as inconsequential since talk is cheap, but advocacy groups and networks convert these into opportunities for accountability politics and when governments fail to walk the talk, these groups expose the distance between discourse and practice which is often embarrassing for governments and compels them to take action (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). The best example of accountability politics was the manner in which human rights organizations used the 1975 Helsinki Accords to pressure the erstwhile Soviet Union and the governments of Eastern Europe to make crucial changes (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

However, if all these information, accountability, and symbolic politics fail to bring about a change in the behavior of a norm-violating state, networks will move to next step and engage in leverage politics, directing their efforts towards a more powerful actor, such as an economic institution, to take action against the state. This usually includes persuading intergovernmental organizations or powerful states to place economic sanctions on a country, cut military aid or public condemn violations in the state.

It may be noted that throughout these efforts, transnational networks constantly work to build themselves a credible image. Developments in communication technologies have gone a long way in allowing these networks to create and maintain this image (Boulding, 1997; Cortright, Pagnucco, & Chatfield, 1997; Khagram, et al., 2002; Smith, 1997).

A Theory on the Effectiveness of Transnational Networks:
**Norms Socialization Process**

Literature in this field has clearly indicated that transnational groups and networks have an impact on international processes. This is in direct contrast to realist theories on international relations which claim that only governments and economic institutions can affect state behavior (Boulding, 1997).

One of the ways in which advocacy groups and networks make an impact is by empowering local domestic groups. Often these groups have little power on their own especially as they function in a hostile environment characterized an antagonistic government. Hence, they reach out to international groups and networks who then support the work of local groups while also pressuring governments to make change. This phenomenon is called the *boomerang pattern* (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2000).

A second method of bringing about change in state behavior involves the *norms socialization* process. This may be defined as the “process by which principled ideas held by individuals become norms in the sense of collective understandings about appropriate behavior which then lead to changes in identities, interests and behavior” (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 1999, p. 11). In other words, this is the “induction of new members… into the ways of behavior that are preferred in a society” (Barnes, Carter, & Skidmore, 1980, p. 35). Thus, when advocacy groups engage in information, symbolic, accountability, and leverage politics, they are essentially aiming to build principled ideas, as described above. These activities can lead “governments to adapt the issue, change institutional procedures to accept the norm, and then use those norms as leverage against states to ultimately change their behavior” (Adams, 2004, p.17).

Integrating the boomerang pattern and the norms-socialization process into a more dynamic model that includes the effects of domestic-transnational-international linkages have on
the local political scene, results in the five-phase *Spiral Model* of human rights change (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999).

The next section presents a review of the Spiral Model as it might have played out between early 1970s to the late 1990s in the Philippines. This provides for a good understanding of the model in real life politics and simultaneously, allows for a solid historical foundation for the present study.

*The Spiral Model*

*International Norms in the Philippines (early 1970s to mid 1990s).*

Phase 1: Repression and Activation of Network

In this stage, norm violating governments are found to oppress their citizens and commit abuses while transnational advocacy networks gather information and expose their subjugation, so as to shame the government and gain international support. Norm-violating governments in this stage all most always respond by denying the accusations (Adams, 2004).

By the early 1970s, the Philippines had an authoritarian government led by President Ferdinand Marcos who used ambitious economic programs as the excuse for establishing authoritarian-corporate-type structures that lacked public accountability (Robison, 1993; Stauffer 1977), allowing opportunities for human rights violations (Jetschke, 1999). In response to Marcos’ illegal detentions and other rights abuses, two important human rights emerged -- a church group called the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) and the Free Legal Assistant Group (FLAG) – both of which relied extensively on domestic nation-wide church network to document individual abuse and also worked with the international church organizations (Nemenzo, 1995).
Phase 2: Mobilization and Governmental Denial

In this stage, governments continue to deny accusation of abuse and simultaneously accuse networks and organizations of illegitimate intervention and invasion of the nation’s sovereignty (Adams, 2004).

In the Philippines, the process began in 1974-75 with the Marcos government discrediting any and all foreign voices by invoking the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs which failed miserably due to the role of the U.S. in Philippine politics and the political elite’s support for a strong U.S.-Philippine relationship as well as the Philippines’ support for human rights in international forum. Thus, Marcos was caught in his own rhetoric (Jetschke, 1999).

Phase 3: Tactical Concessions

In this stage, norm-violating governments take some immediate but usually short-term actions to assuage international protests but generally, these lead to long term improvements. Governments also show more respect for human rights groups and the domestic opposition, thus allowing the latter especially to grow significantly stronger (Adams, 2004). However, this has occasionally led to increased repression as state view them as greater threats than before (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999).

Philippines entered the third stage in 1977-78 and it lasted till Marcos’ removal from power in 1986. In spite of the fact that Marcos was a reliable and much needed military ally for the United States, the networks were able to lobby the Carter administration to openly criticize him for human rights violations. This reinforced the claims of the international networks which eventually led to Marcos’ announcement of a normalization process soon after (Jetschke, 1999). He also promised to hold elections to a transitory legislature (Corsino, 1981), pledged his

Phase 4: Prescriptive Status phase

At this level, governments accept human rights ideals as valid norms and include them as part of their agenda. It also ratifies relevant treaties and institutionalizes human rights norms by establishing grievance cells and human rights commissions etc (Adams, 2004).

In the Philippines, human rights norms gained prescriptive status in 1986, after Marcos’ departure and the inauguration of President Corazon Aquino. The Aquino administration ratified important treaties such as the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (1986) and the First Optional Protocol (1989) among others, created the Constitutional Commission on Human Rights for complaints against human rights violations and restored legal guarantees such as habeas corpus (Jetschke, 1999). In 1987, however, political violence escalated as government security forces shot demonstrating peasant in the so-called Mendiola massacre and the newly formed human rights institutions seemed incapable of handling the situation. Human rights abuses, therefore, were never completely eliminated and unfortunately, the Philippines has been unable move on to the next stage of Rule Consistent Behavior.

Phase 5: Rule Consistent Behavior

This final stage is reached when human rights norms have been *habitatualised* in the country (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999).

It may be noted that these phases are not evolutionary and states may move back and forth on the spiral. Also, as in evident from the above discussion the phases involve four different groups and interactions: International-transnational interactions among transnationally
operating international non-governmental organization, Western states and international human rights regimes, domestic society in the norm violating state, links between societal opposition and transnational networks, and the national government of the norm-violating state (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 2009).

In conclusion, it is evident that transnational advocacy groups serve three main purposes which make for necessary conditions for sustainable change as states move through the five phases of the Spiral Model. Firstly, they put norm-violating states on the international agenda through “moral-consciousness raising”, secondly, the empower and legitimize domestic opposition groups which protects those groups from the norm-violating governments and support their mobilization efforts and finally, the groups and networks themselves challenge norm-violating governments by pressurizing them “from above” and “from below” (Brysk, 1993; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999).

Levels of Effectiveness:
Keck and Sikkink (1998) specify five different levels of influence that help measure the level of effectiveness of transnational advocacy group.

1. Raising issues and placing them on the agenda
2. Influencing discursive positions
3. Influencing institutional procedures
4. Influencing policy change
5. Influencing state behavior.

This model is particularly efficient because it takes into account that individual transnational advocacy organizations or even entire networks may not be able to achieve specific
policy changes or reform state behavior. However, it effectively shifts the spotlight on smaller changes that the organization may have achieved which eventually contributes to reform in state behavior (Smith, 1997). Ultimately, it is a summation of various activities that have led to the achievement of at least one of the above mentioned levels of effectiveness that endows transnational advocacy groups with soft power (Khagram, et al., 2002).

Keck and Sikkink (1998) observe that effectiveness of the organization depend upon multiple pre-conditions. Two of those include the issue addressed and the actors involved. Issues that can be framed easily through a clear causal story with a definite perpetrator and victim always resonate better with the audience and more likely to be effective. Similarly, cases that are already governed by international law and precedent are more likely to be successful (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999).

In the case of “actors”, cases where international advocacy groups and domestic nongovernmental organizations are already in existence are likely to see better results. Their legitimacy and credibility with target audiences is also crucial, and so is their ability to share information and effectively network with other organizations in determining their final effectiveness. Other states are can also be valuable actors in the campaign if agree to put pressure on the norm-violating state or use material leverage, if available. One must also take into consideration if the norm violating government is vulnerable to such material leverage or even, international shaming (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

**HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Attacks on the press violate universally recognized human rights and discourage journalists from gathering and reporting information. Therefore, it is essential for governments to ensure the safety of journalists and freedom of expression.
Realist political theory considers only state actors to be relevant in changing state behavior. However, theories on the role of transnational advocacy groups in civil society recognize that organizations like the CPJ can have an influence by raising and placing an issue on the agenda, and affecting discourse, institutional procedures, policy, and state behavior on the issue. These influences can pressure governments to adopt internationally accepted norms and eventually make changes in state behavior. As international watchdogs, nongovernmental organizations can force governments to be more concerned about their behavior. The rest of the study uses this model on transnational advocacy to investigate whether or not the CPJ is effective in pressuring governments.

**Research Questions:**

As described earlier, the aim of this project is to study the CPJ’s role in protecting journalists and improving press freedom in the Philippines. Essentially, it seeks to answer the following questions:

R1. What tools of advocacy does the CPJ use to improve the safety of journalists and press freedom in the Philippines?

R2. When measured against Keck and Sikkink’s Five Levels of Effectiveness, how effective are CPJ’s tools in improving the safety of journalists and press freedom in the Philippines?

R3. What types of journalists were murdered in the Philippines i.e. Were they local or foreign journalists, what beat did they cover, which medium did they practice (print, TV, radio, internet etc), were they male or female, and who murdered them?

R4. How does the CPJ’s advocacy help explain the influence of transnational advocacy networks in international processes and politics?
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This study has utilized multiple methods and resources to study the CPJ’s effectiveness in the Philippines. This includes intensive ethnographic fieldwork, historical archival research and interviews.

Ethnographic Fieldwork:

From July 2009 till September 2010, I worked at CPJ in my capacity as an intern for the Asia program. My position required me to monitor and research the press freedom situation in Asia. Apart from cases on The Philippines, I also worked on cases from the Indian sub-continent, China, Fiji and other South East Asia countries.

On a regular basis, I conducted Internet searches, coordinated with local news sources and connected with CPJ’s regional affiliates to assist with the Asia program’s research and campaigning activities. I read local newspapers and monitored other news sources for information on attacks on journalists or violations of press freedom in the region. Then, I forwarded those cases, with preliminary information to my immediate supervisor, the Asia Program Research Associate, Ms. Madeline Earp. She would then scan through the cases and return them to me with follow-up instructions.

Usually, these instructions would involve researching the case online and getting in touch with local contacts via phone or email for their inputs on the matter. After establishing at least two independent sources for the story and verifying all the information, I wrote up a case report. This case report was akin to a news report and written in accordance with Associated Press style guidelines. I would then send the report to Ms. Earp, who would edit it and return the draft with questions. Usually, these questions would refer to possibly vague details in the report and would
almost always require additional research. Ms. Earp and I would continue to work on the report until we were satisfied with its final quality.

In the next stage, Ms. Earp would forward the report-file to CPJ’s editorial team. This team also received similar reports from the other regional programs such as the Middle East program, the Africa program and the Americas program etc. The editorial team would then edit the reports for a second time. If they had questions, they would return to the regional program staff or they would take it to the last step and publish the report on the Web site. Occasionally, if the case was not put online, it was still kept on file for purposes of record and documentation.

Apart from preparing case reports, I also assisted Ms. Earp in the preparation of alerts and special reports. Alerts were prepared in the case of major events such as the Maguindano massacre, brutal murder of a journalist or if there was an important update in an ongoing situation such as the trial of a murdered journalist. These alerts also went through a similar process of editorial scrutiny and were then uploaded to the CPJ Web site. They were also emailed to those who had subscribed to the CPJ’s email list.

On some occasions the program staff would also prepare special reports for major cases such as the Maguindano massacre or the attacks on journalists during political unrest. In my position, as a research intern I would assist Ms. Earp and the Asia Program Coordinator, Mr. Bob Dietz in the production of these reports.

Apart from providing research, writing and editing support, I also provided administrative assistance as required. This included performing tasks such as updating the contacts list for the program and sending alerts directly, via facsimile, to norm-violating government offices as well as helping in the organization of events such as the first CPJ
Impunity Summit -- a two-day event that brought together press freedom advocates from around the world to work in concert and bring the killers of journalists to justice.

During my year-long internship at CPJ, I worked closely on a number of murder, assault and abduction cases. Apart from the Philippines, I worked on many cases from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, India, Cambodia and Singapore including the disappearance of documentary filmmaker Asad Qureshi in Northern Waziristan and the arrest of Amar Desh acting editor, Mahmudur Rahman in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Additionally, I was also involved with the production of CPJ’s annual report on press freedom, *Attacks on the Press* for two consecutive years.

My work at CPJ has been very useful because I was able to see how organization functions on a daily basis, over long period of time. I gained significant familiarity with the organization and its activities. It allowed me valuable insights into the organization and I believe this has provided my study tremendous depth and perspective that has only added to the findings of my interviews and archival research (Berg, 1998; Pindexter & McCombs, 2000).

*Interviews:*

To answer the study’s research questions, I engaged in qualitative interviews with CPJ employees. My internship allowed me several opportunities to speak with Mr. Dietz and Ms. Earp about their work at CPJ. I also had similar exchanges with Sheryl Mendez, CPJ’s Journalist Assistance program associate.

I was also able to speak with the Executive Director of the Centre for Media Freedom and Responsibility which is one of CPJ’s important national allies in The Philippines. Mrs. Melinda Quintos de Jesus is a Filipino journalist of repute and has worked extensively on press freedom issues in the Philippines. She is a founding member of the Board of Trustees of the Southeast
Asia Press Alliance (SEAPA) and is a member of the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) council. She was a panelist at CPJ’s Impunity Summit where I was a volunteer, as mentioned above. Additionally, I also conducted a phone interview with Prof. Sheila Coronel, another Filipino journalist of repute who is currently teaching at the Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism. Prof. Coronel is a founding member of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) that promotes investigative reporting in the Philippine and director of the Toni Stabile Center for Investigative Journalism. She is also a member of CPJ’s Board of Director.

While my interviews with CPJ staff members occurred in segments during the length of my internship, the other interviews followed a semi-structured format (Rubin & Rubin, 1995), which addressed the interviewee’s relationship with CPJ, how it goes about its activities, its challenges, how it evaluates the outcomes of its efforts, previous campaigns, and factors that influence its effectiveness.

*Historical archive research and survey of activities:*

The third segment of this study involved researching the CPJ’s historical archives. During my internship at the CPJ headquarters, I had access to all *Attacks on the Press*, since 1989. This book contains all of the cases CPJ documented during each year. Most of the CPJ’s archives are open to the public and available at its web site at [www.cpj.org](http://www.cpj.org). This site also contains all of its press releases and protest letters since 2000. Other publications from the mid-1990s are also included, but none of these are alerts or protest letters.

*Variables:*

For the purpose of this study, focus has been restricted to the Philippines. This restriction has allowed for a significant reduction in the variances in social, political and economic factors
that would have otherwise had to be accounted for in the case of a larger regional or global study.

A narrow focus on just one country has also led to a much more intensive study of individual cases. This approach was particularly beneficial because this was also how the organization functioned. After the first set of alerts and reports were produced, later advocacy efforts varied on case-to-case basis. Thus, an intensive, case-by-case approach fit in well enough.

Additionally, I also chose to focus on cases of journalist’s murder only. Based on preliminary research, I found that killing journalists in retribution for their work was far the most horrific problem faced by the media in the country. This trend is furthered and fostered by a culture of impunity that allows the journalists’ killers to walk free.

Also, CPJ’s Campaign against Impunity with its focus on the Philippines (and Russia) deals exclusively with murder cases only. Including non-murder cases in the project would have diminished the study of this particular campaign.

In terms of a time-frame, I chose to focus only on CPJ’s activities between 2004 and 2009 since most of the employees I have worked with on the project, did not work at that organization before 2004, or do not have information on issues prior to 2004. A narrow focus also helps keep a check on the number of the cases and allows for the intensive approach, discussed earlier.

Definitions

The following are based on my ethnographic fieldwork and information that is available on the CPJ Web site.

Journalist: CPJ defines journalists as people who cover news or comment on public affairs in print, in photographs, on radio, on television, or online. Writers, editors, publishers,
producers, technicians, photographers, camera operators and directors of news organizations are all included. It may also be noted that in murder cases, CPJ distinguishes between journalists (as defined above) and media workers such as translators, drivers, guards, fixers, and administrative workers. CPJ has been documenting their deaths since 2003 as it believes that media workers play a vital role in news gathering. For the purpose of this study, however, it may be noted that only journalists and not media workers are being considered.

*Killed (confirmed):* Only those journalists who have been murdered in retribution for, or to prevent, news coverage or commentary are considered as Killed (confirmed) cases. This label is also attributed to journalists killed in crossfire or while covering dangerous assignments. It is to be noted that journalists who were clearly not murdered for professional reasons, but were victimized for other causes (such as property disputes, political activism etc) are not considered within the limits of this study.

*Killed (Motive Unconfirmed):* In some cases, evidence linking the crime directly to the journalist’s profession may not be available or the motive for the crime may be unclear. However, if there is enough reason to believe that the killing was related to his or her professional duties, CPJ continues to research the reasons for the crime and encourages local authorities to pursue their investigations. These cases are labeled as Killed (Motive Unconfirmed). They may however be re-labeled based on new information, as I learned during the internship.

*Impunity in Murder Cases:* CPJ monitors the law enforcement and judicial process for each confirmed murder case, and also categorizes the status of the investigation. The categories are as follows:

1. Complete impunity: In this case, no convictions have been obtained
2. Partial justice: Some but not all of those responsible have been convicted. According to CPJ data, typically, assassins are convicted but not masterminds.

3. Full justice: In this case, everyone responsible is convicted, including both perpetrators and masterminds.

* * 

**Suspected Perpetrators in Murder Cases:** This refers to the person or entity that CPJ has identified as most likely to be responsible for the journalist’s murder. Categories include:

1. Political Groups: These may be anti-government parties or combatants, including insurgents and terrorists.
2. Government officials: These refer to civilian government officials, including police.
4. Paramilitary groups: Irregular armed forces allied with the government.
5. Criminal groups: Criminals or members of criminal gangs.
6. Mob violence: Crowds of people acting together but not otherwise organized.
7. Local residents: Individuals inspired to violence by news coverage.

* * 

**Taken Captive:** This refers to the abduction or seizure of a journalist in the period directly before his/her murder.

**Threatened:** This refers to all forms of threats at any time before a journalist was murdered.

**Tortured:** This means the journalist was physically and demonstrably tortured before being murdered.
*Organization:* The CPJ’s organization refers to the number of people who work there and the organization’s hierarchy. It also includes CPJ’s place in the network of transnational advocacy groups that protecting journalists, ensuring press freedom and human rights.

*Campaigns:* This refers to any set of activities, “in which members of a diffuse principled network…develop explicit, visible ties and mutually recognized roles in pursuit of a common goal, as defined by Keck and Sikkink (1998, p. 6)
CHAPTER 4
CPJ’S BACKGROUND AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

CPJ was founded in 1981 by a group of American foreign correspondents in response to the brutal treatment meted out to their colleagues by authoritarian governments and those who were opposed to independent journalism.

At the time, the American media cared little about the troubles of local reporters working in repressive societies and it was reluctant to cover media abuses, much less advocate against them as it believed that such reporting could hurt the media’s credibility in the public eye. The occasional imprisonment or death of a US foreign correspondent would spark an outrage, but attacks against local journalists by repressive governments were not considered to be news (Simon, 2006).

“The inspiration for this organization came after two of its founders, Laurie Nadel and Michael Massing, launched an international campaign that resulted in the successful release of a Paraguayan journalist from prison”, says Adams (2004).

BACKGROUND

“CPJ’s mission began 20 years ago with two volunteers, a typewriter, and a letter to Walter Cronkite”, wrote journalist and a founding board member of the organization, Michael Massing in a special report in 2001 (Massing, 2001). It all began with the plight of one writer, González Delvalle, a columnist for the Paraguayan newspaper ABC Color, he said.

In May 1980, Gen. Alfredo Stroessner’s government in Paraguay issued an arrest warrant for Delvalle for his series of investigative articles about the country’s criminal justice system, while the journalist was on a month long tour in the United States. Delvalle had long been a
target for his tough reporting and in spite of facing up to three years in prison in the event of a conviction, Delvalle decided to return home and confront the government (Massing, 2001).

Before he left the country, however, Delvalle contacted news writer Laurie Nadel of CBS News. Scarred by her own experience as a reporter for Newsweek and UPI in Chile, Nadel at that time was trying, with little success, to have the American media cover the killing and imprisonment of journalists by military governments in Latin America (Simon, 2006). She shared Delvalle’s story with Michael Massing, an editor at the Columbia Journalism Review and both became concerned about Delvalle’s safety once he returned home. They searched for organizations that would function as a watchdog but were unable to find one that had any real mechanism for assisting threatened journalists outside of the United States (Massing, 2001).

They were however able to alert the newspapers, wire services and regional human right groups of Delvalle’s situation which prevented the journalist’s immediate arrest at the Asunción airport. He was taken into custody the following day but continued pressure from the international community ensured his release after 70 days (Massing, 2001).

Warren Hoge, the New York Times correspondent in Brazil who had flown to Paraguay, quoted González Delvalle’s lawyer in his report as saying, “Pressure from abroad is the only power the dictatorship respects” (Simon, 2006)

Birth of a Movement

The success of Delvalle’s case, stemming from a simple mobilization of press coverage, amazed Nadel and Massing, as they realized that a concerted response could assist other journalists in similar straits. They also believed that the larger principle of press freedom, which is inextricably linked to the global struggle for human rights, was at stake and yet there was no
American organization dedicated to defending journalists when they became victims (Simon, 2006).

Massing sought to harness the power of the American press to “fill the gap”, as Victor Navasky, then editor of *The Nation* described the project, and reached out to the country’s best-known journalists. “The key, we knew, was enlisting the right people, journalists whose very names would communicate the nature and seriousness of our mission,” said Massing (Massing, 2001).

America’s most trusted journalist, Walter Cronkite was chosen to head the new organization and his involvement with CPJ confirmed Massing’s belief that, “the names on the letterhead would get government attention around the world” (Simon, 2006).

Once Cronkite was on-board, other journalists who had a record of commitment to press freedom were roped in such as the *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis, Jane Kramer of *The New Yorker*, Peter Arnett of the Associated Press, Colman McCarthy and Dan Rather, both from the *Washington Post* and *The Nation’s* Victor Navasky, who also suggested that Massing approach Aryeh Neier, the newly named executive director of Helsinki Watch (which would later become Human Rights Watch) (Massing, 2001; Simon, 2006).

Neier provided invaluable advice about starting a nonprofit organization while Alice Arlen, the head of the Alicia Patterson Foundation gave free space where Nadel, Massing and a volunteer worked to “convert the luster of our letterhead into tangible support for journalists abroad” (Massing, 2001).

The trio compiled a list of sympathetic journalists and officials, gathered information about individual cases of attack and mailed news digests of these cases, urging their readers to protest with the appropriate authorities. But they did not know if they were having any effect.
The First Test of Effectiveness:

In April 1982, when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and started a war with Britain, the military junta in Buenos Aires arrested three British journalists on espionage charges – Simon Winchester of The Sunday Times, and Ian Mather and Tony Prime of The Observer – in an attempt to control the flow of news.

In response, the three-member team at the newly formed CPJ mailed an urgent appeal to 300 recipients who included members of the press, government officials and human rights organizations. The appeal closed with a recommendation that protest letters and telegrams be sent to Argentina’s foreign and justice ministers, and this recommendation was taken up by many who flooded the Argentine government with their appeals (Massing, 2001).

The journalists were released about 10 days later, and after they returned to the home country, Winchester and Mather informed the CPJ team that their appeal had been pivotal, that Argentine government was flooded protests and forced to order their release (Massing, 2001). It may be noted that several other organizations including the Swiss Embassy, the United Nations secretary general, the Pope and another committee created only to press for the journalists’ freedom had unsuccessfully lobbied for their release (Winchester, 2001).

“And then came the letter from Walter Cronkite on the stationery of the Committee to Protect Journalists,” wrote Winchester (2001).

All three of us [the imprisoned journalists] were delighted to see that he, and a new committee of which he was a leading member, had taken up our case….In a letter to my wife and children, I wrote that I was beginning to feel that the end was in sight, because CPJ and Walter Cronkite had expressed their concern (para. 21).

Results and Future Developments
“CPJ cut its teeth in the Falklands dispute”, Winchester (2001) wrote and describes the organization as a “body that does nothing, quite frankly, but good, and that stands ready to help all of our colleagues, present and future, wherever and whenever they may find themselves in the kind of trouble that only journalists, saving the grammatical infelicity for last, can get into” (para. 29).

“In many ways, the time was right”, says Simon (2006). Developments in information technologies and the Watergate scandal which brought the influence of the American press to its peak, helped American journalists realize that their support could actually make a difference. “If journalists could shake the White House”, said David Marash, an anchor at WCBS in New York and an early board member, “Why can’t we stop the bad guys from shaking down or beating up our colleagues around the world” (Simon, 2006).

**Goals and Aims:**

The Committee to Protect Journalists’ primary goal is to promote press freedom worldwide. And it does so by taking action when journalists are censored, jailed, kidnapped, or killed for their work (CPJ, 2010a). It campaigns for the release of imprisoned journalists, supports journalists in exile and demands justice for those who were killed for doing their job. As Adams (2004) noted in her study, “The main ways the CPJ tries to defend journalists is by strengthening journalists’ power and prestige” (p. 44). She identified four immediate and interdependent actions that had been designed to achieve the above mentioned goals:

1. Strengthen the press freedom network
2. Draw attention to abuses against the press
3. Support local press groups
4. Maintain the CPJ’s authority on press freedom issues in the international community
Structure of the Organization

CPJ’s organizational structure plays an important role in the achievement of its goals (Adams, 2004). As of October 2010, the Committee had 31 staff members, 23 of whom were full-time employees working at the New York headquarters (CPJ, 2010a, see Appendix A). This included editors, program coordinators, research associates, area specialists, regional consultants, directors for development and outreach, advocacy and communication, finance and administration, program assistants and an office manager among others (CPJ, 2010b).

The organization is headed by its Executive Director, Mr. Joel Simon, one of the world’s recognized experts on press freedom. It was under Simon’s direction that CPJ launched the Global Campaign Against Impunity, established the Journalist Assistance program and won the prestigious Thomas J. Dodd Prize in International Justice and Human Rights and a News & Documentary Emmy (CPJ, 2010b). Simon started out as a journalist in Latin America but has been with CPJ since 1997, when he joined as Americas Program Coordinator.

Also in the top leadership is Deputy Director Robert Mahoney, a journalist with extensive experience in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Mahoney reported on the aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the civil war in Sri Lanka, the fallout from the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, civil war in Liberia and later, directed coverage the Palestinian intifada, the Iraqi missile attacks on Israel, the Oslo peace process, and the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. He has also taught journalism worked at the Reuters Foundation in the Middle East, and worked as a consultant for Human Rights Watch (CPJ, 2010b).

The Asia Program at CPJ is a three-member team that includes Program Coordinator, Bob Dietz, Senior Research Associate Madeline Earp and Senior Southeast Asia Representative Shawn W. Crispin.
Dietz, who has been leading the program since 2006, not only has extensive knowledge of Asian affairs but also worked in Africa and the Middle East, before moving to Asia as a Seoul bureau chief for NBC News. He also started the network’s bureau in Manila and later, he was the editor of *Asiaweek* magazine in Hong Kong, following which joined the World Health Organization where he continued to work with local and foreign reporters in Asia (CPJ, 2010b).

Senior Asia Program Research Associate, Madeline Earp has a Master’s Degree in East Asian studies from Harvard University, studied Chinese in Taiwan and China and has written extensively about the Chinese media (CPJ, 2010b).

Based in Bangkok, Thailand, senior Southeast Asia representative, Shawn Crispin is an editor for *Asia Times Online* and an award-winning journalist with significant experience working in the region. Earlier, he was bureau chief for the Hong Kong-based *Far Eastern Economic Review*, has served as an investigative consultant with Human Rights Watch and also speaks fluent Thai (CPJ, 2010b).

It may be noted that each member has significant regional expertise, that they all lived and worked in the region and this experience has allowed them to build local connections and networks as well as fostered an understanding of the region.

The staff at CPJ is supported by a 35-member board of directors that includes prominent journalists such as Paul Steiger, Christiane Amanpour, Kathleen Carroll and Josh Friedman (CPJ, 2010c). A complete list of the members on this board is provided in Appendix B. Members of the board actively participate in CPJ’s activities by contributing to special reports, supporting international missions and advising with advocacy work (see, for example, Coronel, 2007).

Like most advocacy groups, CPJ too works in sync with an elaborate network of journalists, human rights groups, and other press freedom organizations (Adams, 2004). Some of
the organizations it works with include the IAPA which demands justice for journalists killed in the Americas through legal action and by raising social awareness, the Moscow-based Glasnost Defense Foundation which provides legal support to Russian journalists and advocates for their rights, the London-based International News Safety Institute and Vienna-based International Press Institute and the Paris-based Reporter Without Borders (CPJ, 2010d).

Additionally in the Philippines, CPJ works closely with the Centre for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR), a local press freedom group that works to strengthen the free press and is also a founding member and secretariat of the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists, a coalition of Philippine media groups that provides legal and financial support for the prosecution of journalist murders. The National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP) which represents the Philippine working press is another organization which may be described as a CPJ ally in the country (CPJ, 2010d).

Conclusions

This chapter describes how and why the CPJ was created, its overall goals, its organizational structure, and how it fits into the larger network of transnational advocacy groups that are also working to protect working journalists and promote press freedom.

According to Keck and Sikkink (1998), transnational advocacy networks are created to fill the void that exists due to a lack of interest in an oppressed group. The individual accounts of Massing, Winchester and Simon demonstrate that CPJ was established as one of the first organizations that would focus solely on the plight of journalists who had been attacked, abused and even killed for doing their job. Massing, Nadel and their small team believed that they could harness the power of the American press to make a difference for the colleagues who were suffering under authoritarian regimes and similar institutions.
Delvalle’s case was a clear example of the tremendous power of the American media, and how that inherent potential could be used to protect the rights and freedoms of its own community members. It may be noted that till date, the organization uses much of the same model of advocacy that it had found effective in Delvalle’s case.

The case of the three British journalists who were imprisoned in Argentina, on the other hand, was the organization’s first test of effectiveness which it passed with flying colors as is evident from the personal testimonies of Winchester and Mather, previously describes.

Currently, CPJ functions individually and as part of a larger network of organizations that work to protect press freedom.

As the next chapter will illustrate, many of CPJ’s activities include building and strengthening this network. CPJ also encourages the organization of local groups so as to bring about a more efficient exchange of reliable information. Chapter 5 discusses the specific activities the CPJ engages in to achieve its objectives and Chapters 6, 7, and 8 will use Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) model of transnational advocacy to evaluate whether these activities are effective.
CHAPTER 5
CPJ’s ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES

CPJ undertakes a wide range of activities that allow the organization to fulfill its goals of promoting press freedom and protecting journalists through raising awareness, building networks and working in collaboration with the local networks. This includes producing alerts and case reports, publishing a comprehensive survey on press freedom, organizing international press freedom missions, collaborating with local allies and government officials to bring about policy change, assisting journalists in trouble get to safety and recognizing the work of brave journalists etc. Much of this is similar to the model of activities adopted by the organization at its inception, all though it has modified to include present day social and technological advances.

Information Politics

As Keck and Sikkink (1998) explain information is essential for the effectiveness of the network as, “they provide information that would not otherwise be available, from sources that might not otherwise be heard” (Pg. 18). In fact, it is by fulfilling the role of alternate sources of information and by providing additional testimony from victims, that non-state actors such as these transnational advocacy groups and networks gain influence that lead to effectiveness.

In the case of CPJ, this involves publishing alerts and case reports on its Web site and sending them out to its extensive contacts lists. These documents contain information about attacks on journalists or press freedom abuses that would not have otherwise been available to the larger public. Often, it also contains testimony from reporters and editors who have been victimized.

However, to ensure that these documents are persuasive enough to move political and social actors towards change, it is imperative that they be “clear, power messages that appeal to shared principles” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). CPJ ensure that this is the case by producing documents that are written like news reports and framing them so that it appeals to a broad “global constituency”.

During my internship, I learnt that all case reports are written in accordance with the guidelines set by the Associated Press or in other words, they are written in the AP style. This ensures that readers are familiar with the format of the report.

Essentially, networks and groups strive to investigate the problem and then alert the press and policymakers (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). In fact, this process of “promoting change by reporting facts” has also been described as the “human rights methodology” (Thomas, 1993).

In the case of CPJ, this methodology is particularly relevant since the organization is a group of journalists who are striving to protect their colleagues by investigating cases of abuse and attack, and then alerting the general press and policymakers to mobilize popular opinion and ultimately bring about change that will improve press freedom conditions as well as ensure the safety of journalists.

As Joel Simon, executive director of CPJ said,

> We’re not lawyers or bodyguards, but like journalists covering a huge story. We do case-driven research, without being a research body. Journalists and others contact us when in trouble. We report on attacks and abuses on them, without taking a stand. We issue press releases raising alarms when we come across stories of journalists facing problems and attend trials across the globe, to remind the victim and the judge that the world is watching (Tehelka, 2010)

Additionally, Keck and Sikkink (1998) point out that the information provided by the networks and groups must be reliable and well-documented or else the organizations will have no credibility. It also must be timely and dramatic to be effective.

The emphasis on reliability and credibility is similar to the functioning of news organization and this furthers Simon’s description of CPJ as a group of journalists who are using the tools of investigative journalism to bring about change. My internship experience revealed that CPJ has very high standards of credibility and accuracy. For example, in the case of alerts and case reports, it is imperative to indentify at least two independent sources of information. This is especially crucial in
the current age of information technology and the 24-hour news cycle, when news stories published by one organization is often picked up and repeated verbatim by others. Therefore, the emphasis on two independent sources ensures significantly higher levels of accuracy.

Also, program staff is prohibited from including reports produced by other advocacy groups such as Reporters Without Borders or International Federation of Journalists as a source for CPJ reports. This is an additional measure taken to guarantee independent and accurate reporting. It may be noted however that local press freedom organizations that provide first hand information, such as CMFR in the Philippines, are considered as independent sources of information.

This connection with local groups is crucial because, as Keck and Sikkink (1998) point out, most non-governmental organizations cannot afford to maintain a wide network of staff members in many countries. Forging links with local groups is the only way to ensure a regular exchange of information at low and affordable costs.

CPJ maintains extensive connections with many local groups. In the Philippines, for example, it works closely with CMFR and the NUJP, as well as the FFJ. Additionally, its South East Asia representative Shawn Crispin provides extensive first hand information.

Gathering information: CPJ gathers information from multiple sources. In some cases, it is a first-hand account that is received directly from the journalist or his colleagues or local press freedom groups.

Also, program staff members keep themselves abreast of local news mostly by reading local news sources online. As mentioned earlier, the Asia program also works with Shawn Crispin for additional coverage. The organization also receives information from other groups and networks such as IFEX.

During the information gathering stage, an important activity is to determine if the case falls within the CPJ mandate – for example, if the victim was indeed a journalist, as defined by
CPJ and/or if he was indeed victimized for his activities as a journalist. In the age of bloggers and decentralized media, this distinction is more easily said than done. My internship experience revealed that the organization deals with these on a case by case basis using pre-defined parameters.

In addition to gathering information in the manner described above, CPJ also organizes fact finding missions to countries where it difficult to get information from other sources.

_Raising Awareness:_ After the information has been verified, CPJ aims to extensively publicize this information. One of the most important ways in which the information is publicized is by emailing the information report, usually in the form of a news alert to an extensive list of contacts that include other press freedom groups, human rights groups, media organizations, journalists and other media professionals. The alerts are also sent to the offices of concerned policy makers and government officials.

Additionally, these reports are also put up on CPJ’s Web site. More recently, the organization has incorporated social media into their publicity efforts and many of the reports are also put up on Facebook and Twitter.

If the organization believes that there is a pattern of “particularly egregious cases” (Adams, 2004) in a particular country, it will send a protest letter to its government. Unlike alerts, protest letters are sent out with much less frequency and are often addressed to government officials, including high ranking officials such as even the President. Additionally, these letters are also addressed to the U.S. representatives in that country and the country’s representative in the U.S.

Annually, CPJ produces a “reference guide to press freedom worldwide, providing factual and unbiased analyses of media conditions in more than a 100 nations” (CPJ, 2009) titled
**Attacks on the Press.** This is reference guide is widely distributed as a book as well as posted online on the organization’s Web site.

Apart from distributing its reports and publications, CPJ also raises awareness about press freedom issues by collaborating with mainstream media. In fact, CPJ’s reports and findings have often been quoted in the mainstream media (See CPJ, 2010). Also, CPJ meets with government officials and policymakers, conducts international missions, organizes and participates in conferences, discussion panels to engage in information politics.

**Symbolic Politics**

According to Keck and Sikkink (1998), engaging in symbolic politics is an integral part of the persuasion process that enables networks and advocacy groups to raise awareness. CPJ too uses the power of symbols to mobilize popular opinion.

This usage is most commonly reflected in the use of powerful photographs on the organization’s Web site and other publications. For example, the cover photo for CPJ’s annual report for the year 2010 depicts a young woman with a red gag on her mouth. The caption reads, “A journalist gags her mouth to protest violent attacks against members of the media by alleged supporters of President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela” (CPJ, 2010). Similarly, the front cover photo of the 2009 issue of *Attacks on the Press* depicts a photojournalist (AP photographer Dario Lopez-Mills, in this case) cornered by armed policemen. He was covering the protests that followed a presidential coup in Honduras, the inside pages explain (CPJ, 2009). Also, photographs of familiar journalists are used in case updates and special reports to remind the audience, of journalists who were victimized for their work (see, for example, CPJ, 2010). These images are a vivid portrayal of the real dangers faced by journalists and the terrible violation of press freedom.
On the other hand, CPJ’s logo which is organization’s acronym, *CPJ*, with a flame on top of the *J*, embodies an “image of hope and progress” and “suggests that the CPJ is a guiding light in the darkness for journalists all around the world” (Adams, 2004, p. 56).

CPJ also uses popular dates and anniversaries as symbols for press freedom awareness activities. For example, on World Press Freedom Day (May 03) CPJ had freelance journalist Danielle Shapiro blog about the dangers faced by local journalists and media workers (translators, fixers, drivers etc) who often work with foreign correspondents but rarely get the attention and praise they deserve (Shapiro, 2010). As Shapiro mentions in her blog, “Of all the journalists who have died around the world because of their work, 90 percent are locals, according to CPJ research. It is common that their murderers are never found, prosecuted or convicted”. My internship at CPJ led to me realize that the cause of these local journalists and media workers is an important part of the organization’s campaign activity (see CPJ, 2010) and it is evident from the above example that the organization used the power of symbolism to raise awareness about the issue.

Similarly, only three days before World Press Freedom Day, CPJ also released a special report titled “Top 10 Journalists Cases to Solve” on April 29, 2010, challenging authorities in 10 different nations including the Philippines to bring justice and reverse the culture of impunity (CPJ, 2010). This report not only helped re-emphasize major cases, including one from 1998 Burkina Faso, but also served as an opportunity to publicize CPJ’s own Global Campaign Against Impunity.

CPJ also uses anniversaries as symbols to remind people of the past attacks on journalists. March 24, 2010 was the fifth anniversary of slain Filipino journalist Marlene Garcia
Esperat and I worked with CPJ’s Asia Program as we marked the occasion by publishing a blog post on the case that included a detailed time-line of the case (Earp/Mukherjee, 2010).

It may be noted that symbolic politics is most commonly used in large group protests (Khagram, et al., 2002), and CPJ generally does not organize group protests.

*Leverage Politics*

Since the concept of effectiveness often includes bringing about policy change by target actors such as governments, international financial institutions etc, Keck and Sikkink (1998) theorize that to networks and groups will be concerned with gaining leverage with these institutions so that they have to ability to “pressure” and “persuade” them. Engaging in leverage politics allows smaller groups to gain influence that would otherwise have not been possible and therefore, it is almost imperative that the group be able to identify some material or moral leverage points for strategic success. In fact, as Keck and Sikkink (1998) point out human rights issues became negotiable because human rights practices were connected to military or financial aid or bilateral diplomatic relations. Of course, human rights groups had to make those issues salient using information and symbolic politics before stronger members of the network could connect those issues to something else of value: “Money, trade or prestige”.

In the case of the Philippines, moral leverage as played an important role in the struggle for press freedom rights. As U.S.-based Filipino journalist Sheila Coronel who is also a CPJ board member said, “Certain governments like that of Philippines are very sensitive to the opinion of others, like the United States. This is because they get aid from the U.S. government and has close ties with it” (S. Coronel, personal communication, January 12, 2010).
**Accountability Politics**

CPJ engaged in accountability politics by publicly reminding governments and policy makers of their prior commitments to press freedom and ensuring that they walk the talk. For example, the day Senator Benigno S. Aquino III was declared winner of the 2010 Presidential elections, CPJ wrote him a letter reminding him of his commitment to ending the culture of impunity that plagues his country as well as recommended that he launch a probe into the Maguindanao massacre (Simon, 2010).

**Direct Assistance/Journalist Assistance Program**

Apart from the aforementioned methods, CPJ also tries to help journalists in distress by providing them direct financial and non-financial assistance through the Journalist Assistance program. Led by Sheryl Mendez, this program maintains a fund for emergency grants to journalists and when required, works with governments and international agencies to assist journalists secure refugee or asylum status and also provides logistical support for them resettlement in exile (CPJ, 2010). According to the CPJ Web site, some of the services provided by the Journalist Assistant program are listed below:

- Helping get medical care for journalists following brutal assaults in retaliation for their work, or for journalists suffering from mistreatment in prison.
- Supporting journalists forced to go into hiding or to relocate within their countries to escape threats from local officials, militia, or criminal gangs.
- Contributing to legal funds for journalists facing prison.
- Evacuating journalists at risk into temporary havens.
- Providing support for families of imprisoned journalists.
It may be noted that the Journalist Assistant program is not considered to an advocacy activity but instead supports CPJ’s typical advocacy activities.

**Conclusions**

Similar to most transnational advocacy groups, CPJ’s primary focus is on information politics – i.e. gathering, documenting and exchanging information. To increase the effectiveness of its information politics, the organization also engages in symbolic politics and accountability politics. When and if these measures fail, the organization also undertakes activities that incorporate leverage politics to bring about changes in state policy and behavior. It also has a direct assistance program but this is not included in its list of advocacy activities because providing direct assistance to individual journalists does not contribute towards long-term improvements in levels of press freedom or provide increased safety to working journalists (Adams, 2004).

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 describe in extensive details the media situation in the Philippines and CPJ’s campaigns in that country, followed by a special focus on the Campaign against Impunity. The chapters then explore, according to Keck and Sikkink’s levels of influence, if the campaigns and activities are effective.
CHAPTER 6
A PROFILE OF THE PHILIPPINES PRESS AND POLITICS

When journalists report from conflict zones in the world, they are unfortunately vulnerable and face the possibility of murder, kidnappings and death by crossfire. Their situation has often been studied and analyzed be it in the case of the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Taback & Coupland, 2006) or the case of war-torn African nations such as Angola and Rwanda from the early 1990’s (Matloff, 1995).

However, the deaths of journalists outside conflict zones in what may be defined as peace time democracies has received little attention. This is in spite of the fact that a large number of journalists have been killed with impunity in many such countries. In 2008, CPJ brought out its first Impunity Index which lists countries that are worst at prosecuting the killers of journalists. And while, countries in conflict such as Iraq and Somalia have always topped the list, other peace time democracies such as Brazil, the Philippines, India and Russia have occupied a majority of positions on the list (see CPJ, 2008, CPJ, 2009 and CPJ, 2010). Interestingly many of these are also transitional democracies or weak democracies.

The Philippines may easily be considered to be one of them. As explained in the Literature Review section, after the removal of Ferdinand Marcos from presidency in 1986, the country witnessed a wave of democratization during which period human rights abuses decreased in general, while in particular the media experienced significant freedoms. In fact, the nation prides itself for having the “freest” in the region. Yet in 2009 was the deadliest year for press freedom as 36 journalists were killed in the Philippines: At least, 33 of these were killed because of their work, 30 of whom died on November 23 in the Mindanao massacre. Additionally, between 2004 and 2008, 34 journalists were killed, of whom at least 18 were killed
for their work. It may be noted that Silvio Waisbord (2002 & 2007) who has researched press freedom issues in the Latin America has said that violence against the press is often the result a lack of accountability for the perpetrators of the attack.

**Development of the Philippine Press**

The modern day Filipino press may trace its roots back to the Spanish colonial period (Anables, 2003). During the 19th century, more than a 100 Spanish language newspapers were published in the country and the Philippine press played an important role in shaping the nationalist discourse of the time (Coronel, 2001).

In 1898, the United States acquired the Philippines from Spain and continued to administer it until 1935. During this period, a vibrant English language press was established, which eventually overshadowed the older Spanish language press (Ables, 2003). The English language press introduced the U.S. model of commercial press and also brought in modern printing technology (Coronel, 2001).

During World War II, when the Japanese occupied the Philippines, they severely restricted media by preventing the reception of broadcasts from the U.S. and stopping the publication of all but one newspaper (Ables, 2003). However, as Coronel (2001) points out, an alternate press system soon emerged, and it discreetly distributed news material throughout the islands.

Nonetheless, media censorship continued as President Marcos introduced Martial Law that abolished Congress and he himself took over all executive and legislative power (Ables, 2003). Media organizations could function only if they had received a permit and in reality, as the press secretary and the secretary of national defense took over communication, only a pro-government media was allowed to function. Additionally during the time, the Filipino media also
suffered government intimidation and violence. It may be noted until this time, the Philippines
did not have a traditional of state-owned or government-run media, unlike other European or
Asian countries (Coronel, 2001).

The removal of President Marcos from dictatorship though the non-violent People Power
revolution in 1986 marked the return of democracy to the Philippines as well as greater freedom
for the national press as the newly elected President Corazon Aquino’s Constitutional
Commission of 1986 re-introduced the right to freedom of speech and expression.

The power of the free Philippine press became evident in the run-up to the Second People
Power Revolution which led to the peaceful removal of then President Joseph Estrada in January
2001. Journalist had uncovered much of the evidence, including property and real estate deeds
and tax records, which supported the corruption charges during impeachment trial of President
Estrada (Møller & Jackson 2002).

Additionally, it must be noted that various new media and technology tools also played
an important role in this second revolution. Text messages, online groups and email lists helped
connect Internet users instantly and even though, its effects were restricted to the Metro Manila
Area, it contributed significantly towards popular mobilization (Coronel, 2001).

Today, the Philippine press is diverse and vibrant. There are 297 television stations and
1,042 radio stations in 17 regions and 81 provinces, nine broadsheets and 19 tabloids in Metro
Manila, and another 552 newspapers in the provinces, according to 2008 statistics by the
Philippine National Telecommunications Commission. Most of the major newspapers and media
organizations also maintain a strong presence on the World Wide Web as is evident from Web
sites such as Inquirer.net, GMA News.tv, SunStar News Exchange and ABS-CBN News.com.
Other independent news sites include Bulatlat.com and MindaNews etc.
Newspapers are considered to be the medium of the elite as they are more expensive and not easily available outside of urban areas. Radio, on the other hand, has the widest coverage and is the medium of choice for the poorer people living in rural areas. AM radio is the main vehicle for news and public affairs information while FM radio provides mostly entertainment content (Rosales, 2006).

*Killed Journalists: A profile*

According to CPJ (2010), 99 journalists have been killed in the Philippines since the organization started keeping records in 1992. Of these, 70 were killed between 2004 and 2009 and 51 of those were killed in direct relation to their work. In the case of remaining 19, there was no direct evidence linking their death to their work.

CPJ data showed that 93 percent of the murdered journalists were killed with impunity while another 7 percent have received only partial justice wherein for example, the gunman may have been charged or arrested but the mastermind remained at large. Between 2004 and 2009, only four cases have received partial justice. Not a single case since 2004 has received full justice.

A vast majority of the journalists were killed by government officials. Between 2004 and 2009, the source of fire in 78.4 percent of killed journalists’ cases was traced back to government officials. Criminal groups were held responsible for 11.7 percent of the cases while another 5.8 percent was attributed to be the handiwork of political groups. In 3.9 percent of the cases no known source of fire could be determined.

Given the large number of politically motivated killings of journalists, it is not surprising therefore to note that a significant number of the killed journalists were either covering politics or corruption. According to CPJ data, between 2004 and 2009, at least 70.5 percent of the killed
Journalists were covering politics while another 23.5 percent were reporting on corruption issues and 1.9 percent was crime and politics. The other journalists killed were covering human rights or crime.

Analysis of CPJ data also revealed that between 2004 and 2009, more than half of the journalists killed worked for newspapers, i.e. 52.9 percent were print media journalists. Radiomen followed closely at 37.2 percent while Television journalists made up about 5.8 percent of the journalists killed. About 3.9 percent of journalists worked for more than two media, usually both print and radio.

Research has also shown that most of the journalists’ killings occurred in provincial areas and not in metropolitan areas such as Manila and Cebu (Rosales, 2006).

It may also be noted that different organizations and media groups have varying numbers for each of the above categories follows its own methodology and definition. For instance, during the course of my internship I learnt that NUJP considers the death of every journalist to be related to his work, unless otherwise proven. CMFR, on the other hand, only considers those cases where a journalist was definitely killed in relation to his work.

In conclusion, it may be said that an overview of the profiles of killed journalists points to the fact that a disturbingly large number of killings are politically motivated by and occur in smaller provincial towns, away from the seat of power in Manila.

The above observation then calls for a review of the political situation in the Philippines – which is undertaken in the next segment.

*Philippine Politics – A Profile*

The prevalence of provincial politics which nurtures individual patronage over state ideals, as well as the inability of the state to control violence allows for the Philippines to be
considered as a “weak state” that enables killings of journalists and fosters an environment of impunity (Lumbang, 2009).

A “Cacique” Democracy

The Philippine state in the post-Marcos era has been characterized a “persistence of local authoritarian enclaves” which causes “electorally competitive national regimes” to fall short of a “minimum democratic threshold” (Franco, 2001, p. 71). Such states may be differently described has as an “elite democracy” (Hawes, 1987; Bello & Gershman, 1990; Stauffer, 1990), and a “cacique democracy” (Anderson, 1988).

Post-World War II, a new class of influential men appeared on the Philippines political scene. Originally belonging to the lower ranks of Filipino society, these men had gathered many resources while they were engaged in guerilla warfare but were not necessarily committed to a nationalist idea of the Philippine state, but together with the elite class including the landowners and political clans they formed an influential group (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005).

Given the resources (weapons, private armies) and the political influence (family based political clans often have absolute power over their territories) wielded by the provincial groups, the central government in Manila has been largely reluctant to rein them in and consequently, the provincial areas have been left to their own devices (Rogers, 2005). Naturally, rigged elections, bad governance, crime and violence have become hallmarks of these states which have received the moniker of “guns, goons and gold” (Linantud, 1998).

Given its inability to deliver democratic goods such as free and fair elections or even control the parallel system of violence and coercion, the Philippine state may be understood as a weak state fosters an environment free of law as opposed to a rule of law environment (Rakipi, 2002).
Additionally, the provincial political scene in the Philippines has also been scarred by the “political survival techniques of the predatory political elite” (Van de Loo, 2004, p. 263). In other words, the ruling class has cared little for good governance but has instead focused only on individual welfare, making sure that the positions of power stay within the family. Consequently, there has been widespread nepotism especially in the allocation of political posts “reflect the loyalty of particular groups, the threat of other groups and the importance of specific state agencies” (Migdal, 1998, p. 274).

This lack of a meritocracy has directly lead to a greater emphasis on personal capital, which does depletes drastically when the press conducts exposes or reports on scandals, etc. (Lumbang, 2009). This explains to a large extent why journalists covering politics, corruption and crime are prime targets and how a disturbingly large number of local politicians are allegedly responsible for journalists’ murder.

The next chapter looks into the issue of Impunity in journalists’ murder and the role and power of the Philippine judiciary as it relates to murder of journalists. This is followed by a detailed analysis of CPJ’s Global Campaign Against Impunity and a review of the major cases of killed journalists in the Philippines.
CHAPTER 7

MAJOR CASES REVIEW

According to CPJ records, between 2004 and 2009, 51 journalists were killed in the Philippines for their work. Of these, eight journalists were killed in 2004, four journalists died in 2005, and an equal number became murder victims in 2006. There were no journalists killed for their work in 2007 but the death toll rose by two notches again in 2008 and finally in 2009, 30 journalists were massacred in one single incident of election-related violence while three others died in separate incidents during the course of the year.

As mentioned before, the Maguindanao massacre of 2009 led CPJ to label the Philippines as one of the deadliest nations for working journalists worldwide. However, this was not the first time the nation had been similarly described. The year 2004 had also been a particularly bad year for press freedom and journalists’ safety in the Philippines and CPJ had, at that time, stated that the archipelago was the “most murderous country of all” (CPJ, 2005a). It beat war-torn Iraq as well as Colombia, Bangladesh and Russia to the top of list, as local journalists fought corruption, poor governance and widespread impunity in their own country. Of the eight journalists killed that year, at least six were radio broadcasters who engaged in critical reporting against government officials, police officer and other influential members of their community.
One of the first murder cases that came up in the year was that of Rowell Endrinal. A vocal critic of local politicians on his program on DZRC radio and earlier, Endrinal had already been receiving threats for his work. On February 11, 2004, as Endrinal was leaving for work, gunmen shot him several times in Legazpi City, in Albay Province (CPJ, 2004a). Only months later on June 17, 2004, another radio broadcaster, Elpidio Binoya, who was known for his “pointed political commentaries” on Radyo Natin was gunned down in General Santos city in southern island of Mindanao (CPJ, 2004b). The death toll continued to rise when a third radio commentator Roger Mariano, was fatally shot by gunmen while he was riding home from work on July 31, 2004, in Laoag City, capital of Illocos Norte province. Mariano conducted his own show ‘Roger Mariano in Action’ on the local station dzJC Radyo Natin-Akson Radyo on which he often criticized corrupt government officials (CPJ, 2004c). When police found his body, it noted that his trademark bag, which reportedly had a disk with information about an alleged scam at an electric company in Illocos, was missing but no other belongings, such as wallet or money, had been taken, reported the Mindanao Examiner. Five days later, a correspondent for the Manila-based tabloid Bulgar and the local radio station DZRH, Arnel Manalo was killed in a similar manner in Bauan, in Batangas Province, 60 miles (100 kilometers) south of the capital, Manila (CPJ, 2004d).

The situation had been closely monitored by CPJ that also documented the media killings and produced reports and alerts. In the Philippines, the NUJP was shocked by the rapidly rising number of killed journalists. It organized rallies and demonstrations to raise awareness and demand immediate justice (CPJ, 2004e, para 6).
Increasing pressure from local and international media groups as well as a fast-deteriorating situation led President Macapagal-Arroyo to acknowledge that “the violence committed against media practitioners has reached a point of serious concern” and on August 17, 2004, she ordered the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation to work with media organizations to “resolve the senseless killings of journalists” and protect those who have threatened (Genalyn D. Kabiling, 2004, para 3). The House Speaker Jose de Venecia also promised to raise a 2 million Philippines pesos reward for information leading to the arrest of journalists’ killers, the report said.

Nonetheless, the killings of journalists continued unabated. On September 29, Romeo Binungcal who had reported against corrupt officials was killed in Bataan Province (CPJ, 2004e) while Eldy Sablas was shot dead for his commentary on illegal gambling and drug trade on October 19, in Tandang, in Surigao del Sur Province (CPJ, 2004f).

And then came the fatal and bloody weekend in November of 2004. A young photojournalist Gene Boyd Lumawag was taking photographs of the sunset in Jolo, the capital of the Muslim-majority southern province of Sulu, on November 12, 2004, when he received a single shot to his head, allegedly by members of the Abu Sayyaf Islamic separatist group, which killed him on the spot. The 26-year-old was a photo editor at the news agency MindaNews, and also worked as a photo correspondent at the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Lumawag, and another journalist were investigating corruption in local government for a project of the U.S.-based Asia Foundation, on good governance practices in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (CPJ, 2004g).

A day later, Herson Hinolan was shot from behind while he was using a public restroom in the small town of Kalibo, about 200 miles away from capital city of Manila, in central Aklan
province. Hinolan was the station manager of DYIN Bombo Radyo where he also hosted his own top-rated morning show, called Bombohanay Bigtime on which he brazenly criticized government officials and other powerful persons. According to local news reports, Hinolan sustained bullet wounds in his abdomen and arms, and witnesses took him to the hospital. Two days later on November 15, Hinolan at the age of 37 succumbed to his injuries, becoming the 8th journalist to be killed for his work, that year in the Philippines (CPJ, 2004h).

The weekend killings led to intensified reactions from press freedom advocates as well as the local and international press. Journalists gathered in Manila and across the country and organized a series of protests and demonstrations to demand justice for their slain colleagues. These protests were led by local press freedom groups and other journalists’ organizations such as the NUJP, CMFR, and the Philippine Center for Photojournalism (PCP), Press Photographers of the Philippines (PPP) and College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP) (Pacific Media Watch, 2004). Protestors wore black t-shirts and arm-bands that read “Stop Killing Journalists”. Similar events were organized in Baguio City, in front of the Justice Hall where journalists called upon the Arroyo administration to speedy and impartial justice, in Cordillera where the photographers’ group candle-light vigil and on Panay Island (Aubrey SC Makilan, 2004). On Panay Island journalists and radio listeners turned up en-masse as Hinolan’s body was to being transferred to Bacolod City, in Negros Occidental province, where also there was a similar scene as the slain journalist received a hero’s welcome (Rolly Espina, 2004, para1).

The global press freedom network worked closely with the local groups and supported their actions. By the end of the year, a total of 11 journalists had been killed all though in three of those cases CPJ is still investigating if the journalists were killed for their work. CPJ produced a steady stream of alerts and reports that kept documented the killings as well as served to inform
the public about. The reports mentioned that 2004 was the deadliest year for journalists Filipino journalists in more than a year and none of perpetrators of the 47 journalists killed since the country became a democracy in 1986 had at that time been convicted (see CPJ, 2004i).

Additionally on December 10, 2004, CPJ brought out a new report titled “Death Toll for Journalists Highest in the Decade” that focused on the increased number of killings in the Philippines and in war-torn Iraq, that had led to 2004 being the deadliest year in the past decade. CPJ’s then Executive Director Ann Cooper described killings as “shocking” and “unacceptable” and also noted that “some of these reporters died in crossfire while covering a very dangerous war in Iraq, but the majority were murdered in direct reprisal for their reporting, particularly in the Philippines, where killers of journalists are not brought to justice” (CPJ, 2004j, para 2).

Overall, the report summarized that the eight journalists who were targeted for their work in the Philippines were mostly provincial radio reporters who reported on corruption and often against government officials and their killings were a reflection on the growing culture of impunity wherein journalists’ killers since 1986 had not been convicted and justice was denied to the slain journalists (CPJ, 2004j).

Other international press freedom groups also pointed out that 2004 had been a particularly deadly year for journalists, globally. IFJ brought out a similar report on the death of 100 journalists (by IFJ estimates) worldwide, and along with Nicaragua and the Ivory Coast, named the Philippines as those countries responsible for a “crisis in news safety” (IFJ, 2004). Roby Alampay, executive director of the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA) expressed dismay and said that the killings proved that the situation was “out of control” (Aubrey SC Makilan, 2004).
However, it may be pointed out that pressure from local media watchdogs and high levels of international scrutiny did lead to some positive developments. A massive manhunt launched by Central Mindanao police led to the surrender of two suspects, local political leader Ephraim “Toto” Englis and a second suspect, Alfonso Roquero in Binoya’s murder on August 23 and murder charges were filed against them by the General Santos City Prosecutor’s Office (Bong Reblando, 2004, para1).

In Roger Mariano’s case, murder charges were filed against senior police officer, Apolonio Medrano, and other suspects based on the testimony of Alvin Turingan who had witnessed the shooting and had positively identified Medrano as the gunman. However, Medrano’s stalling tactics delayed the trial considerably while the family complained of witness intimidation (Wright, 2005a).

On November 17, 2004, Sulu’s Provincial Prosecutor filed a case against two suspects in the Lumawag’s case: brothers Itting and Omar Sailani, who were known members of the Abu Sayyaf group based on the testimony of a military officer. On December 13, a Regional Trial Court issued an arrest warrant against the brothers, but they were never apprehended (CMFR, 2004a). Additionally, on November 19, murder charges were also filed against Alfred Arcenio, then mayor of the town of Lezo in Aklan province as the gunman who fatally shot Hinolan (CMFR, 2004b).

In conclusion, it may be said that a horrific rise in the number of killed journalists led to increased domestic pressure on and international scrutiny of the Arroya administration. This led to the president’s acknowledgement of the gravity of the situation as well as forced at least a verbal commitment towards to cause of journalists’ safety. As discussed earlier, this allowed for greater support from the law enforcement agencies and government officials who even offered
rewards for information. These efforts even translated into some positive developments as some suspects were identified and/or arrested, and some sort of legal proceedings were undertaken.

However, it was also noted that even if charges were filed against suspects and some arrests made, these actions have since then not lead to a definite conviction. Take Mariano’s case for example: Due to fears of witness intimidation and concerns regarding the influence of the defendants in the area, in July 2005, Mariano’s wife, requested to transfer the case to Manila. Trial resumed in 2006 when the Supreme Court granted her request and ended only recently on August 11, 2010, when a Manila RTC acquitted Medrano and a second gunman of all charges (CMFR, 2010a). Similarly in Hinolan’s case, the 2004 murder charges were reduced in early 2005 these charges had been reduced and Arcenio had posted bail even before an arrest warrant had been issued. In May 2005, the Kalibo RTC ordered a re-investigation of the case to look for probable cause for murder and an arrest warrant was issued more than a year later in September 2007. But it was only in March 2008, almost four years after Hinolan’s death and a month after witness Peter Melgar had recanted his original testimony that Arcenio surrendered to the police. Hinolan’s case has since been transferred from Aklan to an RTC in Cebu. Additionally, after the prosecution was able to present a second witness that positively identified Arcenio as the gunman, the defendant was denied bail. Arcenio is currently in police custody in Cebu and his trial is on-going (CMFR, 2004b).

Thus 2004 drew to close without a single conviction either in any of the eight murder cases that happened during the year or in any of the 48 journalist murders that had taken place since 1986 (CPJ, 2004e). Naturally, despite government and police promises to improve law and order situation in the country so as to fight the prevalent culture of impunity, local press freedom advocates rightly felt that they had merely paid “lip service” to the problem. “Philippine leaders
have been assuring action and results. They’ve offered rewards, stronger laws, and swifter responses to counter the rash of assassinations. So far, however, all they’ve produced are evidence that they do not even know where to begin arresting the problem,” SEAPA’s Roby Alampay observed during the November 17 demonstrations (Aubrey SC Makilan, 2004). NUJP members remained skeptical of Manila’s old tricks such as the creation of task forces, questioned the effectiveness of offering monetary rewards for information and pointed out that often agents of the government (police, military officials who are sometimes hired by local politicians as hitmen) are themselves prime suspects in the murders (Aubrey SC Makilan, 2004).

In conclusion, two points may be noted: Firstly, the efforts of local press freedom groups were successful in raising awareness about the deteriorating situation of press freedom in the country. These groups worked closely with international press freedom groups and networks, such as the CPJ to pressure the Arroyo government to making verbal commitments as well as strengthen the power of their own organizations, in accordance with the boomerang pattern of advocacy described in the Literature Review section. Former Asia Program coordinator, Abi Wright noted in her overview of press freedom in the region that “Local activism played a critical role in defending journalists’ rights” (Wright, 2004, para 21). Secondly, while police and government officials did make verbal commitments, they often did not live up to their promises. Their failure to do so was well documented by CPJ in its regional report in the annual publication, *Attacks on the Press*. Wright wrote in her report that governments are often “deeply ambivalent” about the role of the press as an effective watchdog, often “curtailing the press” or “turning a blind eye to murderous attacks on journalists”. In her closing sentence she aptly summed up the situation which was true not just for the Philippines, but for many other Asian
countries as well. “For now, the Asian press is developing at a quicker pace than many of the institutions needed to protect and enhance it”, she said (Wright, 2004, para 22).
MAJOR CASES REVIEW – 2005

After a murderous 2004, the number of media killings dropped in 2005 all though the problems that plagued the industry remained in place. A total of eight journalists were killed in 2005, and CPJ investigations confirmed that at least half of those killings were in retribution while the committee continued to investigate the motives for the remaining killings.

Marlene Garcia Esperat

The first attack on a journalist in 2005 happened early on in the year on March 24 when a gunman strode into the home of columnist Marlene Garcia Esperat and shot a single bullet to her head while she was having dinner with her two sons. Esperat was an anti-graft commentator for the *Midland Review* in Tacurong City in Sultan Kudarat province. A chemist by training, she was initially an employee of the Department of Agriculture in Central Mindanao where she had exposed a fertilizer scam that implicated even then President Arroyo, and eventually inspired her to pursue investigative journalism (CPJ, 2005b).

Esperat’s murder outraged the local media and other press freedom advocates, who launched an intensive global campaign to bring attention to the case. Days after the incident, CPJ sent out an alert on March 28 that was titled, “Columnist gunned down”. The report emphasized the fact the Esperat’s murder could be strongly linked to her work -- it quoted her husband George who had said in an interview to the local press that his wife had “made many enemies because of her exposés”, that she had also received death threats and even the Philippine National Police Chief, General Arturo Lomibao believed that “the motive is work-related as media practitioner” (CPJ, 2005c).

Local press freedom groups such as the NUJP and CMFR also sent out similar press alerts. The PCIJ published a memorial piece that was titled “Farewell, Erin Brokovich”, as
Esperat was fondly known to her colleagues including CPJ’s current board member Sheila Coronel, who along with local journalist Luz Rimban penned the article (Rimban & Coronel, 2005). The poignant story described Esperat as “determined” yet “colorful” but painfully aware of the threats to her life: “I want to look pretty when the assassins come to get me,” Esperat had said about the glitter she wore in her eyes, the report said (para 2). Other international advocacy groups also directed their efforts towards publicizing the brazen attack and bringing global attention to the case (See, IFEX, 2005, RSF, 2005).

Intense pressure at home as well as from international actors led to some quick initial breakthroughs in the case. Less than a month after the attack, the Philippine National Police unit launched in 2004 by President Arroyo to investigate journalists’ killings, Task Force Newsmen arrested four suspects including Rowie Barua, a military officer who was the middleman in murder and later, revealed that he had been hired by Osmena Montaner and Estrella Sabay, officials of the Department of Agriculture who had been criticized by Esperat (Earp and Mukherjee, 2010). Charges were filed at Tacurong RTC but the case was moved to Cebu RTC because of the influence of the defendants in the area. However, a day before the case was transferred Tacurong RTC judge dropped the charges against alleged masterminds, Montaner and Sabay because of conflicting evidence (CMFR, 2005a).

*Marked for Death*

As the days went by, CPJ kept its focus on the Philippine killings and on May 2 released a special report titled “Marked for Death” to commemorate the May 3 – World Press Freedom Day. In a study that analyzed journalists’ deaths between 2000 and 2005, CPJ noted that “Murder was the leading cause of job-related deaths among journalists worldwide, and the Philippines is the most murderous country of all” (CPJ, 2005d). Other countries on the Top 5 list
were Iraq, Colombia, Bangladesh and Russia and all together, there were 58 cases of journalists killed in retribution for their work and all those cases were committed with impunity, the report said at the time. The report also called on the governments in these countries to dedicate resources and devote political will power towards the resolution of these crimes (para 6).

CPJ’s study not only documented the number of deaths and other facts but also analyzed these to provide invaluable insight into a complex socio-political problem. It noted that journalists were mostly killed for reporting on corruption, crime, drug trafficking and activities of rebel groups including in war-zones such as Iraq, and that most of them were killed in the same “lawless regions” of the state and they had all been threatened beforehand. Together, the number of journalists killed in the top five countries listed accounted for almost half the journalists killed worldwide (CPJ, 2005d).

While the study was one of a global nature, and did not focus only on the Philippines, nonetheless the emergent trends that were pointed out were true for the archipelago-state as well. As case descriptions mentioned above are proof, in the Philippines a vast majority of the killed journalists, from Mariano and Hinolan to Lumawag and Esperat, covered politics or crime. Additionally, they were all from lawless regions of the state such as Mindanao or other poorly governed regional provinces that were beyond the reach of Manila’s federal government. The journalists had also been threatened and in some cases, there were even prior assassinations attempts such as in the case of Esperat, who, since that incident, lived under police protection. In fact, on the day of murder, she had let her guards take some time off as it was the weekend for Holy Easter.

Similar reports detailing the deteriorating situation of press freedom and journalists’ safety in the Philippines were also published by other advocacy groups such as Reporters
Without Borders which held Filipino authorities responsible for nourishing a “culture of impunity” (Brossel & Julliard, 2005). These reports by various international advocacy groups, including those produced by the CPJ, found significant coverage in the regional and international media as it pertained to growing dangers of critical reporting in the Philippines (See Carlos Conde, 2005, para2; The Hindu, 2005; and Taipei Times, 2005).

It may also be noted that the Philippine government often scoffed at these reports and attempted to publicly discredit the authenticity of the reports. On Press Freedom Day, President Arroyo’s spokesman Ignacio Bunye described the reports as “unfair and exaggerated, considering the special attention being given by the [police] to this issue” and added that, “Press freedom is fully protected” (Taipei Times, 2005). Bunye had also reacted in a similar fashion to the earlier December 10, 2004, CPJ report that focused on the increased number of killings in the Philippines and Iraq. “Labeling the Philippines as a dangerous place for journalists a la Iraq is grossly misplaced and misleading. Our press has never been cowed by murderers”, he said in an official statement (Office of the Press Secretary, Manila, Philippines, 2004) that specifically referred to CPJ’s report that put democratic, peace-time Philippines on the same list as war-ravaged Iraq. It is the opinion of the researcher that such responses from the Philippines’ government is significant proof of the fact that transnational advocacy groups do have significant power, albeit soft power, that may deter governments. This is especially true in the case of young, emerging but often weak and fragile democracies that nonetheless care about their image on the global stage. It may be mentioned that if the above scenario was untrue, the Philippine government could have chosen to ignore the report completely.

*Klein Cantoneros*
However, unfortunately international scrutiny failed to deter journalists’ killers as the death toll was raised another two notches in about a week’s time since the publication of CPJ’s May 2 report. Two days later, radio broadcaster Klein Cantoneros was shot to death by three gunmen who pumped seven bullets into his body in Mindanao’s province’s Dipolog City. A former public relations agent for political candidates, Cantoneros, 32, was a block-timer – a journalist who leases air time from the station owner on DXAA-FM since 2004, conducting his own program, “Nasud, Pagmata Na” (People, Wake Up) on which he frequently criticized local officials for corruption and gambling (CPJ, 2005e).

He had received threats before his death, and was also carrying a .45-caliber pistol, which he did use to shoot back at his attackers, whom he also identified before his death, his colleague Robert Baguio reportedly said. As is almost customary in the Philippines, a special task force was formed to solve Cantoneros’ murder and it was headed by Dipolog City Philippine National Police Chief Tomas Hizon (The Daily Dipolognon, 2005).

**Philip Agustin**

Less than a week after Cantoneros was shot, gunmen killed publisher Philip Agustin with a single shot to his through his window at home on May 10 in Dingalan in Aurora Province. Agustin, who published a community newspaper, Starline Times Recorder, had recently reported against Dingalan mayor, Jaime Ylarde for the misuse of municipal funds that had been allocated to the town after it was hit by devastating flashfloods and landslides (CPJ, 2005f).

Alarmed by the death of two journalists in less than a week and only days after the publication of its damning report about the prevalent culture of impunity in the Philippines, CPJ sent out another alert on the matter. The report detailed the circumstances of the tragic deaths of the two journalists and additionally emphasized that both had reported against local government
officials including Governor Rolando Yebes and mayor Jaime Ylarde in the case of Cantoneros and Agustin, respectively (CPJ, 2005g). It also reminded the international community of the earlier murder of Marlene Garcia Esperat while Executive Director Ann Cooper called on the government to “apprehend those responsible [for the murders] and prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law” (para 5).

Press Freedom Fund

The new set of murders eventually led the Arroyo government to take some concrete steps towards the improvement of press freedom and journalists’ safety. On May 16, in a direct response to the demands of multiple press freedom groups, President Arroyo launched a 5 million peso (U.S. $92,500) Press Freedom Fund to support a nationwide campaign to stop the indiscriminate killings of Philippine journalists (CPJ, 2006a).

The President promised 3 million pesos from her funds, while House Speaker Jose De Venecia was to contribute the remaining 2 million pesos. The money from the fund was allocated as follows: 2 million pesos for the formation of a quick response team that would only investigate murders of journalists and provide financial assistance to their families, another 2 million pesos for the Philippine National Police to be used as cash rewards for informants and finally, a million pesos was given to the Department of Justice to improve its Witness Protection Program, said presidential spokesman Ignacio Bunye (Ferdie Maglalang, 2005, para1).

Rolando Morales

On July 3, radio commentator Morales was returning from work when he was ambushed by eight assailants on four motorcycles who shot him at least 15 times in Mindanao province. A former plantation-inspector and village official, since 2003 Morales hosted his own show, called “Voice of the Barangay (village)” on Radio Mindanao Network and was known for his tough
commentaries on the illegal drug trade and had also accused local officials of summary executions (CPJ, 2005h). In August, police filed murder charges and issued arrest warrants against alleged gunmen Federico Sarifa Jr. and Sonny Dimol and a series of John Does but they have since evaded arrest and have featured on PNP’s Most Wanted List for Media Killings (GMA News, 2009).

**CPJ 2005 Mission to the Philippines**

In June, a CPJ delegation, led by CPJ’s Asia Program Coordinator, Abi Wright, and including Executive Director of SEAPA, Roby Alampay and Executive Editor of the Hong Kong based daily *The Standard*, A. Linn Neumann, visited the Philippines on a 10-day mission to investigate recent media killings. The delegation travelled across the country from Manila to the provinces in Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao, and met with the family members of slain journalists, their friends and colleagues, other journalists and local politicians (CPJ, 2006a).

At the end of the trip, the delegation produced an array of reports on the current situation of the media in the Philippines. One of those reports written by Wright was titled “Philippines: On the Radio, Under the Sun”, and as the name suggests was a detailed analysis of the many radio broadcasters and commentators who were killed in recent years (Wright, 2005a). The report was an excellent exercise in news analysis as well as human rights advocacy.

Wright’s report opened with a vivid description of Hinolan in his studio starting up his commentary against corrupt officials and illegal gambling with a loud beat on his bass drum, literally signifying the bang element in his show. The beating of the drum is featured on all Bombo Radyo stations and is representative of the network’s characteristic hard-hitting commentary as well as its name, which in local Tagalog means to bang on a drum, Wright explains (para 5). The report presented in details the character of Hinolan’s work and his
influence as a journalist which stemmed from his brave and popular style, as seen through the eyes of his friends and colleagues such as Lilia dela Cruz, who took over from Hinolan as station manager and Carlos Conde, a Manila-based freelance journalist and Secretary General of the NUJP. It also took a closer look at the Roger Mariano and Klein Cantoneros’ cases.

Additionally, the report carefully analysed the predominant issues in the Philippine media such as the ethical concerns of radio block-timers, the failure of the independent broadcast regulator KBP to function effectively, the financial constraints of the Witness Protect Program that leads the avenue open for witness intimidation and the dangers of a fast spreading gun-culture in an already lawless part of the country.

**Conclusions**

Continued international pressure and local activism compelled the Arroyo administration to pay more than just lip service to the problem of impunity in the country and instead undertake concrete actions. The Press Freedom Fund created in May was definitely a step in the right direction. However, more recent reports have revealed that much of the promised funds never quite materialized because it remained caught in legislative squabbles. The PNP and Taskforce Newsmen also showed improved levels of crime investigation which naturally led to more suspects being identified and in some cases, charges being filed against the suspects.

However, the Philippine legal system remains a complex one that is particularly susceptible to local influence and is often abused by powerful defendants leading to mistrials and injustice. As a result, none of the suspects charged with murder in any of the journalists’ killings since 2004 have yet been convicted. Worse still, the masterminds of the crime are rarely even brought to trial as it is usually only the gunmen who get caught, if at all. For example, in Esperat’s case charges were brought against the masterminds, Montaner and Sabay, but they
were eventually dropped due to insufficient evidence. Similarly, in Agustin’s case local police nabbed the gunmen who pointed to the local mayor as the mastermind but he was not taken into custody while Morales’ case arrest warrants were issued against the hitmen, but they evaded arrest and could not be brought into custody.
MAJOR CASES REVIEW – 2006

The year began with a disturbing development as President Arroyo declared a state of emergency in the country on February 24 in response to a foiled coup attempt that threatened her office, and heightened security concerns (Guardian.co.uk, 2006). The State of Emergency was in effect only eight days, but it was long enough for the Arroyo administration to present a serious threat to press freedom in the country, that alarmed media organizations and advocacy groups worldwide as is evident from CPJ’s letter of concern to the president (See CPJ, 2006b).

Senator Lugar’s Senate Inquiry

The steadily increasing number of journalists’ killed with impunity in the country had led to growing concern and increasing scrutiny from the international press freedom network. Ultimately in May of 2006, the advocacy efforts bore fruit as U.S. Senator Richard Lugar ordered a senate inquiry into journalists killed in the Philippine since 2000 and also urged the Philippine government to bring journalists’ killers to justice (The Philippine Star, 2006). “Democracy depends on the free flow of information to the public, which depends on a press free to do its work without government intimidation… Ensuring that legal officials thoroughly investigate and prosecute attacks on journalists is critical,” said Lugar, who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which held the inquiry, on World Press Freedom Day.

Senator Lugar’s call received a quick response from President Arroyo who immediately ordered the Department of Foreign Affairs to prepare a complete written report on the efforts undertaken by the government to resolve journalists’ murders, as requested by the Senator and send it to the U.S. Senate (Ed Mahilum, 2006, para1).

In conjunction with President Arroyo’s orders, Philippine Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye also issued a statement in response to Lugar’s call for inquiry in which he said that, “All the
authorities particularly the Philippine National Police (PNP) are doing everything necessary to address these different cases of attacks on our journalists... We assure U.S. Sen. Richard Lugar that the Philippine government has taken decisive action regarding cases of killing of Filipino journalists” (The Philippine Star, 2006).

Additionally, the Philippine Ambassador to Washington, Albert del Rosario, informed the U.S. Senate committee that of the 31 cases that Manila recorded for the 2000-2005 period, at least 15 had already been investigated and were undergoing trial, another 14 were still being investigated while two cases had been dismissed because of the prosecution’s failure to present strong evidence. Rosario’s figures were complimented by Bunye’s assertions that Philippines democracy continued to nurture a free press as was evident from the “vibrance of commentaries over the air-lanes and in print” (The Philippine Star, 2006).

On May 6, the Philippine National Police Director General Arturo Lomibao strongly denied to local reporters that the police are not doing enough to solve the cases of journalists and insisted that international reports that labeled Philippines as a dangerous place for journalists were indeed “devoid of the truth” as the killers had either been caught or the police were on their trail (Ed Mahilum, 2006, para3). Other senior police officials also denied the prevalence of the “culture of violence” in the country, and much like Bunye’s assertions, said that “the country affords all of you the rights. We protect the lives and uphold press freedom”, news reports said. They also pointed out that 39 of the 69 cases of journalists killed since 1986 were considered solved since the perpetrators had been identified and charged before the courts (Ed Mahilum, 2006, para7).

While Senator Lugar’s intervention was welcome by the local press and international advocacy groups who also noted President Arroyo’s swift response, press freedom groups were
dismayed by the Philippine government’s reaction as has been described above. The government had tried to effectively disregard the failing law and order situation the country that had lead to repeated attacks on the news media while the police denied that a culture of impunity existed in the country. Press freedom advocates were particularly concerned that the Philippine police considered many of the cases solved when charges had been filed against suspects, even though no convictions had been achieved.

Protest Letter

On May 15, CPJ wrote to a letter to President Arroyo expressing its concerns and pointed out even those cases that had been labeled as solved, there had been no convictions (See CPJ, 2006d). The letter mentioned that “While the government has made efforts to solve the killings of journalists, none of the powerful figures behind some of these murders have been convicted” thus ensuring the Philippine government knew that the cases were being monitored closely. Additionally, it also said that “…those who would attack or kill a journalist in the Philippines can still do so with impunity, despite the pledge you made last year to address the problem”, therefore carefully highlighting the fact that lip service alone was enough to solve the problem and the president had fallen short of her words.

It also pointed out some errors in the report that Arroyo’s administration sent to Sen. Lugar. For example, it noted that in the case of Roland Ureta, a radio broadcaster killed in 2001, the report mentions that charges were filed against two suspects in September 2004 but fails to add that those were dropped in December 2004, and that case has since stalled. Similarly, the letter also pointed out that another solved case, that of Gene Boyd Lumawag, also effectively remained unresolved as the suspects had never been apprehended.
The letter also made a note of some of the achievements that had been made in a few cases, especially the prosecution of police officer Guillermo Wapile who gunned down Edgar Damalerio in 2002 but also mentioned that if other cases were not similarly prosecuted, Damalerio’s case would stand out as an “anomaly”. The committee’s concerns that the Philippine government was trying to “play down” the gravity of the situation even though the situation had not improved significantly was immediately lent true when another journalist was killed less than a week after the letter was sent to President Arroyo.

Fernando Batul

Two gunmen on motorcycles shot 37-year-old Fernando Batul six times while he was on his way to work on May 22 in the Puerto Princesa town on Palawan Island. A former vice-mayor, Batul, was a radio commentator for DZRH and DYPR where he criticized government officials, including current Mayor Hagedorn, for corruption and nepotism (CPJ, 2006c). Batul had previously received death threats through letters and text messages, and even a hand grenade (that failed to explode) was thrown into his home. He had informed the National Bureau of Investigation and said that he feared local police officers were the culprits, CPJ report said.

The committee also released an alert calling upon the Philippine government to investigate Batul’s case (See CPJ, 2006e). Given the rising pressure, President Arroyo condemned the killing and ordered the police “to do whatever it takes” to bring the perpetrators to justice. Her lead was followed by local officials as Puerto Princesa City Mayor Hagedorn pressured local police to arrest the killers and also offered a monetary reward for tips (Genalyn D. Kabiling, 2006 para2).

On May 25, PNP arrested a police officer, Aaron Golifardo as the suspected gunman who was dismissed from service the next day. The case is currently under-trial (CMFR, 2006a).
Maricel and George Vigo

A contributor to the Bangkok-based news agency Union of Catholic Asian News (UCAN), George Vigo and his wife, Maricel, radio program host on local station DXND, were shot dead by two gunmen on motorcycles while they were walking back home in Mindanao Island on June 16. Other journalists considered their work “uncontroversial”, all though they had previously reported on corruption and right-wing militias and the offices of a newspaper they had founded had been suspiciously burned down in 2001 (CPJ, 2006f).

In typical PNP fashion, a task force was launched to hunt down the killers and the alleged gunman Jhnever Madangguit was arrested but the case against him dismissed due to insufficient evidence by the end of the year. Madangguit, who was believed to be only the “fall guy” protecting the actual masterminds, died in a supposed bus accident in 2007 (Mindanews, 2007).

Armando Pace

Gunmen on motorcycles shot Pace as he was going home from work in Digos City on Mindanao Island on July 18. The 51-year-old radio broadcaster on DXDS was known for his “stinging” commentary on corruption and local politics and several libel suits had been filed against him (CPJ, 2006g).

Pace’s 16-year-old neighbor had witnessed the murder and was able to identify gunman Joy Anticamara in a line-up on July 18. Anticamara was eventually convicted in 2009 but the masterminds have not been identified. CPJ considers the case to have received partial justice only.

Developments in Marlene Garcia Esperat’s case

A major landmark was achieved in the case of Marlene Garcia Esperat. On October 6, the three gunmen who had shot her were convicted in a Cebu court and sentenced to 30 to 40 years
in prison. Additionally, Justice Secretary Ron Gonzales ordered the reinstatement of charges against the masterminds, Montaner and Sabay (CPJ, 2007a). Judge Eric Menchavez convicted the Gerry Cabayag and his accomplices Randy Grecia and Estanislao Bismanos of murder while former military officer Rowie Barua who had hired the men to shoot Garcia on behalf of the two masterminds and had later turned into a state witness, was acquitted for lack of evidence (Inquirer.net, 2006a). The decision came after the case was transferred from Mindanao’s Tacurong city to Cebu city and Nena Santos, a private prosecutor got involved in the investigation of the crime and became a member of the prosecuting panel.

The decision was well-received by local press freedom groups and international networks. Statements issued by international media watchdogs were widely reproduced in the local media to prove that the case had received global coverage and therefore, it was being closely monitored (Inquirer.net, 2006b). CPJ issued a statement welcoming the decision while also calling upon the “government to aggressively pursue the prosecution of those who allegedly ordered the killing” and urging the “authorities to redouble their efforts in investigating the many unsolved journalist murders in the Philippines” (CPJ, 2006h).

It may be noted that since Esperat’s assassination in May of 2005, press freedom networks had monitored developments in her case and there was a significant amount of pressure on the Philippine authorities to resolve the case. For example, days before the trial against the three gunmen and the middleman began in early May, 10 press freedom organizations came together to call upon President Arroyo to ensure that all the gunmen as well as the masterminds are prosecuted and the slain journalist receives justice (CFJE, 2006). CPJ was one of the 10 organizations that signed the document. Other organizations where the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, Center for Media Freedom & Responsibility, Committee to Protect Journalists,

Developments in other cases:

On March 6, General Santos City RTC acquitted village head, Ephraim Ingles in the case of Elpidio Binoya for lack of evidence but the petition to acquit Ingles’ driver, the alleged gunman was rejected (CMFR, 2004c). In the case of Roger Mariano, the Supreme Court’s First Division ordered his case to be transferred from Laoag RTC to Manila on April 3. In 2005, his wife had petitioned for the transfer and this petition was strongly endorsed by the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists Inc (CMFR, 2004d). In September, the Kalibo RTC found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant against Lezo mayor Alfredo Arcenio for the murder of Herson Hinolan (CMFR, 2004b).

Conclusions

While killings of journalists continued unabated in the country, limited progress was made in respect to some cases. This was partly in response to the increased effectiveness of the Philippine National Police, the Arroyo administration and other law-enforcement agencies, and partly due to the tremendous pressure that fell upon Philippine authorities from various quarters including the U.S. Senate.

Significant achievements were made in the case of Marlene Garcia Esperat’s case and much of it can be attributed to the work of her private prosecutor Nena Santos and local press freedom groups such as FFFJ and CMFR. It maybe noted that CPJ supported these organizations significantly.
However, many other cases remained mired in the faulty system as cases dismissed due to lack of evidence, witness intimidation and prosecutorial conduct. For example: Agustin’s family had requested their state prosecutor to be removed for he was allegedly biased in favor of the defendant mayor Ylarde.

In conclusion it may be said that developments during the year were evidence of the fact that the work of transnational advocacy groups in conjunction with other actors such as local press freedom groups and foreign politicians were successful in pressurizing the Philippine government to enforce law and order in the land and deliver justice to its people. However, the continued killings made it evident that the problem of impunity and media safety remained far from resolved.
MAJOR CASES REVIEW – 2007

Violence against journalists dropped significantly during the year as there were no confirmed cases of journalists being killed in connection to their work. Two journalists were killed and CPJ is continuing to investigate if they were killed for their work. Additionally, it may be noted that the 2007 attacks on journalists met with quick responses as President Arroyo instructed the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau Investigation to assist in with the inquiry (CPJ, 2008a). This response – an apparent change in attitude of the government and law enforcement agencies – was largely the result of increasing international pressure and scrutiny by advocacy groups.

During the course of the year, the focus remained on the levels of impunity with which journalists were killed in the country in particular, and on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions in general, as will be discussed below.

CPJ’s 2007 Mission to the Philippines

In July, a two-member delegation consisting of CPJ’s Executive Director, Joel Simon and CPJ Board Member, Sheila Coronel visited the Philippines to investigate the Marlene Garcia Esperat case in particular and the killings of journalists in general. They were in Manila and met with local journalists and government officials including the Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, Reynato S. Puno (CPJ, 2007b).

The mission may be deemed as successful as Chief Justice Puno made a verbal commitment to bring the killers of journalists to justice and protect the press and the right to free speech. He also added that the unsolved murder led to increasing distrust in the criminal justice system. CPJ’s Executive Director Joel Simon was satisfied with the Chief Justice’s words. “We’re pleased by Chief Justice Puno’s comments and hope the Supreme Court, along with the
other branches of the Philippine government, will continue to take steps to bring to justice the killers of journalists,” he said (CPJ, 2007b, para 4).

At the end of the mission, the delegates produced special reports on the matter and these were widely circulated and posted on the committee’s Web site. Sheila Coronel, along with Elizabeth Witchel authored a CPJ special report, titled “The Road to Justice” (Coronel, 2007). The report was a part of a package of stories in the Dangerous Assignments series that explored the killing of journalists followed by governmental response, and continuing efforts to bring justice. Apart from reports by Simon and Coronel from their research and advocacy mission to the Philippines in July, the package contained stories from Ann Cooper, who undertook an April mission to Moscow and Frank Smyth who went to Oakland in September to investigate the killing of U.S. editor (CPJ, 2007c).

Coronel’s report looked closely at the Esperat case and presented a detailed description of her life and work. It also painstakingly described the events that led up to her assassination as well as the events that followed the shooting, including how police and other government agencies responded to the crisis. In a companion report, Joel Simon chronicles the role of the private prosecutor, as opposed to one appointed by the state, in the case of Esperat. Simply titled, “The Private Prosecutor”, Simon’s report notes that while private prosecutors are not allowed to try a murder case, they may work directly with the police and government prosecution throughout the investigation and trial (Simon, 2007). It details the contribution of private attorney, Nena Santos in Esperat’s trial from preparing court documents to alerting the national and international media to new developments that allow for the case to be in the media and serve as a rallying point.

National Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances
Days before the CPJ delegation met with Chief Justice Puno, the Supreme Court of the Philippines held a two-day National Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances in Manila to resolve the issue of extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions including those of journalists. The event was well attended by justices, activists, police officers, politicians, and even militant leaders of the insurgency. While the summit was not specifically targeted towards the case of killed journalists, they were included as part of the larger issue. The summit ended with several recommendations from the attending delegates and included one “to carefully study the possibility of creating a new offense for the killings and assaults on journalists… akin to the law penalizing violence against woman and children. …these groups are in need of protection by the law” (Tetch Torres & Thea Alberto, 2007, para15). These recommendations were forwarded by the Chief Justice Puno to President Arroyo, the Philippine Senate and the House of Representatives.

Though the summit was not solely focused on journalists, the fact that it was organized by the Philippine judiciary to resolve a larger national crisis and the situation was journalists was included and even given special consideration is an excellent example of the effectiveness of advocacy groups in bringing about positive change. As described in previous chapters, international pressure had been consistently growing on the Philippine government, and the country had received significant bad press in the international media. This, along with pressures from foreign politicians and governments, led to a definite response from the national agencies.

Philip Alston’s Mission to the Philippines

Pressure from multiple sources, locally and internationally, was necessary to force the Philippine government to acknowledge the deteriorating situation within the country as well as take immediate steps to resolve the issue. Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human
Rights Council on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston’s, 10-day mission to the Philippines was one of those factors.

Dr. Alston visited the Philippines between February 12 and 21 on the invitation of the Philippine government to investigate extrajudicial investigations. He spent most of his time in Davao, Manila and Baguio, and met with several senior officials of Government, including the President, the Executive Secretary, the National Security Adviser, the Secretaries for Defense and Justice, members of Congress, the Chief Justice, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), representatives of the MNLF and MILF, members of Task Force Usig, and with the Melo Commission (Alston, 2008). It may be noted that Dr. Alston’s visit was in response to the Arroyo government’s invitation and this in itself was a reflection of the government’s acknowledgement of the problem as well as willingness to work with other agencies to better the situation.

Like the National Summit, Dr. Alston mission was not specific to journalists. Overall, the report looked into the killings by the New People’s Army, killings related to the conflict in western Mindanao and agrarian reform disputes but additionally also investigated the cases of killed journalists (Alston, 2008). The report made significant recommendations including the re-evaluation of counter-insurgency tactics, increased accountability for government agencies, better witness protection programs and the publication of the Melo commission’s report, which the government had refused to publish until that point.

In the specific case of journalists, the report mentioned that an increasing number of journalists had been killed in recent years and a vast majority of those could have traced back to local roots. While some journalists had been killed for their exposes against powerful individuals, others had been murdered because they got involved in disputes by publicly taking
sides. Dr. Alston also criticized the structure of the media industry which allowed for the much-maligned “AC-DC” – Attack, Collect: Defend, Collect – form of journalism by “block-timers” who bought airtime from radio networks and were responsible for their own advertising revenue. He observed that many of the killed journalists were block-timers who spoke out against local powers and there was a “lamentable” degree of impunity in the matter (Alston, 2008, p.16).

It may be noted that much of the analysis presented in Dr. Alston’s report was in accordance with the analysis provided by CPJ, and other advocacy groups. For example, Abi Wright had also criticized the AC-DC form of journalism and the culture of block-timers and emphasized that journalists were often killed by local powers, beyond Manila’s control (Wright, 2005). She had also recommended that the witness protection program be improved to strengthen the criminal justice system. Wright’s analysis was also quoted in Alston’s report (See page 43). In fact, CPJ’s facts, figures and reports were extensively quoted in Alston’s report on the section on journalists. Along with data from CMFR and NUJP, CPJ numbers were also used for comparative purposes (See page 42).
Impunity and Press Freedom Conference

To combat the increasing number of killed journalists in the Philippines as well as to fight the culture of impunity that engulfed these killings, CPJ in alliance with CMFR, SEAPA and the Open Society Institute (OSI) organized a two-day conference in Manila to launch its Campaign Against Impunity. Held between February 27 to 29, 2008 in the Philippine financial center of Makati City, the conference was well-attended by 190 participants including human rights activists, lawyers, justices, media persons, government and police officials and foreign delegates from South Korea, United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, Australia, and the United States and resource persons from Southeast Asia and Latin America.

The conference was an excellent exercise in the study of the impunity issue in the Philippines in comparison with other nations in the region and worldwide. For example while Chief Justice Puno, who delivered the keynote address, acknowledged that the Philippine democracy was threatened because the media had come under attack and this was considered to be a significant show of judicial support by CPJ (CPJ, 2009a), the second keynote speaker, Director of the Inter American Press Association (IAPA), Ricardo Trotti, compared the situation in Philippines to one in Latin America and identified a lack of political will, an inadequate criminal justice system, and government corruption as some of the factors which allow impunity to flourish. He also pointed out that his organization works closely with the local governments to combat impunity. SEAPA’s Roby Alampay noted that given similarities in the legal traditions and political environments in the Philippines and Latin America, one had much to be learnt from the others experience.
Similarly, Ramon Magsaysay Awardee for Journalism, Literature, and Creative Arts in 2000 and head of the Dr. Soetomo Press Institute, Atmakusumah Astraatmadja, pointed out that in Indonesia, the press has been continuously muzzled despite the fact that Suharto’s dictatorship ended in 1998. Former dean of the University of the Philippines College of Law, Raul Pangalangan, discussed the recommendations that had emerged from the National Summit on Extrajudicial Execution organized by the Supreme Court in Manila the year before, and emphasized the problems faced by the Philippine prosecutors and weaknesses of the country’s witness protection program.

Additionally, other panelists also discussed the role of the courts as human rights mechanisms in the context of key cases in the Philippines and around the world. Christine Chung, a senior fellow at the Schell Center for International Human Rights, and a former prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) provided the ICC as an example of a court of law that was specifically designed to fight human rights abuses and while it may have its flaws, it still had a credible record of fighting crimes against humanity.

The panelists also engaged in in-depth discussions regarding the importance of a sustained campaign against impunity as had been exemplified in the Marlene Garcia Esperat case. Senior Philippine State prosecutor Leo Dacera pointed out that this campaign which had been spearheaded by the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists (FFFJ), a consortium of local press freedom groups and supported by other international groups such as the CPJ, had been effective would be effective in fighting impunity as it led to the conviction of Esperat’s gunmen. The private prosecutor in Esperat’s case, Nena Santos supported Dacera’s views and added that close cooperation between private counsel, public prosecutors, and the witness protection program helped win those convictions.
On similar lines, secretary general of the Free Legal Assistance Group Maria Socorro Diokno, emphasized the role of civil society organizations in achieving key victories and milestones and mentioned the supported granted to Dr. Alston as a good example of organizations across political lines and social ideologies working together. Should you name him? Just for context purposes? CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon also emphasized that a strong consortium of the local press and media advocacy groups, and constant presence of international pressure can make a difference in the fight against impunity.

The conference, which received wide publicity in the local and international media, was a successful platform for various actors to come together and make a united effort to fight impunity. This was especially needed as the number of killed journalists continued to increase as described below.

Dennis Cuesta

On August 4, two gunmen on motorcycles fired several shots at Cuesta, a program director and anchor for DXMD, an affiliate of the Radio Mindanao Network. He sustained multiple injuries, including a gunshot wound to the head, and died in a local hospital five days later. Earlier, Cuesta had been threatened in relation to his recent broadcasts, according to Dennievin Macaranas, a network operations manager who spoke with CPJ by telephone. The commentator had also recently applied for a firearm license and requested police protection (CPJ, 2008c).

CPJ put out a statement that was widely publicized to draw attention in to the case. The statement included details of the attack and possible motives and called for an immediate investigation. Elisabeth Witchel, CPJ’s Impunity Campaign Coordinator, mentioned that the attack followed a familiar but deadly pattern and noted that in the last 10 years at least 25
journalists were victims of premeditated murder (CPJ, 2008d). After Cuesta died in the hospital of gunshot wounds, CPJ issued another statement mourning his death and keeping his case in the spotlight. The statement repeated the committee’s call to local and national authorities for thorough investigations, noted that effective prosecution of the murderers is the only way to break the pattern of journalists being slain with impunity and additionally sent condolences to the Cuesta family (CPJ, 2008e).

Martin Roxas

Only three days after Cuesta was shot, two men shot Roxas in the back as he drove his motorcycle Roxas City, in central Panay Island. Roxas was a program director with DYVR and died at a local hospital from a gunshot wound to his spine. His colleagues said he had been threatened and even attacked before in relation to his work which included coverage of various political issues such as misappropriation of city funds, the AP reported (CPJ, 2008f).

CPJ issued a statement publicizing Roxas’ death and emphasizing that he may have been killed for his work. Also, the committee was alarmed that two journalists had been gunned down in less than a week. “For nearly two years, we saw a lull in journalist killings. These two attacks … are an alarming sign that violence against Philippine journalists may be on the rise”, said Witchel in the statement (CPJ, 2008g). Also, CPJ board member Sheila Coronel blogged about the deaths as well. She noted that while the deaths were not connected, they did follow an eerie pattern wherein gunmen on motorcycles gun down journalists who are usually provincial radio broadcasters and highlighted the continuing vulnerability of journalists. (Coronel, 2008).

Developments in the Marlene Garcia Esperat case

The anti-graft columnist’s case went through multiple twists and turns through the Philippine criminal justice system during the year. It may be noted that as mentioned earlier, the
three gunmen who had shot Esperat were convicted and sentenced to 17 years in prison in a landmark 2006 verdict. The gunmen had also pointed towards the masterminds but they were still to be convicted. Since 2005, prosecutors had repeatedly tried to bring charges against the two officials from the department of agriculture, Montaner and Sabay. Initial efforts by the prosecution in Tacurong RTC met with resistance from judges who had been swayed by the significant power of the defendants. Later the case was moved to Cebu Regional Trial Court, which issued an arrest warrant on February 4. A few days later, CPJ even sent a letter to the PNP director welcoming the warrants and asking for a quick arrest (CPJ, 2008h). Within a month, however a restraining order was put out by an appeals court as Cebu RTC as the two suspects questioned the jurisdiction of the Cebu court. This led CPJ to write a letter to Chief Justice Puno regarding it concerns about the case (CPJ, 2008i). As described before, Chief Justice Puno had expressed his support for Impunity campaign and had made verbal commitments towards the project. In October 2008, the prosecution was finally able to file new murder charges against the two suspects in Tacurong. Asia Program coordinator Bob Dietz issued a statement that said: “This is more reassuring news from the Philippines. It is good that the local court has moved on to the next step of bringing to justice the alleged masterminds behind the terrible murder of Marlene Garcia-Esperat. We hope the government watches this case closely and ensures that it is fully prosecuted and justice is served” (CPJ, 2008j). However, the two suspects immediately filed motions to squash the warrants.

Conclusions:

Throughout the year, the committee engaged in information politics, accountability politics, leverage politics and symbolic politics. It consistently brought out reports and statements that were widely publicized. These are important tools of advocacy that allow for
continued scrutiny of norm violating governments. It also worked closely with its local allies to build strong foundations. Another effective tool of advocacy was the constant trial monitoring of the Marlene Garcia Esperat case. For a variety of reasons, the Esperat case has become a landmark one, and by monitoring the trial and other developments, CPJ and other advocacy groups send out a clear message that even local courts are not beyond international purview.
MAJOR CASES REVIEW – 2009

Maguindanao Massacre

The year turned out to be a deadly year for press freedom as 31 media professionals were massacred in a case of election-related violence in Mindanao province. On November 23, a group of journalists were travelling with a convoy that intended to file gubernatorial candidacy papers for local politician Esmael Mangudadatu in the provincial capital of Shariff Aguak. Mangudadatu himself was not travelling with the convoy since he had been warned of a possible attack but other female members of his family and his supporters were in the convoy and he had also invited members of the press, hoping that a large contingent of women, independent members and journalists would not be attacked, according to local and foreign media reports (CPJ, 2010a).

But Mangudadatu was terribly mistaken. En route to Shariff Aguak, the contingent was ambushed by more than 100 heavily armed militiamen. They were led at gunpoint to a remote clearing where large pits had been prepared and each one of them was shot and dumped into two mass graves (Crispin, 2010). Fifty-seven people were killed that night in an event that was largely the result of political clan rivalries and eventually came to be known as the Maguindanao massacre.

Local Fact-Finding Mission

Four local press freedom groups organized a fact-finding mission to gather more details about the incidence. Eventually, an authoritative report was compiled by the FFFJ, NUJP, PCIJ and MindaNews, all local press freedom groups, that said that 29 journalists and two media workers had been killed and most of the victims worked for Mindanao-based newspapers, while some were employed by radio and television outlets (See Report, 2009). “No single event has
claimed as many journalists’ lives in the 18 years since CPJ began compiling detailed records”, CPJ said in a statement. According to CPJ research, the deadliest prior event for the press came in Iraq on October 12, 2006, when 11 employees of Al-Shaabiya television were killed in an attack at the station’s Baghdad studios.

In the following days, the Mayor of Datu Unsay in Maguindanao, Andal Amapatuan Jr. was identified as a prime suspect in the killing. He surrendered to the police but claimed innocence. It may be noted that in this case the journalists were not directly targeted for their work. The massacre was the result of a long-standing rivalry between two political groups though not related to the ongoing conflict with Muslim secessionists in the province. However, even though the journalists were casualties in a political battle during election time, it must be pointed out that they were a part of the convoy because they were following a major story.

CPJ and other organizations responded almost immediately to the crisis in Mindanao. CPJ worked with local and international advocacy groups to extend financial aid to the families of slain journalists (CPJ, 2009b). Additionally, CPJ’s Shawn Crispin was part of a team of representatives from about 10 international press freedom groups that visited the Philippines in the immediate aftermath of the massacre to support their Philippine colleagues, investigate the situation and estimate the needs of the victim’s families. The mission members were mostly in General Santos City and did not visit the site of the massacre since large parts of the province had come under a state of emergency since the incident (Dietz, 2009).

In a preliminary report, the members expressed a concern over the commitment and capacity of Philippine authorities to conduct full and independent prosecution of the killers. It also highlighted an urgent need for counseling and humanitarian support for the families of the victims. At least 75 children have lost a parent in the attack and in many cases the victim was the
sole breadwinner for family, the report said. Additionally, it mentioned that witnesses need to be protected and a comprehensive safety program should be created for journalists in Mindanao for the May 2010 national elections (See IFJ report, 2009). On December 9, CPJ joined journalists all over the world in a Global Day of Solidarity to demand justice for those killed in the Philippines. Investigations and extensive advocacy work regarding the massacre continued well into 2010.

While the scale of the massacre was unprecedented, it was not completely unexpected as the Philippines had a culture of violence against journalists. Evidence of this lay in the fact that apart from the 31 media persons killed the massacre, six other journalists were killed in the country in 2009. At least three were killed in direct relation for their work, while one of them was killed while on a dangerous assignment. CPJ is still investigating the motives for the death of the others.

Ernie Rollin

Rollin was shot at least three times by two men wearing ski masks and riding motorcycles around 5:30 a.m. at a gas station on February 23, in Oroquieta City in the Misamis. He was shot a fourth time after his partner Ligaya Barero, who was nearby, tried to help him.

Rollin was a popular outspoken radio commentator on the DXSY radio station. Prior to his death, he had discussed controversial laws in the province and even criticized some local politicians. On May 24, a former member of the New People’s Army, Juel Jumalon was arrested as the suspected gunman. A murder case was filed against Jumalon and another, unnamed man at the Misamis Occidental Regional Trial Court on June 22. The masterminds were not revealed during the investigation (CPJ, 2009c).
Crispin Perez

Perez was stabbed and fatally shot in San Jose, in the province of Mindoro Occidental on June 9, right after his morning show on the local DWDO radio station. Perez, who was also a practicing lawyer and a former politician, was approached by his killer who was pretending to seek advice from him and then shot dead. His killer fled on a motorcycle but was identified his widow as a local police officer who is also the body guard of a local politician. Perez’s colleagues believe he was killed because of his commentaries on the irregularities in the local mining and electricity projects (CPJ, 2009d). A suspect was arrested in July.

Developments in the Marlene Garcia Esperat Case

Court proceedings against two suspects progressed slowly through the year 2009. In April, a local court denied a motion from the defendants, Department of Agriculture officials Osmena Montaner and Estrella Sabay, to dismiss murder charges. In August, the Supreme Court granted a request for a change of venue for the case from Tacarong City to Manila.

It may be noted that the case had moved earlier from Tacurong to Cebu City and then back to Tacurong over the course of four years since the 2005 murder. The request to change location had been filed by CPJ ally and local media coalition, FFFJ. The coalition sought the venue change due to concerns about the safety of witnesses and prosecutors, and possible political interference in the local court.

The masterminds, Montaner and Sabay continued to evade arrests throughout the year which led to widespread criticism that the police were not pursuing the suspects. The police responded to those criticisms by announcing the creation of 21 dedicated “tracker teams” to track down suspects and post more than 6,000 wanted posters, replete with rewards (CPJ, 2010a).
Developments in other cases

In a rare but encouraging development, the killer of radio journalist Armando Pace, Joy Anticamara was convicted by a Malita RTC in Davao Del Sur province on April 29. Anticamara was sentenced to 17 years in prison based on the testimony of a 16-year-old student who witnessed the crime. However, the mastermind of the crime has still not been brought to justice and CPJ considers the case to have received partial justice only.

While the system succeeded in bringing justice to one slain journalist, it continued to fail many others. In the case of Dennis Cuesta for example, a witness identified Police Chief Inspector Redempto “Boy” Acharon, cousin of the city’s mayor, as one of Cuesta’s assassins but Acharon’s lawyer successfully reassigned the case from one local court to another and in the meantime, arrest warrants against the suspects were withdrawn in February. The warrant was reissued in May, but the suspect remained free in late year while the witness was forced into the witness protection program.
Established in November 2007 with the support of the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, the CPJ’s Global Campaign against Impunity is a special program initiative that aims to bring journalists’ killers to justice. As mentioned earlier, the program currently focuses only on the Philippines and Russia – two countries where journalists are routinely murdered with impunity. The staggering number of unsolved murder cases in these countries has had a strongly detrimental effect not only on the journalism profession and those who practice it but also on the general welfare of society at its watchdog is rendered largely ineffective.

According to the Committee’s Web site, the Global Campaign Against Impunity aims for CPJ to work in association with local journalist groups in Russia and the Philippines so as to (i) document and publicize the murders of journalists and subsequent law enforcement actions, (ii) advocate for justice through meetings with local prosecutors, police, government officials and judicial officials, (iii) provide support to the families of victims, (iv) conduct discussions and press conferences to publicize the problem and identify solutions, (v) analyze data, investigate cases, and produce in-depth reports identifying law enforcement failures and recommending solutions, (vi) promote the use of witness protection programs, change-of-venue motions and other techniques proven effective in obtaining justice and finally (vii) enlist the support of the international community in seeking justice for killed journalists and their families (CPJ, 2007).

The program is an excellent example of how CPJ has employed a comprehensive approach towards tackling the issue of impunity in the Philippines and Russia. Its efforts to document and publicize the killings by publishing news alerts and special reports and organizing
press conferences result in information politics. Fact-finding missions and follow up reports allow for accountability politics while in meetings with government officials and members of the judiciary, the CPJ engages in leverage politics.

The Maguindanao massacre of 2009 in the Philippines especially served as a litmus test to measure the effectiveness of the Global Campaign against Impunity program. The program had already been active for two years before the massacre allowing CPJ significant time to build stronger local connections and in a way, best prepare itself for an incident of such proportions. Whether the Campaign will be effective in ensuring that the killed journalists get justice in the long run is yet to be seen, as cases of this nature tend to go on for years before justice is meted out but in the short term, the Campaign has allowed for CPJ to undertake a focused initiative that ensures that the incident gets the kind of time, attention and diligence it deserves. As part of the Campaign, CPJ has undertaken advocacy missions to the Philippines that have helped the Committee build a strong body of research material on the basis of which it can better fight impunity in that country as well as make a stronger case for international attention. For example, only weeks after the Maguindanao massacre, CPJ sent its South-east Asia representative, Shawn Crispin, to the Philippines as part of an independent investigative team that interviewed witnesses, worked with the victims’ families to get an insight of the problems they were facing (pressure from the politically influential killers to back away the case, potential poverty resulting from the death of the only earning member of the family etc) as well as networked with local investigators. At the end of the mission, Crispin prepared detailed reports about the situation in Mindanao that helped raise awareness about massacre but also let CPJ plan future activities in the region.
Moreover, the Campaign has also helped further prosecution efforts in key murder cases. While there is little doubt that the battle against impunity is one that will require a long-term commitment and will definitely not be resolved more sooner than due to the legal complexities and political implications of the case as well as the due to the larger structural challenges posed dysfunctional law enforcement institutions embedded within a weak democracy, there is no denying that CPJ’s high-level advocacy work, carried out in association with local groups, in the Philippines is beginning to make an impact. This is especially evident with regard to the criminal prosecution of the journalists’ killers wherein constant trial monitoring and significant international attention has made it difficult for those with vested interests to manipulate to their advantage an already-faulty system.

The CPJ Impunity Summit 2010

Apart from the activities described above, the CPJ has also undertaken several other advocacy initiatives to further its battle against impunity. One of most important amongst these was the first Impunity Summit that was organized in April 2010 at New York at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism. The summit served as an effective meeting place for journalists and press freedom advocates from seven countries across the world to come together and work towards fighting impunity. Participants came from Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka and over a period of two days, worked towards building an action plan of sorts. At the end of the summit, participants came up with a list of goals and aims as well as concrete proposals that would contribute to the fight against impunity.

Members noted that while documenting investigations into cases of impunity there was greater need for more coordination and indeed greater collaboration between groups would
greatly benefit their cause. Towards that end, members recommended press freedom and rights groups should come together to create a common databank—“a mother server of sorts”—that would store sensitive information related to murder investigations. It may be noted that ensuring the security of such information has always been a hassle for press freedom advocates investigating sensitive murder cases and a databank would solve much of that problem. It could be hosted by CPJ (or another designated group) but would be accessible to all members and remain protected by a solid, reliable security system. Other recommendation included the creation of a user-friendly resource page where organizations worldwide that battle impunity would be listed along with their specialized profiles. It is worthy note that the Campaign’s page on the CPJ Website has a comparable resource section which is particularly helpful. Members also suggested that a similar public database of lawyers/jurists who provide pro-bono legal help to victims of impunity and their colleagues & relatives be created.

With respect to campaigning and advocacy activities, members emphasized the need for the greater symbolic politics. They recommended the creation of an anti-impunity symbol, the designation of an International Day of Impunity and the establishment of an international award that would honor individuals and groups that have fought bravely against the scourge of impunity. These “anti-Impunity heroes” did not just have to be press freedom advocates but could also be policemen, lawyers, journalists, judges, political leaders, etc who have fought against impunity. Members suggested that the awards ceremony be globally publicized through viral marketing campaigns using social media, celebrity support as well as mainstream media. This would ensure the engagement of the larger society that lies outside of the press freedom community with the movement against impunity. Other recommendations included building broader alliances with civil society and human rights organizations, develop and promote a
Guide on Campaigning and Advocacy both in terms of tactics related to impunity, and tools or opportunities for advocacy in international and intergovernmental mechanisms.

From the above, it is clear that there was a definite focus on building strong partnerships between groups working across the world as well on creating strong alliances with local press freedom groups. Members suggested that to build strong intra organizational that would further the fight against impunity, each group should appoint a consultant or assign a staff member produce a memo detailing the current and planned impunity related work of each group. This would allow all groups to be on the same page and well informed about the other’s activities. They also recommended the organization of similar impunity summits at least every three years that would allow for greater coordination, an opportunity to examine past achievements and failures and chalk out new plans for the future. This would allow for a more effective fight against impunity.

The Impunity Index

The Index which has been referred to heavily in previous chapters, it must be mentioned is also a Campaign initiative. It was first developed in 2008 and aims to calculate the number of unsolved journalist murder cases as a percentage of a country’s population. To compile the index, CPJ examined journalist murders worldwide from 2000 through 2009 and tagged any case where no conviction had been obtained as unsolved. For a country to feature on the name-and-shame list it must have had five or more unsolved cases. And the only way out of that list was to actually solve the murder cases. The list aims to name countries where journalists’ murderers go scot free and put them to shame by exposing their failures to the world at large. That in turn is expected to force leaders in those countries to initiate a reform process. As Simon explained
during the launch of the 2010 Impunity Index at the aforementioned Impunity Summit in April 2010, “Our goal in compiling this index is to spur leaders in these nations to action. Many of these cases are solvable — the perpetrators have been identified but authorities lack the political will to prosecute.”

Conclusions

CPJ’s three year old Global Campaign against Impunity may still be in its infancy and perhaps it is a tad bit too early to evaluate its long term effectiveness in preventing journalists’ murder in the Philippines or even against fighting impunity in particular. However, there is little doubt that CPJ’s strategy of undertaking a “focused and systematic advocacy” campaign, as Simon described the program in a January 2011 blog entry (Simon, 2011), has definitely paid off. For example, CPJ’s constant efforts to focus the problem of impunity in journalists’ murders and the larger threat it poses to a developing democracy like the Philippines has resulted in a paradigm shift in governmental response to the situation. Earlier, especially under the Arroyo administration, government officials would routinely challenge CPJ research and often refused to accept the Committee’s version of the story. As mentioned earlier, on one occasion the government had even gone out of its way to publicly refute CPJ’s description of the Philippines as one of the world’s most dangerous places for journalists. Government officials claimed that this was an “exaggeration.” Things changed, however, following the carnage in Maguindanao that led to a national crisis and unprecedented levels of international attention. As President Benigno Aquino took office and promised reforms, CPJ’s delegation to Manila found that some things had indeed changed for the better at Malacang Palace, the presidential seat. CPJ members were more welcome than in previous years and they reportedly found the government to be more
“open and highly receptive” to their concerns. More importantly perhaps members of the new administration did not once deny the gravity of the situation. Instead, they pledged their commitment towards pursuing justice. While these were only verbal promises and it remains to be seen to what extent they government will actually follow up on this, it is nonetheless a promising step in the right direction and will hopefully lead to more arrests and prosecutions.

Finally, there are small indicators pointing towards the successes of the Campaign. Primary among these was an additional $100,000 in grant money that the CPJ received John S. and James L. Knight Foundation in support of the Campaign (CPJ, 2011a). The additional funding will not only help boost advocacy efforts currently being undertaken in the Philippines and Russia but will also allow the Committee to intensify their efforts in other countries such as Pakistan, Iraqi Kurdistan and Mexico. In other words, the potential successes of the pilot projects introduced in the Philippines and Russia has encouraged the Committee to extend its Campaign to other countries. This is a very promising development.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY

This study provides a detailed insight on how transnational advocacy works on the ground to bring about real change in the international sphere. More specifically, it examines the effectiveness of such advocacy work through the prism of CPJ’s efforts in preventing journalists’ murders in the Philippines. The study takes into consideration how a relatively small, non-governmental organization such as the CPJ works to put its issues on the national and international agenda, influence discursive positions and impact state behavior. This final chapter highlights some of the more important observations made throughout the study and places them in the Spiral Model of change as described in the Literature Review section and then tests those observations for the five levels of effectiveness, as outlined by Keck and Sikkink (1998). This will be followed by answers to the research questions that were noted at the start of the study.

General Observations:

The role of local press freedom groups: The efforts of these groups were crucial to the functioning of CPJ especially with respect to raising awareness and putting issues on the national agenda. They worked closely not just with CPJ but also with the entire international press freedom network in general and together a collective effort made possible small but worthy achievements such as verbal commitments from government officials, as CPJ officials themselves acknowledged. Additionally, these partnerships allowed the local organizations to strengthen their own influence, in accordance with the boomerang pattern of advocacy described in the Literature Review section.
Evolving state response: Even though this study looked only at CPJ’s advocacy efforts between 2004 and 2009, a marked improvement in the response of the State and its agencies to the deteriorating situation of press freedom in the Philippines was noticed. For example: As noted earlier, continued international pressure and local activism compelled the Arroyo administration to pay more than just lip service to the problem of impunity in the country and take concrete actions. The Press Freedom Fund was created while the Philippine National Police bettered their criminal investigations which naturally led to more suspects being identified and in some cases, charges being filed against them.

False promises and empty words: While being able to extract verbal commitments and even force the initiation of several anti-impunity measures by the government is surely an achievement for the CPJ and its local partners, the fact that these often turned out to be little more than empty words and hollow promises diminished its significance. For example, even though the Press Freedom Fund was established, much of the promised funds remained caught in a bureaucratic trap. Similarly, local and national leaders would often pledge their support to the cause and promise to take action but in reality would do little to disturb the status quo.

The Philippine legal and law enforcement system: Particularly susceptible to manipulation by vested interests, the system is routinely abused by powerful defendants leading to mistrials and injustice. Consequently, few suspects are very charged and those who do fine their day court are let off easily. For example, in Esperat’s case charges were brought against the masterminds of crime, Montaner and Sabay – a rarity in itself – but they were eventually dropped due to insufficient evidence. Similarly, in Agustin’s case local police caught the gunmen who pointed to the local mayor as the mastermind but the latter was not taken into custody.
Only limited progress in many cases: Thanks to the increased effectiveness of the Philippine National Police, the Philippine government and other state agencies (a direct consequence of high level advocacy by CPJ and other groups) significant achievements were made in quite a few cases. Primary among them would be the Esperat case, although none of them have till date been taken to their logical conclusion.

Global Campaign Against Impunity: This special initiative allows for focused, high level advocacy and it has the potential to make a significant impact. The Campaign also ensures that the Committee is able to dedicate the kind of time, resource and attention that a case like the Philippines requires. It also allows for advocacy strategies to be decided on a case-by-case basis thus making it a whole lot more effective than a generic situational response.

Plotting the observations against the Spiral Model of change:

Phase 1: Repression and Activation of the Network

With specific regard to the press freedom scenario, the Philippines entered this stage when CPJ and other press freedom groups began large scale efforts to fight impunity in the country. Most of the efforts at this stage involved information politics and symbolic politics designed so as to publicize the scourge and draw global attention to the problem. As expected, the Philippine government at this stage responded by denying the accusations.

Phase 2: Mobilization and Governmental Denial

In this stage, the Philippine government (under President Arroyo) continued to deny the accusations of impunity and ignored the entire situation. Government officials discredited CPJ
research and when the Committee declared the country to be the most dangerous place for
working journalists they labeled it an exaggeration, as noted in earlier chapters.

Phase 3: Tactical Concessions

The Philippines moved into this third stage when the Arroyo government made certain
tactical concessions to tackle growing outrage over media killings as well as to appease key
international donors such as the United States that had begun to take note of the fast deteriorating
situation. These concessions came in the form of task forces, several of them, that were formed
especially to investigate the killing of one or all journalists. Examples would be Taskforce
Newsmen and Taskforce USIG. Other concessions would include measures such as the Press
Freedom Fund and other government legislation. However, while these measures were welcome
they were expectedly not always sincere efforts from the government. This could explain why a
majority of the funds for the Press Freedom fund never materialized. Nonetheless, there was a
gradual shift in government response to the situation as it inched towards at least acknowledging
the problem for what it was.

Phase 4: Prescriptive Status phase

Regime change after a decade of President Arroyo’s rule set the stage for the Philippines
to move on to the next stage wherein the new President Aquino made a strong commitment to
bring the killers of journalists to justice and included fighting impunity with an iron fist as
integral part of his governance policy. His commitment and policies have predictably trickled
down to the level of local administration as well. Consequently, police officials are now found to
respond better to media killings etc.
Phase 5: Rule Consistent Behaviour

The Philippines has yet to reach this stage but hopefully if President Aquino can guide the country effectively through the previous stage, it will have a good chance of making it to this final stage wherein media killings will no longer a social norm.

Keck and Sikkink’s Five Levels of Effectiveness:

Raising issues and placing them on the agenda: In association with local groups and other international press freedom groups and rights’ organizations, CPJ has strived to and succeeded in placing the particular issue of impunity and its effects on press freedom on the global agenda ensuring that it receives the kind of international attention that is crucial to pressurizing local governments to introduce systemic reforms and bring about policy change. They have also worked to make a national issue in the Philippines and President Aquino’s acknowledgement of the problem of impunity has served as validation of their efforts.

Influencing discursive positions: Verbal promises made by the previous Arroyo government as well the lip service rendered by local police and law enforcement officials are examples of how advocacy work carried out by CPJ and other members of the press freedom network have influenced the government’s discursive position on the issue, as explained in the earlier section.

Influencing institutional positions: The few anti-impunity measures undertaken by the Arroyo administration as well as the actions of the Aquino administration (which also include indirect efforts such as giving due credence to CPJ research) are evidence of how international advocacy has also helped influence government response to impunity in the Philippines.
Additionally, there is also evidence that state agencies such as the Philippine National Police and the judiciary are mending their ways to ensure the guilty are brought to justice.

Influencing policy change: The election of President Aquino held out some positive changes that could have signaled the change in state policy towards impunity. However, there is not enough evidence at this point to claim that there has been concrete policy change. The world is yet to see if President Aquino will follow the same trajectory as his predecessor or if he would actually come down heavily on journalists’ killers.

Influencing state behavior: Given that media killings continue unabated in the Philippines and impunity is still an unsolved issue, it can only be said the international advocacy has had little impact at this level.

Against this background, it would be worthwhile to address the research questions outlined earlier:

1. What tools of advocacy does the CPJ use to improve the safety of journalists and press freedom in the Philippines?

The most important tool of advocacy that the CPJ employs to fight impunity in the Philippines is that of investigative journalism. These are the supported by more traditional forms of advocacy. Additionally, through the Campaign CPJ also engages in high level advocacy in some cases.

2. How effective are CPJ’s tools in improving the safety of journalists and press freedom in the Philippines?
CPJ has achieved three of the five levels of effectiveness as defined by Keck and Sikkink. In other words, CPJ has been fairly effective in the Philippines.

3. What types of journalists were murdered in the Philippines? Were they local or foreign journalists, what beat did they cover, which medium did they practice (print, TV, radio, internet etc), were they male or female, and who murdered them?

All journalists murdered in the Philippines between 2004 and 2009 were local journalists. A vast majority of them were crime reporters and an overwhelming number of the killed journalists were radio journalists. According to the statistics, killed journalists were mostly male and were murdered in direct retaliation for their work.

4. How does the CPJ’s advocacy help explain the influence of transnational advocacy networks in international processes and politics?

CPJ’s work in the Philippines shows that international advocacy can and does have an impact. It is beyond the purview of this study to distinguish between at individual organizations doing the same work but as an effective member of the press freedom network, CPJ’s advocacy work definitely contributes towards fighting impunity in the Philippines.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Limits to trans-nationalism: The 1980s freeze campaign. In J. Smith, R. Pagnucco, & C. Chatfield (Eds.), Transnational social movements and global politics: Solidarity beyond the state (pp. 159-175). Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.


Sikkink (Eds.). Restructuring world politics: Transnational social movements, networks, and norms (pp. 3-23). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.


Appendix A: CPJ Staff

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Joel Simon

DEPUTY DIRECTOR
Robert Mahoney

DIRECTOR OF DEVELOPMENT AND OUTREACH
John Weis

SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER
Kavita Menon

DIRECTOR OF FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
Lade Kadejo

EDITORIAL DIRECTOR
Bill Sweeney

SENIOR EDITOR
Lauren Wolfe

DEPUTY EDITOR FOR INNOVATION
Kamal Singh Masuta

WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE AND JOURNALIST SECURITY COORDINATOR
Frank Smyth

PROGRAM ASSISTANT
Alice Forbes Spear

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT AND BOARD LIAISON
Gregory Fay
OFFICE MANAGER
Janet Mason

ADVOCACY PROGRAMS
AFRICA ADVOCACY COORDINATOR
Mohamed Hassim Keita
EAST AFRICA CONSULTANT
Tom Rhodes
SENIOR PROGRAM COORDINATOR
FOR THE AMERICAS
Carlos Lauría
AMERICAS RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
José Barbeito
MEXICO REPRESENTATIVE
Mike O’Connor
ASIA PROGRAM COORDINATOR
Bob Dietz
ASIA RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
Madeline Earp
SENIOR SOUTHEAST ASIA REPRESENTATIVE
Shawn W. Crispin
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA PROGRAM COORDINATOR
Nina Ognianova
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
Muzaffar Suleymanov
SENIOR EUROPEAN CONSULTANT

Jean-Paul Marthoz
EUROPEAN CONSULTANT

Borja Bergareche
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA PROGRAM COORDINATOR

Mohamed Abdel Dayem
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA RESEARCH ASSOCIATE

Rima Marrouch
INTERNET ADVOCACY COORDINATOR

Danny O’Brien
PROGRAM COORDINATOR FOR JOURNALIST ASSISTANCE AND THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST IMPUNITY

María Salazar-Ferro
JOURNALIST ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ASSOCIATE

Sheryl A. Mendez
CONSULTANT FOR JOURNALIST ASSISTANCE AND THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST IMPUNITY

Elisabeth Witchel
Appendix B: CPJ Board of Directors

Chairman

Paul E. Steiger

ProPublica

Honorary Co-Chairman

Walter Cronkite (1916-2009)

Terry Anderson

Directors

Andrew Alexander, The Washington Post

Franz Allina

Christiane Amanpour, ABC News

Dean Baquet, The New York Times

Kathleen Carroll, The Associated Press

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, The Washington Post

Sheila Coronel, Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism

Josh Friedman, Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism

Anne Garrels, National Public Radio

James C. Goodale, Debevoise & Plimpton

Cheryl Gould, NBC News

Charlayne Hunter-Gault

Gwen Ifill, PBS

Jane Kramer, The New Yorker

David Laventhal
Lara Logan, CBS News
Rebecca MacKinnon
David Marash
Kati Marton
Michael Massing
Geraldine Fabrikant Metz, The New York Times
Victor Navasky, The Nation
Andres Oppenheimer, The Miami Herald
Burl Osborne, Freedom Communications
Clarence Page, Chicago Tribune
Norman Pearlstine, Bloomberg LP
Ahmed Rashid
Dan Rather, HDNet
Gene Roberts, University of Maryland, Philip Merrill College of Journalism
María Teresa Ronderos, Semana.com
Sandra Mims Rowe
Diane Sawyer, ABC News
David Schlesinger, Reuters
Paul C. Tash, St. Petersburg Times
Mark Whitaker, NBC News
Brian Williams, NBC News
Matthew Winkler, Bloomberg News

ADVISORY BOARD
Tom Brokaw, NBC News

Steven L. Isenberg, PEN American Center

Anthony Lewis

Charles Overby, The Freedom Forum

Erwin Potts

John Seigenthaler, The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center