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The Unseen Track of *Erie Railroad*: Why History and Jurisprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Form of *Erie* Analysis

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THE UNSEEN TRACK OF ERIE RAILROAD: WHY HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE SUGGEST A MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD FORM OF ERIE ANALYSIS

Donald L. Doernberg

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I. INTRODUCTION

It probably is fair to say that *Erie Railroad v. Tompkins*¹ and the doctrine that bears its name² have caused more *angst* among first-year law students than any other single concept. Students tend to recall that Justice Brandeis said that there is no federal common law, but he did not.³ They tend to recall that state, not federal, substantive law applies in diversity cases. That is often, but not always, true,⁴ not least because choice of law proceeds on an issue-by-issue

¹ 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

² The term “*Erie doctrine*” today is commonly understood to embrace all situations in which the court must choose between federal or state law, an election known as “vertical” choice of law to distinguish it from choosing among states’ laws, which is known as “horizontal” choice of law. This is so even though *Hanna v. Plumer* said that the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000), rather than *Erie* itself, governs questions about the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text. See generally John Hart Ely, *The Irrepressible Myth of Erie*, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974). This Article will use “*Erie doctrine*” consistently with the commonly understood convention.

³ It is important to distinguish between vertical and horizontal choice of law. The former refers to the choice of whether federal or state law governs a particular question. In many circumstances, the Supremacy Clause controls that question. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Horizontal choice of law involves choosing among the laws of the states as co-equal sovereigns. The Constitution has relatively little to say about how the courts must make such horizontal choices. See generally WILLIAM M. RICHLAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 94-98, at 299-314 (3d ed. 2002).

⁴ See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (dominant federal interest (“DFI”) in foreign relations compels application of federal act-of-state doctrine in a contract dispute brought to the federal court under diversity jurisdiction); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (unique federal interest in having a federal military contractor’s immunity). For further discussion, see infra notes 210-18 and accompanying text. See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (When jurisdiction rested on the United States being the plaintiff, see Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, par. 1, 36 Stat. 1091, 1091 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1345). DFI in the obligations created by federal commercial paper justified application of a federal common law rule.). For further discussion, see infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
basis, not with respect to an entire case.\textsuperscript{5} They tend to believe that \textit{Erie} reflected a clear demarcation between substantive and procedural law, but nothing could be further from the truth.\textsuperscript{6} They tend to believe at least that when a federal court \textit{does} apply state law, it applies the substantive law of the state in which it sits. Alas, that too is misleading and oversimplified.\textsuperscript{7}

Given the number of cases the Supreme Court has taken since announcing the doctrine in 1938,\textsuperscript{8} it causes a fair amount of trouble in the lower federal

\textsuperscript{5} This approach is known as \textit{dépeçage}: “[French ‘dismemberment’] A court’s application of different state laws to different issues in a legal dispute; choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis.” \textsc{Black’s Law Dictionary} 469-70 (8th ed. 2004). Dean Symeonides characterizes issue-by-issue consideration as “one of the conflicts revolution’s main accomplishments.” Symeon C. Symeonides, \textit{American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century}, 37 \textsc{Williamette L. Rev.} 1, 82 (2001). Accord Alfred Hill, \textit{For a Third Conflicts Restatement—But Stop Trying to Reinvent the Wheel}, 75 \textsc{Ind. L.J.} 535, 538 (2000).

\textsuperscript{6} \textit{See}, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. \textit{v.} York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (statutes of limitation are always substantive for \textit{Erie} purposes because they are outcome determinative). Although the Court has abandoned exclusive reliance on the outcome-determinative test in vertical choice-of-laws situations, \textit{see}, e.g., Byrd \textit{v.} Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), the holding of \textit{Guaranty Trust} remains untouched.


\textit{Erie} itself is a fine example. The accident underlying the case occurred in Pennsylvania. Tompkins sued in the Southern District of New York. The critical issue was whether Tompkins, walking along the \textit{Erie}’s right-of-way, was a licensee or a trespasser, the owner owing the latter only a minimal duty of care. When the Supreme Court considered the issue, it looked at the difference between federal law and Pennsylvania law on the point, notwithstanding that the case began in a New York federal court. That is because New York then followed the \textit{lex-loci-delictus} approach to choice of law in tort cases.


Two commentators remarked that the doctrine had commanded the attention of an entire generation of academic lawyers. Peter Westen \& Jeffrey S. Lehman, \textit{Is There Life for Erie after the Death of Diversity?}, 78 \textsc{Mich. L. Rev.} 311, 312 (1980). That statement is now hopelessly dated;
courts as well. Professor Thomas Rowe asks, “Does anyone else think the Supreme Court is doing a halfway decent job in its Erie-Hanna jurisprudence?”

Well, I do. I might even suggest that the Court has done an excellent job. It simply has done a notably poor job of explaining its decisions. The premise of this Article is that a form of myopia has made the doctrine blurrier than it needs to be. Concentrating first on the state of American law in the colonial and early constitutional period and second on shifts in jurisprudential thinking in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century causes the doctrine to come into much sharper focus. Analysis of cases presenting Erie questions becomes more straightforward and less mysterious.

This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses federal law as a new category of law after ratification of the Constitution and what that connotes for the time before federal law existed. Part II examines the shift from the natural law perspective, which had dominated jurisprudence into the late nineteenth century, to legal positivism. It was that change more than anything else that doomed the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, which controlled vertical choice-of-law questions in the federal courts for ninety-six years until the Erie Court declared it unconstitutional. Part III canvasses the development of the Erie doctrine in the terms the Supreme Court has used, from Erie to Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., the Court’s most recent full-blown Erie effort. Part IV proposes a different way of doing Erie analysis, one that is consistent with the Court’s results in Erie cases but more coherent and easier to understand. Part IV also examines the approach to the Erie doctrine that some well known scholars have adopted. It argues that the Erie doctrine concerns a choice-of-law problem that is subject to successful analysis using a governmental-interest ap-


9 Rowe, supra note 8, at 963.
13 The Court touched upon a vertical choice-of-law problem in Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., but focused more on the process for choosing the content of federal common law than on the antecedent decision that federal common law should govern. 531 U.S. 497 (2001). The Court relied on earlier cases for the proposition that the Constitution, through its provisions establishing federal judicial power, U.S. Const. art. III, the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, and the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2, made the issue of the preclusive effect of federal judgments a matter of federal law. See, e.g., Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1883). There was no significant discussion of the basic choice-of-law decision.
proach of the type now common in conflict of laws. To be sure, the balancing of interests differs in *Erie* situations because the Supremacy Clause is a constitutional thumb on the scales, but one that ends up making the inquiry easier, not harder.

II. THE LAW EXTANT IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE 1787 AND IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARD

In the beginning, there was the law that the states used. That was all there could have been; there was no central government on the American continent in the colonial period. The Articles of Confederation, the first attempt at creating a central government, failed because of state law’s dominance and the states’ unwillingness to permit any significant concentration of power in a central government. They collapsed in six years. As a practical matter, therefore, when the Constitution came into effect in 1788, state law governed nearly all areas of society.

The greatest single struggle of the Constitutional Convention revolved around the distribution of power between the states and the federal government. To be sure, other battles raged, notably between large and small states over how their disparate sizes should translate into influence within the federal government and between northern and southern states over the institution of

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14 See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY, & LARRY KRAMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 132 (6th ed. 2001). “On the one hand, few courts purport . . . to apply ‘interest analysis’ in the form Currie advocated . . . On the other hand, many courts that claim to follow the Second Restatement’s ‘most significant relationship’ test . . . apply it in a way . . . indistinguishable from straightforward interest analysis.” Id.

15 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.


18 The result the Framers reached, with the states having equal representation in the Senate and proportional representation in the House of Representatives, is known as the Great Compromise. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 950 n.15 (1983) (referring to the Great Compromise as establishing that the Senate represented the states and the House represented the people); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553, 574 (1964) (The Great Compromise “averted a deadlock in the Con-

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slavery. The single concern that united the states, however, was that the centralized government would invade their prerogatives, impose its view and eventually threaten their existence.

That was the backdrop when the federal government began. Justices over the centuries have been fond of saying that the federal government is one of limited powers. That is well enough, but it oversimplifies the relationship between federal and state power. The Constitution’s enumeration of federal power (primarily in Article I, § 8) is an exclusive list of areas in which the federal government may act, but that is a one-dimensional view. The missing dimension is that the list also describes areas in which federal law can displace state law. When the nation began, state law “occupied the field.” Its dominance, however, was more akin to power filling a vacuum than to a doctrine of enforced exclusivity.

institutional Convention which [sic] had threatened to abort the birth of our Nation.”); FARRAND, supra note 16, at 91-112.

19 See FARRAND, supra note 16, at 110, 149-52. Farrand noted that “[i]n 1787, slavery was not the important question[,] it might be said that it was not the moral question that it later became. The proceedings of the federal convention did not become known until the slavery question had grown into the paramount issue of the day.” Id. at 110. Perhaps so, but it was a thorny enough issue that the delegates felt it necessary to use a constitutional provision to defer one of the important disputes about it. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (prohibiting Congress from banning the slave trade until at least 1808, but allowing federal import taxes on slaves).

20 Some delegates worried that establishing a central government variously described as national, supreme or federal, was inimical to states’ survival. “Mr. Charles Pinkney wished to know of Mr. Randolph whether he meant to abolish the State Governs altogether.” I MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 33-34 (1966). One resolution, adopted early in the Convention, provided: “That a national Governt. ought to be established, consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive & Judiciary.” Id. at 35. James Madison’s notes reflect Pinkney’s concern. “[T]he term supreme required explanation—It was asked whether it was intended to annihilate state governments?” Id. at 39. That fear has not entirely faded from view. See, e.g., Pete DuPont, Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: Will States Exist?, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137 (1993).

21 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[O]ur cases are quite clear that there are real limits to federal power.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (“[N]o one disputes the proposition that [t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers.”) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529-30 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (referring to the plan that the Federal Government was to be a government of express and limited powers . . . “); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers reserved. It must necessarily be so, because the United States have no claim to any authority but such as the States have surrendered to them . . . .”) (emphasis added).

22 This occurs because of the interaction of the power-granting clauses of the Constitution and the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

23 The Court uses this phrase to describe federal preemption even of state law that is not incompatible with existing congressional regulation. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
State law, however, was not the only game in town. Natural law had existed since at least ancient Greece. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, John Locke and many others referred to a transcendent body of principles to which people should aspire or that governed human relations.24 In England, the dominant theory of the common law was that judges did not make it; they discovered it.25 Pre-Erie America knew three types of law: state law, federal law and natural law, often referred to as “general” law. It took the rise of legal positivism, typified by one of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s most famous admonitions, to remake the American view of law as a whole and of the law of federal-state relations in particular.

III. COMMON LAW, NATURAL LAW, AND THE RISE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM

“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified . . . .”26 Legal positivism is “[t]he theory that legal rules are valid only because they are enacted by an existing political authority or accepted as binding in a given society, not because they are grounded in morality or in natural law.”27 The rise of legal positivism doomed natural law; the two could not co-exist.28 The Supreme Court decided Swift v. Tyson29 under the banner of general law, and Swift provided the doctrinal basis for the vertical choice-of-law approach that governed for nearly a century.

Swift was the Court’s first interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act (“RDA”).30 “The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decisions in trials at common law, in the courts of the United

25 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 70 (1765). See also Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 38 (2001).
27 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 915 (8th ed. 2004).
28 One might, of course, take an ecclesiastical view, considering natural law to be the law’s interpretation of God’s command, but neither the United States nor England ever explicitly embraced theocracy. In the United States, such an approach would present obvious First Amendment problems. Perhaps for that reason, United States courts have always referred to general law.
States, in cases where they apply." For a single-sentence, apparently straightforward provision, the Act has provided a remarkable amount of grist for the federal judicial mill. The Act’s wording reflects the presumed primacy of state law by making state law the default rule. This may signal the continuing tension between state and federal power that was so manifest at the Constitutional Convention and the uneasy settlement that the Framers reached: state law would continue to govern unless federal law displaced it.

It is difficult to know what to make of the last clause. “[I]n cases where they apply” has provided all of the action in vertical choice-of-law. Perhaps Congress simply meant that federal courts should not apply state law when the state courts themselves would not apply it. That view, however, makes the clause almost meaningless, violating a basic canon of statutory construction. The only other interpretation that readily suggests itself is tautological, and tautologies are singularly unhelpful. In any event, the federal courts have assumed that Congress intended it as a direction to the federal courts to apply a particular body of law in diversity cases. The task is to determine the sources from among which the federal courts might make that choice-of-law decision.

31 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92.

32 See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 350 U.S. 270, 298 (1956) ("As early as in Bacon’s Abridgement, sect. 2, it was said that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’"). See also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 812 (1983) (referring to “the canon that every word of a statute must be given significance; nothing in the statute can be treated as surplusage").

33 Professor Wilfred Ritz argued that RDA had a wholly different purpose and was not intended to apply to diversity cases at all.

[S]ufficient evidence . . . [exists] to demonstrate that Section 34 could not possibly have been intended by Oliver Ellsworth and the other members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the summer of 1789 to have performed the functions that Professors Warren and Goebel, Justices Story and Brandeis, and the Supreme Court majority in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins have attributed to it. It would have literally been unthinkable for the members of the First Congress to have directed national courts sitting in diversity cases to apply the law of the states in which they sat. The necessary conceptual framework was only in the early stages of formation.

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Section 34 is a direction to the national courts to apply American law, as distinguished from English law. American law is to be found in the “laws of the several states” viewed as a group of eleven states in 1789, and not viewed separately and individually. It is not a direction to apply the law of a particular state, for if it had been so intended, the section would have referred to the “laws of the respective states.”

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The section most probably was intended as a temporary measure to provide an applicable American law for national criminal prosecutions, should national criminal prosecutions be brought in the national courts, pending the time that Congress would provide by statute for the definition of national crimes.
Swift involved a dispute over a bill of exchange that the defendant Tyson had dishonored when Swift presented it for payment. Swift argued that he was, in today’s parlance, a holder in due course. Tyson repudiated the note, claiming that Swift’s predecessors in interest obtained it fraudulently. The dispute had contacts with New York and Maine. Justice Story considered New York cases on whether Tyson could defend Swift’s action on the same ground that would have been available had Swift’s predecessors in interest sued. He found New York’s position unclear, but declared it irrelevant. In the process, he identified the various sources of law that might bear on resolution of the case.

[It remains to be considered, whether it [the New York doctrine] is obligatory upon this court, if it differs from the principles established in the general commercial law. It is observable, that the courts of New York do not found their decisions upon this point, upon any local statute, or positive, fixed or ancient local usage; but they deduce the doctrine from the general principles of commercial law. In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended, that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws. They are often re-examined, reversed and qualified by the courts themselves. The laws of a state are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long-established local customs having the force of laws. And we have not now the slightest difficulty in holding, that this section [the Rules of Decision Act], upon its true intentment and construction, is strictly limited to local statutes and local usages of the character before stated, and does not ex-

An alternative possibility, although less likely, is that the section was intended as a direction to the national courts to apply American law in all judicial proceedings at common law, both civil and criminal. This application would have included the diversity jurisdiction.

The one thing that can be said with assurance is that Section 34 was not intended to apply exclusively to diversity proceedings; that it was not intended to direct the application of the law of particular states in diversity proceedings; and that it was not intended to apply to suits in equity. In short, on its historical basis, Erie is dead wrong.

Wilfred Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 79, 148 (1990). Whether Professor Ritz or other scholars who have addressed the vertical choice-of-law problem are historically correct about Congress’s intent, it is clear that today RDA is viewed as a choice-of-law statute for diversity cases and when state law otherwise governs of its own force, as when supplemental jurisdiction (see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)) brings state law claims before a federal court in a federal-question case.

34 A holder in due course is “[a] person who in good faith has given value for a negotiable instrument that is complete and regular on its face, is not overdue, and, to the possessor’s knowledge, has not been dishonored.” Black’s Law Dictionary 749 (8th ed. 2004).
tend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.35

Thus, law might come from statutes (and, by inference, constitutions) of the states or of the federal government. The pronouncements of courts were not "laws." In addition, there were "general principles and doctrines" for courts to consult. "[S]o-called ‘general’ matters, in the absence of a valid state statute, were to be determined by the federal courts according to what they conceived to be widely held jurisprudential doctrines."36 Swift thus recognized three sources of law—state, federal and natural—an accurate reflection of American jurisprudence in 1842.37

In the late nineteenth century, natural law came under attack.38 Perhaps the best known early positivist formulation is John Austin’s: law as the command of the sovereign.39 By the mid-twentieth century it was possible for Justice Frankfurter to say a few words over the corpse (no longer the corpus) of

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Law was conceived as a "brooding omnipresence" of Reason, of which decisions were merely evidence and not themselves the controlling formulations. Accordingly, federal courts deemed themselves free to ascertain what Reason, and therefore Law, required wholly independent of authoritatively declared State law, even in cases where a legal right as the basis for relief was created by State authority and could not be created by federal authority and the case got into a federal court merely because it was "between Citizens of different States" under Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution of the United States.


Since the Civil War, jurisprudential positivism had been spreading among American lawyers, judges, scholars, and treatise writers. Stemming in part from the writings of the English philosophers John Austin and Jeremy Bentham, positivism rejected the idea that "law" was based on rational or moral principles that transcended human experience. Positivists defined law as the de facto rules and customs that existed in a society and that were generally followed by its members. More "scientifically," they defined it as the "command" of the sovereign that was backed by the force of the state. "Law" was thus a social and empirical fact, not a philosophical concept.

39 See John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 3-25 (R. Campbell ed. 1879).
natural law in *Guaranty Trust Co. v. York*. He noted that *Erie*’s significance lay not merely in overruling *Swift*, but in the fact that “[i]t overruled a particular way of looking at law which [sic] dominated the judicial process long after its inadequacies had been laid bare.” Thus, the federal courts’ entitlement to decide matters of “general” law had vanished.

IV. THE TORTUOUS DEVELOPMENT OF THE *ERIE* DOCTRINE

A. *The Announcement*

Even on its own terms, unclouded by subsequent developments, the Court’s opinion in *Erie Railroad v. Tompkins* is not a model of analytical clarity, though it signified an enormous shift in the law applicable in the federal courts. Tompkins was walking on a well-worn footpath beside *Erie*’s tracks in Pennsylvania when a passing train with something projecting from its side struck and injured him. He brought a diversity action in the Southern District of New York, and recovered a $30,000 jury verdict. Erie had argued that Pennsylvania law should apply to the action. Under that law, Tompkins was a trespasser, and Erie was “not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it be wanton or willful.” Citing *Swift v. Tyson*, Tompkins argued successfully that, there being no Pennsylvania statute on point, federal general law governed. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Justice Brandeis opened the opinion with a surprise: “The question for decision is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of *Swift v. Tyson* shall now be disapproved.” That was striking; the petition for certiorari did not present that question, and neither of the parties briefed it. Erie, which invoked Supreme Court review, wanted Pennsylvania rather than federal law to apply, but rather than urging the Court to overrule *Swift*, it characterized the Pennsylvania rule as

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41 Id. at 101.
42 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
43 Id. at 69.
44 Id. at 70.
45 Id.
46 Id.
48 *Erie*, 304 U.S. at 69 (citation omitted).
a local property rule applicable under *Swift*’s regime. Tompkins was perfectly happy with the federal rule and thus had no incentive to disturb *Swift*.

The Court listed several reasons to overrule *Swift*. Justice Brandeis first cited a law review article by Charles Warren that closely examined the legislative history of the RDA:

[T]he construction given to it by the Court was erroneous; and that the purpose of the section was merely to make certain that, in all matters except those in which some federal law is controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as their rules of decision the law of the state, unwritten as well as written.

However, the Court pointed out that it would not ordinarily alter such a long-standing interpretation of a statute on the basis of secondary authority. Nonetheless, noting the intensified criticism *Swift* received following *Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co.*, the Court pushed ahead.

The second point that the Court relied upon stemmed directly from its experience under *Swift*. Justice Brandeis was candid that things had not worked out as the *Swift* Court hoped. “Persistence of state courts in their own opinions

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50 The Court’s opinion obscured Erie’s argument: “Erie had contended that application of the Pennsylvania rule was required, among other things, by § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789. . . .” *Erie*, 304 U.S. at 71. This might suggest that *Erie* had indeed urged overruling *Swift*, but it had not. Erie’s argument was that the status of one crossing another’s land was a matter of property law, not torts. Thus, it would have been part of the “local law” that *Swift* had left to the states. *See infra* notes 60-61 and accompanying text. Professor Purcell suggests that although the Railroad would have benefited in *Erie* from overruling *Swift*, it probably did not adopt that strategy because *Swift* continued to serve it well in many other cases. *See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Louis Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution* 97-101 (2003).


52 *Erie*, 304 U.S. at 72-73 (footnote omitted).

53 *Id.* at 77.

54 276 U.S. 518 (1928). It is not clear whether one should refer to this case as “celebrated” or “infamous,” but it is at least well known. The Brown & Yellow Taxicab Company wanted exclusive rights to pick up passengers at the Louisville & Nashville Railroad’s Bowling Green station in Kentucky. Brown & Yellow negotiated an exclusivity contract with the railroad. Black & White, a local competitor, refused to cease its activities at the station and sometimes occupied Brown & Yellow’s parking spaces. Both companies were Kentucky corporations. Kentucky law prohibited exclusivity contracts, but the federal courts recognized them. Brown & Yellow therefore reincorporated in Kentucky, reincorporated in Tennessee, and sued Black & White in Kentucky federal court, seeking injunctive relief. (A corporation’s principal place of business, now also a determinant of state citizenship for diversity cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2000), was not included under the diversity statute as it stood when *Black & White* arose.) Brown & Yellow prevailed. The Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Holmes filed a vigorous dissent. *See infra* note 68 and accompanying text.
on questions of common law prevented uniformity ..."55 For many students, this statement is puzzling. They wonder how the states could have persisted in their own opinions after the Supreme Court had spoken. After all, federal common law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on the states, is it not?56

Here the difference between the natural-law and the legal-positivist approaches becomes critical. Justice Brandeis continued: "the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and that of local law developed a new well of uncertainties."57 This observation recalled the three sources of law that the federal courts knew until Erie.58 First, there was federal law, which stemmed from the Constitution, from federal statutes and from judicial decisions of questions of law that fell within one of the Constitution’s grants of federal power.59 Second, there was state (or, as Justice Brandeis referred to it, "local") law. Under Swift, that included state constitutions, state statutes, and state decisional law that related to local matters.60 General rules of contract law applicable in the states were not considered state law within the meaning of RDA unless declared by state statute; they were general common law not associated with any sovereign. That body of "general

55 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
56 Indeed it is, provided that it is federal common law and not federal general common law. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
57 Id.
58 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
59 See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) ("whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive") (citations omitted); Kenna v. Claumet, H. & S.E.R. Co., 120 N.E. 259 (Ill. 1918) (recognizing that the Supreme Court's implying a private right of action under the Federal Safety Appliance Act, Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 53, repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 745, in Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), bound the state courts not to permit any relief under state law inconsistent with Rigsby); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (overturning a damage award against the Postmaster General by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on the ground that the federal common law principle of absolute immunity for federal officers prohibited the award).
60 The Court defined local matters as:

rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intra-territorial in their nature and character. It never has been supposed by us, that the section did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments, and especially to questions of general commercial law, where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the case.

commercial law was common (so to speak) to the states and the federal government. Neither could authoritatively expound it to the other. That is why the state courts were able to "persist" in their own opinions of general law without running afoul of the Supremacy Clause.

Then Justice Brandeis made a remarkable pronouncement: "If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do so." As he put it: "We merely declare that in applying the doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several states." This declaration would be extraordinary enough standing alone—the Court announcing that it (and, under its guidance, the lower federal courts) had been adjudicating cases in an unconstitutional manner for ninety-six years. The Court was not through, however, and expounded the core of the *Erie* Doctrine.

Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.

That short passage effected a notable change in the law. First, Justice Brandeis effectively banished general law to the past, reconceptualizing the sources of law to only two: state and federal law. In this, he echoed Justice

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61 The Court explicitly applied this approach to torts in *Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh* over the protest of Justice Field, who urged that the federal courts could not displace state law—including state decisional law—with respect to areas of law that the Constitution does not commit to the federal government. 149 U.S. 368 (1893). He rejected the idea of general law in the federal courts, arguing that the *Swift* doctrine improperly undermined the states' independence. *See* id. at 401.

62 *See* U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.


64 *Id.* at 80 (emphasis added).

65 *Id.* at 78.

66 "It is impossible to overstate the importance of the *Erie* decision." WRIGHT & KANE, *supra* note 49, at 378 (footnote omitted).

67 Justice Brandeis emphasized the sentence so often imperfectly recalled, declaring the nonexistence of federal general common law. *See* supra note 3. Thus, the entire body of general law
Holmes, who had argued forcefully against the idea of general law independent of a sovereign, first expressing his reservations in *Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,* and then in *Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.*

created under *Swift v. Tyson* became, in an instant, dead authority, although that is not to say that the Court never looked to that body of law again.

[T]he *Erie* decision did not require that federal courts stop citing cases decided before 1938 and reinvent federal common law from scratch. The Supreme Court has continued to rely on pre-1938 cases about federal officers' immunity from suit and interstate boundary disputes. Former doctrines of "general common law" have been reconceptualized as doctrines of federal common law that continue to govern in areas of dominant federal concern.


Only five years after *Erie,* the Court decided that federal law should govern a dispute with respect to the rights and obligations of the United States on its own commercial paper. The Court found the appropriate rule of decision in a case that antedated *Erie.* See United States v. Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. 363, 367-68 (1943):

And while the federal law merchant developed for about a century under the regime of *Swift v. Tyson* . . . represented general commercial law rather than a choice of a federal rule designed to protect a federal right, it nevertheless stands as a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal rules applicable to these federal questions.

*United States v. National Exchange Bank . . .* [1909] falls in that category. The Court held that the United States could recover as drawee from one who presented for payment a pension check on which the name of the payee had been forged, in spite of a protracted delay on the part of the United States in giving notice of the forgery. The Court followed *Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Merchants Bank . . .* [1888], which held that the right of the drawee against one who presented a check with a forged endorsement of the payee's name accrued at the date of payment and was not dependent on notice or demand.

See infra notes 219-228 and accompanying text.

68 244 U.S. 205, 218-219 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.

69 276 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting):

If there were such a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute, the Courts of the United States might be right in using their independent judgment as to what it was. But there is no such body of law. The fallacy and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there is this outside thing to be found. Law is a word used with different meanings, but law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere else.

It would be difficult to find a more forthright statement of the legal positivist thesis in any federal opinion.
Second, for diversity purposes state decisional law became indistinguishable in authoritiveness from state statutory or constitutional law, which RDA had always commanded the federal courts to use. The federal courts would later face the problems of when state decisional law was clear enough, whether any court below the state’s highest court declared state law binding in diversity cases, and whether the federal courts may predict that a state’s highest court will abandon an old precedent. Those cases, however, involved mere details; the Court had firmly set the underlying principle.

Third, the Court reflected the Constitution’s limitations on federal legislative authority and tied its own power to those limitations. This part of *Erie* taught that if Congress had no legislative authority to create law governing the case, then the Court had none. Logic demanded this result. The Constitution is not simply an empowering document; it is also a significantly limiting one. It would have made little sense for the Framers to cabin federal legislative power only to permit the federal courts to announce and apply rules that would have been regarded as usurpations of state authority if Congress had enacted them.

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70 See, e.g., King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153 (1948) (state decisions having no precedential value in the state not authoritative for *Erie* purposes); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940) (recognizing intermediate state appellate courts as authoritative for *Erie* purposes in the absence of an opinion from the highest state court).

71 See, e.g., Mason v. Am. Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957) (predicting that Mississippi would no longer follow a products liability rule announced in a 1928 case but would instead conform state law to the modern trend).


We are reminded by the *Erie* opinion that neither Congress nor the federal courts can, under the guise of formulating rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules which are not supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other section of the Constitution; in such areas state law must govern because there can be no other law.

See infra notes 113-28 and accompanying text. See also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956) ("*Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins* indicated that Congress does not have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to controversies in diversity of citizenship cases.").

73 There is irony in the Court’s approach. Although the Court held that the *Swift* approach violated the Constitution, Justice Brandeis never identified how. At one point he observed that *Swift’s* “doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law,” *Erie*, 304 U.S. at 75, suggesting an equal protection component. That seems an unlikely basis for the decision, however. The Equal Protection Clause is in the Fourteenth Amendment, regulating state but not federal conduct. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court eventually recognized an equal protection component to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but not until its decision in *Bolling v. Sharpe*, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a companion case to *Brown v. Bd. of Educ.*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that involved segregated schools in the District of Columbia. The opinion also noted that “in applying the doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are
This part of the opinion also contained the single word destined to cause the most trouble in later years. Justice Brandeis announced that Congress lacked the power to create certain substantive rules of law. That is the only appearance of that word or of the substantive/procedural distinction in the entire opinion. Later courts would have to deal with the thorny question of what was substantive and what was procedural.

reserved by the Constitution to the several states.” *Erie*, 304 U.S. at 80. Perhaps that was a reference to the Tenth Amendment, but there is no citation. In fact, there is no citation to any constitutional provision anywhere in the opinion.

Commentators have observed how remarkable this is. The Court could have reached the same outcome simply by disapproving Swift’s interpretation of RDA, and Justice Reed’s concurrence urged precisely that. *See Erie*, 304 U.S. at 91 (Reed, J., concurring). Instead, the Court reached out to decide a constitutional question that neither party had presented, and it did so without specifying the provision of the Constitution upon which it relied. And the author? The selfsame Justice Brandeis who, in a famous concurrence only two years earlier, had urged the Court to avoid unnecessarily deciding constitutional questions. *See Ashwander v. TVA*, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. *v. Comm‘rs of Emigration*, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) (“The Court will not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.’ ”)). Yet, he managed somehow to reconcile the approach he urged in *Ashwander* with the inscrutable constitutional opinion he wrote in *Erie*. *See Wright & Kane*, supra note 49, § 56, at 382-83.

Professor Ely, on the other hand, viewed this apparent omission as a strength. He noted that the defect in *Swift* existed “because nothing in the Constitution provided the central government with a general lawmaking authority of the sort the Court had been exercising . . .” *Ely*, supra note 2, at 703. His point was that there was no federal power simpliciter, rather than that the federal law the Court had created encroached on some state power enclave. The Constitution enumerated no such power, so the question of encroachment should never have arisen. It was the Constitution’s silence, not any particular declaration, that doomed *Swift*.

74 *See supra* note 65 accompanying text.

75 *See infra* notes 76-101 and accompanying text. Justice Reed commented on the difficulty: “The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy . . .” *Erie*, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring in part). Under the method of analysis that this Article proposes, however, the characterization is unnecessary for purposes of comparing state and federal rules in order to make the choice-of-law decision. *See infra* Part IV. I hasten to add that when evaluating the validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000), one must consider whether the Rule “abridge[s], enlarge[s] or modify[es] any substantive right.” If it does not, then REA requires that the Federal Rule supersede any conflicting law or rule. REA thus addresses itself to two matters in this respect, the first dealing with Federal Rule validity and the second concerning how the federal courts must make the vertical choice-of-law decision. This is wholly consistent with the approach that I suggest.

*Erie* eliminated what had been a conflicts anomaly in *Swift’s* approach to the vertical choice-of-law problem. Under the conflicts approaches of the time, a court typically applied its own procedural rules but the substantive rules of the jurisdiction in which the claim arose. *See, e.g., Eugene F. Scolés, Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers & Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws* § 3.8, at 128 (4th ed. 2004) (“The distinction between ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ has medieval origins: a court will apply foreign law only to the extent that it deals with the substance of the case, i.e., affects the outcome of the litigation, but will rely on forum law to deal with the ‘procedural’ aspects . . .”) (footnotes omitted); *Robert A. Leflar, American Conflicts Law* 126-27 (3d ed. 1977).
B. The Application


The Court began to wrestle with that issue in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., a personal injury case. Plaintiff suffered injuries in Indiana but sued in Illinois federal court. The issue was whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s authorization of pre-trial physical and mental examinations was substantive or procedural. Illinois did not permit such examinations; Indiana did. The district court had found Sibbach in contempt for refusing an order to submit to a physical examination by a court-appointed physician. She argued that Rules 35 and 37 (which then, as now, prescribed the actions a court might take to deal with discovery problems) exceeded the mandate of the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”), which specified that rules promulgated under its ægis “neither abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant.” The Sibbach Court had to decide whether “the right to be exempt from such an order is one of substantive law…” If it was substantive, Erie demanded that the Illinois federal court apply the Indiana rule (because that was where the cause of action arose). Sibbach therefore tried to walk a fine line, conceding that Rule 35 dealt with procedure but arguing that it nonetheless violated the REA.

The Court rejected Sibbach’s suggestion that Congress intended not merely to forbid rules that would change the elements of a claim or the underlying legal rights giving rise thereto (such as the right to be free from harm caused by another’s negligence), but also to protect any other “important and substantial rights theretofore recognized.” The majority recoiled, noting that the plaintiff’s approach would entail endless litigation in future cases. Justice Owen Roberts expressed an apparently simple test that turned out to be remarkably unhelpful. “The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law

In diversity cases, the claims arose in the individual states, not in the United States, as it were. Normal conflicts approach would have called for the federal courts to apply the law of the states on substantive matters and federal law on procedural matters. Swift eschewed that approach in favor of what Justice Brandeis would later call federal general common law. Erie adopted the dominant approach to conflicts questions.

76 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
79 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10.
80 Id. at 13.
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.\textsuperscript{81}

2. \textit{Guaranty Trust Co. v. York}:\textsuperscript{82} What Is Substantive?

In only four years, the Court returned to the problem. \textit{Guaranty Trust Co. v. York} concerned whether a state statute of limitations was substantive or procedural for \textit{Erie} purposes. The question that \textit{Guaranty Trust} considered was "whether, when no recovery could be had in a State court because the action is barred by the statute of limitations, a federal court in equity can take cognizance of the suit because there is diversity of citizenship between the parties."\textsuperscript{83} The answer was no.

Two aspects of \textit{Guaranty Trust} are particularly significant. First, Justice Frankfurter endeavored to clarify what was substantive and what was procedural for \textit{Erie} purposes by announcing an outcome-determinative test:

\begin{quote}
[T]he question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of "procedure" in some sense. The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?
\end{quote}

Plainly enough, a statute that would completely bar recovery in a suit if brought in a State court bears on a State created right vitally and not merely formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should follow State law.\textsuperscript{84}

Thus, if applying federal instead of state law would cause the outcome of the case to change, the federal court had to apply state law. Statutes of limitations

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Id.} at 14. This might have portended affirmance of the contempt citation. The Court reversed, however, admonishing the district court for having committed plain error in ignoring Rule 37's specification that contempt was not an available sanction for violation of an order to take a physical examination.

\textit{Sibbach} has had its share of academic detractors. Professor Ely argued that the Court essentially ignored the second sentence of REA by failing to consider whether Federal Rule 35, even if it did "really regulate[] procedure," nonetheless abridged, enlarged or modified state substantive rights in violation of REA, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000). \textit{See} Ely, \textit{supra} note 2, at 719.

\textsuperscript{82} 326 U.S. 99 (1945)

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Id.} at 107.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Id.} at 109, 110.
became substantive,\textsuperscript{85} a holding the Court has never modified, although the test’s dominance has waned.\textsuperscript{86} The outcome-determinative test, while more concrete than \textit{Sibbach’s} “really regulates procedure,” nonetheless created significant problems for the Court, but there is one more aspect of \textit{Guaranty Trust} that commands attention first.

\textit{Erie} announced a constitutional imperative. In discussing \textit{Erie}, \textit{Guaranty Trust} never suggested that the Constitution compelled using the state limitation. Instead, Justice Frankfurter referred four times to \textit{Erie}’s “policy of federal jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{87} The reason is that, in contrast to \textit{Erie}’s statement that federal power did not extend to the issue in question, in \textit{Guaranty Trust} it did. Few would have disputed that Congress could enact limitations periods applicable in the federal courts, even for state claims being heard under diversity jurisdiction. The combination of Congress’s power to create inferior federal courts\textsuperscript{88} and the Necessary and Proper Clause\textsuperscript{89} would have permitted it to decide how long federal courts should remain open to increasingly stale claims.

\textit{Guaranty Trust} thus made clear that \textit{Erie} proceeds on two levels. First, there is the constitutional level that \textit{Erie} announced. In areas not committed by the Constitution to the federal government, state law must govern. Second, even in areas where the federal government has constitutional power, one must remember \textit{Erie}’s disapproval of cases reaching different results merely because they were tried in different courts.\textsuperscript{90} Therefore, the fact that Congress could

\textsuperscript{85} In horizontal choice-of-law situations, courts view statutes of limitations as procedural, subject to narrow exceptions: 1) if a statute simultaneously creates a new liability and the limitation, 2) if a statute creates a new liability and the limitation, although in another statute, is “directed to the newly created liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified the right,” 3) if the forum that created the limitation treats it as substantive, and 4) if the limitation extinguishes the underlying right. \textit{See} Bournias v. Atl. Mar. Co., 220 F.2d 152, 154-56 (2d Cir. 1955) (internal quotation marks omitted).


\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Guaranty Trust}, 326 U.S. at 101 (emphasis added). \textit{See also id.} at 109 (\textit{Erie} “expressed a policy “that touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between State and federal courts.”); \textit{id.} ("policy that underlies \textit{Erie} . . ."); \textit{id.} at 110 (“A policy so important to our federalism must be kept free from entanglements with analytical or terminological niceties.”).

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{See} U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. It is important to remember that Article III, § 2, does not vest jurisdiction in any inferior federal court. It merely describes the extent of the jurisdictional power that Congress may vest in any inferior courts that Congress might create, \textit{see} U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, pursuant to its power under Article I, § 9.

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{See} U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

\textsuperscript{90} Recall Justice Brandeis’s comment about the \textit{Swift} doctrine making equal application of the law impossible.

Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the state. \textit{Swift v. Tyson} introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens against citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten “general law” vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the right should be determined was
have prescribed a rule did not mean that the federal courts should. They must bear in mind the policy of having diversity claims reach the same result in federal courts as they would have in state courts. This policy reflects the emerging Erie doctrine’s distaste for result-changing forum shopping.

The policy perspective had its problems also. Almost any variation in
law can change the outcome of a case, and after Guaranty Trust, the Court had several opportunities to see how the outcome-determinative test would work. Three cases decided the same day in 1949 show how the outcome-determinative test became a dominant direction to apply state law even in the face of contrary federal law. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. asked whether state or federal law determined the event that stopped a state statute of limitations from running. Under state law, that occurred when the defendant received service of process. Federal Rule 3, by contrast, stated that an action began when the plaintiff filed the summons and complaint, though it said nothing about limitations. Filing in Ragan came before expiration of the limitation, but service came after. The Court applied the outcome-determinative test, and the result was clear. State law had to govern, and the limitation barred the action.

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. was a shareholder’s derivative action. Plaintiff sued in New Jersey federal court. The Supreme Court had to decide whether to apply Federal Rule 23(b), which required no bond, or a

conferral upon the noncitizen. Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law.

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938) (footnote omitted)

See, e.g., id.; Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109:

In essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.

The Court later referred to avoiding forum shopping as one of the “twin aims of the Erie rule.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.

As Justice Harlan put it in Hanna v. Plumer, “any rule, no matter how clearly ‘procedural,’ can affect the outcome of litigation if it is not obeyed.” 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).

The Court would later hold that Rule 3 does not address when a limitations period stops running in diversity cases, Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980). See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.

337 U.S. 541 (1949).

At the time, Rule 23(b) read as follows:

SECONDARY ACTION BY SHAREHOLDERS. In an action brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders in an association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the association refuses to enforce rights which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by
New Jersey statute that required the plaintiff to post bond to cover the corporation’s expenses and counsel fees if the plaintiff lost. Cohen resembles Ragan; neither of the federal rules specifically mentioned the matter at issue. The Court held that because the state’s bond requirement might deter some plaintiffs from suing, it was outcome-determinative within the meaning of Guaranty Trust.

Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.98 was a Mississippi federal case in which a Tennessee corporation sued to recover a broker’s commission. Under Mississippi law, a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the state could not sue in its courts. Federal Rule 17(b), by contrast, explicitly provided that the law of the state of incorporation governed capacity to sue, and Tennessee law created no disability. Woods differs from Ragan and Cohen because Rule 17(b) spoke directly to the point. Nonetheless, the Court, referring to Guaranty Trust’s statement that the federal court in a diversity case is “in effect, only another court of the State . . .,”99 held that the state rule applied.100 This was outcome-determinative with a vengeance. The fact that there was a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure directly on point did not matter; the only thing that did matter was that applying state rather than federal law would produce a different result.

These three cases demonstrated how dominant the outcome-determinative test was. State provisions could undercut all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Applying state law in the face of directly contrary federal law seemed to turn supremacy on its head. An adjustment was inevitable.101

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100 The York case was premised on the theory that a right that local law creates but that it does not supply with a remedy is no right at all for purposes of enforcement in a federal court in a diversity case; that where in such cases one is barred from recovery in the state court, he should likewise be barred in the federal court. The contrary result would create discriminations against citizens of the State in favor of those authorized to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. It was that element of discrimination that Erie R. Co v. Tompkins was designed to eliminate.

Woods, 337 U.S. at 538.
101 See Ely, supra note 2, at 709.
3. **Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electrical Cooperative, Inc.**:\(^{102}\) Acknowledging the Balance

Byrd was a North Carolina lineman employed by a contractor hired by Blue Ridge, a South Carolina corporation. He was injured and sought damages from Blue Ridge in a diversity action in South Carolina. Blue Ridge argued that Byrd was limited to worker’s compensation. Byrd denied that he was a statutory employee under South Carolina law. In South Carolina’s courts, the judge would have decided the statutory-employee question,\(^{103}\) but the district court sent the issue to the jury, which returned a verdict for Byrd. The choice-of-law issue for the Supreme Court was whether South Carolina or federal practice should govern.\(^ {104}\)

Blue Ridge asserted that *Erie’s* policy favoring uniform results compelled adhering to South Carolina’s practice.\(^ {105}\) The Court first asked, in effect, whether the state practice was substantive or procedural for *Erie* purposes.\(^ {106}\) South Carolina’s Supreme Court had stated no reasons for displacing the jury’s normal functioning\(^ {107}\) with respect to this single issue. Justice Brennan downplayed the rule’s importance, characterizing it as “merely a form and mode of enforcing the [employer’s] immunity . . . and not a rule intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties.”\(^ {108}\) Then he noted the *Erie* policy that *Guaranty Trust* identified: having litigation come out the same way in state and federal courts. “Therefore, were ‘outcome’ the only con-


\(^{103}\) *See* Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 96 S.E.2d 566 (S.C. 1957).

\(^{104}\) There was a second issue before the Court as well: whether the Fourth Circuit, when it reversed and directed entry of judgment for Blue Ridge, should instead have remanded the case to give Byrd an opportunity to introduce further evidence on whether he was a statutory employee. The Supreme Court ruled for Byrd on that issue. *Byrd*, 356 U.S. at 533.

\(^{105}\) *Id.* at 534.

\(^{106}\) *Id.* at 535:

> It was decided in *Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins* that the federal courts in diversity cases must respect the definition of state-created rights and obligations by the state courts. We must, therefore, first examine the [state] rule . . . to determine whether it is bound up with these rights and obligations in such a way that its application in the federal court is required.

\(^{107}\) *Id.* at 535-36. That does not mean that no such policy existed. South Carolina may have wanted judges to decide the issue out of concern that juries, knowing that statutory compensation would likely be less than damages recoverable in tort, might strain to find plaintiffs non-statutory employees. Were that to happen with any regularity, it might imperil the workers compensation system’s goals of assuring speedy, no-fault relief for the injured employee and predictable financial exposure for the employer.

Of course, by positing the issue in this manner, Justice Brennan committed the logical fallacy of assuming his conclusion. Under South Carolina’s approach, the “normal function” of the jury did not extend to the issue of whether someone was a statutory employee.

\(^{108}\) *Id.* at 536. It is not hard to imagine another reason for the South Carolina rule. *See supra* note 104.
sideration, a strong case might appear for saying that the federal court should follow the state practice."

Before 1958, the *Erie* doctrine involved two considerations. The first, exemplified by *Erie*, was whether there was federal competence to act in the area. The *Erie* Court held that there was no federal authority, and the choice-of-law inquiry ended there. The second inquiry is whether, if there is federal competence, federal or state law should govern. *Guaranty Trust* adopted the outcome-determinative approach to decide that question. Until *Byrd*, once federal authority existed, outcome was the only consideration, as *Ragan*, *Cohen* and *Woods* demonstrated.

*Byrd* identified two additional factors. The Court emphasized the strong federal policy favoring jury trials. *Erie* notwithstanding, Justice Brennan looked at a pre-*Erie* diversity case to underscore the importance of the federal policy. He noted that distribution of trial functions between judge and jury was integral to the federal system and that "there is a strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts." Justice

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109 Id. at 537.
110 See supra text accompanying note 61.
111 See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text. See also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (state law governed enforceability of a contract's arbitration clause because of arbitration's presumed effect on outcome); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947) (state law governs *res judicata* effect of state court judgment; no different outcome in subsequent federal diversity action would be proper).
113 See Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931) (extant federal directed verdict practice overcame state constitutional requirement that all questions of contributory negligence go to the jury). This is another illustration of pre-*Erie* case law having post-*Erie* relevance. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
114 *Byrd*, 356 U.S. at 538. Justice Brennan also noted the "influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment..." Id. at 537. It is not entirely clear why the Seventh Amendment was influential only. It may be because the Amendment speaks in terms of common law actions as of 1791, when worker compensation claims did not exist. See, e.g., Robert P. Wasson, Jr., *Resolving Separation of Powers and Federalism Problems Raised by Erie, The Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act: A Proposed Solution*, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 519, 616-17 (2004). On the other hand, one commentator has noted that Justice Brennan's language has left generations of commentators free to disagree about whether *Byrd* is really a Seventh Amendment case or not, that is, whether the Seventh Amendment provides a better grounding for the decision than the one(s) the Court adopted more explicitly. Without more guidance from the Court[,] however, there is no way to argue dispositively for this interpretation based on what the Court said.


The Court also downplayed the possibility that the choice of law in *Byrd* was truly outcome-determinative. "We do not think the likelihood of a different result is so strong as to require the federal practice of jury determination of factual issues to yield to the state rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome." *Byrd*, 356 U.S. at 540.
Brennan lionized federal policy, minimizing South Carolina’s interest in its own rule. The opinion exemplifies balancing state and federal interests in application of their respective rules. Guaranty Trust knew nothing of the sort. There was no discussion of any federal interest (for example) in closing the federal courts to stale claims or of the importance to the state of its limitations period. Before Byrd, it was outcome-determination or nothing. After Byrd, there was more to think about.

The Court had shifted to a three-part vertical choice-of-law inquiry. A district court should balance the federal interest underlying creation or application of a federal rule, the state interest in application of the state rule, and the outcome-determinative effect of the choice. If the choice was outcome-determinative, there was additional weight on the state side of the balance, but the outcome-determinative test had ceased to be solely dispositive.

Byrd did not end the development of vertical choice-of-law doctrine; it did not involve application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court’s last word on that subject had come in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. and had left the Federal Rules in a precarious position vis-à-vis conflicting state rules. Seven years after Byrd, the Court addressed that problem.


Hanna sought damages arising from automobile negligence; Plumer was the executor of the estate of the driver who had caused the accident. Hanna complied with Federal Rule 4 in serving the summons and complaint; the process server left copies with Plumer’s wife at their residence. Massachusetts law required personal, not substituted, service on an executor. Plumer won summary judgment on that point, based on Guaranty Trust and Ragan. The First Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Massachusetts’s requirement of personal service was substantive, not procedural, for Erie purposes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the federal service rule governed.

Although the Court adverted to Sibbach, which had upheld the applicability of Federal Rules 35 and 37 in a diversity action under an Erie analysis, Hanna’s thrust was considerably different. Plumer had argued that Erie and the

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115 See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
118 Then, as now, the relevant part of the Rule allowed service “by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to [the individual] personally or by leaving copies thereof at [the individual’s] dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) (1937), in 1 Moore’s Federal Practice § 4App.01, at 4App.-1 (3d ed. 2006) (current version at Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)).
120 312 U.S. 1 (1941). See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
outcome-determinative test required using the Massachusetts rule.\textsuperscript{121} The Court demurred, noting instead the “twin aims of the \textit{Erie} rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”\textsuperscript{122} It found that, considered \textit{ex ante}, the different service rules would be unlikely to affect a plaintiff's choice of forum and therefore were insufficiently substantial to compel using the state rule.\textsuperscript{123}

Then came the surprise. The Court announced that the \textit{Erie} line of cases did not supply the proper standard for resolving the choice-of-law issue in \textit{Hanna}:

\begin{quote}
Reduced to essentials, the argument is: (1) \textit{Erie}, as refined in \textit{York}, demands that federal courts apply state law whenever application of federal law in its stead will alter the outcome of the case. (2) In this case, a determination that the Massachusetts service requirements obtain will result in immediate victory for respondent. If, on the other hand, it should be held that Rule 4(d)(1) is applicable, the litigation will continue, with possible victory for the petitioner. (3) Therefore, \textit{Erie} demands application of the Massachusetts rule. \textit{Hanna}, 380 U.S. at 466.
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Id.} at 468 (footnote omitted).
\textsuperscript{123} Justice Harlan’s concurrence expressed it differently:

To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state or a federal rule, whether “substantive” or “procedural,” is to stay close to basic principles by inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation. \textit{Id.} at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
\end{quote}

Professor Rowe has argued that \textit{Hanna}’s reference to the “twin aims” of \textit{Erie} largely supplanted \textit{Byrd}’s balancing approach. \textit{Rowe}, \textsuperscript{ supra} note 8, at 985-86. With great respect for my long-time friend and colleague, I see it differently. \textit{Hanna} and \textit{Byrd} are not alternatives; they act together. \textit{See infra} notes 245-49 and accompanying text.

A brief word on forum shopping and \textit{Hanna}’s reference to the “twin aims” is in order. Although the Court intended to discourage vertical forum shopping, perspectives on forum shopping’s desirability differ. The Court could not have blinded itself to the reality of forum shopping; indeed, counsel’s ethical obligation to the client includes the duty to choose the forum in which successful representation of the client’s interests is most likely. \textit{See}, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, \textit{The Forum Game}, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 370-71 (2006) (citing Mary Garvey Algero, \textit{In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue}, 78 Neb. L. Rev. 79, 106 (1999); Russell J. Weintraub, \textit{International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens}, 29 Tex. Int’l L.J. 321, 322 (1994)). The forum shopping against which \textit{Erie} and \textit{Hanna} inveighed was vertical forum shopping that changed the results of cases because the federal courts’ adhered to \textit{Swift v. Tyson}. \textit{See supra} notes 29-37, 51 and accompanying text. The \textit{Erie} line of cases has nothing to do with the permissibility, desirability and prevalence of horizontal forum shopping.

Second, one must at least question whether the “twin aims” that the \textit{Hanna} Court identified really stand independently. As the \textit{Erie} Court saw the problem, vertical forum shopping combined with \textit{Swift}’s approach to choice of law produced the inequitable administration of the laws. Justice Brandeis’s whole point in this regard was that the \textit{Swift} rule gave an undeserved substantive advantage to out-of-staters over in-staters. \textit{See} \textit{Erie R.R. v. Tompkins}, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938). Thus, it is not clear whether the “twin aims” are truly separate considerations or are Siamese twins, linked in pursuit of the same goal.
The *Erie* rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true that there have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by one of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case was not that *Erie* commanded displacement of the Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which [sic] covered the point in dispute, *Erie* commanded the enforcement of state law.¹²⁴

*Hanna* was obviously not such a case; Rule 4 spoke unambiguously to the point.¹²⁵ Instead, the Court ruled that the *Sibbach* really-regulates-procedure test¹²⁶ was the proper test for evaluating the Federal Rules. REA,¹²⁷ not *Erie*, governed the legitimacy of the Federal Rules, although both involved vertical choice-of-law issues. Chief Justice Warren contrasted the way *Erie* and REA work.

When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided *Erie* choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie

¹²⁴ *Hanna*, 380 U.S. at 470 (emphasis added). The Court did not mention *Woods* in this regard, although Rule 17(b) clearly covered the issue there. But then, the *Woods* Court never cited Rule 17(b) at all. See *Woods* v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).

¹²⁵ "Here . . . the clash is unavoidable: Rule 4(d) (1) says—implicitly, but with unmistakable clarity—that in-hand service is not required in federal courts." *Hanna*, 380 U.S. at 470. In *Marshall* v. *Mulrenin*, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974), the First Circuit argued that the *Hanna* Court had misunderstood the intensely substantive purpose of the Massachusetts statute and therefore reached the wrong decision.

¹²⁶ *Sibbach*, 312 U.S. at 14. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.


(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.

(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.

(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.\footnote{\textit{Hanna}, 380 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted). In fairness, one must note that the Chief Justice undermined the relative clarity of this approach at the very end of the opinion: Thus, though a court, in measuring a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the degree to which the Rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation stay from the course it would follow in state courts, ... it cannot be forgotten that the \textit{Erie} rule, and the guidelines suggested in \textit{York}, were created to serve another purpose altogether. To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act. \textit{Id.} at 473-74 (citation and footnote omitted). Regrettably, the Court has never provided very clear guidance about when a Federal Rule "covered the point" and when it does not. \textit{Id.} at 470. \textit{See}, e.g., Gasperini v. Ct. for Humanities Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); \textit{infra} notes 167-86 and accompanying text; Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); \textit{infra} notes 133-35 and accompanying text.}

Thus, after \textit{Hanna}, there were alternative vertical choice-of-law analyses. On the Federal Rules side, REA prescribed the inquiry. For other matters, \textit{Erie} dominated, but the Court cautioned against rigidity in applying its lessons.\footnote{\textit{Hanna}, 380 U.S. at 472-73 (quoting Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963)) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).}

\section*{C. Aftermath}

With \textit{Hanna}, basic vertical choice-of-law analysis was in place, but that did not make things easy for the Court. Challenges concerning both the Federal Rules and federal common law continued to arise. In 1980, the Court confronted the issue that \textit{Ragan}\footnote{337 U.S. 530 (1949). \textit{See supra} notes 91-92 and accompanying text.} had decided under the outcome-determinative approach: whether Federal Rule 3\footnote{\textsc{Fed. R. Civ. P.} 3: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."} or state law\footnote{State law provided that service of process stopped the running of the statute of limitations. \textsc{Kan. Stat. Ann.} § 60-308 (1935).} provides the relevant mo-
ment for stopping the statute of limitations. *Walker v. Armco Steel Co.* 133 reached the same result as *Ragan,* but by a different route. Applying *Hanna,* the Court held that Rule 3 did not address the issue because it says nothing about statutes of limitations. 134 The state rule therefore governed by default, there being no federal rule on point. 135 This stands in sharp contrast to *Ragan,* where the state rule applied because it was outcome-determinative. 136

The Court also applied the *Hanna-Walker* approach in *Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods.* 137 The plaintiffs sued Burlington in an Alabama state court. 138 Burlington removed and, upon losing a jury verdict, appealed. 139 The Fifth Circuit affirmed without modification and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for imposition of a 10% penalty that Alabama law 140 mandated. Burlington took the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the penalty was unconstitutional. 141 A unanimous Court did not reach the constitutional question, finding instead that Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 142 controlled to the exclusion of the Alabama statute. 143

Rule 38 permits the appellate court to impose damages and costs if it finds the appeal to have been frivolous. 144 Alabama law, by contrast, leaves the appellate courts no discretion and sets the amount of damages at a fixed 10% of the underlying judgment. 145 In effect, Alabama law erects a conclusive presumption that any losing appeal is frivolous. The Supreme Court found a direct collision 146 and then considered whether the Federal Rule ran afoot of the second sentence of the REA by impermissibly affecting substantive rights. 147

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133 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
134 *Id.* at 752.
135 *Id.* On the other hand, for federal-question cases, the filing of the complaint, as described in Rule 3, does mark the stopping of the statute of limitations. See *West v. Conrail,* 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987).
138 *Id.*
139 *Id.* at 2-3.
141 *Id.*
142 "If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." *Fed. R. App. P.* 38.
143 *Burlington,* 480 U.S. at 8.
146 "[T]he Rule's discretionary mode of operation unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory provision of Alabama's affirmance penalty statute." *Burlington Northern,* 480 U.S. at 7.
147 *Id.* at 8.
Here the Court’s reasoning was less persuasive. Relying *inter alia* on *Hanna*, Justice Marshall argued that “Rules which [sic] incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate this provision if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules.”148 The first question was whether Alabama law created any substantive right. The Court concluded that it did not,149 but one might quarrel with that conclusion because the Court had recognized earlier in the opinion that the Alabama statute had two purposes: “to penalize frivolous appeals and appeals interposed for delay ... and to provide ‘additional damages’ as compensation to the appellants for having to suffer the ordeal of defending the judgments on appeal.”150 The Court could have viewed the second purpose as substantive, which would have compelled deciding Burlington’s due process and equal protection claims.151

The last piece of the conceptual puzzle came in 1988. *Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.* involved a contract with a forum-selection clause specifying that disputes were triable only in a state or federal court in the Bor-

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148 Id. at 5. That appears to clash directly with the REA’s insistence that federal rules not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right...” 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) (2000) (emphasis added). On the other hand, Justice Marshall relied on *Hanna’s* observation that REA does not require the Federal Rules to have no effect at all on litigants’ rights, only that they not affect the substantive rules that will determine what the litigants’ rights actually are.

“Congress’ prohibition of any alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably to rules of practice and procedure, have been brought before a court authorized to determine their rights. ... The fact that the application of Rule 4(f) will operate to subject petitioner’s rights to adjudication by the district court for northern Mississippi will undoubtedly affect those rights. But it does not operate to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which that court will adjudicate its rights.”


149 Federal Rule 38 regulates matters which [sic] can reasonably be classified as procedural, thereby satisfying the constitutional standard for validity. Its displacement of the Alabama statute also satisfies the statutory constraints of the Rules Enabling Act. The choice made by the drafters of the Federal Rules in favor of a discretionary procedure affects only the process of enforcing litigants’ rights and not the rights themselves.

*Burlington Northern*, 480 U.S. at 8

150 Id. at 4 (citations omitted).

151 If the Court had applied the interest analysis approach that its other *Erie* cases exemplified and that the Court later used to decide *Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.*, 518 U.S. 415 (1996), discussed *infra* notes 147-60, 219-20 and accompanying text, it would have reached a different conclusion, but that is not the crux of the matter. Once the Court decided that the Alabama statute had no substantive component and that the Federal Rule spoke directly to the point, there was no balancing to be done. The Court’s casual conclusion that there was no substantive state right prevented any REA challenge to the Rule’s validity.
of Manhattan in New York City. Stewart sued in an Alabama federal court. Ricoh sought dismissal for improper venue or transfer to the Southern District of New York. The district court denied the motion on the ground that state law governed and that Alabama disfavored forum-selection clauses. The Eleventh Circuit held that federal law governed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

The important thing about Ricoh for Erie purposes is the manner in which the Court approached the federal statute. Section 1404(a) says nothing about forum selection clauses. One might have expected, because of Hanna and Walker, that the Court would find that the federal transfer statute did not speak to enforceability of forum-selection clauses. Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court, however, took a different approach from the one used in cases concerning the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Walker—which he had written. He noted that § 1404(a) lists several factors the courts should consider in deciding whether to transfer a case. In his view, a forum-selection clause bore heavily (but not dispositively) on whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice. The Court did not insist that the conflict between state and federal law be as direct and unavoidable as Hanna and Walker had suggested. “[T]he statute, fairly construed, does cover the point in dispute.” In Walker, Rule 3 did not speak of statutes of limitations and so did not apply on its own terms. In Hanna, Rule 4 did specify how service should be made, in direct conflict with state law. In Stewart, the clash was more oblique. Alabama law refused to recognize forum-selection clauses. Federal law was not explicit. Nonetheless, the Court found Alabama law in conflict with Congress’s direction that the court deciding a transfer motion consider party and witness convenience

153 Id.
156 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 22.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 32.
159 “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
160 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30.
161 Id. at 31.
162 Id. at 29.
163 See supra note 122.
164 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 22.
and the interest of justice. In effect, statutes get wider interpretive latitude than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The most difficult cases, though, involve neither federal statutes nor federal rules. When those exist, the court’s problem is a rather ordinary one of interpretation. The Erie doctrine presents its greatest challenges when there is no textual provision, so that the courts must decide whether to create new federal rules. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc. was such a case. Gasperini won a $450,000 verdict from a jury. Under New York law, appellate courts review jury verdicts and must order new trials if they find the verdict “deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.” The Second Circuit attempted to follow the New York approach and found the verdict excessive, ordering a new trial unless Gasperini agreed to accept a $100,000 award. The Supreme Court focused on the conflict between the New York

165 Id. at 32.
166 Statutes, including procedural statutes, get that latitude because the Constitution contains no limiting provision comparable to REA’s substantive-rights limitation. It is a mistake to read statutes with the narrow focus that the Court has prescribed for the Federal Rules. REA includes a limitation on the scope of the Federal Rules—that they not “abridge, enlarge or modify” substantive rights—that is not applicable to federal statutes, which certainly can affect substantive rights as long as the statute is within one of the Constitution’s grants of power to Congress.

That is the point Justice Scalia overlooked in his forceful dissent. Id. at 33-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He argued that the statute did not speak to forum-selection clauses and further that the federal courts could not, “consistent with the twin-aims test of Erie . . . , fashion a judge-made rule to govern this issue of contract validity.” Id. at 33. In his view, § 1404(a) “looks to the present and the future. As the specific reference to convenience of parties and witnesses suggests, it requires consideration of what is likely to be just in the future, when the case is tried, in light of things as they now stand.” Id. at 34. He concluded that the majority misapplied § 1404(a) by “import[ing], in my view without adequate textual foundation, a new retrospective element into the court’s deliberations, requiring examination of what the facts were concerning, among other things, the bargaining power of the parties and the presence or absence of overreaching at the time the contract was made.” Id. at 34-35. He also saw the majority’s approach to the case as incompatible with the fact that “issues of contract, including a contract’s validity, are nearly always governed by state law.” Id. at 36. He could find no reason in § 1404(a)’s language or history to depart from that customary approach. Id. at 37.

One might quibble with characterizing the Alabama rule as going to validity of the contract. Alabama interprets its statute as making forum-selection provisions unenforceable. This view allows an Alabama court to retain and adjudicate a contract case even if there is a forum-selection clause in the contract specifying another forum. The contract is otherwise in effect. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554 (Ala. 1980). One might also disagree with Justice Scalia’s characterization of § 1404 as forward-looking only. The statute does refer to convenience and the interest of justice, as he noted, but text suggests no reason to disregard forum-selection clauses or other pre-dispute matters that may, after all, give some insight into those factors.

168 Id. at 420.
169 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995) (current version at N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney Supp. 2005)).
170 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 415.
approach and the Seventh Amendment,\footnote{U.S. Const. amend. VII: In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.} which forbids appellate reexamination of facts determined by juries except as the common law permitted.\footnote{Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418-419.}

Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion noted that “[c]lassification of a law as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’ for Erie purposes is sometimes a challenging endeavor.”\footnote{Id. at 427 (footnote omitted).} She first considered whether the materially-deviates standard was “outcome affective,” observing that a statutory cap on damages certainly would be substantive for Erie purposes.\footnote{Id. at 428.} She found that a cap determined by case law was not significantly different.\footnote{Id. at 429.} “In sum, § 5501(c) contains a procedural instruction, but the State’s objective is manifestly substantive.”\footnote{Id. (citation omitted).} The problem was that New York specified a particular procedure for accomplishing the objective, one that clashed with federal law.

The Court found that New York’s attempt to limit excessive damages did implicate Erie’s “twin aims,” but it separated the substantive goal from the procedure for achieving it.\footnote{Id. at 416.} The Court decided it could serve the substantive objective without violating the Seventh Amendment by having federal trial judges make the excessiveness determination, using New York’s deviates-materially standard and operating under traditional powers to grant new trials.\footnote{Id. at 433.} Federal law allows granting a new trial if the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.\footnote{See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) (allowing new trials in jury cases “for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States”); Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (all articulating the “great weight” standard); William Ingliss & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981); Cities Serv. Co. v. Launey, 403 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1968).} “This discretion includes overturning verdicts for excessiveness and ordering a new trial without qualification, or conditioned on the verdict winner’s refusal to agree to a reduction (remittitur)”\footnote{Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 433 (citing Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935)). The majority was not quite finished, however, for Justice Ginsburg said that the courts of appeals could still review district court determinations for abuse of discretion. Id. at 438.} \footnote{Id. at 449 (Scalia, J., dissenting).}

Gasperini has its share of critics. Justice Scalia found the clash with the Seventh Amendment unavoidable.\footnote{Id. at 449 (Scalia, J., dissenting).} In his view, the Amendment prohibits
appellate review of verdicts for excessiveness. He further argued that it is impermissible for states to dictate to federal courts whether judges or juries should perform particular functions, relying in part on Byrd. He faulted the majority for paying too little attention to the principle that federal appellate courts cannot re-examine facts (except according to the principles of common law), including to evaluate excessiveness. His biggest criticism, however, went to the heart of the Erie problem: "The Court commits the classic Erie mistake of regarding whatever changes the outcome as substantive. . . ." In short, Justice Scalia did not agree that the matter was substantive for Erie purposes.

The point, however, is not whether the majority or Justice Scalia was correct about the matter being substantive or procedural. Instead, it is that nearly six decades after the Court announced Erie, it was still possible for the Justices to split so sharply on the issue. There is, however, a better way to conceptualize the Erie problem and to approach the analysis. The next part suggests that other way and that it is consistent with the cases from Erie forward.

V. THE UNSEEN TRACK

A. A New Approach

The Erie doctrine is a response to a choice-of-law problem, a typical conflict-of-laws issue. The Court, however, did not speak in conflicts terms originally and has since avoided that terminology except for a brief flirtation with it in Byrd, with its talk of the policies underlying both the state and federal rules as to whether an issue was for the jury or the court. Perhaps this omission is not surprising, since the technique of interest analysis made no formal appearance until the scholarly work of Brainerd Currie suggested it. Yet to-

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182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 463.
185 Id. at 457-58.
186 Id. at 465.
187 See supra text accompanying note 114.

On the other hand, for a short while the Court itself had decreed interest balancing with respect to the effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, on horizontal choice of law. In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), the Court wrestled with when that Clause required a state to apply the law of a sister state. Then-Justice Stone announced that interest analysis was the proper approach:
day, unlike when the Court decided Erie, government interest analysis is an important mode of conflicts analysis. It provides both a better explanation of the Erie doctrine’s past and a better approach to Erie issues yet to arise.

A single presumption and a single question underlie the vertical choice-of-law problem. The presumption stems from the history of law in the United States from the pre-constitutional period through the present. The post-colonial nation began with only the law that the states used. As federal law developed, some of it displaced state law. One may view the Constitution, particularly Article I, Section 8, as a statement to the newly formed federal government to the effect of “these are the areas in which you may displace state law.” Thus, one should begin analyzing any vertical choice-of-law problem by presuming that state law applies. The presumption is rebuttable, to be sure, but state law is the starting point.

The only thing that can rebut the presumption is a dominant federal interest (DFI) that demands displacement of state law. If there is, federal law governs; if there is not, state law remains undisturbed. The Erie doctrine’s history helps clarify what is and what is not a DFI.

Consider Erie itself. Justice Brandeis announced that there was no general federal authority in the area of tort law. The Constitution did not

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[T]he conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its [sic] own statutes to those of the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to their weight.

... Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right, because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum.

*Id.* at 547-48. For full-faith-and-credit purposes, the Court abandoned that approach four years later in an opinion that Justice Stone also authored. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), focused only on finding a legitimate forum interest in the application of its own laws, and did not attempt to balance the interests of any other state. Although the Court cited *Alaska Packers* with approval for the proposition that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not invariably require a state to apply another state’s statute in preference to its own, Justice Stone did not use the *Alaska Packers* balancing technique. *Id.* at 501. He did not explain why.

189 See supra note 14.

190 This included perceived natural law. See supra Part I.

191 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.

192 I pose this question to my students in class as whether there is a Big Federal Deal (BFD). It may not be as elegant as “dominant federal interest” or “DFI,” but somehow it seems easier for students to remember.

193 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
permit the federal government, either legislatively or judicially, to create federal
tort law and thus to displace state law. Accordingly, by constitutional defin-
tion, there could not have been a DFI. The reservoir of natural law upon which
the federal courts had drawn for ninety-six years had dried up with the demise
of natural-law jurisprudence. One might conceptualize the death of natural-
law theory in United States jurisprudence as creating a partial vacuum in areas
of law not within the Constitution’s grant of power to the federal government.
State law filled it by default.

Erie is the easy case. Beginning with Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. and
Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York, things become more complic-
ated. In both cases, there was federal power; both concerned procedure in the
federal courts, an area subject to congressional control. In Sibbach, Congress
had exercised the power, albeit indirectly, by passing the REA and by acquies-
cing in the rules of procedure that the Court produced. Rules 35 and 37, gov-

194 See supra text accompanying note 62. That does not mean that the federal government
never can address matters of tort law. The Federal Employers Liability Act, Act of Apr. 22, 1908,

Some have suggested that Erie is not a case about the scope of federal power generally so much as a
separation-of-powers case. They appear to take that view on the theory that, under the Com-
merce Clause, Congress could have legislated Tompkins’ status as invitee, licensee or trespasser
because Erie Railroad was an interstate carrier. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the De-
that Congress could have provided a federal answer to that question by statute under the Com-
merce Clause.”); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1321, 1416 (2001) (“If . . . the Court meant that Congress lacks power to enact a specific
rule of decision for cases like Erie, then this observation is questionable in light of the Court’s
temporaneous decisions broadly interpreting the scope of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause.”) (citing Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1682, 1684 n.10 (1974)). In hindsight, that is appealing, the only problem being that the Erie Court
apparently did not perceive that possibility and did not express itself in such
terms. See Donald L. Doenenberg, Juridical Chameleons in the “New Erie” Canal, 1990 UTAH L.
REV. 759, 795-97 (1990). Professor Ely recognized that the Erie Court had ruled on the basis of
lack of federal competence—in either Congress or the judiciary—to address this area of law, see
Ely, supra note 2, at 704, 706, and the Court itself took that position in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956) (“Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does
not have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to controversies in diversity
of citizenship cases.”).

195 Arguably, the Court forgot that lesson when it decided Boyle v. United Techs., Inc., 487

196 See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.

197 304 U.S. 64.

198 312 U.S. 1 (1941).


200 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 18; see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.

201 312 U.S. 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2000) (requiring the Court to propose rules or amend-
ments by May 1 of any calendar year, the changes to go into effect on December 1 of that year
unless Congress acts to prevent that).
erning physical and mental examinations and sanctions for failure to comply with discovery rules and orders of the court entered pursuant to them, were at issue.\textsuperscript{202} One might regard Sibbach as the forerunner of Hanna v. Plumer,\textsuperscript{203} which directly addressed how to analyze cases involving vertical choice-of-law problems and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In Sibbach, however, the Court did not undertake so explicit an inquiry; it simply asked whether the rules "really regulate procedure."\textsuperscript{204} Having decided that they did, the Court applied them.\textsuperscript{205} Among other things, Hanna confirms the command of the REA that valid Federal Rules of Civil Procedure trump inconsistent laws.\textsuperscript{206} There is a dominant federal interest by statutory definition.

\textit{Guaranty Trust v. York} found no such interest.\textsuperscript{207} The Court discussed the case in policy, not constitutional, terms because Congress could have prescribed limitations periods applicable in the federal courts. That Congress had not done so implies that it did not think that there was a DFI.\textsuperscript{208} Justice Frankfurter recalled \textsl{Erie}'s policy of not having cases come out differently simply because of the choice of the federal rather than the state forum.\textsuperscript{209} That policy helped the Court effectively to conclude that there was no DFI, so state law applied.

In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electrical Cooperative,\textsuperscript{210} the Court dabbled in the language of modern conflict of laws analysis, performing a governmental interest analysis to reach its conclusion that distribution of functions between judge and jury in the federal system is a DFI. Justice Brennan's majority opinion did not find a substantive policy underlying South Carolina's decision to have the statutory employee issue tried to the court.\textsuperscript{211} He declined to speculate

\textsuperscript{202} Sibbach, 312 U.S. 1.
\textsuperscript{203} 380 U.S. 460 (1965); see supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{204} 312 U.S. at 9-10.
\textsuperscript{205} Id. at 13-16.
\textsuperscript{206} 380 U.S. 460.
\textsuperscript{207} 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
\textsuperscript{208} There might be reasons for having a federally prescribed limitation. Limitations periods exist both to provide repose for the defendant, see, e.g., Order of R.R. Tel. v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)—a substantive goal but certainly not a matter of federal concern with respect to a state claim—and to prevent the courts from having to adjudicate stale cases, see, e.g., Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("Courts ought to be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights.")—a procedural goal that could be a matter of federal concern.
\textsuperscript{209} In essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.
\textsuperscript{210} 356 U.S. 525 (1958); see supra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{211} But see supra note 105 (suggesting that the Court did not look very hard for one).
about substantive purposes underlying the state rule and thus, as a practical matter, found the state’s interest de minimis.\textsuperscript{212}

On the other side of the balance, the majority found very strong federal interests in having the jury decide the issue.\textsuperscript{213} It recited the independent federal judicial system’s interest in determining for itself how to allocate trial functions and adverted to the Seventh Amendment as a powerful (but not necessarily controlling) influence.\textsuperscript{214} Justice Brennan specifically recognized and subordinated the \textit{Erie} policy of having diversity cases come out the same way in state and federal court.\textsuperscript{215} Finally, he asserted the “strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts,” citing a pre-\textit{Erie} case that refused, \textit{Swift v. Tyson} notwithstanding, to apply a state constitutional provision in similar circumstances.\textsuperscript{216} In short, in the allocation of tasks between federal judges and juries, the Court found a DFI that overcame both \textit{Erie}’s policy of uniform treatment and the fact that the choice of law might be outcome determinative.\textsuperscript{217}

It was not astonishing that the Court balanced state and federal interests when considering vertical choice of law. Only five years after \textit{Erie} and fifteen years before \textit{Byrd}, the Court anticipated the technique Justice Brennan employed in \textit{Byrd}, albeit in a case under a grant of jurisdiction other than diversity.\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States}\textsuperscript{219} concerned a government-issued

\textsuperscript{212} \textit{Byrd}, 356 U.S. at 536.

\textsuperscript{213} \textit{Id.} at 537-38.

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{216} \textit{Id.} at 538 (citing Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931)); \textit{see supra} note 110 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{217} The federal system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential characteristic of that system is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under the influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury.... The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created obligations ... cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule—not bound up with rights and obligations—which disrupts the federal system of allocating functions between judge and jury.... Thus the inquiry here is whether the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions should yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come out one way in the federal court and another way in the state court.

We think that in the circumstances of this case the federal court should not follow the state rule.

\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States}, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).

\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Id.} The United States invoked the court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, par. 1, 36 Stat. 1091, 1091 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2000)).
check cashed on a forged endorsement. The theft was discovered and a new check issued to the intended payee.\textsuperscript{220} For many months, the government did not notify Clearfield Trust, which had processed the original check, that the government wanted reimbursement.\textsuperscript{221} The issue was whether delay in notification barred recovery or whether the bank should have to show prejudice from the delay.\textsuperscript{222} The state rule did not require any showing; unreasonable delay \textit{simpliciter} barred the claim.\textsuperscript{223} The Court ruled for the government, but the result is not nearly as important as the technique the Court used to reach it.

The Court began by declaring that \textit{Erie} did not apply.\textsuperscript{224} It is important, however, that the Court did not say that \textit{Erie} was inapplicable because jurisdiction rested on something other than diversity. Instead, the opinion distinguished \textit{Erie}.

When the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a constitutional function or power. This check was issued for services performed under the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1935. . . . The authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and statutes of the United States and was in no way dependent on the laws of . . . any . . . state. . . . The duties imposed upon the United States and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots in the same federal sources. In the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.\textsuperscript{225}

\textit{Erie} did not apply because there \textit{was} federal power to issue checks and to determine the rights and obligations that they created, whereas the \textit{Erie} Court had declared that there was no federal power with respect to torts.

\textit{Erie}’s inapplicability did not, however, guarantee that federal substantive law principles would govern. The Court made that clear in two ways. First, it did not declare that because \textit{Erie} did not apply, federal law governed \textit{a fortiori}-

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\item\textsuperscript{220} \textit{Clearfield Trust Co.}, 318 U.S. at 365.
\item\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Id.}, at 364. The check was for $24.20. \textit{Id.} History does not record how much the government spent in the recovery effort—our tax dollars at work.
\item\textsuperscript{222} \textit{Id.} at 369.
\item\textsuperscript{223} \textit{Id.} at 367.
\item\textsuperscript{224} \textit{Id.} at 366.
\item\textsuperscript{225} \textit{Id.} at 366-67 (citations and footnote omitted). The first sentence of the quotation stands in sharp contrast to Justice Brandeis’s declaration in \textit{Erie} that “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.” \textit{Erie} R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Where Justice Brandeis was declaring that there was no federal power to make law in \textit{Erie}, Justice Douglas was emphasizing precisely the opposite in \textit{Clearfield}. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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ori. Second, Justice Douglas recognized that "[i]n our choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state law." 226 He went on, however, to explain why using state law would be inappropriate, and he did so in the language of interest balancing:

The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale[,] and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states. The application of state law . . . would subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain.227

The only thing Justice Douglas did not do was use the term DFI, but it is unmistakable that he felt that the federal interest was so overwhelming that no state interests could overcome it.228


227 Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 367. The Court found the appropriate content for the new federal common law rule it was fashioning in the pre-Erie general commercial law that the Court had articulated under the aegis of Swift. See supra note 64.

228 Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 363. One should not conclude that either having the federal government as a party, having federal commercial paper involved, or both (and both were the case in Clearfield) thereafter meant that there was automatically a DFI. In Bank of Am. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Parnell, the United States called some bonds for early payment. 352 U.S. 29 (1956). Some of Bank of America's bonds disappeared the day after the call. Id. at 30. Parnell cashed them four years later. Id. at 31. Bank of America sued for conversion, naming as defendants Parnell, an associate, and the banks that had processed the bonds after presentment. Id. The choice-of-law issue concerned who had the burden of proof with respect to good faith in presenting the bonds. Id. Under state law, the burden was on the presenters to show good faith, but federal law placed the burden on Bank of America to show its absence. Id. The Third Circuit ruled for Parnell, relying on Clearfield. Id. at 31-32. A seven-to-two Court reversed. Id. at 34. The majority sounded miffed at the Third Circuit's handling of the matter. Id. at 33. "The Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of this litigation in holding that the Clearfield Trust case controlled . . . . The basis for this decision was stated with unclouded explicitness." Id. In essence, the Court explained that the conversion action involved a property dispute—whether Parnell or Bank of America owned the bonds when they were presented—and that state law governed property law claims, including burden of proof, particularly when only private parties were involved. Id. In other words, there was no DFI.

Even when the United States is a party and federal loans are involved, state law may nonetheless provide the content of the rule of decision. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (Federal law should govern disputes arising out of SBA and FHA loans, but state law provides the content because the government individually negotiates loan agreements with the borrowers. Contrast Clearfield, which makes clear that the federal government issues checks en masse, without individual negotiation. 318 U.S. 363. The federal interest in uniformity in Clearfield was accordingly not present in Kimbell Foods. In other words, there was no DFI.).
Hanna v. Plumer\textsuperscript{229} and Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation\textsuperscript{230} illustrate other applications of the suggested approach. In Hanna, the Court essentially found that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that is valid under the REA\textsuperscript{231} is a DFI.\textsuperscript{232} That should not have surprised anyone; both the REA and the Supremacy Clause\textsuperscript{233} demand that result. They are the constitutional and statutory thumbs on the scales of the interest balancing for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. True, the Hanna Court specified that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must speak “with unmistakable clarity”\textsuperscript{234} to trump a state rule, but that is merely a determination of the Rule’s scope.\textsuperscript{235} If a Federal Rule consistent with the REA’s limitation does “[cover] the point in dispute,”\textsuperscript{236} it governs, by the direct command of the REA, which functions in this context as a statutory Supremacy Clause. The supremacy concept prescribes that the federal interest in any authorized rule of federal law automatically outweighs any state interest in a conflicting state rule. The Constitution, supplemented by the REA with respect to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has weighed the interests and struck the balance, and the federal courts need not—indeed, cannot—engage in supplemental weighing.

Hanna also contained a phrase to which the Court would refer explicitly far more often than to Byrd balancing. Confirming the diminished role of Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative test, Chief Justice Warren emphasized Erie’s “twin aims”: discouraging forum shopping and avoiding inequitable administration of the laws.\textsuperscript{237} The interest-balancing approach accommodates both

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\item \textsuperscript{229} 380 U.S. 460 (1965); see supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{230} 487 U.S. 22 (1988); see supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{231} 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000); see supra note 136.
\item \textsuperscript{232} 380 U.S. 460.
\item \textsuperscript{233} U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The priority of federal law is subject to the Clause’s requirement that the federal rule under “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.” Thus, as Stewart demonstrates, a statute need only pass constitutional muster, whereas a federal rule (whether stemming from the Supreme Court as in the case of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or from an executive agency pursuant to a grant of rule-making authority from Congress) must additionally satisfy the limitations of the statute that authorizes it. For the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the relevant statute is REA. See supra text accompanying note 125.
\item \textsuperscript{234} Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470; see also id. at 472 (referring to the “direct collision” between the state and federal provisions); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 n.4 (1988) (both referring to “direct collision” as the standard when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is involved); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 & n.9 (1980). Regrettably, the Court itself has not spoken with unmistakable clarity about when that sort of clash exists or when the Federal Rule in fact “covers” the point in dispute, see supra note 125, and candor compels recognizing that the technique suggested here does nothing to eliminate that particular Hanna problem.
\item \textsuperscript{235} As Hanna noted, previous cases occasionally declined to apply a federal procedural rule on the ground that it did not speak to the issue at hand. See supra text accompanying note 124.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470.
\item \textsuperscript{237} See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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interests. Swift encouraged forum shopping by allowing federal courts to apply different substantive rules from those that the state courts would have used. Cases turned purely on forum identity, which rested on the parties’ citizenship. That created the inequity of which Justice Brandeis spoke, because out-of-state parties gained a forum-selection advantage solely by reason of their citizenship.

By contrast, the interest-balancing approach makes the choice of law turn on the state and federal governments’ interest in applying their respective rules, not on the accident of the parties’ citizenships. It is a rational rather than a whimsical system of choosing law. That is not to say that it is necessarily precise or easily predictable; no one who has followed interest analysis since Brainerd Currie called attention to the technique could say that. It does, however, make the choice turn on considerations external to the parties’ desire to be in one forum or another. “There is nothing inequitable about choosing one law over another if the means is itself permissible.” Moreover, once a substantive federal common-law rule exists, the federal rule is binding even in the state courts because of supremacy, diminishing the incentive to forum shop.

Stewart is entirely consistent with this approach. It involved interpreting a statute, not a rule of civil procedure, but the same supremacy mechanism operated; the Court failed to articulate it, as it failed in Hanna. The difference between Stewart and Hanna is the latitude the courts have in interpreting the underlying federal principle. Regrettably, the Court in Stewart echoed Hanna in asking whether “the statute covers the point in dispute.” That phrasing obscured the fact that the Court will infer unexpressed congressional intent when interpreting a statute but will not rest to the same degree on inference about the scope of a Federal Rule. Thus, in Hanna, Rule 4 prescribed the manner of service, and the clash with the more restrictive Massachusetts provision was unavoidable. By contrast, Walker, which resurrected the statute-of-limitations problem Ragan addressed, refused to apply Rule 3 on the

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238 This assumes that the interests are distinct and separable, which they may not be. See supra note 120.
239 See supra note 70.
240 Letter from David I. Levine, Professor, University of California, Berkeley (undated) (on file with the author).
241 Procedural federal common law rules apply only in the federal courts.
242 See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
243 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1998); see supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
244 Id. at 26; see supra text accompanying note 124.
245 But see supra note 122. The Hanna Court took Federal Rule 4’s specification of substituted service as a permissible method to imply that the Rule did not require in-hand service. In effect, however, the Court interpreted Rule 4’s language as a direct expression of (its own) intent.
246 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
247 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
ground that the Rule said nothing about statutes of limitations and how to stop them from running out.\textsuperscript{248}

Federal statutes are different. First, the REA commands that a Federal Rule not impermissibly affect substantive rights, but there is no such limitation on statutes. Congress may pass a statute dealing with federal procedure that does alter substantive rights. Second, the Court rarely requires Congress to legislate in read-my-lips terms.\textsuperscript{249} \textit{Stewart} reflects that difference. "If Congress intended to reach the issue before the District Court, and if it enacted its intention into law in a manner that abides with the Constitution, that is the end of the matter. . . .”\textsuperscript{250} The Court found that 28 U.S.C. § 1404 governs the effect of forum selection clauses in contracts despite a state law forbidding them. The language the Court used is significant: "We believe that the statute, \textit{fairly construed}, does cover the point in dispute. . . . The flexible and individualized analysis Congress prescribed in § 1404(a) . . . encompasses consideration of the parties’ private expression of their venue preferences.”\textsuperscript{251} Consideration, however, is not dictation. Under state law, the forum-selection clause was disallowed; under federal law it was not. The federal statute prevailed. But why should that be a shock? The Supremacy Clause says that any valid federal law or rule trumps any inconsistent state provision. The federal standard is, by constitutional definition, a DFI.

The difficult cases have no federal textual provision—constitutional provision, statute or REA rule. Yet even here, the underlying presumption and question remain the same: state law governs unless there is a DFI. The diffi-

\textsuperscript{248} \textit{Walker}, 446 U.S. at 751.

\textsuperscript{249} This is one of those circumstances in which the exceptions prove the rule. For example, there are two situations in which the Court has required Congress to be absolutely explicit. The first involves the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from having to defend civil actions in the federal courts. \textit{See U.S. Const. amend. XI. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer}, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), held that Congress may, in legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, abrogate the states’ Eleventh-Amendment immunity from federal suit. Nine years later, \textit{Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon}, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), ruled that an authorization of suits against “any recipient” of funds under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2002), did not permit a private federal action against a state agency, referring to “the requirement, well established in our cases, that Congress unequivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal court.” \textit{Id.} at 242.


\textsuperscript{250} \textit{Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.}, 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988).

\textsuperscript{251} \textit{Id.} at 29-30 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court noted that the district court should consider the forum-selection clause as a part of “the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000). The Court has made clear that it will not \textit{construe} a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure in making choice-of-law decisions. That is the effect of the “unmistakable clarity” and “direct collision” requirements the Court has imposed. \textit{See supra} note 190.
ulty arises because the courts must figure out for themselves if there is a DFI. Such cases sometimes divide the Court, but history shows that it is capable of making those determinations.

Byrd is in that mold. The Court avoided a constitutional issue by implying that the Seventh Amendment did not control. There was, therefore, no textual provision, but there was a federal common-law procedural practice that left issue for the jury. The majority found that the federal interest in regulating procedure in federal courts overcame South Carolina’s preference for trying the statutory-employee issue to a judge.

Byrd exemplifies a federal procedural interest overcoming contrary state law, but on occasion the Court has found that federal substantive interests, though not articulated in positive law, also can dominate and require displacement of state law. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Cuban government had expropriated a sugar crop that a Cuban corporation had contracted to sell to an American company. After delivery of the expropriated crop, the purchaser paid Sabbatino as receiver for the original owner, rather than paying the Cuban government. Banco Nacional, a government instrumentality, brought a diversity action sounding in conversion to recover the money. The issue was whether the act-of-state doctrine supported the Cuban government’s claim to ownership of the crop. Although the Court noted that the issue might come out the same way under either New York or federal law, it went out of its way to find a DFI in foreign relations that compelled the governing law to be federal.

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252 One may suspect at times that declaration of a DFI is merely a conclusion rather than the end product of careful analysis; the cases vary. In Clearfield Trust, for example, Justice Douglas made a plausible case that the obligations of the federal government on its own commercial paper issued in bulk could not rationally turn on the law of whatever state the paper was in when a problem arose. See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text. On the other hand, Justice Scalia’s declaration for the five-to-four majority in Boyle v. United Technologies, Inc., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), is more difficult to swallow, particularly because on six occasions Congress had considered, but not enacted, a federal rule similar to the one the Court announced. Congress, at least, did not seem to perceive a DFI. See supra notes 216-25 and accompanying text.


254 Justice Brennan adverted to the “influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment.” Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537. See supra note 111.

255 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.


257 “The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.” Id. at 401.

258 Id. at 400-01.

259 Whatever considerations are thought to predominate, it is plain that the problems involved are uniquely federal in nature. If federal authority, in this instance this Court, orders the field of judicial competence in this area for the federal courts, and the state courts are left free to formulate their own rules,
It would be a mistake to regard Banco Nacional as a non-Erie case. It is a vertical choice-of-law case, even though the Court did not use Erie vocabulary to explain its result. And, the Court’s reasoning process demonstrates that, as had been the case in Clearfield and Byrd, the Justices were balancing interests in making the decision. Moreover, the analysis is consistent with the underlying principle that state law governs unless a DFI causes and justifies the federal courts’ displacing state law. All vertical choice-of-law cases implicate the Erie problem, whether the Court explicitly refers to Erie or not. Part of the thesis of this Article is that one can best understand federal common law cases like Banco Nacional through the lens of the Erie doctrine’s decades-long focus on potential clashes between state and federal laws, which, after all, presumably reflect state and federal interests.

In 1988, the Court found a DFI in another substantive area in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. David Boyle died when his marine helicopter crashed off the Virginia coast. His father brought a wrongful-death diversity action against United Technologies (parent of Sikorsky Division, the manufacturer). He argued two theories of liability—first that the crash occurred because Sikorsky negligently repaired the helicopter, and second that Sikorsky defectively designed the co-pilot’s emergency escape system, which prevented Boyle’s escape after the crash. Although a jury found for the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Fourth Circuit first found that Boyle had not carried his burden of proof with respect to the defective repair. More significantly for present purposes, the court ruled that Boyle could not rely on defective design because the court had that day recognized a military-contractor immunity defense, which turned aside Boyle’s claim.

When Boyle reached the Supreme Court, a five-to-four majority affirmed. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion found both that “the procurement of equipment by the United States is an area of uniquely federal interest . . .” and that there was a “significant conflict . . . between an identifiable federal policy.

The purposes behind the doctrine could be as effectively undermined as if there had been no federal pronouncement on the subject.

[W]e are constrained to make it clear than an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.

_Id._ at 423-25.


_Id._ at 503. The escape hatch opened outward. That is great . . . except when the craft is under water.

_Id._

_Id._

See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986).

Boyle, 487 U.S. at 503.

_Id._ at 507.
or interest and the [operation] of state law."\textsuperscript{267} So saying, the Court found that Virginia’s tort law, which would have allowed recovery on the plaintiff’s defective-design theory, had to yield to the military contractor defense that the Court recognized, following the Fourth Circuit’s lead.\textsuperscript{268} The point here is not whether the majority was justified in finding the federal interest predominant; it is rather that Boyle is another example of a DFI preempting a substantive state rule.

Gasperini\textsuperscript{269} also yields to the DFI approach. As the majority noted, the New York statute contained a substantive goal wrapped in a procedural approach. The split result that the majority adopted was difficult to explain in traditional Erie terms, but it is much easier in the context of interest-balancing on an issue-by-issue basis. With respect to New York’s desire to limit excessive jury awards, there was no DFI.\textsuperscript{270} The underlying claim was not federal, and there was no reason for the federal government to care whether tort awards were large or small, excessive or inadequate. When it came to the mechanism for determining excessiveness, however, there was a DFI. Just as allocating functions between judge and jury was a DFI in Byrd, in Gasperini allocating functions between trial and appellate courts was a matter on which the Supreme Court was unwilling to take dictation from the states. From an interest-analysis perspective, Gasperini is indistinguishable from Byrd, and both make perfect sense.\textsuperscript{271} I grant, of course, that the Gasperini Court spoke in terms of accom-
moderation and not in terms of interest-balancing. One must focus, however, on what the Court was accommodating—New York’s interest in reasonable limitation of damage awards and the federal interest in having trials and appeals proceed in a manner consistent with federal practice, whether prescribed by the Constitution, a statute, or a federal procedural rule.

Viewing *Erie* problems as choice-of-law problems amenable to an interest-balancing approach is not incompatible with the Supreme Court’s technique for resolving vertical conflicts. It is a simple process except when there is no federal textual provision. If there is no federal authority under the Constitution, state law must govern under the rule of *Erie*. All remaining cases assume that there is such authority. If a federal textual provision speaks to the issue, it must govern. In all those variations, the Supremacy Clause commands that the balance is on the federal side.

Only if there is no federal textual provision do the federal courts face a difficult decision—the "relatively unguided *Erie* choice" to which *Hanna* referred. Sometimes, as *Clearfield, Byrd, Banco Nacional, Boyle* and *Gasperini’s* procedural aspect demonstrate, the Court will identify a DFI that requires making federal common law. Other times, as exemplified by *Guaranty Trust, Parnell, Walker* and *Gasperini’s* substantive aspect, the Court will decline. Separation of powers becomes a powerful consideration in such cases. Various Justices have explained that although Congress has great latitude to declare a DFI, being constrained only by the Constitution, the Court must be

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272 One can represent the analytical process in a flow chart. See Appendix A.

273 With respect to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one simply must remember that for the rule to be authorized, it cannot “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right[s],” at least in any direct way. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000); see *supra* note 136 and accompanying text. In this respect, the REA operates like a choice-of-law provision, authorizing the Federal Rules, directing application of valid rules in the face of conflicting law, but commanding by implication that the courts choose state law in preference to a Federal Rule that has an impermissible effect on substantive rights.

more restrained.\textsuperscript{275} It will act only if the federal interest is overwhelming, largely because the Justices do not see their role as making policy.\textsuperscript{276}

The DFI approach explains the results in the sixty-nine years of \textit{Erie} jurisprudence with less contorted reasoning than the Court has managed. There is another advantage as well: in doing the DFI interest-balancing analysis, it is not necessary to label the state and federal rules as either substantive or procedural.\textsuperscript{277} To be sure, if the matter is traditionally viewed as substantive, there is little likelihood in a diversity case that there will be a DFI.\textsuperscript{278} By the same token, if the matter is typically procedural, it is more likely (but certainly not in-

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\textsuperscript{275} This distinction shows up particularly well in the Court's increasingly narrow view of when it is appropriate to imply a private right of action in a federal statute or constitutional provision. Justice Powell was the standard-bearer of this approach, beginning with his dissent in \textit{Cannon v. University of Chicago}, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Justice Scalia, concurring in \textit{Thompson v. Thompson}, where the Court refused to imply a private right of action in the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, said "we should get out of the business of implied private rights of action altogether." 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988). As Professor Chemerinsky noted, "Advocates of this position maintain that Congress alone has the power to authorize private rights of action and that the Court oversteps its bounds when it both creates the basis for the suit and awards a remedy under it." \textsc{Erwin Chemerinsky}, \textsc{Federal Jurisdiction} \S\ 6.3, at 388 (4th ed. 2003) (footnote omitted).
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\begin{quote}
\ldots Congress recognizes that the creation of private actions is a legislative function and frequently exercises it. When Congress chooses not to provide a private civil remedy, federal courts should not assume the legislative role of creating such a remedy. \ldots \textit{Cort} allows the Judicial Branch to assume policymaking authority vested by the Constitution in the Legislative Branch.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{See also} \textit{Gregg v. Georgia}, 428 U.S. 153, 174-75 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.) ("[W]hile we have an obligation to insure that constitutional bounds are not overreached, we may not act as judges as we might as legislators."); \textit{S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan}, 325 U.S. 761, 794-95 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting):
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
The balancing of these probabilities, however, is not in my judgment a matter for judicial determination, but one which \textit[sic] calls for legislative consideration. Representatives elected by the people to make their laws, rather than judges appointed to interpret those laws, can best determine the policies which \textit[sic] govern the people. That at least is the basic principle on which our democratic society rests.
\end{quote}

The Justices do not always agree about what is overwhelming and what is not. \textit{Boyle} is a perfect example of a clash on that point. \textit{See supra} notes 213-17 and accompanying text.

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\textsuperscript{277} One must decide whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure affects substantive rights in order to know whether or not the Rule is valid under the REA. That does not involve measuring the Federal Rule against a competing state rule. If the Federal Rule is within REA's mandate, then REA proceeds to make the choice-of-law decision by specifying the preemptive effect of the Federal Rule. \textit{See supra} notes 72, 124 and accompanying text.
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\textsuperscript{278} That is not to say there never is; that would be wrong, as \textit{Clearfield}, \textit{Banco Nacional} and \textit{Boyle} demonstrate. \textit{See supra} notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
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evitable)\(^{279}\) that there may be a DFI.\(^{280}\) The labels themselves, however, are beside the point, except when testing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure against the REA’s standard. Even when properly and uncontroversially applied, these labels are flawed predictors of how the Court will resolve a vertical conflict. There is little reason to strain to apply one or the other; it does not end the inquiry or even advance the analysis very much to do so.

I realize that in urging this approach, I am swimming upstream against the Supreme Court’s continued articulation of the substance-procedure dichotomy. Part of my point, however, is that the dichotomy is not nearly the aid to analysis that the Court appears to assume. The method suggested here does not reach results incompatible with the Court’s cases; rather, it offers a more coherent way of reaching and explaining those results.

B. Scholarship and the Court’s Terms of Analysis

Since 1938, the Court has analyzed its vertical choice-of-law cases with its goals relatively firmly in mind, but using a vocabulary that has needlessly made the process more difficult to understand. The only explicit acknowledgement of the interest balancing process came in *Byrd*, and as Professor Rowe has pointed out, the Court has not referred many times to that language, relying far more often on the “twin aims” formulation of *Hanna*.\(^{281}\) That has obscured what is actually going on, and it has caused scholarship to focus too much on what the Court says and not enough on other ways to conceptualize what it does.

Professor John Hart Ely contributed one of the most well-known articles about *Erie*, discussing what he saw as *Erie*’s “irrepressible myth.”\(^{282}\) His theory was that

the indiscriminate admixture of all questions respecting choices between federal and state law in diversity cases, under the single rubric of “the Erie doctrine” or “the Erie problem,” has served to make a major

\(^{279}\) See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); see supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text. *Guaranty Trust* is a particularly good case for demonstrating the inutility of the labels. Under outcome-determinative analysis, statutes of limitation became substantive so that the case would reach the same result in state or federal court. Had more than one state been involved, there would have been a question of which state’s limitation period to use. “Traditional conflicts law characterized statutes of limitations as procedural because it is ‘the purpose of a statute of limitations . . . to protect both the parties and the local courts against the prosecution of stale claims.’” Scoles et al., supra note 72, § 3.9, at 129 (quoting Restatement (Second) Of Conflict of Laws § 142 cmt. d (1971)) (footnotes omitted). Thus, it would have been possible for the same state limitations period to apply because it was procedural for horizontal choice-of-law purposes but substantive for vertical choice-of-law purposes. Small wonder that first-year law students roll their eyes when trying to make sense of the *Erie* doctrine.


\(^{281}\) See supra note 120.

\(^{282}\) Ely, supra note 2.
mystery out of what are really three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory and constitutional interpretation.\textsuperscript{283}

He saw the inquiry subdivided into parts governed, respectively, by the Constitution, RDA, and REA.

The United States Constitution... constitutes the relevant text only where Congress has passed a statute creating law for diversity actions, and it is in this situation alone that Hanna's "arguably procedural" test controls. Where a nonstatutory rule is involved, the Constitution necessarily remains in the background, but is functionally irrelevant because the applicable statutes are significantly more protective of the prerogatives of state law. Thus, where there is no relevant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or other Rule promulgated pursuant to the Enabling Act and the federal rule in issue is therefore wholly judge-made, whether state or federal law should be applied is controlled by the Rules of Decision Act, the statute construed in \textit{Erie} and \textit{York}. Where the matter in issue is covered by a Federal Rule, however, the Enabling Act—and not the Rules of Decision Act itself or the line of cases construing it—constitutes the relevant standard.\textsuperscript{284}

Without disagreeing with Professor Ely's general hierarchical formulation, I suggest that it is nonetheless possible (and preferable) to view the vertical choice-of-law inquiry as subsuming the subdivisions to which he referred. Each of the three measuring rods he discussed operates in aid of the Constitution's only choice-of-law rule with respect to vertical conflicts:\textsuperscript{285} the Supremacy Clause. That Clause is quintessentially a choice-of-law rule; that is its only purpose. It teaches that whenever federal law legitimately exists, it trumps inconsistent state law. The three referents that Professor Ely specified are measures of legitimacy for federal law.

Professor Ely's view is not erroneous. It merely focuses exclusively on the trees (each worth careful attention in its own right) without giving overall consideration to the forest. The Constitution is the only test of legitimacy for acts of Congress. RDA and REA, as constitutional exercises of congressional power with respect to the federal judiciary's functioning, are the appropriate legitimacy tests for non-statutory federal rules in the federal courts. The fact remains that the overarching questions are whether the Constitution \textit{allows} fed-

\textsuperscript{283} Id. at 697-98.
\textsuperscript{284} Id. at 698.
\textsuperscript{285} With respect to horizontal conflicts, both the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause come into play. \textit{See generally Currie, et al., supra note 14, Chapter 3.}
eral law on a particular issue to exist, whether there is federal law on the issue, and, if not, whether the federal courts should create federal law.

Professor Ely’s approach seems also to be a bit underinclusive because it does not address the phenomenon of federal law controlling substantive issues in (admittedly rare, but certainly not unheard of) diversity cases. He took the position that:

When there is no Federal Rule, and as a result the Rules of Decision Act constitutes the controlling text, the court need ordinarily not concern itself with whether the federal rule urged by one party, or the state rule urged by the other, is most fairly designated substantive or procedural. The test is whether the choice between the two is material in the sense Hanna indicated, and that is not a function of the goals the rulemakers on either side were pursuing.286

This language strongly connotes that if applying a federal rule might adversely affect the “twin aims” of the Erie doctrine, the choice-of-law decision must be in favor of state law. Yet, this is demonstrably not so. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino287 and Boyle v. United Technologies, Inc.,288 both diversity cases, the Supreme Court directed application of federal judge-made rules to issues that were substantive by any measure and that, therefore, implicated Erie’s “twin aims.”289

Or did they? Before Erie, there were two types of federal judge-made law. First, there was the federal general common law created on Swift’s authority. That law, though created by a branch of the federal government, was none-

286 Ely, supra note 2, at 722-23 (citations omitted).
287 376 U.S. 398 (1964); see supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
288 487 U.S. 500 (1988); see supra note 213 and accompanying text.
289 In Banco Nacional, had plaintiff and defendant shared citizenship, the case would have gone forward in the New York courts. The Court apparently would have recognized the act-of-state doctrine, but might have applied it as a matter of state, not federal law. That would have made a difference, because if a state “misapplies” state law, the case is not reviewable in the Supreme Court because the Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000). See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935). See also Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (Supreme Court has no statutory authorization to review issues of state law). For the issue to be reviewable, the underlying law would have to be federal; that is the importance of the Sabbatino Court making it clear that the act-of-state doctrine must be a matter of federal law.

In Boyle, the effect is even more dramatic. If Boyle had proceeded under Virginia law, the Virginia courts would not have recognized the federal-contractors’-immunity defense that the Fourth Circuit had created the same day it decided Boyle, and Boyle would have recovered. The Supreme Court might have elected to review and to declare that the Fourth Circuit’s immunity rule pre-empted Virginia’s law, but the incentive to forum shop before the Supreme Court has declared federal common law is clear.
theless not authoritative for supremacy purposes,\textsuperscript{290} which is why the states were, to paraphrase Justice Brandeis, free to persist in their own opinions on the same legal issues.\textsuperscript{291} Second, there was what some might call genuine federal common law—judge-made principles that were federal for supremacy purposes (and therefore binding on the state courts), as \textit{Banco Nacional} made clear.\textsuperscript{292} Thus, declaration of a principle of genuine federal common law, whether before or after \textit{Erie}, did not risk the perceived evils of forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws. Those came from lack of vertical uniformity in the law applied to non-federal issues by state and federal courts. Supremacy ensured that, with respect to genuine federal common law, there would be vertical uniformity, and \textit{Erie} recognized both the extent and the limits of that choice-of-law rule and confirmed the RDA’s consistency with it.\textsuperscript{293}

There is one more place in which I see Professor Ely’s approach as less illuminating than it might be. In highlighting \textit{Hanna}’s focus on REA as the appropriate test for the validity of a Federal Rule of Civil (or Appellate) Procedure and the RDA as the test for everything other than federal procedural statutes,\textsuperscript{294} Professor Ely failed to account for \textit{Byrd}. The conflict of laws involved in that case\textsuperscript{295} implicated what the \textit{Hanna} Court would later characterize as the “twin aims” of \textit{Erie}. It takes no great leap of imagination to anticipate that a litigant might choose the federal forum precisely to get a jury trial not available

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[290] That is, the federal courts and the principles of general common law that they discovered and articulated had the same hierarchical and precedential status, respectively, as the state courts and the principles of general common law that they announced.
\item[291] See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
\item[292] The Court in the pre-\textit{Erie} act of state cases, although not burdened by the problem of the source of applicable law, used language sufficiently strong and broadsweeping to suggest that state courts were \textit{not} left free to develop their own doctrines (as they would have been had this Court merely been interpreting common law under \textit{Swift v. Tyson} . . .). \textit{Banco Nacional} de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964). See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984) (recognizing \textit{Banco Nacional} as authoritative).
\item[293] See Ely, supra note 2, at 715: [T]he problem reduces itself to a choice of uniformities, specifically a choice between horizontal uniformity among all the federal courts and vertical uniformity between the federal and state courts of a given state. But that choice was at the heart of the disagreement between \textit{Swift} and \textit{Erie}, and \textit{Erie} signaled a recognition that although the promotion of one kind of uniformity inevitably sacrifices the other, the Rules of Decision Act had made a choice, and had chosen vertical uniformity.
\item[294] See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
\item[295] The conflict was over who—judge or jury—decided whether \textit{Byrd} was a statutory employee for purposes of South Carolina’s workers compensation law, which limited recovery to the statutory amount and prevented recovery on any common law theory. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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in the state’s courts on a critical issue in the case. In any diversity case where the availability of a jury trial is at issue, then, the possibility for the discrimination between citizens and non-citizens that both Erie and Hanna discussed would exist. Applying Professor Ely’s test would lead to the conclusion that the state rule should apply, yet Byrd demonstrates that it does not. The correct test, which the Court used in Byrd but has not otherwise articulated explicitly, is whether there is a DFI. Byrd found that allocating work between judge and jury in the federal courts is a DFI. Hanna, articulating the “twin-aims” concern several years later, by no means disapproved Byrd or its technique; it simply said that when there is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Byrd’s (or, indeed, any) RDA analysis was inappropriate. This position shows how the Court’s consistent omission of interest-balancing terminology has made more difficult the task of those who have tried to analyze and rationalize the Court’s Erie decisions on the Court’s own terms.

Having agreed with Professor Rowe’s general evaluation of how the Court is doing in this area, \(^{296}\) I must diverge from his overall view of what the Court is doing. His view is that Byrd is of minimal importance. “Whatever the lower federal courts were doing, the Supreme Court never returned to Byrd-style balancing[,] and the last time before Gasperini that a Court majority cited Byrd was in 1977, in a per curiam opinion....” \(^{297}\) I see it differently; in my view the Court has never departed from Byrd-style balancing and, in fact, has been exemplifying it at least since the Clearfield decision in 1943. \(^{298}\) Professor Rowe’s thesis is that Hanna’s articulation of the “twin aims” of the Erie doctrine is the approach the Court has used for cases involving procedural federal common law since 1965. \(^{299}\) He suggests that Hanna’s “twin-aims” approach goes beyond Byrd’s balancing and has largely supplanted it, although the presence of a federal interest may add an additional factor. \(^{300}\) I suggest that the two operate to-

\(^{296}\) See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

\(^{297}\) Rowe, supra note 8, at 986 (footnote omitted).

\(^{298}\) See supra notes 180-220 and accompanying text. I realize that this may seem heretical to my colleague.

[F]or evaluating arguments made after the Court’s latest Erie-Hanna decision about whether it did nor did not mark a major departure, it is worth observing that anyone who in (at least) the last ten or so years had thought—or worse, taught—that Byrd was the dominant approach with current sanction by the Supreme Court for general application in cases involving judge-made federal procedural law had not been paying close attention to the Court’s recent decisions.

Rowe, supra note 8, at 987. I plead guilty as charged, for reasons already explained, see supra notes 162-237 and others that will shortly follow. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.

\(^{299}\) See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 8, at 998 (discussing Gasperini and observing that “it is significant that the discussion in part IIIA on the choice of review standard relies entirely on the Hanna ‘twin aims’ rendition of Erie and York and—like every other Supreme Court invocation of the ‘twin aims’ test,—conspicuously omits Byrd.”) (footnotes omitted).

\(^{300}\) See id. at 1014:
gether. Byrd balancing and Hanna's "twin aims" operate on different levels in service of the same goal. Hanna's expression is in the nature of a mission statement; Byrd balancing is the method that best typifies how the Court has achieved it, albeit without specific mention save in one part of Gasperini. The goal is to avoid vertical forum shopping and the inequity between citizens and non-citizens that Justice Brandeis identified in Erie. The Court achieves that goal by refusing to displace state law (whether substantive or procedural) unless there is some dominant federal need to do so—hence the balancing approach. The underlying presumption that state law applies to every issue, the decision in Gasperini, and the whole of the Erie doctrine reflect deference to state law by the federal judiciary and exemplify a variation on the conflict-of-laws concept of dépeçage. That term ordinarily refers to choices of law involving equally authoritative sources—different states. In the Erie context, dépeçage calls for applying state laws to some issues and federal laws to others, keeping the twin aims firmly in the courts' sights.

As best we may be able to tell on the basis of Gasperini itself and subsequent lower-court decisions, the Hanna "twin aims" approach remains applicable to such decisional-rule cases—unless an "essential characteristic" of the federal judicial system presenting a "countervailing federal interest" is involved. In such cases Byrd and Gasperini call for a broadening beyond the "twin aims" version of "outcome-determination" analysis to include consideration of the nature and weight of the state's interest in application of its own rule in federal court, with particular focus on whether it is "bound up with" clearly substantive state-law rights and an eye to whether the state or federal interest should prevail or if the two can be accommodated.

I think it is fair to say that Professor Rowe is not a great fan of Byrd balancing, for he quotes a leading treatise:

[T]here is no scale on which the balancing process called for by the [Byrd] Court can take place. There is no way to say with assurance in a particular case that the federal interest asserted is more or less important than the value of preserving uniformity of result with the state court. Even if there were such a scale, the weights to be placed upon it must be whatever the judges say they are.

Id. at 1010 (citing 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4508, at 242 (2d ed. 1996)). Here I can agree wholeheartedly with Professor Rowe, but the criticism is applicable to all qualitative balancing processes. Boyle v. United Technologies, Inc., 487 U.S. 500 (1987), demonstrates how posited federal interests may appear certain and overwhelming to some while appearing non-existent or ephemeral to others. See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text. As Dean Larry Kramer has pointed out, "The Second Restatement [of Conflict of Laws] is the most widely used alternative to the traditional approach, although this may be only because it is so amorphous that courts commit themselves to nothing by adopting it." LARRY KRAMER, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS 89 (6th ed. 2001). For better or worse, courts balance interests regularly, despite the vagueness of such approaches, presumably because balancing seems better than the Procrustean rigidity of rules that allow no exercise of judgment in individual cases.

301 See supra text accompanying note 164.
C. A Practical Note About Methods of Argument (for Attorneys) and Explanation (for Judges)

Although the interest-balancing approach works in terms of explaining the results the Court has reached and is likely to continue to reach in these cases, that does not mean that arguing or deciding cases explicitly in those terms is likely to be effective. Nearly seventy years of *Erie* jurisprudence has accustomed the courts to hearing discussion of vertical choice-of-law issues in the terms the Supreme Court traditionally uses. The fact that interest balancing works does not automatically render its vocabulary as the best one to use when arguing a vertical choice-of-law point. It is always wise to speak to courts in the terms they expect to hear; one might make a powerful argument to the Supreme Court in Hindi, but one would not expect it to have the effect that the same argument would have expressed in English. Accordingly, while one may privately analyze these questions by using the interest-balancing approach, it is advisable to craft one’s public advocacy of the result of the analysis in the Court’s own terms, which, regrettably, do not focus on the language of interest-balancing. Otherwise federal judges, upon hearing an argument not dressed in the Supreme Court’s vocabulary, may feel that they are being asked to rule on a basis that they are not free to employ.

By the same token, judges in the inferior federal courts may (and, I think, should) do their analysis in interest-balancing terms. It may be more prudent, however, for them to write their opinions using the familiar, but somewhat obscuring, language of the *Erie* doctrine. One hopes, of course, that the Supreme Court will become more explicit about the role of interest-balancing in *Erie* analysis. The Justices were on that track in *Byrd*, but have not sufficiently focused on the role that interest balancing actually plays. *Gasperini* is a first-rate example of interest-balancing and *dépeçage* working together; it is regrettable that Justice Ginsburg did not cast the opinion in those terms, for she surely would have reached the same result, and it would have been easier to understand.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court’s choice of the language it uses to explain its approach to vertical choice-of-law questions has made the *Erie* problem look harder than it really is. The Justices have not taken the proverbial step back and focused on the process that underlies their articulated reasons instead of simply looking at the issues presented by particular cases. There is no mystery here. There appears to be one only because the Court has not explicitly acknowledged the interest-balancing (except in *Byrd*) that explains its decisions.

State law will apply to any issue unless federal law trumps it via the Supremacy Clause. Whenever a federal constitutional, statutory or regulatory pro-
vision addresses the issue, supremaiy decides the choice-of-law issue; it makes the extant federal rule automatically a DFI. In the absence of such a provision, the federal courts must determine whether, nonetheless, some DFI requires the court to displace state law by creating a federal rule. That necessitates examining whether the issue involves an area of unique federal interest and whether there is a significant conflict between the federal interest and state law. That inquiry can never have the simplicity of a bright-line test, but it is far more straightforward if one keeps in mind the basic interest-balancing approach that the Erie doctrine exemplifies, as it has since the very beginning.


APPENDIX

Yes
Is there federal competence?
No. (Erie)

Is there a constitutional rule?

Yes
DFI. Apply it.

No

Is there a federal statute?

Yes. (Stewart)

No
DFI. Apply it.

Is there a valid Federal Rule directly on point?

Yes. (Hanna)

No. (Walker)

Is there otherwise a DFI sufficient to justify the federal courts in displacing state law?

Yes. (Banco Nacional, Boyle: Byrd; Clearfield)

No. (Guaranty Trust, Parnell)

The court should create and apply federal common law, which, if substantive, will be binding (by supremacy) on the states.

Apply state law.