Party Systems, Democratization and Governance in Africa: Aligning theory and praxis using Sierra Leone as a case study

Mohamed Saffa Lamin
Party Systems, Democratization and Governance in Africa: Aligning theory and praxis using Sierra Leone as a case study

Mohamed Saffa Lamin

Dissertation submitted to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences at West Virginia University

in partial fulfilment of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in
Political Science/ Political Science

Donley T. Studlar, Ph.D., Chair
Philip A. Michelbach, Ph.D.
Robert D. Duval, Ph.D.
Tamba E. M’bayo, Ph.D.
Stephen W. Howard, Ph.D.

Department of Political Science

Morgantown, West Virginia
2015

Key Words: Democratization Electoral Systems Ethnicity Governance Multi-Partyism Party Systems Pluralism
Copyright 2015 Mohamed Saffa Lamin
ABSTRACT

Party Systems, Democratization and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Aligning theory and praxis using Sierra Leone as a case study

Mohamed Saffa Lamin

There has been an upsurge in the movement towards democracy in developing countries since the end of the Cold War, which has led former autocratic regimes to embrace values of good governance as they transition to democracy (Huntington, 1991: 21-26). Democratic triumphalism has even led some scholars to declare the “end of history” due to the absence of alternative political systems that rival Western democracy (Fukuyama, 2006). The so-called “third wave” of democratization has been aided by multilateral institutions, international aid agencies and Western democratic governments, which since the 1990s have used democratization and good governance as collateral for foreign aid, as well as a yardstick to measure the legitimacy of regimes (Carothers, 1999: 40-41). Among the major foundations of democracy advanced by theorists are competition and contestation (Huntington, 1991: 6), which means the acquisition of power must be preceded by a contest among political parties. In sub-Saharan African countries, the main argument for the adoption of democratic forms of government put forward by international institutions and domestic actors alike is that stable multi-party systems provides multiple avenues for citizens to participate broadly in the political process, and by so doing, lay the foundation for the institutionalization of democracy and good governance.

In Sierra Leone, a new constitution was adopted in 1991 that made provision for a multi-party system and a Single Member District (SMD) electoral system as key ingredients of a democracy that produces good governance. Due to the need to hold representative elections even during the war, the SMD system was substituted by the PR system in 1996. When the war ended in 2002, the SMD system was reinstated but subsequent elections show gradual decline in the number of smaller parties that win parliamentary seats. In this dissertation, I aim to find out the extent to which the attainment of multi-party democracy may be constrained by the choice of the SMD systems in Sub Saharan Africa. Specifically, I hypothesize that larger District Magnitudes (DM - i.e., the number of electoral seats per constituency) lead to the formation of ethnically based two party systems, whereas lower district magnitude lead to the formation of multi-party systems. Through longitudinal analysis of election results in Sierra Leone from 1996 - 2002, I aim to show: first, the extent to which changes in district magnitude influence ethnicity or facilitates the formation or deepening of ethno-political cleavages in the diverse societies of Africa. Second, whether such cleavages in turn influence party system outcomes in Sub-Saharan African countries, and third, the extent to which changes in party systems influence democratization and governance in Sierra Leone. Finally, I extend Lipjhart’s typologies (party systems and electoral systems only) in “Patterns of Democracy,” as alternative paths that sub Saharan African countries could follow in their quest to attain democracy and good governance.

I expect findings that show that PR systems have multiplicative effects on smaller parties whereas SMD systems have a reductive effect on smaller parties. Since current theories show that political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to reflect existing ethno-political cleavage structures, this study will clarify the relationship between party systems, electoral system, and ethnicity and the implications of such relationships for the institutionalization of democracy and good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, I expect findings that show no significant difference in governance based on a country’s party system, which is intriguing given that a recent study finds and points to the significance of such a difference (Janda and Kwak, 2012).
Table of Contents

i. Abstract

ii. Table of Contents 1

iii. Introduction 2

Chapter 1: Theoretical Approach, Literature Review and Key Hypothesis 13

a) Theoretical approach
b) Literature review
   i. Party systems
   ii. Electoral systems
   iii. Democracy and democratization
   iv. Governance
c) Key hypotheses

Chapter 2: Methodology and Case Selection 49

a) Methodology
b) The case – Sierra Leone
c) Historical background and major political developments in Sierra Leone
d) Definition of variables and key measurements

Chapter 3: Party system, electoral systems and ethnicity in Sierra Leone 66

i. Introduction
a) Ethnic identities and party affiliation in Sierra Leone
b) Party system(s), electoral system(s) and ethnic identities in Sierra Leone
c) Ethno-regional basis of party representation in Sierra Leone

Chapter 4: Democratization and governance in Sierra Leone 97

i. Introduction
a) Democracy and democratization in Sierra Leone
b) Governance in Sierra Leone – Evidence from 1996 - 2002

Chapter 6: Theory and conclusion 121

a) Key findings
b) Reconfiguring party systems, electoral systems, democratization and governance in sub-Saharan African
c) Discussion

Appendix 137
Introduction

It has been argued that since the end of the Cold War, there has been a pervasive trend toward democratization, especially in countries of the former communist bloc, Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Huntington, 1991: 21-26). Lately, this trend is manifesting itself in the form of the Arab Spring, which is a metaphor that captures the popular uprisings in countries ruled by various forms of authoritarian regimes in North Africa and the Middle East. The call for representative democracy, often generated by local political actors is also aided by the actions of international institutions that argue that democratization and good governance are preconditions for development (Makinda, 2013: 555). In 2001, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) established the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF), to enable donors to contribute towards the provision of “discretionary funds to explore innovative approaches in democratic governance in politically sensitive environments and within the areas of inclusive participation, responsive institutions and international principles” (undp.org). More recently, the US government has set up the Millennium Development Corporation to evaluate the progress of democratization and good governance in developing countries, and select countries to partner with based on their record in meeting key benchmarks that are in line with the Millennium Development goals.

The underlying aim of the effort to spur democratization in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world is based on the notion that the adoption of western democratic institutions will lead to the attainment good governance. A key test of democratization in developing countries is the institutionalization of healthy and competitive party systems along with robust electoral systems to ensure that the competition for power is free, fair, and representative of the
aspirations of the people. Elections are therefore seen as the gateway to democracy while good governance is seen as its ultimate end, according to this logic.

In Africa, as in elsewhere in the world, the popular option for healthy competitive party system is the multi-party system. While there is hardly any scholarly work to show that multi-party systems yield better governance than two party systems, which are also competitive and popular in the US and Westminster systems, Sub-Saharan African countries are clamoring more for multi-partyism than two party systems due to the belief that multi-partyism could ensure better representation for all ethnic groups. While this position seems logical on the face of it, it is largely normative. Moreover, it does not consider the reductive, mechanical and psychological effects of district magnitude and legal thresholds on smaller parties. Also, it fails to consider the effect that ethnicity itself could have on shaping the structure of the party system. It therefore remains to be tested whether the preference for, and institutionalization of, multi-partyism in Africa is valid because it yields better governance than two-party systems which are predominant in Western democracies. This dissertation will attempt to answer this question later on in the analysis.

How does a country’s electoral system and ethno-political cleavage structure affect its party system? Conversely, how do changes in the party system, especially with regard to changes in the district magnitude, impact the level of democratic governance in a country? These questions are at the heart of this dissertation, which seeks to show how alternative electoral systems, ethno-political cleavage structures and party systems defined in terms of the number of the strong, effective, or significant number of parties in parliament, impact democratization and governance Sub-Saharan African states. I focus on sub-Saharan Africa, and use Sierra Leone as a case study, because it is a country in which the clarion call for democracy
was probably the loudest while governance may be the most dismal in the region. Moreover, given that international institutions continue to invest huge resources into promoting democratization and good governance in Africa, and in particular, advocating multi-party systems as a key item on the democratic menu, these questions become even more salient. But on what epistemological foundations do such assumptions rest? To what extent are underlying assumptions about these relationships supported theoretically? Are the resources invested in the promotion of democracy being used worthily? This dissertation is an attempt to answer these questions, as well as offer a way to configure electoral institutions with party systems and ethnicity to produce democracies capable of delivering good governance using Lipjhart’s typologies. Lipjhart distinguished Majoritarian from Consensual systems, with the former referring to a democratic system in which the acquisition and use of power is based on majority rule and the latter referring to one in which the use of power is based consensus.

These policy actions advocated by citizens and NGOs, and sanctioned by the international community have often been premised upon and validated by findings of scholars who have studied the relationships between these variables. In their cross-national study of the relationship between party systems and governance, Janda and Kwak, while holding country size and wealth constant, hypothesized that countries with non-partisan governments fared better on governance than those with partisan parliaments, and that those with partisan parliaments fared better on governance than those without party systems. They also hypothesized that the more competitive, aggregative and stable (all separate hypotheses) a country is the better its governance outcomes will be (Janda and Kwak: 2011: 99 and 175). They found that countries with no political parties performed significantly worse in all of the six indicators of governance provided by the Worldwide Governance Index than those with party systems, whether they are
partisan or not. The Worldwide Governance Index is a database that contains data on governance for 212 countries in areas ranging from political stability to control of corruption.

While their study fails to make a clear dichotomy between party systems based on the number of parties, it lays a theoretical foundation that supports the normative arguments underlying efforts by the international community, NGOs, and citizens to promote multi-party democracy in Africa and other parts of the developing world as a panacea for good governance (Janda and Kwak, 2011: xxv1). However, the failure to make a clear distinction between party systems based on the number of parties while focusing instead on the narrow distinction between partisan and non-partisan parliaments leaves open the question of whether the “significant”, “relevant” or “effective” number of parties in parliament affects the quality of governance in a country.

Although their work does not directly explore the relationship between party systems and governance outcomes, Booth and Cammade (2013) challenged another premise upon which the push for good governance rests, the principal-agent model which sees the people as principals and their leaders as agents entrusted to enact the mandate of the people. They claim that governance and developments efforts often fail to yield their desired objectives due to the adoption of models such as the principal-agent model which fails to address collective action problems that often beleaguer diverse societies. Their claim is in sharp contrast with that of Janda and Kwak (2011) who found theoretical support for the success externally inspired models in Africa, particularly that which establishes a positive correlation between multi-partyism and good governance.
Even though Janda and Kwan explore the relationship between party systems, non-party systems, and governance around the world, they do not consider ethnicity or ethno-political cleavages, which play a key role in the strategic coordination of votes and in shaping the party system outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Mozaffar et.al., 2003: 380). In fact Mozaffar et. al. found that in Africa, ethnic fragmentation and concentration, along with district magnitude (i.e., the number of seats per constituency) are key determinants of party systems. Specifically, they found a “curvilinear relationship between ethno-political fragmentation and the structure of party systems in Africa’s emerging democracies. Low fragmentation correlates in a straightforward way with a small number of parties and low party system fragmentation. High fragmentation encourages the formation of intergroup coalitions that also help to reduce the number of parties and the party system. But moderate levels of ethnic fragmentation, combined with the countervailing effects of concentration, increase the number of parties and party system, with district magnitude exerting an additional moderating influence to diminish the prospect of excessive increase in both” (Mozaffar et.al. 2013: 389).

Mozaffar et.al. addressed another major theoretical issue which is crucial to the study of electoral systems by focusing attention on ethno-political cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan found that the cleavage structure of a society shapes the structure of its party system (Lipset and Rokkan, 1969), although more studies tend to focus on the relationship between the number of parties and the structure of the electoral system as the main determinant of party systems (Duverger, 1954, Lipjhart, 1998). By combining ethno-political cleavage structures and the electoral systems, Mozaffar et.at., bridged the theoretical gap that often exists in the study of party systems.
Mozaffar et.al.’s finding has not gone unchallenged, in fact, Brambor et.al. (2007) did not only contest the fundamental arguments of Mozaffar et.al. but accused them of “promoting the common notion of African exceptionalism” for suggesting that Africa has a ‘distinctive morphology of ethnic groups’ (Brambor et.al. 2007: 315). Using the same data as Mozaffar et.al., and claiming to correct some of the major mistakes that led Mozaffar et.al., to their findings, they found that “African party systems respond to institutional and sociological factors such as district magnitude and ethnic fragmentation in the same way as more established party systems. They concluded that with regards to these characteristics African party systems do not seem to be particularly distinctive at all” (Brambor et. al, 2007). Even though this criticism deserves attention, it does not seem to take serious account of ethnic-based electoral patterns and frequent election-based violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the study shows that mechanical and psychological effects of districting, as well as legal thresholds often influence ethnic group calculus in deciding which party to support. While Brambor et.al. pointed to these factors as reasons for dismissing Mozaffar et.al.’s findings, they do very little in their own study to convincingly demonstrate how similar to Western based models and theories these variables are in their interactions.

Despite the criticism by Bambor et.al. and other scholars who maintain that African party and electoral systems are not at all distinctive (Lindberg, 2005), I intend to use Mozaffar et.al.’s approach in order to measure the “independent, interactive and additive” effects of electoral systems and ethnicity or ethno-political cleavages on the structure of party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa by using Sierra Leone as a case study. I take their approach because the aspiration of most African countries is to have multi-party systems understood loosely as more than two parties that represent the various interests of their societies, and contesting for the
authority to govern even as some argue that the goal of multi-partyism is gradually eroding in most sub-Saharan African countries (Boggards, 2004:173). These authors point out that even though multiple parties often contest in “free and fair” elections, the “effective” or “significant” number of parties has not always been “multi.” The reductive effect on the number of parties has often been associated with “mechanical and psychological effects” of district magnitudes and legal thresholds more broadly. Van de Walle argued that most parties that won the “transition to democracy” elections in Africa in the early 1990s remained in power until the early 2000s, and that there are mostly single dominant parties in Sub-Saharan Africa (Van de Walle, 2003: 297; Boggards, 2004:173). While this may not necessarily be the case in some countries like Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ghana, which seem to have two dominant parties, it is suggestive of the fact that the goal of multi-party democracy is often constrained by institutional factors, as well as sociological factors such as ethnicity or ethno-political cleavages.

While it is important to quibble over the mechanical, psychological, and reductive effects of districting on smaller parties, and the question of whether African countries differ fundamentally from European countries in terms of the functioning of their institutions, it is even more important that valid theories of how various institutions can be coupled in order to produce vibrant democracies and good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa be constructed. As noted above, Lijphart’s theory distinguishes between majoritarian and consensual democracies, and argues that while consensual systems exhibit significantly higher indictors of democratic quality, only minor differences exist between the two systems with regards to governing effectiveness (Lijphart, 1999: 8). Lipjhart finding is theoretically significant because it throws light on importance of party systems for the quality of governance in a society. This dissertation therefore relies on it to offer a theory of alternative party and electoral systems, as well as ethno-
political cleavage structures that can be applied to democracy and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The significance of Lijphart’s theory to this work lies in the fact that other than ethnicity it includes all of the institutional variables studied in this dissertation. Also, he found and established theoretical support for certain relationships between the variables. For example, he found that SMDs favored two party systems while PR favors multi-partyism (Lijphart, 1999, Duverger, 1954). More importantly, his data included developing countries and even some from Africa, which makes it more representative than most works undertaken by Western scholars. Finally, unlike Janda and Kwak, Lijphart made a distinction between the two types of party systems in term of governance, although he found very little difference between them. Although these two systems entail a lot more, it is clear that foundationally the executive-parties dimension deal extensively with the electoral system – party system relationship referenced above. The theoretical significance of that relationship can be used, at least in part, to postulate or hypothesize, as I do later, that multiparty systems exhibit better governance than two-party systems. It is also the basis upon which I make the theoretical distinction with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa because it captures and distinguishes all but one of the variables in this study.

In order to extend Lijphart’s typology to include ethnicity and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, I first did a time series analysis of the parliamentary and presidential elections in Sierra Leone from 1996 - 2012, with the aim of showing the extent to which the electoral systems and ethnicity or ethno-political cleavages structure the workings of party systems. Following that, I did an analysis of the democratic and governance trends in Sierra Leone during the same period with the goal of determining the extent to which changes in electoral institutions, ethnicity or ethno-political cleavage structures, and party systems influence democratization and
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. I used both presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as the number of seats won and percentage of votes earned in measuring changes in party system outcomes. The reason for this is because presidential elections seem to offer candidates the opportunity to use their “blackmail and / or coalition” potentials to influence party system outcomes, which makes it erroneous to confine the analysis to parliamentary elections alone.

Due to legal thresholds that require candidates to earn a certain percentage vote in order to win in a growing number of countries, it has become increasingly possible for candidates representing smaller parties to exert considerable leverage during presidential elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. For an example, the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone stipulates that a presidential candidate must get a minimum of 55% of the votes in the first round of elections in order to stave off a second round of voting. This is almost impossible to achieve due to the sheer number of parties that contest Presidential elections, and the “salience of ethno-political groups for electoral support” (Mozaffar et.al. 2003: 381). Also, since 1996, Sierra Leone has held two Parliamentary elections under the PR system and two under the SMD system but after the 2012 Parliamentary elections the number of political parties with seats in Parliament witnessed a noticeable drop from seven in 1996 to just the two main parties. Sierra Leone is therefore the ideal case for this study due to the fact that it operated under alternate electoral and party systems during the period under review. Furthermore, there are previous works that point to the salience of ethnicity in the politics of Sierra Leone (Kandeh 1992), which makes it amenable for a study that attempts to theorize about how ethnicity interacts with party systems and other related variables.

This study is expected to contribute to the comparative literature on the relationship between party systems, electoral systems, ethnicity and ethno-political cleavages, and how it
affects democratization and governance in Africa. Also, it attempts to connect multiple variables in a rigorous way in order to show the theoretical contradictions in the way certain institutional and socio-cultural variables interact Sierra Leone. Ultimately, it advances a theory about how to couple electoral and party systems with models of ethnicity to produce democracy and good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In chapter 1, I laid out the main theoretical arguments underpinning the work and developed specific hypotheses based on an extensive review of the literature on party systems, electoral systems, ethnicity, democratization and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. I also offered preliminary evidence of plausibility for the study, justification for the use of hypotheses, operationalized the main variables, and discussed the methodology employed in the research.

In chapter 2, I use pluralism and ethnic pluralism in particular, as the main theoretical framework to explain how differences in socio-cultural institutions and ethno-political cleavages challenge the applicability of generalized theories of party systems, democratization and governance.

I undertook an extensive review of the literature on party systems, democratization, and governance in sub-Saharan Africa in chapter 3 in order to show that a lacuna exists in the body of knowledge relating to the interactions between those variables in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the leading works on party systems, electoral systems, democratization, and governance have been undertaken by Western scholars such as Duverger, Lipset and Rokkan, Lipjhart etc., and the majority of these works are based on the dynamics of western democracies which are quite different from Sub-Saharan Africa where ethnic differences are exacerbated by ignorance and poverty, and rendered lethal in electoral terms. I attempted where possible to integrate the
existing Western-based theories with emerging ones on African in order to shed light on the nature of the interactions among the variables under review.

Chapter 4 starts with an examination of the evolution of party politics in Sierra Leone, with particular attention to the period from 1996 to 2012. It is necessary to do that in order to show how political parties and party systems have evolved in Sierra Leone, completely metamorphosing from multi-party to one party system, then back to multi-party, and now a two party system. I also analyze the nexus between party system and democratization, as well as between party system and governance in Sierra Leone, while considering the impact of ethnicity on those processes.

In chapter 5, I used Polity IV dataset and the Worldwide Governance Index to analyze trends in democratization and Governance in Sierra Leone. Finally, in Chapter 6, I used Lijphart’s typology of democratic systems, along with potentially relevant ethnic configurations in order to propose a theory of party systems, democratization, and governance that can be used in regulating the existing interactions between these institutional and socio-cultural variables in Sub-Saharan African countries. The theory includes alternative systems i.e., two party versus multi-party systems, and it pairs them with the appropriate electoral systems, ethno-political cleavage structures typical of diverse, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural societies in order to produce viable democracies based on good governance.
Chapter 1

Theoretical Approach, Literature Review and Key Hypotheses

In order to explain the effects of ethnicity and ethno-political cleavages on the functioning of party systems, and of the party system on democratization and governance, I used cultural pluralism as the main theoretical framework for analysis. Even though some of its main underpinnings have been challenged by scholars from various academic perspectives, pluralism remains a useful theoretical framework for the investigation of the effects of ethnicity and ethno-political cleavages on party systems as well as democratization and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa because it helps explain the process of alliance formation and behavior in diverse societies.

a) Theoretical Approach - Pluralism (Ethnicity)

As a theory, pluralism was dormant until the 1960s when the so-called “melting pot” theories, focused mainly on the assimilation of smaller cultural groups by larger and dominant ones, came under attack by scholars who debunked the notion of the development of homogenous, assimilated cultures through a process of sustained interaction and political integration (Young, 1976: 7). Assimilationist or “melting pot” theories were constructed on the assumption that in the process of cultural interaction, a single dominant culture would emerge and engulf the subordinate cultures as more and more people from those cultures learn and adopt the values and lifestyles of the dominant culture. The works of Parenti and Glazer, and Moynihan, were very influential in building the intellectual blocks of pluralist theory (broadly construed) by showing how obsolete theories of cultural assimilation had become (Young, 1976: 7-8). In fact, the works of these critics did much to not only undermine the main theoretical
foundations of assimilation, they also paved the way for the rise of pluralism as an alternate theory about group behavior.

The concept of cultural pluralism, like most concepts in this study may be quite confusing due to differing views expressed by critics as well as significant variations in the utility of the concept, even within political science. It is more confusing when one considers that culture entails elements ranging from ethnicity to religion etc. In an attempt to define the broad contours of the concept and underscore its political significance, Crawford Young outlined what he referred to as the “three basic components” of cultural pluralism (Young: 1976: 12).

According to Young, pluralism must be used in reference to: a) group interactions within a sovereign political context which in modern times will correspond to the state, b) that there should be at least two significant groups that affect overall transactions in the political environment through their interaction, which can be competitive or conflictual, and c) that solidarity among various groups is derived from ethnic, linguistic, racial, kinship, customary or territorial ties or associations (Young, 1976: 12).

In addition to the three basic components of cultural pluralism, Young put forward three fundamental hypotheses that are noteworthy for this project. He hypothesized that; “a) cultural grouping are not set in stone, i.e., groups expand and contract, and even atrophy in response to historical forces and changes in the patterns of interaction within the political environment; b) that an individual’s group loyalty is neither circumscribed nor sacrosanct, by which he means, an individual can belong to more than one group, and can even switch loyalty from one group to another; and c) theoretically, group ideologies vary in intensity depending on the strength of historical ties, cultural affinities, shared destiny, or other nebulous or esoteric criteria that lead to bonds of solidarity” (Young:1976: 12-13).
It should be noted that even though group loyalties can sometimes be uncertain, and that individuals can and in most cases do, belong to more than one group, individual and collective loyalty to a particular group identity may be more salient as a basis for association and political action than for other groups. For example, in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic identity tends to be far more politically salient because of the compelling need in some cases to rely on ethno-political coalitions and cleavages in the strategic coordination of votes (Mozaffar et. al. 2003: 380). Similarly, religious identity appears to be a far more salient in terms of identity formulation and loyalty in North Africa and the Maghreb than it appears to be case in Sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of Nigeria, Somalia, and Mali etc. where religious extremism has been on the rise in recent times. Moreover, even though Young makes the case that “the individual is not necessarily assigned by birth to a single cultural aggregate” (Young: 1976: 13), certain cultural aggregates are often affiliated with individuals for the rest of their lives. For example, in most Sub Saharan African countries, a child is born into his/her parent’s ethnic group, which means (s)he is expected to remain a loyal part of that group for the rest of his or her life. As Mazrui put it, “politics in Africa is sometimes hard to keep clean merely because we are moving from one set of values to another. In no other area of life is this better illustrated than in the whole issue of tribal solidarity and kinship obligations. Pressures are exerted on the African official or politician to remind him of those who share his ultimate social womb… Even an African intellectual is sometimes subjected to this kind of pressure.” (Mazrui, in Gutkind (ed). 1970: 114).

Since the purpose of this dissertation is to show how ethnicity and ethno-political cleavage structures interact with electoral systems to produce party systems that promote democracy and good governance, I use the term ethnicity to refer to the inter-ethnic group
dynamics that exist within various societies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although ethnicity means essentially the same thing as “tribalism,” I refrain from using the latter for the obvious reason that its use in scholarly literature today imply condescension for the groups that it is used to refer to. Still, the use of term “tribalism” remains quite popular in non-intellectual circles and it conjures the same image as ethnicity when used by intellectuals. Notwithstanding the dedication of an entire volume of a journal (Journal of Asian and African Studies: 1970: V: 1-2) to “the passing of the tribal man in Africa,” his ghost still looms in the form of the “ethnic man,” who has maintained a constant presence in post-independent Sub-Saharan African. In the volume dedicated to the memory of “tribal man” in Africa, the African scholars argued that the tribal man’s passing was questionable at best, whereas others, citing the potential unifying effects of modernization, concluded that the use of tribalism as an anthropological concept had no utility other than being a “pejorative” term used by ill-informed “Eurocentric” scholars and travelers to refer to their limited understanding of other cultures.

Mazrui’s argument has most recently been re-echoed by other scholars including Franck and Rainer (2012), who used the current acceptable terminology-ethnicity-and focused their study on “ethnic favoritism” in education and infant mortality. They made essentially the same argument as Mazrui about the “altruist,” “psychic benefits,” and “quid pro quo” gains that accrue from people seeing someone from their ethnic group in power (Franck and Rainer, 2012: 296). These benefits are not always aimed at satisfying the primal feelings, in some cases they can be very real, tangible benefits such as those making education and resources for infant mortality prevention more affordable to one’s kinsmen (Franck and Rainer: 2012: 295-97). This claim notwithstanding, evidence to support the notion that ethnic groups benefit from having their kinsmen in power can be difficult to adduce although studies exist that link poor economic
performance with “ethnic favoritism.” In fact, Franck and Rainer found leaders’ ethnicity and “ethnic favoritism” to be widespread and among the key reasons for much of the African continent’s underdevelopment (Franck and Rainer, 2012: 294-5).

Using thrusts of ethnicity or ethnic favoritism referenced above, Franck and Ranier developed three models of ethnic favoritism and labeled them “ethnic altruistic,” “psychic benefits” and “quid pro quo” models respectively (Franck and Rainer 2012: 295-6). They claim that these three models help explain the conditions for the formation of ethnic cleavages and the promotion or hindrance of ethnic favoritism in Africa. The “ethnic altruistic” model assumes that the leader cares about the well-being of his kinsmen and that (s)he is preoccupied with making sure their needs are met. On the other hand the “psychic benefits” model assumes that people derive psychic (feel good) benefits from seeing one of their own in a position of dominance, whether in power or other forms of competitive endeavor. The “quid pro quo” model sees the leader as an opportunity seeker, who purposefully goes out and forges winning coalitions that may comprise mostly his kinsmen but also other groups that will help him win elections and stay in office (Franck and Rainer, 2012: 296).

Consequently, they concluded that while the “psychic benefits” model may not promote ethnicity and ethnic favoritism, the other two models could due to the fact that individuals derive great benefit, although “psychic,” from having their kinsman in power. This is especially under the “psychic benefits” model where kinsmen often expect political favors in return for support. While one can argue with the actual application of the theory it sounds plausible that there may be situations where leaders could earn the support of their kinsmen without promoting ethnic favoritism. On the other hand, when leaders become preoccupied with the protection or promotion of the narrow group interests of their kinsmen, or the wilful carving of winning ethnic
coalitions during elections, as they are often inclined to do, ethnic favoritism could just as easily and purposefully be promoted (Franck and Rainer, 2012: 296). The ethnic altruistic model usually obtains when an authoritarian ruler is in power, whereas the “quid pro quo” model is typical of the way leaders in democratic societies go about acquiring and maintaining power (Franck and Rainer, 2012: 295-6). These theoretical distinctions give insights into the circumstances under which the use of ethnicity is considered politically expedient by leaders.

Using constructivist logic, Mozaffar et.al. theorized that in putting together winning coalitions, African leaders usually engage in ethnic fragmentation or concentration (Mozaffar et.al. 2003). They rejected the notion that ethnicity is often primordial, i.e., ethnicity is based on a relationship that is “fixed” and rooted in antiquity, and instead argued that ethnicity is often socially constructed and driven by socio-economic and political factors (Mozaffar et.al. 2003: 279). Furthermore, they argued that ethno-political cleavages are “constructed and politicized” and that they “mediate the direct effects of electoral institutions reflexively through the processes of ethnic fragmentation and ethnic concentration” (Mozaffar et.al. 2003: 381-83).

Ethnic fragmentation occurs when members of the same ethnic group splinter, whereas ethnic concentration occurs when members of the same or similar ethnic group band together or coalesce in order to form a winning political coalition. In other words, ethnic concentration usually occurs when contiguous ethnic groups coalesce for political or other purposes. Mozaffar et.al. hypothesized and found that a reflexive relationship exist between ethno-political cleavages and the number of parties. They dismissed theories that maintain that increased number of cleavages (high ethno-political fragmentation) leads to increased number of parties, while decreased number of cleavages leads to a reduction in the number of political parties, as inapplicable to Sub-Saharan Africa (Mozaffar et.al. 2003: 381). They attributed their exception
to the “complex group morphology” that exhibit striking similarities but “politically salient differences” within ethnic groups in Africa.

Adding to the debate, Arriola, claims with reference to inter-party competition in Sub-Saharan Africa, that “electoral competition in multiethnic societies to be meaningful, requires opposition coordination across ethnic groups” (Arriola, 2013). He goes on to say disunity among opposition party leaders from different ethnic groups makes it possible for even the most despised incumbents to stay in power by mobilizing and/or blackmailing the business class into fund their campaigns, thereby perpetuating their rule. He cited country-specific examples ranging from Kenya to Gabon, in order to show how elite fragmentation along ethnic lines enable even loathed dictators to stay in power through divide or by blackmailing the business class into support them election after election. Inversely, in order to defeat incumbents, he argued that opposition leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa must transcend ethnic loyalties and adopt “pecuniary coalition-building” strategies that enable them to enlist the support of the business class whenever the incumbent’s capacity to blackmail them diminishes (Arriola, 2013).

Furthermore, Bah (2005) underscores the importance of ethnicity in the political context in Sub-Saharan Africa where, as he pointed out, ethnic fragmentation among elites has been among the major causes of the two periods of breakdown in democracy, and ethnic integration central in the design of democratic institutions from the first to the forth republic in Nigeria, the most populous and ethnically diverse country in Africa.

These finding by various scholars from in and out of Africa, go further to show the extent of the premium the people, as well as the politicians in Sub-Saharan Africa place on ethnicity in anticipation of the electoral benefits that it yields. In fact, the literature review shows clearly that ethnicity is not only important to voters because they get psychic benefits from belonging to
certain ethnic groups, but because it often comes with real advantages in terms of resource allocation, as well as preferential treatment in the public and private arenas. Similarly, ethnic affiliations often have costs and benefits for politicians who often win or lose elections not because of their policy positions, but because of the electoral strength of the ethnic group that they belong to or the strength of the inter-ethnic coalition that they can muster.

Another related concept that merits some discussion due to the fact that it has often been confused with ethnicity, or misapplied when used in reference to Africa, is nationalism. Nationalism refers to the feeling of belonging to a political entity worthy of sovereignty. This feeling can be derived from kinship, linguistic, and other ethno-linguistic or primordial ties, which can translate into the willingness to fight for the liberation, unification or consolidation of the sovereignty of that group. The main difference between nationalism and tribalism is that nationalism is a relatively modern ideological construct, and that the unit of analysis of nationalism is the “nation-state” (Young, 1976: 13-14) as opposed to tribalism, which is used in reference to so-called “primitive” societies.

The ambiguities in the use of the concept in relation to Africa are quite evident, given that the “nation-state” in sub-Saharan Africa arose out of the process of social engineering rather than evolution. It could be argued theoretically that most states in sub-Saharan Africa are not “nation-states” strictly defined because they were united mainly by colonial authorities based on administrative convenience which makes them neither monolithic nor unified at the core. In fact, there were significant variations in political structures, value systems, and other cultural attributes which were further magnified by the attainment of independence, competition for power amongst hitherto culturally differentiated societies, and the ultimate search for identity by newly independent states. Little wonder then that political competition in post-colonial Africa
today is characterized by deep ethnic cleavages which get deeper with every political contest. Pluralism is therefore a legitimate theoretical approach as well as a key variable, and although its use in the current literature is somewhat limited, it is very useful in the analysis of the effects of ethnicity on political competition and party politics in sub-Saharan Africa.

b) Literature Review

i) Party Systems

According to Sartori, the study of political parties has been complicated by the ambiguities that the term “party” generates (Sartori, 2005: 3-5; Mainwaring, 2001). Political parties have been often confused with “factions,” which have negative connotative and denotative meaning because they conjure an image of a wide gulf between fiercely opposing forces. While parties belong to a whole, factions are isolated from each other and often characterized by vigorous pursuit of self-interest rather than national interest (Sartori, 2005: 20-22; 52). Parties have also been often confused with ‘groups” and “organizations,” broadly speaking. Membership to groups and organizations are often restricted based on objectives and programs while parties tend to be more” ideologically” driven. The main objective of groups and organizations are often centered on representing of the interests of the members of the groups, not necessarily the acquisition of political power. In an era dominated by competitive politics parties tend to be diverse in membership and broad in outlook, with their main objective being the acquisition and maintenance of political power.

In order to clarify the meaning of parties, Sartori put forward a rationale for political parties that views parties as: a) distinct from factions b) as an integral part of a whole, and c) as “channels of expression” (Sartori, 2005: 22). Based on these criteria, I define a political party
as a group of citizens united by common interest or ideology, and organized for political action with the aim of acquiring and maintaining power or significantly altering the power dynamics and leadership structure in the state. This definition captures features that are relevant to both small and large parties in two and multi-party systems that may be incapable of winning elections but are nonetheless relevant or significant because they have the power to alter the leadership structure in a state due to their “coalition” or “blackmail” potentials. It is particularly important in the context of the current discussion because states in Africa are now leaning towards multi-partyism, which tends to be fertile soil for the germination of coalitions, or in which smaller and seemingly weaker parties are often courted by stronger parties to form coalitions that could ultimately give them the majority required to govern in close elections.

Political parties are central to the democratic process (Duverger, 1965: xxiii-xxiv; Mainwaring, 1999: 12; Neumann, 1956: 1), and in order to understand the democratic process, we have to first understand the role political parties play in fostering democracy and facilitating good governance. According to Neumann, political parties organize the public and educate the masses on issues of political responsibility (Neumann, 1956: 397). It has long been argued that “social learning” is fundamental to democracy because of the complexity of voting and the difficulty of making policy choices advocated by different parties, especially in societies with low literacy rates and correspondingly high levels of ethnic diversity. In order for ordinary citizens in those countries to embark on effective political participation by making tough choices between various parties, they need to be educated on the complexities of the political process, and parties are often best suited for this task because they want to hold and maintain power.

In addition to educating the masses, parties mobilize the public for political action through rallies, town hall meetings, and get-out-the-vote campaigns. Opposition parties, in
particular, tend to be effective in mobilizing the public against policies proposed by ruling parties that they consider not to be in the interest of the people. It should be borne in mind that while opposition parties tend to be quite effective in educating the masses about the ills of the government in power, their ultimate goal is to have the opportunity through effective opposition, to be the party in power.

Furthermore, political parties nominate candidates for electoral offices (Gunther and Diamond, 2001) and create linkages between the government and the people (Neumann, 1956: 397) by serving as conduits through which societal concerns are channeled to the governments and as feedback loops through which governmental initiatives are brought to the people. In very diverse states, parties tend to be the main highways and by-ways through which government reaches the people, especially those in minority communities.

Finally, political parties facilitate social integration (Gunther and Diamond, 2001) by ensuring the preservation of the uniqueness of each social group, even as efforts are made to integrate them in the state. In very diverse societies, integration tends to be a major preoccupation of political leaders because if societies do not see themselves as part of the body politic they may consider it counter-productive to participate effectively in the affairs of the state. Parties therefore divide groups and people in a state for purposes of winning elections, but strive to unite them once the elections are over so as to lay the foundation for governance which require coalition-building.

In order to further the understanding of the functioning of political parties, various scholars have put forward typologies for classifying them. One dimension that has been quite useful is to examine parties in terms of cleavage structures i.e. the gulf that exists between
various parties due to the ideologies that they espouse or the social divisions that they represent in a society (Neumann 1956: 157-68, Duverger, 1954: 231, 237, Lipset and Rokkan 1969). Using this schema, Neumann identified “in” versus the “out” group (Neumann, 1956: 400), wherein the in group represents the conservative orientation that has a status quo bias, and the out group represents change or reform. He categorized “in” parties as “parties of patronage” and out “parties as parties of principle.” In terms of ideologies, he identified the following: communist, socialist, liberal/radical, agrarian, Christian, and conservative (Neumann, 1956: 400-402).

Using ideological cleavage structures to identify Latin American parties, Gunther and Diamond identified seven types of parties ranging from left, center-left, center, center-right, right, right and Christian/secular, and personalist (Gunther and Diamond, 2001). It is obvious that leftist parties are usually identified with socialist or communist ideologies that advocate government control of the means of ownership, production and distribution of goods and services, whereas those on the right are associated with conservative values that advocate free market and limited government principles. The rest of the party types tend to fall somewhere on the continuum from socialist/communist ideologies to conservative ideals, with the main differences being in the degree to which they embrace principles on one end of the continuum or the other. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, socialist/communist leaning parties have become considerably less in significant, even in Eastern Europe. Gunther and Diamond identified fifteen types of political parties based on organization, which encompasses a) thick or thin parties or elite-based versus mass-based parties; b) pragmatic orientation, which includes ideological versus particularistic, or clientele parties; and c) tolerant and pluralistic, or democratic versus proto-hegemonic, or anti-system (Gunther and Diamond, 2001).
Even though classifying parties based on ideological cleavages has been a common practice, it does have some obvious setbacks. First, such a typology assumes that all political parties are ideologically based. However, the truth is most parties tend to seek the center in order to gain power, and govern from the right or left once it is acquired. This shifting of positions based on political expediency call into question the utility of ideological cleavages as a basis for identifying parties. Moreover, in developing countries, parties do not often identify themselves with clear cut ideologies because they see an obvious advantage in doing so. Instead, they often try to co-opt ideologies that seem to appeal to the public or the international community at the time. Also, parties in developing countries, especially in Africa, tend to draw most of their support from ethnic groups (Posner, 2005), which renders ideology of lesser consequence in the formation and functioning of political parties.

A more practical way of identifying political parties, which I employ in this project, is the number of parties. This typology identifies parties broadly into one, two and multi-party systems (Duverger, 1954: 203-205). In a one party system which is not the focus of this dissertation, there is only one party recognized by the state. Even though proponents of this type of party system argue that it minimizes ethnic and other cleavages while enhancing prospects for national integration by uniting countries around single parties through the philosophy of “democratic centralism,” it has also associated with dictatorial rule which undermines democracy. A two party system is one in which only two major parties are capable of winning elections and forming governments based on the strength of their representation in parliament, their relevance in the electoral process, and/or their effectiveness as parties generally.

The fact that a country is classified as a two party system does not however mean that only two parties exist. In fact, there may be multiple parties but the key distinguishing factor
between a two party system and a multi-party system is that under the two party system, only two parties have realistic chances of winning elections and forming independent (coalition free) governments, whereas under multi-party systems more than two parties can demonstrate the potential to form governments independently or in coalition with other parties. The smaller parties under this system, because of their diminished chances of winning due to the so-called mechanical and psychological effects of districting, often resort to the use of their “blackmail” or “coalition potential” to demonstrate their relevance in electoral and political processes.

In order to distinguish party systems based on the number of parties, the notion of party strength was introduced (Duverger, 1965: 283-290, Blondel, 1968). Duverger focused on the number of votes earned in an election or the number of seats won in parliament (Duverger, 1965: 281), while Blondel’s criterion for a strong party is one that captures at least 40% of the total votes cast in an election (Blondel, 1968). This criterion therefore classifies two party systems as one in which the two main parties capture 40% or more (respectively) of the total votes cast in an election. Blondel also talks about a three party system as one in which three main parties vie for power, which may include two strong parties and a weak or smaller third party (Blondel, 1968). He suggested that three party systems may be considered two-and-half party systems and noted that: “While it would seem theoretically possible for three party systems to exist, in which all three parties were of about equal size, there are in fact no three party systems of this kind in western democracies…It can thus be stated that, while theoretically possible, a genuine three party system is not a likely type among western democracies” (Blondel, 1968, p. 185).

If the theoretical distinction between two and three party systems is confusing, it is even more so between two and multi-party systems. A multi-party system is one in which multiple parties of about of medium strength (i.e., they poll above 20% of the votes) engage in a contest
for power through a system of free and fair elections. Even though the multi-party system is
touted as the ideal party system for developing countries (Janda and Kwan, 2011), the fact is that
the majority of parties in countries with multi-party systems tend to be small with the exception
of two main parties that fall in the medium, or large party categories. That being the case, should
such a system be classified as a two party system or a multi-party system? This could have been
the fundamental problem that led Duverger to argue that it is not always easy to distinguish
between two-party and multi-party systems due to the co-existence of a number of smaller
parties alongside the larger parties (Duverger, 1965: 207).

In addressing the shortcomings of the classification of parties based on strength, Sartori
put forward the notion of party relevance (Sartori, 1976). According to Sartori, a party may be
considered relevant based on its “coalition” and/or “blackmail” potentials, which have
implications for the tactics that parties use in competitive environments (Sartori, 1976). A party
is considered electorally relevant if its coalition or blackmail potentials are high, whereas a party
may be discounted as irrelevant if its coalition or blackmail potentials are low because it will not
affect overall party competition in a significant way. It is therefore noteworthy that a vibrant
multi-party system hinges not on the number of parties but on their strength as well as their
relevance in altering the processes of government formation and governance.

The criterion of party relevance assumes a higher degree of significance in a multi-party
context, especially in developing countries like those in Sub-Saharan Africa, where ethnic
diversity poses real challenges for the flourishing of genuine multi-partyism. According to
Sartori “…there has been a marked imbalance between the sophisticated conceptual frameworks
developed for the Third World vis-a-viz the poverty of the frameworks retained for the Western
world. If only to restore the balance, a reconsideration of the Western or Western-type
experience deserves, I feel, high priority…Two related problems call for preliminary attention: how to avoid (i) typological mishandlings, and (ii) Euromorphic disguises” (Sartori, 1976)

As noted above, the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), has led to the re-institutionalization of the multi-party systems in countries of the developing world, even if in sheer numbers of parties only. This rebirth of democracy and competitive party politics in countries of the developing world that are often characterized by deep ethnic and social cleavage structures warrant new approaches to the study of party systems and new typologies that capture the theoretical idiosyncrasies of the developing countries as noted by Sartori (Sartori, 1976).

Cognizant this theoretical lacuna, especially as it relates to developing countries, Mainwaring opined that political scientists need to rethink political parties and party systems in those countries for the following reasons: i) weakly institutionalized party systems that are prevalent in developing countries operate differently from highly institutionalized party systems in Western democracies, ii) that social cleavage approach, which pervades western democratic systems are not the most suitable for understanding political parties and party systems in countries which adopted democratic principles during the Third Wave of democratization, and iii) in order to understand party systems in these countries, we need to understand the relationship between the political elites and the state, and the extent to which they (elites) exert influence on party systems (Mainwaring, 1999: 21-22).

Mozaffar et. al. tried to establish a clear link between electoral systems, ethno-political cleavage structures and party systems in Africa in a cross national study. Of particular interest to this study is the finding that low levels of fragmentation exert reductive effects on the number of parties and causes party system fragmentation while high levels of fragmentation exert the
opposite effect due to the incentives it creates for intergroup coalition building. Also, they found that moderate levels of fragmentation and concentration orchestrate increases in the number of parties, which can be moderated by changes in district magnitudes (Mozaffa et. al. 2004: 389). This finding goes on to reinforce earlier, mostly Western-based findings, that party systems are by-products of both electoral systems design and social cleavage structures, and the authors remind us that “the complex interaction of electoral institutions and ethno-political cleavages thus structure the conversion of votes in Africa’s emerging and unconsolidated democracies” (Mozaffar et. al. 2004: 389). Others have questioned the significance ethno-political cleavage structures in the determination of the number of parties and charge that notions of African exceptionalism are subsumed in the findings of Mozaffar et.al. They argued that African party systems do conform to the general theoretical propositions developed based on Western democracies (Brambor et.al. 2007; and Lindberg 2005). However, those scholars failed to show evidence from actual cases in Africa to support their own claims. Relying on in-depth case study analysis, this dissertation will show the ways in which electoral systems and ethnicity structure party systems, and how party systems can in turn influence governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.

ii) Electoral Systems

Even though party systems are considered central to the democratic process, they do not guarantee democracy all by themselves. In order for party systems to function effectively and ascertain democratic outcomes, there needs to be credible rules in place to regulate the competition for power among the contesting parties. Effective party systems therefore require fair electoral systems to determine how votes will be translated into seats. According to Farrell, “in almost any course on politics the following themes generally function as important topics for consideration: elections and representation; parties and party systems; government formation and
the politics of coalitions. In each of these areas, the electoral system plays a key role. Depending on how the system is designed it may be easier or harder for particular politicians to win seats; it may be easier or harder for particular parties to gain representation in parliament; it may be more or less likely that one party can form a government on its own. In short, there are important questions about the functioning of political systems that are influenced, at least in part, by the design of the electoral system.” (Farrell, 2011: 3).

Farrell’s quote above illuminates the role of electoral systems as it relates to the proper functioning of democratic systems. In fact, it has been argued that electoral systems are key intervening variables in the nexus between party systems and the realization of democratic outcomes in a society (Duverger, 1954 and Lijphart, 1997). Given its importance in the functioning of democratic systems, one needs to be clear about the exact meaning of electoral systems. Elections are a competitive mechanism by which citizens in a democratic society directly or indirectly choose their leaders. Elections usually take place under a set of rules that are designed to make the competition free and fair. These rules may determine who votes, and who gets to be voted for, when campaigning should commence and also lay down rules governing campaigns, etc. The rules which determine the conduct of elections are collectively referred to as electoral laws (Farrell, 2011: 3), which should not be confused with specific laws that regulate the election process, such as the determination of the ballot structure, the rules for calculating majority, and the determination of who gets elected (Farrell, 2011: 3). In short, an **electoral system** is a system of laws that outline how elections are won and lost, and how representation is determined and attained in a democratic society.

Since the start of the Third Wave of democracy, there has been a renewed interest in the study of electoral systems among scholars. This interest grew out of the realization that electoral
systems help legitimize governments. Also, because electoral systems lay down the rules of competition among various parties in the state, they have become the means by which citizens and the world community recognizes the legitimacy of certain parties or individuals to rule. A government is considered legitimate if it wins the majority or plurality of votes required to form a government. On the other hand, a government is considered illegitimate if it acquires power by any means other than being freely and fairly elected at the ballot box.

Farrell has noted that depending on the design, electoral systems may help produce stable governments (Farrell, 2011: 4). In majoritarian systems the ballot structure tends to be categorical, that is, voters are given the option of voting for one and only one candidate or proposition. This kind of ballot structure increases the disproportionality among competing parties, but produces clear majority party led governments. Conversely, in proportional systems, the ballot structure tends to be ordinal, which minimizes the level of disproportionality among competing parties, thereby failing to produce clear majority-dominated governments (Lipjhart, 1999: 14-15; Farrell, 2011: 165-171). In order to govern in such an environment, parties with fragile majorities are often forced to coalesce with smaller or extremist parties to form governing majorities. Such coalition governments are often political marriages-of-convenience, entered into by parties that have no ideological affinity, but only a strategic, symbiotic interest in co-governance.

The study of electoral systems has been greatly enhanced by Douglas Rae (1969), who identified the key variables used in its classification. According to Rae, electoral systems can be identified based the District Magnitude (DM), Electoral Formula (EF), and Ballot Structure (BS) (Rae, 1969). District magnitude refers to the number of seats per constituency, which can range from one (DM=1) to as many as hundreds (DM≥1). In general, electoral districts with one or
other smaller number of representative(s) tend to be associated with majoritarian systems, whereas districts with larger numbers of representatives tend to be associated with proportional systems (Lijphart, 1999: 143).

**Electoral Formula** refers to the methodology used to calculate majority and award seats in parliament. Electoral Formulae can be designed to either exaggerate or minimize the extent of disproportionality between the number of votes earned and the number of sets awarded to the parties in parliament (Farrell, 2011: 153-154). The **Ballot Structure** determines the choices and options available to the electorate when they cast their votes. Broadly defined, there are two types of ballot structure in use in electoral systems around the world (Rae, 1969; Lijphart, 1999; Farrell, 2011). **Ordinal ballots** allow voters to cast their votes by lining up the candidates in order of preference, and it is often associated with proportional systems. **Categorical ballots** are those that allow voters the option of choosing one, and only one, candidate (or issue) from among those represented on the ballot (Lijphart, 1999: 14 – 15, 143).

Even though other authors have put forward other variables than the ones identified by Rae (Lijphart: 1999: 144 - 165), I intend to use Rae’s variables in this dissertation because they to have the greatest potential effects on the functioning of the party system (Taagepera and Schugart, 1989; Lipjhart, 1999). Using Rae’s variables, two broad types of electoral systems emerge-proportional and majoritarian/ plural systems. Electoral systems based on Proportional Representation are those that are geared towards ensuring that each party’s representation in parliament mirrors as closely as possible, its percentage of total votes won. Proportional electoral systems tend to have larger District Magnitudes, i.e., the number of representatives per electoral district tend to be greater than one (DM>1) (Farrell, 2011: 6-7). In addition to having
larger district magnitudes, Proportional electoral systems tend to have ordinal ballot structures, which enable the citizens to cast their vote for all the contestants in order of preference.

Generally, electoral system enhance minority representation and open up the possibility for smaller political parties that often represent minority interests, to effectively participate in the democratic process (Lijphart: 1999: 152). Nonetheless, PR often leads to the formation of weak coalition governments by stressing representation over the need to establish absolute majority led governments (Farrell: 2011: 218-220). It is therefore not uncommon for governments with proportional electoral systems to be coalition governments held together not by common ideology or policy positions, but by tenuous political arrangements that often fall apart in the face of the real challenges of governance.

Majoritarian systems are designed to ensure that clear winners emerge in elections, and by so doing, they exercise reductive effects on the number of parties in a democratic system (Lindberg, 2005: 44). This is made possible by smaller district magnitudes and categorical ballot structures that accord citizens the right to vote for one and only one candidate or issue (M=1) (Farrell, 2011: 4-6). Majoritarian electoral systems can be sub-divided into Single Member Plurality (SMP), which declares as winner the candidate with the highest number or the plurality of votes; and Simple Majority system, which assigns a win to the candidate with the majority of votes, i.e., the total votes earned by the winner should amount to greater than 50% of the votes.

Advocates of majoritarian systems argue for its favorability on the grounds that it is a simple system, which allows votes to be easily cast and computed, and results declared (Farrell: 2011: 22-25). Because voters are given the option of choosing only one candidate, it makes it easier for voters who may not be politically sophisticated to cast their votes. It also makes it
easy for such votes to be counted and the results declared in a timely manner because it prevents repetitive counting, which cuts down on the time and chaos that often characterize the computing of votes. Majoritarian systems also facilitate smooth transfer of power by making it easier, through its design, for clear winners or majorities to emerge after elections (Lijphart, 1999: 64; Lindberg 2005: 44). The arguments for simplicity notwithstanding, majoritarian systems tend to obscure actual election results by obscuring the degree of disproportionality between the actual votes cast and the number of seats won in parliament. This disproportionality often minimizes possibilities for smaller parties and minority groups to be effectively represented in parliament, and in the overall democratic process.

The case of emerging democracies in Africa and elsewhere in the world pose a major problem in the study of electoral institutions. Ironically, at the same time as countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are building multi-party democracies, the effective numbers of parties are reportedly steadily declining in most of the emerging democracies. While some scholars have associated this trend with the consolidation of power by dominant parties and other non-institutional factors, the majority have associated it with the reductive effects of electoral systems, as well as the “mechanical and psychological effects” of district magnitudes and legal thresholds (Lindberg, 2005). In this respect, Mozaffar et.al. are different because they showed how electoral systems interacts with ethno-political cleavages in Africa to cause reductions the number of parties or counter the reduction of parties in Africa. Even though their work has met with vehement criticism, more study is required to establish the relationship between those variables and the extent of their interaction in shaping party systems in Africa.

iii) Democracy and democratization
In order to better understand the role of political parties, especially in plural societies, one must fully understand what democracy really entails. Like political parties, the concept of democracy though widely used, is replete with conceptual inconsistencies (Parry, 1994). These inconsistencies could be associated with the fact that democracy is a value-laden concept (Khagram, 1993). Derived from two Greek words, *demos* meaning “people” and *kratos* meaning “authority,” democracy refers to a government ruled by the people (Sorensen, 2010). Though derived from the ancient Greek practice of direct democracy, wherein all adult male citizens had the right to participate directly in decision-making, democracy as currently understood refers to the practice of ruling a polity by the majority the of citizens through their elected representatives. This conception of democracy presupposes a form of government that is derived from competitive venture involving two or more sides. The mechanism through which that competition is conducted in the state is the political party; hence, political parties are central to the formation and institutionalization of democratic governments.

Typically, there are three broad dimensions of democracy – the political, economic and social dimensions. As Khagram pointed out, political democracy, which is the subject of this dissertation, is different from economic and social democracy (Khagram, 1993). Economic democracy has been used to refer to the functioning of the free market system, wherein individuals and firms compete freely with others and in the process offer the consumer competitive choices at affordable prices. This economic democracy is often used to refer to capitalist systems in which market forces determine the choices and options available to individual consumers. Social democracy, on the other hand, refers to the degree of social inclusion in a society. Like political democracy, it focuses on issues such as equality of opportunity, which arises when various groups merge in an effort to further their mutual
interests. Even though democracy in these two arenas is not to be confused with democracy in the political arena, they often tend to go hand-in-hand.

Political democracy, which has also been referred to as polyarchy by Robert Dahl, spells out the “conditions” that should exist for a society to be referred to as democratic. Among the conditions necessary for democracy to flourish are accountability, participation, competition, and contestation (Dahl, 1970). Dahl generated from these broad conditions a series of specific conditions that should exist in a democratic society. Among these conditions are free, fair and regular elections in which citizens choose among various parties based on their proposed policies, the party that best represents their interests, among which may be: the right to vote and to be voted for, freedom of association and expression, and universal adult suffrage (Dahl 1982: 10-11).

The conditions for democracy approach focus the attention of scholars on the conditions that promote or hinder the institutionalization of democracy in a society. It is therefore a comparative approach to the study of democracy, whereas the transition to democracy approach focuses on the historical processes involved in the transformation of societies from one regime type to another (Khagram, 1993). In short, the transitions to democracy perspective seeks to understand the dynamic process by which a society moves from an authoritarian form of government, one in which power is concentrated in the hands of one person or a few unelected officials, to a more representative form of government. This process of transitioning from an authoritarian form of government to a more representative one is referred to as democratization (Parry and Moran 1994), although it is used interchangeably with democracy in this dissertation.
It is evident from the distinction above that still further problems emanate from a classification of democracy based the conditions for, and transitions to democracy approaches. Specifically, the transitions to democracy approach implies that states tend to move from one regime type, i.e., from authoritarian regime to democratic regimes. Recent studies in political regimes show that authoritarian and democratic regimes are not merely polar opposites as assumed by Sartori when he defined democracy as “a system in which no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with the power to rule and, therefore, no one can abrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power” (Sartori, 1976: 206). Rather, they show that there is a continuum from authoritarianism to democracy, and that along the continuum, other regime types, which may be neither wholly autocratic nor fully democratic, can be found. In the words of Huntington, democratic and autocratic, or nondemocratic systems are not “dichotomous but continuous variables” (Huntington, 1991: 11). In fact, the Center for systemic Peace identified a third regime type, which has been referred to as anocracy because it contains elements of both democracy and authoritarianism (Polity IV dataset). Anocracies tend to contain certain elements of representative government such as elections, which may not be free and fair, along with weak governmental and evaluative institutions. In other words, the government could be elected but not accountable to electorate; it may have institutions for governance that could be found in full blown democracies such as legislative, executive, and judiciary, but they may not be answerable to the people; and evaluative institutions such as the press may not be free or disinterested (Polity IV).

It is important to keep this third regime type in mind, especially in the analysis of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa because most of the states have just transitioned, or are transitioning, from autocratic regimes to more democratic ones. Given this analytical distinction,
is it appropriate to refer to sub-Saharan African countries as democracies? Should those countries, the majority of which are in the process of transitioning towards democracy, be analyzed within the same conceptual framework as those designed for mature democracies? These are questions that I intend to address in the examination of the case selected for the project.

In a more recent work on democracies, which include cases from Africa, Lijphart made a distinction between two major typologies of democracy: majoritarian and consensual (Lijphart, 1999). A majoritarian form of democracy is one that is based on the majority of seats in the legislature required to govern, whereas the consensual form refers to the consultative and inclusive process required to govern. Using data collected and analyzed for 36 countries, Lijphart found that consensual types of democracy are more democratic than majoritarian types because they pursue “kinder, gentler policies” that cares for the environment, the poor and needy, and puts fewer people in jail (Lijphart, 1999).

Lijphart’s typology is very useful to this work because even though most of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are transitioning to democracies, they have to ultimately decide which type of democracy and democratic institutions best suit their own purposes. Lijphart therefore offers a way for those countries to couple various institutions into alternative systems in order to attain better democratic quality, although only marginal difference should be expected in terms of governance between the two types (Lijphart, 1999). As argued above, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa now conduct regular multi-party elections, and have in place institutional arrangements designed to facilitate democratic processes in their states, however those institutions tend to be configured in ways that undermine rather than enhance democracy due to
the fact that they are often arbitrarily put together, rather than being grounded in theories of
general and specific applicability.

iv) Governance

As can be seen from the literature review above, political parties enhance the working of
democratic forms of government because they provide a mechanism for effective competition
and representation among various opposing elements in society. The quality of democracy is in
turn influenced by the governance structures that are put in place. In other words, the kind of
governance structure in a society could enhance or minimize prospects for democratic
consolidation because it is through governance that various groups in society realize the costs
and benefits of the democratic process. Similarly, the quality of democracy in a society may
promote or inhibit good governance by over-centralizing power in the hands of one individual or
institution of the state. Given the centrality of this proposition, the central question in
establishing the relationship between party systems, democratization and governance in Africa
becomes how do party systems influence the process of governance in a state?

It is necessary to understand what governance entails in order to properly answer the
question above. Governance refers to the process by which power flows from the leadership
down to the people, which can be centralized or decentralized, depending on whether power
flows from top to bottom, or from bottom-up. If the governance structures in place in a society
impose constraints on the leadership, and as a consequence forces it to be more inclusive, then
democracy could be enhanced because such constraints open up political space for more people
outside the leadership class to participate in the political process. If, on the other hand, there are
little or no constraints on the leadership in the exercise of its powers, the resulting constriction of political space means that democracy could be jeopardized.

Like democracy, governance is a nebulous concept (Pierre, 2000: 3) that should not be confused with government. Government refers to the mechanism for managing the affairs of the state, which may include the governing institutions such as the legislative, executive and the judiciary, as well as the personnel that run the institutions. Government can therefore refer to the main institutions of state, or the people that form the leadership of a state. For ease of distinction, I would argue that government refers to the governing institutions, whereas, governance focuses on the process of managing the affairs of the state. According to Pierre, governance refers to “…sustaining coordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives such as political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil society and transnational organizations. What previously were undisputedly roles of government are now increasingly seen as more common, generic, which can be resolved by political institution but also by other actors. The main point here is that political institutions no longer maintain a monopoly of the orchestration of governance” (Pierre, 2000: 3 - 4).

Implicit in the quote above is the notion that government now has to share the responsibility for the delivery of public goods and services with non-state actors. Such shared responsibility necessitates a different approach to governing, an approach that requires government to play a catalytic role in ensuring that the goals and objectives of society are attained efficiently, effectively and equitably. Government under this conceptualization must be inclusive, flexible in terms of the institutional arrangements, and accountable to the citizenry.
Another definition of governance which tries to effectively delimit the porous boundaries of governance, put forward by Kaufmann et. al., conceptualizes governance as “…the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced; (b) the capacity of government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” (kaufmann et. al., 2010: ).

The definition by Kaufmann et.al. brings out the main elements of governance already alluded to. They include the mechanism for the selection of the leadership as well as a means for monitoring the extent of its power. It also stresses the capacity of government in the formulation and implementation of policies, which is the fundamental responsibility of government in a democratic society. Finally, the definition underscores the central role of the citizen over the state in regulating socio-economic interactions among various groups in the society. The definition clearly reinforces the democratic foundation of governance. The citizens must elect their leaders, who must in turn craft and implement sound policies to facilitate smooth interaction among them, and in doing so, it (the government) must include key stakeholders, whose endorsement of such policies gives them political legitimacy and therefore better chances of succeeding.

According to Hirst, “good governance…means creating an effective political framework conducive to private economic action-stable regimes, the rule of law, efficient state administration adapted to the roles that government can actually perform, and a strong civil society independent of the government. Democracy is valuable in this context if it provides legitimation for good governance. Multi-party competition and free elections are valuable in
preventing cronyism and corruption and in building support for development strategies, but only if parties eschew extremism and play the game by the appropriate liberal rules” (Hirst in Pierre, 2000: 14)

In international relations, the notion of governance has been enhanced by the neo-liberal view that cooperation among states is necessary for the resolution of shared problems (Koehane, 1984) such as global warming, the regulation of the international financial markets, nuclear proliferation, etc. This realization led to a reevaluation of the role of international institutions, bilateral relations, mechanisms that enhance cooperation in the international arena, and in particular, attempts to enhance the capabilities to monitor and control such interactions at the domestic level (Hirst in Pierre, 2000: 16). Because of these developments, organizations such as the IMF and WTO are retooling their institutional practices to accommodate the demands for more local collaboration in policies rather than the top-down, highly technocratic model that had characterized policy making processes in those organizations.

Associated mainly with developed countries, corporate governance seeks to institute principles of accountability and transparency in management of corporations without making corresponding structural changes in the objectives of the firm, which essentially is to make profit for its shareholders (Hirst in Pierre, 2000: 17). Corporate governance therefore focuses on promoting the needs of stakeholders rather than shareholders. In short, it focuses on balancing the interests of workers, consumers, the community and the environment rather than just shareholders.

Finally, in the field of public administration, governance has been associated with the new public management strategies that have been employed in the public sector to ensure that
governmental functions are carried out more efficiently, effectively and equitably. It entails a more collaborative approach to public sector management, less hierarchical organizational structures, and a focus on results rather rules.

All of the perspectives on governance referenced above have in common the need for collaboration between the state, civil society, international actors, citizens and NGOs in crafting and implementing policies that maximize the goals of society in an efficient and effective manner. Governance therefore requires institutional reforms as well as changes in the relationship between the government and the governed. Moreover, governance requires more citizen and stakeholder participation in the day-to-day administration of the state, and a corresponding increase in the level of accountability on the part of those that wield political power in the state.

The push for governance has been spurred by the fact that most states are over-loaded, i.e., the problems posed by society are beyond the capacity of the state to handle effectively (Pierre, 2000: 4). Since the 1980-1990s, the capabilities of most states (even in Western democracies) to effectively address the challenges in their economies has eroded severely, and in an effort to resolve the problem, some have resorted to implementing of austerity measures such as public sector reform, privatization, and deregulation (Pierre: 2000: 1-2). In most developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, the institutionalization of these austerity measures or Structural Adjustment Programs are also considered prerequisites or collateral for getting much needed loans and other forms of aid from developed countries and multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the IMF (Hayden et. al., 2004: 10).
At the same time, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become more and more proactive in terms of setting the agenda for governance rather than focus as they traditionally did, on just the provision of services. It is therefore not uncommon these days that NGOs like most multilateral agencies, drive home the need for partnerships with governments in setting the priorities of the state, and in doing so, they underscore the salience of issues such as human rights, education, and capacity building as preconditions for good governance. The erosion of the capabilities of the state to cater for the well-being of its citizens has thus served as an impetus for non-state actors such as civil society groups, multilateral agencies and NGOs, to act as key partners in crafting and implementing policies geared towards ensuring the well-being of citizens.

For most sub-Saharan African countries, governance has become an even more salient issue, given the history of state failure in that part of the world. Prior to the Third Wave of democracy, the majority of sub-Saharan African countries were highly centralized, and under one party systems of government, military juntas, and other authoritarian forms of government that were hardly accountable to the public. Today, the trend seems to be changing, albeit slowly, with the majority of countries making efforts to decentralize power and create meaningful partnerships between state and society with the aim of delivering good governance to their people.

The relationship between party systems and governance had not received much attention until lately either because the focus had been on government and not the process of governance, or because of the difficulty in designing cross-national measures of governance that capture all its major indicators. In that respect, Kaufmann et.al’s. Worldwide Governance Indicators are useful in providing scholars and practitioners reasonable ways to measure various indicators of
governance. One study which attempts to directly link party systems and governance using cross-national data is Janda and Kwak (2011). They found that countries with non-partisan parliaments fared better on governance that those with partisan parliaments, which in turn fared better than countries with non-parties (Janda and Kwak 2011). As interesting as this finding is, it still leaves unanswered the question of whether changes in party systems (based on party strength, relevance or significance) lead to changes in governance. This is curious because billions of dollars are being spent on promoting multi-party democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the developing world in hopes (with no theoretical foundation or empirical support) that it will lead to good governance. This dissertation will attempt to address that question, which deserves to be answered in order to theoretically settle the largely normative argument that somehow links multi-partyism with good governance.

After an extensive review of the literature above, it is clear that all of the works dealing with party systems, democratization, and governance do not conjunctively shed light on the impact of ethnicity by systematically relating it to the major issues that are central to this dissertation. Since, prevailing theories tend to apply more to Western democratic forms of government, which have different socio-economic dynamics this dissertation seeks to fill in the lacuna that remains in the knowledge of the functioning of party systems within diverse, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural political systems such as those found in most of sub Saharan Africa.

c) Key Hypothesis

What emerges from the literature on all of these topics is the suggestion, as stated interalia, that party systems do influence the process of democratization, which can in turn influence the process of governance in a country. The notion that multi-partyism has positive effects on
democratization and governance, has no doubt led scholars, international organizations, civil society groups, and NGOs to invest considerable resources in promoting multi-partyism as a panacea for democratization and good governance in sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries. Even though those efforts are well meaning, the nature of ethnic politics and ethno-political cleavage structures have undermined the democratic process and posed structural barriers to good economic performance in Africa (Franck and Rainer, 2012: 294). In this dissertation, I aim to show how the “mechanical and psychological effects” of changes in electoral systems, along with the deep ethnic divisions that characterize party politics in most Sub-Saharan African countries, undermine its democratic and governance processes.

Based on the review of the literature so far, I developed this broad hypothesis:

H: When coupled with larger district magnitudes, PR systems suppress ethnicity and lead to increases in the number of strong, relevant or effective parties, whereas when coupled with smaller district magnitudes SMD systems engender ethnicity and exert reductive effect on smaller parties.

This hypothesis will allow me to examine not only multi-partyism and its effects on democracy and governance, but also inquire into how mechanical and psychological effects of changes in electoral systems, along with ethnicity and ethno-political cleavage structures, produce two party systems. The analyses will be the basis for the extension of Lipjhart’s theory with specific regards to electoral systems and party systems in a way that better addresses the conditions of Sub-Saharan African states, which tend to have deep ethnic cleavages structures, “mixed” regime types, and malleable governing institutions.
Based on the hypotheses above, and a review of the relevant theories, I develop the following model:

Party systems + Electoral systems + Ethnicity ---> democracy----> Good governance

From the model above, one can deduce that party systems and electoral systems, which are central to the democratic process, have the tendency to produce stable or unstable political regimes based on the how those systems are coupled. Various theories have been advanced in this regard. According to Duverger (1954), single member plurality systems tend to favor two party systems, whereas proportional electoral systems tend to favor multi-party systems (Duverger, 1954). However, these theories have not been tested using ethnicity as an intervening variable as I intend to do with a case study from sub-Sahara Africa. This project will test the actual significance of ethnicity in the democratic process by coupling it with the alternate party and electoral systems to determine the kind of democracy to be adopted.

Beside Duverger who established the theoretical link between electoral systems and party systems, Mozaffar et.al. used constructivist logic to argue that ethnicity is not a “primordial” phenomenon in Africa. Instead, they opined that “ethno-political identity construction and the organization of ethno-political collective action, is preeminently a process of strategic interaction between self-interested actors with divergent interests” (Mozaffar, 2002: 8). These self-interested actors often realize their own goal by fostering “ethnic fragmentation” or “ethnic consolidation.” Elsewhere, Mozaffar et.al. found that both low and high levels of “ethnic fragmentation” lead to decreases in the number of parties (ironically), moderate changes in fragmentation, along with minor changes in district magnitudes could lead to slight increases in the number of parties (Mozaffar et.al., 2004: 389).
With regard to Sierra Leone, Kandeh (2002) found that a binary ethnic divide exists in the country with Mendes exercising ethnic dominance in the South-East and the Temnes exerting dominance in the Northern tier of the country. Additionally, he pointed to another divide between the Krios in the Western Area and the rest of the people in the provinces, a divide which seems to be fading with every election circle in Sierra Leone, due to the increasing numerical differentiation between the two regions, as well as a corresponding decrease in the prosperity gap since independence (Kandeh, 2002).

A recent notable work which establishes a positive relationship between party systems and governance is that of Janda and Kwan (2011). They found that a country’s party system affects its governance structure. However, their work is more universalistic and it examines the majority of democracies in the world rather than regionally specific ones. Even though it helps us make sense of the relationship between party systems and country governance, they do not clarify which type of party system does better at enhancing good governance. Moreover, their work does not consider key intervening variables that are salient in certain political contexts, such as ethnicity is in Africa.
Chapter 2: Methodology, Case and Variables

a) Methodology

Given that politics involves the study of events that are often current and unfolding, interpretations tend to vary, which pose challenges for the epistemological and ontological foundations upon which the discipline rests. In other words, the everyday nature of politics often pose the basic question of whether there is one best way to answer questions regarding how the political world works, and to that Johnson and Reynolds answer yes (Johnson and Reynolds, with Mycoff, 2008: 28). They assert that true political science research should be grounded in scientific knowledge, which has among other characteristics empirical verifiability, falsifiability, transmissibility, and generalizability. Also, it should be cumulative, non-normative, and grounded in theory with strong explanatory power (Johnson and Reynolds, with Mycoff, 2008: 28 - 40). Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to analyzing data in the investigation of political phenomena – quantitative and qualitative methods.

The methodology employed is this dissertation is mixed because I use limited quantitative and qualitative methods. Specifically, I employed the case study method as well as time series analysis of parliamentary and presidential election results to determine the effects of electoral systems and ethnicity or ethno-political cleavage structures on party systems, as well as the effects of party systems on democracy and governance outcomes. The case selected for this study is Sierra Leone, and it is ideal because it fluctuated between majoritarian and consensual electoral systems that produced seemingly different party system outcomes and ethno-political cleavage structures during the period under review (1996-2012). After generating results about the party system outcomes, I used that data along with Polity IV data, a dataset on regime trends
and characteristics, to analyze the relationship between party systems and democratization. The generated data on party systems was used in association with the Worldwide Governance Indicators, a dataset on governance trends for 212 countries, to analyze the relationship between party systems and governance.

The findings from the three sets of analyses were then used to develop a theory that is based on Lipjhart’s typology of democracies, which includes characteristics relating to all but one of the variables studied in this dissertation, to develop a theory that is specifically applicable to Sub-Saharan Africa. The theory developed is suited to the Sub-Saharan African condition because it includes ethno-political cleavage structures, which are fundamental to party system outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa but not included as a variable in Lipjhart’s work because of the breadth of the cases it covered.

b) The case – Sierra Leone

The main goal of this dissertation is to determine the effects of party systems on democratization and governance, and in particular, the effect of ethnicity in promoting or hindering multi-partyism, and its effect on democratization and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. In order to accomplish the aim of this research, I used Sierra Leone as a case study because it is a microcosm of the evolutionary nature electoral systems, coupled with fragmented ethno-political cleavages that seemingly structure the functioning of the party system in Sub-Saharan Africa. While the Constitution stipulates that Sierra Leone is a multi-party state, and multiple parties have contested in recent Presidential and Parliamentary elections, the actual number of parties in Parliament has been in steady decline from six in 1996 to just the two main parties that correspond to the theorized ethnic fault line referenced above.
While this is the case in Sierra Leone, there seem to be parallels in Ghana, Nigeria, and elsewhere on the continent. One institutional similarity that exists among the countries that seem to be heading towards the entrenchment of the two party systems is the institutionalization of the SMD electoral system. As well, there seems to be an ethnic divide that in those countries that bear semblance with that theorized for Sierra Leone. For example, in Ghana the National Democratic Congress (NDC) dominates the North, with its main support among the Ewe people while the South and East are dominated by the New Patriotic Party (NPP), with its main support among the Akan and Twi people. Even though Nigeria has more parties represented in Parliament, at the Presidential level, the two dominant parties-the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has been characterized as the “Southern party” while the main opposition party is considered to be representative of the mainly Northern/ Hausa-Fulani interests. Sierra Leone therefore presents an interesting case that could be studied in depth, in order to gain meaningful insights into the interactions between electoral systems, ethno-political cleavage structures and party systems, and how those interactions influence democratization and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Figure 2.1: Administrative map of Sierra Leone showing the provinces, districts and major towns and cities.

Source: Nations online: countries of the world: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/sierra_leone_map.htm
c) **Historical Background and Major Political Developments in Sierra Leone**

Sierra Leone is located on the West Coast of Africa with an estimated population of approximately million, and a total area of 71,740 sq. km. (CIA: World Fact Book). It is a former British colony that is now a democratic state with presidential system of government. Like most other sub-Saharan African countries, Sierra Leone had a multi-party system at the time of independence, but it experienced a one-party system or other authoritarian forms of government through most of the 1970s and 80s, and then reverted to multi-partyism in the early 1990s. Between 1991 and 2001, Sierra Leone experienced a civil war, which slowed down progress towards democratization. Since then, it has been fraught with challenges similar to those that are being grappled with by other Sub-Saharan African countries. Among the major challenges faced by these countries are those of state consolidation, ethnic fragmentation, stasis etc.

In order to construct a viable theory of party systems, democratization, and governance that accounts for the complexities of politics in Africa’s multi-ethnic societies, I use Sierra Leone as a case study. As argued earlier, Sierra Leone is a perfect case for such a study because, for a country of approximately 6 million people, it comprises eighteen ethnic groups, some of which are mutually intelligible. Of those, the Mende dominates (demographically and politically) the Southern and Eastern provinces of the country, which are made up of seven administrative districts, whereas Temne dominates the Northern Province which comprises five administrative districts. The Western area, which is made up of the capital, Freetown, and its immediate environs, was originally inhabited by the Temne, who in a disputed agreement, sold it to British philanthropists on behalf of the Krios who are descendants of freed slaves from England, Nova Scotia, and Jamaica, as well as recaptured slaves from other African societies.
Until the 1950s, the area known as Freetown and the villages and towns surrounding the Peninsula were governed by the British agents of the Queen resident in Freetown, whereas, the vast majority of the country was governed by their traditional rulers as independent territories (Allen, 1968, p. 306). Under direct British authority, an elaborate system of administration was set up for Freetown, which at the time was referred to as Sierra Leone. At the head of that administrative structure was the Queen or King of Great Britain, who was represented in the territory by the Governor or Governor-General during the time when British merged its West African territories of Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. In order to effectively manage the day-to-day affairs of the colony, the Governor was assisted by an Executive council comprising the most senior members of the administration (Cotay, A. B, 1959: 211). There was also a legislative council charged with the responsibility of making laws for the colony. Due to the shortage of British officials to work in the administration and the gains made by the Krios in education and enterprise, the Krios eventually occupied some of the higher echelons of the administration. Moreover, because they were liberated Africans the Krios were considered British subjects, which accorded them some of the basic rights enjoyed by British citizens (Wyse, 1979, p. 408; Fyfe, 1987, p. 411-421).

The hinterland of Sierra Leone remained under traditional authority until 1896 when the British declared a protectorate over the territory in order to forestall the French who were annexing territories as they were advancing from the North-East of the country. Having already being in the area and signed treaties of friendship and protection with the Chiefs, the British saw it prudent, at least in their own interest, to unilaterally declare the hinterland a British protectorate (Kaplan, 1976: 25-30). Under the principle of “effective occupation” which had just been laid down in the Berlin conference of 1885 as the modus vivendi for the occupation of
African territories by European powers, an administrative mechanism was mandatory whenever a European power acquired a territory in Africa in order to signal to other powers that the territory in question was already under the control of that power. Short on personnel, and unwilling to commit enough funds for the administration of the territory, the British instituted the system of indirect rule, which had already been experimented and proven viable in Northern Nigeria (Kaplan, 1976: 29-30).

Indirect Rule, as an administrative concept, requires two layers of authority, one subordinated to the other. In this case, the subordinated authority/agents were the African chiefs, who had all the trappings of power, wealth and privilege, except that their power was contingent upon what the British crown felt it could delegate to them without losing control of the territory (Richens, 2009: 36-37). Under Indirect Rule, the socio-political structure was largely intact, with only subtle, superficial changes in day-to-day administrative lives of the people in the interior. It gave the people a feeling that they were still autonomous because they were ruled by their chiefs, or so it seemed. Moreover, it also allowed the British to govern the territories with very little input in terms of finance, personnel, and ideas from the colonized people (Richens, 2009: 36-37).

Even though indirect rule made it easier for the British to govern the territories through the use of their own traditional authorities, it has been argued that it complicated the administrative system in Sierra Leone and most former British West African territories, by amalgamating the traditional, cultural, and administrative structures with the modern democratic structure that the British had introduced in Freetown, and would later extend to the rest of the country (Kandeh, 2002: 81-85). However, it should be noted that although traditional authority was used as a unifying force in the interior, it later became a dividing force by the political elite.
upon the attainment of independence and the institutionalization of multi-party democracy (Kandeh 2002: 81-83).

The inherent differences in values between traditional authority under which the majority of the people live and modern authority structures in Sierra Leone led to tension between various groups in the country (Kandeh, 2002; 81-83). The structure of traditional authority is paternalistic, hierarchical, and exclusionary, whereas that of a democracy is impersonal, inclusive and less hierarchical. The differences between the Krios and the people of the hinterland at the time the British merged the two territories for administrative purposes, were reinforced by the fact that the Krio had attained a certain level of exposure to western education, and had thrived in academia and enterprise to the extent that they were often used as agents of colonial authority in most of British West Africa. The people of the hinterland on the other hand, had very little access to Western education, although they were informally educated in traditional values that often conflicted with Western values. These differences have significant impact on governance under the current democratic model that the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries are now practicing (Kandeh, 2002:81-91).

After declaring the protectorate over the hinterland of Sierra Leone in 1896, and instituting a 5 shilling per house annual tax to cover the cost of administration, the people of the hinterland, led by their chiefs, rebelled against the British authority in what has been dubbed the Hut Tax War of 1896-98 (Tangri, 1976: 311-313). The interesting thing to note about the Hut Tax war for the current project is that it did not only bring the people of the hinterland together in collective opposition to British authority but that it temporarily united peoples that had demonstrated hostilities towards each other in the past.
Since the colony and the protectorate differed significantly in values, culture, and level of development, in addition to the fact that existing traditional authority in the hinterland offered a cheap way of governing the territories, the British saw it fit to govern the territories separately. Thus, the colony of Sierra Leone was governed directly by the crown, and the hinterland through the provincial administrative system (kandeh, 2002; 83). However, in the inter war years, there was mounting pressure on the British to grant independence to its territories. In Sierra Leone, the British reacted first by establishing the Provincial Assembly as a way to offer some form of modern democratic representation to the people of the hinterland. As the drumbeat for independence got louder, and it became evident to the British that independence was only a matter of time, the Provincial Assembly was abandoned in favor of representation of the hinterland in the Legislative Council.

By the time Sierra Leone gained independence in on April 21st, 1961, it was a united country for all political purposes. The British bequeathed the country with a Legislative Assembly, to which representatives were elected under a multi-party system, in single member districts, and by universal adult suffrage (Sierra Leone Constitution: 1961). Sierra Leone retained the multi-party system until 1967 general elections created a stalemate between the ruling Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) and the main opposition party, the All Peoples Congress (APC), that led Brigadier Lansana, head of the Army, to overthrow the government, only to be overthrown by junior police officers and commissioned army personnel, who formed the National reformation Council NRC (Kaplan, 1976: 174-180; Fisher, 1969: 611). In 1968, power was handed over to Siaka Stevens, the APC opposition leader who was believed to have won the general elections in 1967, after Corporal Bangura led a successful counter coup against the NRC (Fisher 1969: 611).
On April 27th, 1971, Sierra Leone became a Republic, which effectively granted full sovereignty to the indigenous people (Kaplan, 1976: 182-183). Now, the ultimate authority in Sierra Leone was the President, who under the new Constitution and a parliamentary system of government was the Head of State as well as Head of Government. Following an overwhelming victory by the then ruling APC in the 1973 elections, Siaka Stevens started to gradually move the country towards a one party system of government (Kaplan, 1976:182-188), which was ultimately achieved in 1978. Between 1978 and 1992, Sierra Leone was a one party state, with the APC as the sole party.

The frustrations of Sierra Leonean with the slow pace of development and the restriction of political freedoms, coupled with the global trend towards multi-partyism in the 1990s produced a strong storm of opposition that the APC could not resist. While preparing for multi-partyism (which was suspect in the minds of most Sierra Leoneans), and at the same fighting a civil war with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Corporal Foday S. Sankoh, officers of the armed forces seized power on April 29th, 1992 (Kandeh, 1996: 389-390). With mounting opposition from the international community, and even louder cries for the return to multi-partyism, the officers of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) declared the country ready for multi-party democracy, conducted elections, and handed power over to a weakened civilian government under the SLPP in 1996, only for it to be overthrown twice by the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) respectively. The civil war was finally brought to an end by truce 2001, and Sierra Leone has remained a multi-party state since then.

Under the current Constitution, the country has a Presidential system with single member electoral districts. There are separate elections for Members of Parliament and for the
Presidency every five years, with the President’s term limited to two (Sierra Leone Constitution, 1991). Along the way, however, and especially during the civil war when most of the country was under siege, the Proportional Representation system was used (1996 and 2002 general elections) in order guarantee the continuation of multi-partyism. The use of the PR system in at least two elections is also very crucial to this project because it enables me to analyze the differences in electoral outcomes vis-à-vis party systems, as well as party systems viz-a-vis democratization and governance.

d) Definition of Variables and Key Measurements

For the purpose of this dissertation, a **party system** refers to the number of political parties, i.e., two or multi-party systems. Given that one the party system are associated with autocracies, which the majority of countries have been transitioning from since the start of the Third Wave of democracy, the one party system is not included in this inquiry. I categorize political parties as two or multi-party systems based on the party strength legislatively and electorally (Blondel, 1968: 184-187), as well as, the coalition or blackmail potentials of the parties which can, in some cases, enhance a party’s strength even if that party is not legislatively and electorally as strong (Sartori, 1976).

A **two party system** is one in which there are two strong political parties that earn 40% or more of the votes cast in a general election, or that each account for 40% or more of the parliamentary seats (Blondel, 1968). In other words, characterizing a country as a two party system is not dependent on the number of parties, but rather by the strength of their representation electorally or representatively.
A **multi-party** system is one in which three or more medium, or medium to strong parties each account for 25% or more of the electoral votes, or seats in parliament. This definition is essentially the same as a two party system if one is just focusing on the number of parties. However, considering the strength of the parties as outlined by Blondel enables us to distinguish between a two party and a multi-party system, a distinction which is often lost in in the current advocacy for multi-partyism. It can be argued that in a multi-party system, the coalition or blackmail potentials of the parties are salient because in majoritarian systems with multiple parties and ethnic pluralism, attaining a simple majority is almost always difficult without parties coalescing. The so-called mechanical and psychological effects of changes in district magnitudes, and a legal threshold of 55% majority in the first round of the Presidential elections in Sierra Leone, and increasingly in other Sub-Saharan African countries, make it difficult for large parties to win clear majorities but possible for smaller parties to demonstrate their relevance by increasing their coalition or blackmail potentials.

As noted above, there is a continuum from autocracy and democracies, which are often associated with a two or multi–party systems. The Polity IV project identified a third regime type called **anocracy**, which is a mixed regime type that often combines features of autocracy with democratic principles. **Anocracies** are often associated with governments that are in the process of transitioning to democracies, and since most sub-Saharan African countries have just transitioned, or are in the process of, transitioning to democracies, it seems appropriate to employ the variables used in the Polity IV data set to analyze the regime types rather than assume, as is often the case, that those countries are democracies because they have multi-party elections.
The component variables used in the Polity IV project are: Executive Recruitment, Executive Constraints, and Political Competition and Opposition, which were originally defined by Eckstein and Gurr in their classic work in 1975, and operationalized in the Polity IV codebook. According to Eckstein and Gurr, Executive Recruitment “involves the ways in which superordinates come to occupy their position… In current sociological jargon, this a species of ‘boundary interchange,’ a matter of crossing lines between superordinate and subordinate positions” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, quoted in Polity IV Codebook, 2011: 20). The Polity IV dataset outlines “three indicators of the structural characteristics” of Executive Recruitment, which are: the extent of institutionalization of executive transfer (XRREG); the competitiveness of executive selection (XRCOMP); and the openness of executive recruitment (XROPEN) (Polity IV Codebook 2011: 20). Executive Constraints refer to the extent to which actions of the executive are subject to scrutiny, and reversal in some cases, by countervailing sources of power such as legislative or judicial powers.

Eckstein and Gurr defined participation in this way: “[s]ubordinates need not merely be Passive recipients of direction, and they seldom are. Some of them generally attempt to influence the directive activities of supers. Acts by which subs attempt to wield such influence are acts of participation” (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975, quoted in Polity IV Codebook, 2011: 25). This concept is measured in the Polity IV dataset by the degree to which the “regulation” of political participation is institutionalized; and the extent to which political participation is restricted by government.

I also used Lipjhart’s typology to distinguish between majoritarian and consensual forms of democracy. **Majoritarian** democracy refers to a democratic system in which government is formed and policies are crafted and executed based on majority principles. The summation of
majories can be based on simple majority (majority > 50 %) or other complex formula that could be used to determine that majority. On the other hand, **consensual** democracy refers to the form of democracy in which government formation and governance are based on consultation and consensus.

**Ethnicity** refers to the degree to which ethnic differences play role in the determination political outcomes in a society. It is used interchangeably with ethno-political cleavages in this dissertation, even though **ethno-political cleavages** focus more on the extent to which differences in ethnicity drive or potentially drive political divisions in a society. Ethno-political cleavages can lead to ethnic concentration or ethnic fragmentation (Mozaffar et.al. 2004) For the purpose of this dissertation, **ethnic concentration** refers to the banding together of an ethnic group, or similar ethnic groups, for political purposes such as an elections. Ethnic concentration often instills in others the need to also form their own coalitions and could lead to serious ethnic rivalry and competition. On the other hand, **ethnic fragmentation** refers to the splintering of an ethnic group in furtherance of a certain political objective. The fragmentation may include the primary ethnic group only or those that form that ethnic group coalition. Though both ethnic fragmentation and concentration could lead to violence and conflict, it is seldom the case. In fact, ethnicity and ethnicity differences under this definition only remotely lead to conflict and violence, but they can have significant impact on the coordination of votes in societies where ethnicity is politically salient.

A key problem with research on governance is how to operationalize the variable itself. For this project, I use the definition put forward by Kaufmann et.al, which defines **governance** as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced; (b) the capacity of
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” (kaufmann et. al., 2010).

It is evident from the above definition that governance is not easy to measure. However, the Worldwide Governance Indicators include dimensions of governance that correspond to the three aspects of governance referenced in the definition. The six indicators that comprise the Worldwide Governance Indicators used as key measures of governance in this project are: Voice and Accountability (VA); Political Stability and Absence of violence/Terrorism (PV); Government Effectiveness (GE); Regulatory Quality (RQ); Rule of Law (RL); and Control of Corruption (CC).

According to Kaufmann et.al, **Voice and Accountability (VA)** capture the “perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in the in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” (Kaumann, et.al. 2010). This definition does not only encompass features of good governance, it also includes fundamental rights of citizens to choose the government, which implies that there needs to be competition among certain institutions for leadership of the government. The competitive element embedded in this indicator underscores the role of political parties in good governance, since they are the institutions through which governmental authority is acquired and exercised in the state.

**Political Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism (PV)** captures the “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism” (Kaufmann et.al, 2010).
This definition poses a major problem because political stability does not necessarily mean the absence of violence. If the absence of violence is seen as a basis of stability, then by default, developing countries would be more unstable than developed countries, since the likelihood of a violent overthrow of government is *prima facae* higher in developing country than in developed countries. Consequently, I offer an alternative definition of political stability that means the likelihood of destabilizing a government through violence or other unconstitutional means, as well as, tenuous political arrangements such as coalitions, which undermine the effectiveness of governments in executing the will of the people. This definition accounts for the unstable transitions, or other political arrangements that do not necessarily lead to the overthrow of a government but that undercut its effectiveness, and at some point render it very vulnerable and unstable.

**Government Effectiveness (GE)** “captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressure, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” (Kaumann et.al., 2010). **Regulatory Quality (RQ)** captures the “perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development” (Kaufmann et.al. 2010). These two indicators taken together focus on the ability of governments to formulate and effectively execute policies that promote free enterprise, as well as enhance the prosperity of the citizenry, which are also considered hallmarks of democratic societies.

**Rule of Law (RL)** captures the “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence” (kaufmann et.al., 2010), whereas, **Control of Corruption (CC)** captures “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.” These two indicators collectively deal with issues of accountability both at the institutional, and at the private sector level to ensure that government is efficient, representative of and responsive to the broader interests of society.
Chapter 3

Party System(s), Electoral System(s) and Ethnicity in Sierra Leone

Introduction

In this section of the dissertation, I intend to use evidence from parliamentary and presidential elections in Sierra Leone from 1996 - 2012 in order to assess the applicability of party system and electoral system theories developed primarily by Western scholars in the Sub-Saharan African context. I aim to show how interactions between electoral systems and ethno-political cleavage structures affect party system outcomes in Sierra Leone. Specifically, I explore the extent to which the theorized Temne dominance in the Northern Province and Mende dominance in the South and Eastern Provinces are affected by variations in district magnitudes (DM≥1), mechanical and psychological effects of districting, electoral thresholds, and presidential coattail effects in Sierra Leone. In order to do that, I test the following hypotheses:

H: SMD electoral systems encourage regional ethnic voting in Parliamentary elections, whereas PR discourages regional ethnic voting in both Presidential and Parliamentary elections.

H: Larger district magnitudes (DM>1) in SMD systems promote regional / ethnic voting in parliamentary elections.

H: Larger district magnitudes in SMD systems cause reductions in the number of small parties due to the psychological effects of districting results.

H: Larger district magnitudes lead to reductions in the number of small parties due to the mechanical effects districting.
H: Super-majority requirements / minimum thresholds in Presidential elections discourage regional / ethnic voting.

H: Super-majority requirements / minimum threshold in Presidential elections increases the blackmail / coalition potential of smaller parties.

While the majority of these hypotheses are based on studies of party system and electoral system relationships in Western democracies (Duverger, 1954, Lipjhart, 1992, 1999), those relating to ethnicity were developed primarily based on studies of its effects in Sub-Saharan African states. Duverger’s study forms the basis of the hypothesis that SMDs reinforce two party systems, whereas multi-party systems are reinforced by PR systems (Duverger, 1954). Also, he found that SMD electoral systems offer regionally based parties, even smaller ones the chance to thrive. Although this proposition has been replicated in subsequent studies (Lipjhart, 1999) I want to find out whether the so-called ‘multiplicative effect’ of SMD systems on smaller parties could also be conditioned by changes in district magnitudes. Theoretically, larger district magnitudes tend to be associated with higher numbers of thriving smaller parties, whereas smaller district magnitudes tend to be associated with lower numbers of smaller parties. Since Sierra Leone has experimented with both electoral systems, it offers an interesting opportunity to study the relationship between these variables. As noted above, even though the country is a constitutionally proclaimed multi-party democracy with SMD electoral system, the PR was used during the 1996 and 2002 parliamentary elections as a practical mechanism to facilitate broad national representation at a time when the majority of the country was under siege, and could therefore not be effectively represented under the SMD system.
In 1996, there was only one national constituency (DM=1) with a List PR system that enabled parties to rank their candidates and assign seats to those who fell within their party’s earned proportion of seats. In a move to facilitate “broader representation” in 2002, the Block PR system was introduced and the number of constituencies was increased to 14, with district magnitudes ranging from 6 to 10 (DM≥6, ≤10). A time series analysis of party strengths as well as the number of parties, amidst variations in both electoral systems and district magnitudes will help answer questions about the relationship between party systems and electoral systems, especially when ethno-political cleavages are considered salient \textit{a priori}.

The nature and influence of ethnic politics in Sierra Leone has been well documented (Kandeh 1992). The general findings of these studies show a strong relationship between ethnic / regional affiliation and party system outcomes in Sierra Leone. I aim to test the validity of these findings by showing the extent of that relationship through analyses of voting patterns, derived from regional results of parliamentary elections from 1996 to 2012.

\textbf{a) Ethnic identities and party affiliation in Sierra Leone}

The major assumption underpinning this work is that ethnicity serves as a basis for identity formation as well as political association (Mazrui, 1973, Kandeh, 1992). This point is underscored by the fact even though modernization has spread rapidly in most Sub-Saharan African countries, it has not progressed enough to change the underlying cultural institutions and their relevance in daily political life (Mazrui, 1973, 1986). More recently, Mozaffar et.al., have argued that high levels of both ethnic concentration and ethnic fragmentation reduces the number of parties, whereas moderate levels of ethnic concentration and fragmentation increases the number of parties, and in both cases, district magnitude exercises a moderating effect (Mozaffar
et.al. 2004). This finding has been challenged by other scholars who argue that African party and electoral systems do not function differently from those in Europe and other advanced democracies (Brambor et.al. 2007, and Lindberg (2005). However, Brombar et.al’s. use of the same data as Mozaffar et.al. in order to repudiate their theory and findings does not make their own findings right. In fact, other than rejecting Mozaffar et.al’s. findings, their work does very little to explain the nature of relationship between electoral systems, ethnicity and party systems in Africa. Also, while one can argue with Mozaffar et.al’s theoretical proposition, the ethnic dimensions of party support and election-based violence in Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and other Sub-Saharan African countries in recent times compel us to examine in greater detail the impact of ethnicity on electoral and party system outcomes in Africa.

In Sierra Leone, the majority of societies are organized around ethnic groups, allowing traditional authority to coexist with democratic institutions. In fact, 12 out of the 112 seats in the Sierra Leone parliament are reserved for Paramount Chiefs who represent traditional authority within the framework of modern government (Sierra Leone Constitution, 1992). The relationship between the two authority structures existing side-by-side is mainly harmonious, but from time to time, and in competitive situations such as controversial political contests with zero-sum outcomes, such as in elections involving single member districts, tension can erupt between the two with corrosive effects on the democratic process (Kandeh, 1992: 81).

So, how salient is ethnicity in Sierra Leone politics? In order to answer this question, we have to go back to the pre-colonial and colonial history of Sierra Leone. As has been noted earlier in this work, the majority of Sierra Leonean societies were independent, organized hierarchically under the authority of their chiefs and council of elders (Kaplan, 1976: 12-13). The legitimacy of chiefs and council of elders was mainly traditional, in that their power derived
from the extent to which they upheld the traditional values of their societies (Tangri, 1976). For most societies, this included social cohesion and the capacity to mobilize the group in resistance to perceived threats from others, which means anyone outside their ethnic group. It is therefore not surprising that contiguous ethnic groups competed for scarce resources, and frequently clashed with each other, which only intensified the divisions that existed among them.

There have been numerous references to the Mende-Temne wars in pre-colonial Sierra Leone. This is important to underscore, particularly because those hostilities were between the two major ethnic groups in the country (Kandeh, 1992). The mutual misperception and hostility toward the other displayed by these two societies only deepened after they were integrated into the same country for administrative convenience by the colonialists, whose only calculus in merging the two territories and peoples, despite their deep political rivalries, was efficiency. Such an arrangement worked as long as the neutral, superordinate colonial authority was there to enforce it. Also, in the colonial era, both groups saw the Krio as an adversary, so the need to fight each other subsumed in response to its rising influence (Kandeh, 1992: 81-90). Once the colonial period ended, old, bitter rivalries and animosities resurfaced, especially in the context of competitive national politics, which meant that if used properly, politicians could mobilize their own people in order to capture power and lord it over others (Kandeh, 1992: 90-93).

In the period leading to independence, the British opened up the political space for people from the hinterland to participate in national politics, and further reinforced ethnic divisions by reserving seats in parliament, to which Chiefs from various districts could be appointed (Kandeh, 2002). The Chiefs were appointed to such positions not because of their popularity at the national level, or their vision for national development. Rather, they were appointed because they were considered malleable and popular at the local level, which meant that the British could
partner with them to mobilize support for the policies of the colonial government. As Fyfe noted, “The policy of the British was to increase the power of the chiefs at the local level while subordinating them at the national level” (Fyfe, 1987).

By the time independence was granted in 1961, the majority party was the Sierra Leone Peoples Party, which won the 1957 general elections resoundingly by unifying elites mainly from the interior of the regardless of ethnicity. Even though the founding members of the SLPP were from all the major ethnic groups in the country, the solidarity which existed among them, emanating from their collective opposition to British rule and Creoledom, soon disintegrated after independence (Kandeh, 1992: 90). During the Lancaster House negotiations on the terms of independence, all the leaders of the SLPP agreed to partial independence within the British Commonwealth, which meant that the Queen was to remain the head of state, with the elected Sierra Leonean Prime Minister as the head of government. The lone opposition came from Siaka Stevens, a trade unionist and member of the SLPP who argued against the senselessness of independence under the crown. Nonetheless, independence was granted on April 21st 1961, but on the eve of independence, Siaka Stevens and some of his supporters were arrested and kept in “preventive detention.”

Upon his release after the independence festivities, Siaka Stevens formed the All People’s Congress (APC), which drew the majority of its support from the Northern Province. He was able to do that by claiming in his appeal to the people, that the SLPP had become a Mende party, a claim that had prima facie justification based on the skewness of the cabinet towards the South-East, and the domination of the leadership by the Margia brothers, also from that region (Kaplan, 1976: 174-179). The rift between the SLPP and the APC reached crisis point in the aftermath of the 1967 general elections that ended in a stalemate between the ruling
SLPP and the newly formed APC. Consequently, the head of the army, Brigadier-General David Lansana, who was a Mende and an in-law of the Margai’s, staged a coup, arrested the Governor General, suspended the Constitution, and declared “Martial Law” (Kaplan, 175-180). Brigadier-General Lansana was promptly overthrown by junior officers in a counter-coup, and in 1968 Sergeant Bangura, also from the North and leader of the counter coup, handed power over to Siaka Stevens, who was in exile in Guinea following the coups in 1967.

Siaka Stevens governed under a multi-party system until 1978, when he orchestrated a change to a one party state. Under the one party system, power was concentrated mainly in the hands of the Northern elite and a few clients from the South-East, thus deepening the discontent among those that felt isolated form the trappings of power, wealth, and privilege. Sierra Leone remained a one-party state until 1992 when pressure was mounted by students, civil society groups, political activists and international organizations, for the government to return the country to a multi-party system (Kandeh, 1993). Even before the scheduled elections, there was a military takeover by the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), which derailed the democratic process once again. In 1996, the NPRC was pressured to conduct general elections, notwithstanding the fact that the country was in the midst of the bloody civil war.

Like the British, all successive government led by Sierra Leoneans kept the provision in the constitution that mandates the selection or indirect election of twelve Paramount Chiefs to Parliament (Sierra Leone Constitution 1991). Again, as with the British, the appointment of Chiefs to parliament allows government to exercise greater control over local affairs while creating a semblance of devolution of power, in which the chiefs appear as powerful as some authorities in the central government, while in reality that was not the case. The cumulative effect of this policy is that it enables the central government to use the appointment, indirect
election, or selection of chiefs to Parliament as a “carrot,” so that they can mobilize their people in support of the government when needed to do so. By allowing chiefs, whose authority is based on traditional legitimacy, to play central a role in national politics where legitimacy is legal or rational, the political system in Sierra Leone, like most Sub Saharan African countries, became complicated by the dual authority structure and simultaneous attempt to subordinate traditional to modern authority. It is against this background that I use ethnicity as an independent variable in the analysis of political representation in the context of multi-party politics in Sub-Saharan Africa.

b) Party system(s), Electoral System(s) and Ethnicity in Sierra Leone

In this section, I intend to use election results as evidence to demonstrate how the interaction between the electoral systems, ethnicity and its counterpart, regionalism, impacted party system outcomes in Sierra Leone. The election results analyzed are from 1996 to 2012, because 1996 was the year that Sierra Leone held the first multi-party elections after fourteen years (1978-1992) of one party rule, and another four years (1992-1996) of military rule. It is also important to use the 1996 elections as the starting point in the analysis because the election in 1996, and that which followed in 2002, were held under the Proportional Representation (PR) system for the first time in Sierra Leone’s electoral history. This point needs to be underscored because from its inception, Sierra Leone’s electoral system, like other former British colonies in sub Saharan Africa was fashioned on the Westminster model, which is majoritarian with single member districts.

In 1996, parliamentary elections were held under a list PR system, but concerns were raised about the clarity and quality of representation under a system that did not directly link the
people and their representatives, leading to the adoption of a Block PR was in 2002. For the purpose of conducting that election, the country was divided into fourteen blocks along regional lines, and the number of parliamentary seats was increased from 65 to 112 (DM ≤10) for directly elected Members of Parliament (Carter Center Observer Report, 2002: 23). It is therefore critical to start the analysis at this juncture because it gives me the opportunity to examine the functioning of party systems under both the Proportional and Majoritarian systems, to which Sierra Leone reverted in the 2007, as well as assess the shifts in party strengths regionally and nationally, along with the effects of changes in district magnitude following each election.

In this analysis, I use both presidential and parliamentary election results because although party strength, as operationalized by Blondel, depend on the percentage of votes earned in parliamentary elections or seats won in parliament (Blondel, 1968), Sartori’s party relevance criteria, which is determined by the blackmail or coalition potential (Sartori, 1976) of parties, is equally important, especially in Presidential elections due to threshold and coattail effects. It is not uncommon in close Presidential elections, where candidate are required to poll a certain percentage of votes in order to stave off a second round of voting or a run-off election as is the case in Sierra Leone, to see the large parties courting smaller parties into forming governing coalitions, which consequently increase the coalition or blackmail potentials of the smaller parties, as we shall see later in the analysis.

Blondel’s criteria for determining party strength, which I will use (mainly) to analyze party systems based on the performance of parties using parliamentary election results, are summarized as follows:
Table 3.1: Classification of Party Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party system</th>
<th>Percentage of votes won by parties in parliamentary elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two party system</td>
<td>Two parties with ≥ 40% of votes cast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three party or two and a half party system</td>
<td>Two parties with ≥ 40% and one party with 10-15%, or three parties with ≥ 20% of votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-party system</td>
<td>Three parties or more with ≥ 20% votes cast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blondel, 1968

In addition to offering these criteria for the classification of party systems, Blondel also offered the following criteria for classifying parties by size, which I will use to categorize political parties in Sierra Leone into the following: 1) large 2) medium 3) small to medium 4) small, and 5) very small, parties in this dissertation.

Table 3.2: Blondel’s classification of party strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of party</th>
<th>Percentage of votes won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>≥ 40% of votes cast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>≥ 20% but &lt; 40% of votes cast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small to medium</td>
<td>≥ 15% but &lt; 20% of votes cast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>≥ 10% but &lt; 15% of votes cast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very small</td>
<td>≤ 10% of votes cast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blondel, 1998
Figure 3.2: Percentage of votes won by the main political parties in Sierra Leone from 1996 – 2012

![Graph showing percentage of votes](image)

Source: [http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html](http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html)

Figure 3.3: Number of seats won by party from 1996-2012

![Graph showing number of seats](image)

Source: [http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html](http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html)
In Figure 1 above, the relative strength of the “main” parties viz-a-vis those of other parties (combined), are shown in terms of the percentage of votes earned in parliamentary elections during the period under review. The APC made steady progress, rising from 5.68% in 1996 to 19.80% in 2002 and 40.73% in 2007, which gave it the opportunity to coalesce with the PMDC to form the government. In the 2012 Parliamentary elections, it won 53.67% of the total votes cast. On the contrary, after barely winning the general election in 1996 with 36.08%, the SLPP went on to win the 2002 overwhelmingly by earning 69.9% of the votes cast in 2002, followed by a disappointing 39.54% in 2007, and then 38.25% in 2012. As the electoral fortunes of the SLPP declined after 2002, and that of the APC showed steady growth, the share of votes earned by the smaller parties (other) plummeted noticeably from 58.33% in 1996 to 19.30% and 19.73% in 2002 and 2007 respectively. That figure dropped even further down to 8.08% in 2012, with no seat to show for it.

The figures are even more astounding when examined in terms of the actual numbers of parliamentary seats won by parties during the same time period. It is necessary to look at the actual number of seats won, not merely the percentage of votes earned by each party because variations in district magnitude often help produce different electoral outcomes. In the 1996 parliamentary election the district magnitude was 68, whereas in subsequent elections it was the constitutionally mandated 112 directly contested seats. It is therefore misleading to look at just the percentage of votes earned by various parties in order to judge their relative strength in light of variations in district magnitudes. In other words, there were variations in district magnitudes and shifts in the electoral system from PR to SMD that had obvious mechanical and psychological effects, which I will attempt to further illustrate later.
In figure 2 above, the share of seats won by the APC, like the percentage of votes it earned in the Parliamentary elections, grew steadily from 5 in 1996 to 27 in 2002, and then 59 in 2007, and finally to 67 out the 112 seats in parliament currently. After the number of parliamentary seats was increased in 2002, notwithstanding the drop in district magnitudes from 68 to 8 or less per constituency, the SLPP increased its gains from 27 seats in 1996 to 83 in 2002. It then went on to lose nearly half of those seats in 2007 and maintained that deficit in 2012. At the same time, the number of seats won by other (smaller parties combined) parties declined even more sharply from 36 out of 68 in 1996 to 2 out of 112 seats in 2002. After a slight gain to 10 seats in 2007, associated mainly with the formation of PMDC, the other parties failed to win a single seat in the 2012 parliamentary election.

As noted earlier in this chapter, the 1996 general election was groundbreaking in Sierra Leone’s political history not only because it ushered in an era of multi-partyism after two decades of one party rule, or that it was conducted in the midst of a bloody civil war, but because it accorded Sierra Leoneans the opportunity to experiment with the List PR system, which allowed them to elect their representatives based on national appeal rather individual constituency appeal which tends to be narrow and ethno-regional in scope. Moreover, the reduction in the number of constituencies to 68, and the elimination of seats specifically reserved for the selection of Chiefs to Parliament, were crucial in mitigating the effects of ethnicity because chiefs represent ethnically homogenous communities and therefore are not a true reflection of the national complexion. Also, under the List PR system in 1996, as shown in figure 1, the very small parties won 12 out of the 68 parliamentary seats. However, none of those parties was large enough (theoretically) to alter the power structure because the SLPP won the
election with only 36.9%, which was far less than it needed in order to have the mandate to form the government, or ensure the passage and implementation of its policy proposals.

Based on the number of votes earned and seats allocated, only the 1996 parliamentary election produced a genuine multiparty system in Sierra Leone with two medium, one small-to-medium, and several small parties winning seats in Parliament. The 2002 general elections produced one strong Party (SLPP), one medium-to-large party (APC), and a plethora of small parties that earned ≥3 % of the total votes cast, which meant the majority of them could not be represented in Parliament because they failed to meet the minimum threshold of 12.5 % in order. The 2007 election led to a two party system as did the 2012 election, with only the two main/ large parties gaining seats in parliament.

The electoral history described above reveal a very interesting finding in terms of the link between electoral institutions and party systems. Based on the analysis, it is obvious that under the SMD there is a huge disparity between the percentages of votes earned by parties and the number of seats won in Parliament. Conversely, under the PR system, there is a stronger degree of proportionality between the number of seats won and the percentage of votes earned. Also, it is evident that there is a greater likelihood for representation of smaller parties under the PR system than under SMD electoral system, which makes a compelling case for the institutionalization of the PR system as a foundation for genuine multi-partyism and democratization in Sierra Leone.

Moreover, changes in district magnitudes also exert pressure that forces smaller parties out of the competition. As district magnitudes decreased from 68 (DM=68) in 1996 to 8 or less (DM≤8) in 2002 and ultimately 1 (DM=1) in 2007 and 2012, the percentage as well as number of
seats won by other/ smaller parties declined from 58.33 % and 36 seats in 1996 to 10.3 % and 2 seats in 2002, and 8.08 % and zero seat in 2012. The increase in the share of smaller party representation from 10.7 % and 2 seats in 2002 to 17.98% and 10 seats is an exception to the trend which can be explained in terms of the break-up of the Mende-led SLPP coalition as well as the exertion of “blackmail/ coalition” potential by smaller parties in presidential elections. The otherwise steady decline in the number of smaller parties is a demonstration of the mechanical and psychological effects of districting that has been identified in the literature (Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1967; Lipjhart, 1990 and Pellicer and Wegner, 2014). In anticipation or actual institution of changes in district magnitudes, parties tend to expand the size of their membership and scope of their operation, in order to forge winning coalition. Correspondingly, such changes in district magnitudes exert pressure on smaller parties, especially if there are changes in electoral systems from PR to SMD. In this case, both elements were present between 1996 and 2007, i.e. there was a shift from PR to SMD as well as a decrease in district magnitudes which tend to benefit larger parties at the expense of smaller ones.

In addition to the mechanical effects of increased district magnitudes and changes in electoral system formulas leading to the withering of smaller parties under SMD, psychological effects accompany such changes. When voters consider slim the chances of smaller parties winning seats in Parliament, they tend to vote for the parties that they think can win. As the district magnitudes decrease and smaller parties are forced to campaign in multiple constituencies at the same time, their effectiveness diminishes due to lack of resources to sustain large scale campaigning. Such realization often forces them to merge with larger parties or risk being irrelevant. Mechanical and psychological effects of districting seem to have been at play
and at the root of the decline in the number of the smaller parties and thereby diminishing the prospects for multi-partyism in Sierra Leone.

It is necessary to briefly examine the presidential elections at this juncture in order to account for their role in the evolution of Sierra Leone’s party system. This is important to do because, as shown in the results in figures 1 and 2, presidential and parliamentary election results tend to mirror each other, which underscores the importance of presidential coattails in the determination of party system configuration in Sierra Leone. In deciding on which candidate to vote for, voters often look beyond the proposed policies of a party and on to its individual nominees. They tend to vote for the candidates of their choice in presidential elections, as well as the candidates that represent their parties the Parliamentary elections. Since the vote for the Parliamentary candidate is tied to that of the Presidential candidate, the term “coattail” is often used to describe the situation. The legal threshold of 55% in the first round of presidential contest also has mechanical and psychological effects for the coordination of votes in Sierra Leone, especially in terms of the “blackmail and coalition” potentials of parties. Finally, it is important to examine in some detail the results of the Presidential elections in Sierra Leone during the period under review in order to determine how personal characteristics of presidential candidates help shape ethnic configurations in Sierra Leone.

The presidential elections of 1996 was contested by 13 candidates representing all of the parties, most of which were formed during the war by individuals who were either former members of the two main parties or were relatively new or unknown on the political scene. The presidential elections therefore offer an opportunity to analyze what Sartori referred to as the “coalition” or “blackmail” potentials of parties, which is enhanced in Sierra Leone by the constitutional provision that require a candidate to earn 55% of the votes in the first round in
order to form a government and avoid a run-off with the runner up” (Sierra Leone Constitution, 1991). It was that provision which formed the basis of the second round of balloting in the 1996 and 2007 presidential elections. Since the result of the first round of voting in the 1996 presidential election mirrors the parliamentary elections percentage-wise, Ahmed Tejan Kabba of the SLPP who emerged victorious but earned only 35.80 % was forced into a run-off with the runner-up, Dr. John Karefa Smart of the United People’s Party (UNPP) who won 22.62 %, although both numbers were quite low in terms of reaching majority status. In the second round of voting, Ahmed Tejan Kabba won clearly with 59.45 % while John Karefa Smart earned only 40.51%.

In analyzing the results of the 1996 Presidential election, it is important to bear in mind that of the 13 candidates who contested, all but two - Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and Desmond Luke - were from the Northern Province. The SLPP was firmly united behind Mr. Tejan Kabbah as its candidate while some former members of the APC and other notable personalities from the North formed their own parties such as PDP, UNPP etc. Although it is difficult to determine exactly the extent to which the splintering of the Northern political elites enhanced the position of Mr. Kabbah and the SLPP due to the List PR system that was in place, one can argue with reasonable plausibility that it was in fact the electoral system that made it possible for the break-away leaders to rely on their popularity within certain demographic groups and form their own parties in order to contest the presidential elections.

In the 2002 presidential elections the incumbent, President Ahmed Tejan Kabba of the SLPP won 70 percent of the votes in the first round of the elections, which was enough to forestall a run-off (appendix 2). The strong showing by President Tejan Kabba in the presidential election could be attributed to the credit he got for “ending the war,” and for the
sympathy generated for being twice overthrown after being duly elected. Moreover, he enjoyed
the benefits of incumbency, and the advantage of using state resources for the party cause which
increased his popularity according to the Carter Center (Carter Center Observer Report, 2002).

Although the election was free and fair, it was a contest between the SLPP and the APC
because they were the only parties that won seats in that election (National Election Commission
of Sierra Leone). To be fair, the dominance by the APC and SLPP in the 2002 can be attributed
in part to the deaths of the Dr. John Karefa-Smart and Mr. Thaimu Bangura, who placed second
and third in the 1996 presidential election. This point is noteworthy because it further
underscores the significance of the personal attributes of candidates in driving votes, especially
in presidential elections in Sierra Leone. After the deaths of the two leading opposition
candidates following the 1996 elections, their parties lost the competitive edge had fared worse
in subsequent elections. While some of these changes may be attributed to the mechanical and
psychological effects of districting and legal thresholds at the presidential level, one must
acknowledge the importance of individual candidates in the determination of electoral outcomes
as demonstrated by the examples of the PDP and UNPP.

The regionalization of the electorate in 2002 made it easier for citizens of various ethnic
backgrounds to search for parties that represent their group interest. Needless to say it still
remains a problem even today. In a recent survey, 61 % of Sierra Leoneans said that the
government does not treat their ethnic group fairly, while another 36 percent believe their ethnic
group is sometimes, often, or always treated unfairly by other ethnic groups (Afrobarometer:
http://www.afrobarometer.org). These statistics are a grim reminder of why people vote based
on ethnic affiliation rather national aspiration. The calculation is that their interest as a group
will be advanced by the government led by members of their own group.

83
The 2007 Presidential election in Sierra Leone offer an opportunity to test whether political affiliation is ethnically based, although it does not seem manifest in the previous elections analyzed. The reasons for this are two-fold: First, by constitutional provision, President Ahmad Tejan Kabba was not on the ballot due to the term limit requirement which meant the two main parties had to field new candidates, although the APC’s Ernest Koroma, ran for the Presidency in 2002, and Solomon Berewa of the SLPP was the Vice President. Also, the SLPP was thrust into a leadership struggle to fill in the void left by President Kabbah, which caused a splintering of the party that led Mr. Charles Margai to form the PMDC. After neither candidate representing the major parties failed to earn the required 55 % to form the government, he (Charles Margai) coalesced with the APC and urged his supporters to do the same (BBC News 2007: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6954744.stm).

As can be seen from figures 1 and 2, the election was a tie between the ruling SLPP and the APC, with the parties earning 39.54 % and 40.73 % respectively. Other parties accounted for the remaining number of seats. In fact, all 10 seats won by the PMDC were won in the SLPP stronghold in the Southern Province, which is also the home of Mr. Margai and a place where the Margai “dynasty” remains very influential. Mr. Margai took with him the emerging elites and idealists in the SLPP, thus undermining the ethnic cohesion that could have increased the likelihood of the SLPP winning the elections through dominance in the South and Eastern Provinces (BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6961449.stm). Since the PMDC performed so well in the SLPP stronghold, one can therefore surmise that its performance significantly altered the ethno-regional political configuration in Sierra Leone. In the end, it was Mr. Margai’s decision to coalesce with the APC that gave it the edge in the run-off election (Ohman, 2008: 765).
The 2012 presidential election was won overwhelmingly by the incumbent, President Ernest Bai Koroma, who was able to stave off a second round of balloting by winning 58.65 % compared to the opposition SLPP candidate, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio (Rtd), who won 37.36 %. More importantly, the PMDC’s Charles Margai, a former SLPP member and Presidential aspirant who swayed the 2007 elections, came third but won only 1.29 % of the votes. It is therefore safe to say the 2012 election was a straight contest between the APC and the SLPP, even though a total of nine candidates vied for the Presidency.

Clearly, presidential election affects the party system in Sierra Leone through the presidential coattails, the mechanical and psychological effects of legal thresholds, as well as the exertion of “blackmail” and “coalition” potential by smaller parties. The fact that presidential elections often mirror that of the parliamentary elections, at least in percentage terms, show that there is a strong relationship between the two elections with the presidential influencing the parliamentary. However, the fact that certain candidates and their parties performed strongly in 1996 but not so much in subsequent elections, especially after the deaths of their founding fathers, point to the importance of candidate selection in driving votes in both presidential elections in Sierra Leone.

Also, the splintering of the SLPP and the strong performance by the PMDC in the 2007 elections show that individual candidates, as well as presidential thresholds influence the party system. Thresholds increase the “blackmail” or “coalition” potential of the smaller parties as has been illustrated by the case of the PMDC whose presidential candidate earned 15 % in the first round of voting in 2007, causing the APC to actively seek his support and the SLPP to despise his presence in the race. Also, the declaration of support for the APC by Mr. Margai and the
PMDC had the psychological effect of tilting the election in its favor due to the fact that the electorate saw a clear path to victory for the APC with the support of PMDC.

c) Ethno-regional basis of party representation in Sierra Leone

In order to account for the effects on ethnicity or ethno-political cleavages on electoral outcome and party systems, we need to take a look at the disaggregated results of the elections which show the relative strengths of various parties by district and region. This is necessary because a key hypothesis of this dissertation is that two party systems along with SMD electoral systems promote ethnicity whereas multi-party and PR systems suppress it. The main arguments for this hypothesis have been laid out earlier in this chapter, however in order to test the validity of those arguments, actual voting patterns during the time period from 1996 to present need to be examined to determine if the theorized Mende and Temne dominance in South-East and Northern provinces of Sierra Leonean respectively held true. In other words, we need to study the regional data in order to measure the effects of ethnicity and the extent to which party systems and electoral systems are influenced by it. An important statistic about ethnic suspicion referenced above need to be kept in mind as the analysis proceed because it illustrates the level of suspicion with which people view “others,” or believe “others” treat them in a political context. In turn, this suspicion, perhaps misperception, could form the basis for ethnic solidarity, if for no other reason than to preserve and protect the interest of one’s ethnic group from perceived domination.

It is important to state that provincial data for the 1996 parliamentary election is missing because that election was held under the List PR system, with the entire country merged into a single constituency (DM=67). Consequently, the result cannot be broken down regionally but as
noted in the introduction to this chapter, and evident from figure 3 below the SLPP dominated the Eastern region by winning all 24 seats that were contested in that region in the 2002 Parliamentary elections. The total domination of the Eastern Province by the SLPP in 2002 can minimally be attributed to the advantage of incumbency, but it was largely due to the regionalization of the electorate, which was accentuated by increased district magnitudes from one (1) to fourteen (14) blocks based on region. Under those conditions, the SLPP had obvious advantage in the South and Eastern regions because it had maintained dominance those region since the institutionalization of multi-partyism in Sierra Leone (Kandeh, 1992).

In the 2007, all but one of the seats in the Eastern Province was won by the SLPP leaving the APC with the only other seat, however it was significant because that was the first time the APC won a seat in the Eastern province since the return to multi-party rule. One explanation given for this is that the vice presidential candidate for the APC hailed from Kono district in Eastern Province, and that he mobilized the voters in his own constituency in order to deliver victory for his party. More importantly, in 2012 the APC won 7 seats in the Eastern Province whereas the SLPP won only 18 of the contested seats. It was an epic blow to the SLPP’s national prospect, given that it relies on dominance of South and Eastern regions for victory in national elections. The steady improvements in the performance of the APC in the Eastern Province could also be attributed to the strength of incumbency and the use of state resources to ascertain electoral victory. Like the SLPP, there were accusations of abuse of electoral laws, as well suppression of votes primarily in the South-Eastern SLPP-dominated region.

Another key finding in this dissertation is that small parties virtually ceased to exist and impact on the electoral system as time wore on, and as electoral systems changed and district magnitudes contacted. As noted earlier, the enlargement of the number of constituencies from
one to fourteen in 2002, and then to 112 in 2007 and 2012, coupled with reversion to SMD, severely undercut the capacity of smaller parties to compete effectively due to the financial burden that campaigning in multiple constituencies imposed on them. To make matters worse, filing fees were increased astronomically in the 2012 cycle, making it impossible for the smaller parties to afford (Carter Center Observer Report, 2012). Apart from the financial burden that the expansion of the number of constituencies imposed on the smaller parties, it made it easier for the larger parties to mobilize their (regionalized) bases into voting for “their” own party rather than one that advances that national interest.

The graph below show the trend in the performance of the main parties in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone from 1996 to 2012, and it illustrates the argument made throughout this dissertation, that as district magnitude increases the strength and relevance of the smaller parties wane, thereby increasing the prospects for ethnicity as a basis for party affiliation, although candidate characteristics could also alter outcomes in regions that do not traditionally support them.

**Figure 3.4: Trend in Party representation in the Eastern Province from 2002 - 2012**

![Graph showing party representation](http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html)
As in the East, the SLPP won all the 32 seats that were contested in the Southern Province in 2002. That should not be surprising, given that the base of the SLPP has traditionally been the Mende-dominated South and Eastern regions of the country, (Kandeh 1992). However in 2007, the SLPP won only 14 seats, while the PMDC won 10 and the APC won 1 seat (figure 4). As noted earlier, the leader and most of the elites that formed the PMDC hailed from the South and Eastern Provinces, and since their leader Mr. Charles F. Margai had a very strong name recognition and support in that region, he was able to hold the SLPP in check in the election. Also, the fragmentation of the Mende-led, South-Eastern SLPP coalition, which as evident from the distribution of seats in the Southern Province is another reason why it performed badly in the Southern Province in the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections.

The SLPP also won all the seats contested in the South in 2012. The total domination of the Southern Province by the SLPP resulted from the unification of the Mende elite in and recognition of the fact that the fragmentation of “their party,” and ethnic coalition, and splintering of the votes in the Southern province was the main reason why the party lost the election in 2007. By 2012, the general perception was that Mr. Margai was contesting in order to soothe his own ego, especially after he broke away from the APC coalition that he helped put in power. All in all, the rallying of the Mende’s around the SLPP in 2012 shows that when the perceived ethnic disunity causes a lose-lose proposition for members of a group, as was the conviction among the Mende’s following the 2007 elections, they will unite in an effort to regain control of the political power and maximize their mutual benefit. This fragmentation and eventual unification of the Mendes feed into the perception that by nearly two to one (63 %)
Sierra Leoneans believe that the interests of their ethnic groups are not represented by the government power if it is dominated by another ethnic group.

**Figure 3.5: Trend in Party representation in the Southern Province from 2002 - 2012**

The resurgence of the APC was evident by the 22 of the 40 seats that the party won in the 2002 parliamentary election in the Northern Province. In that election, the SLPP won a total of 18 seats in the Northern Province, which is traditionally the base of the APC. However, as noted earlier, the leaders of the PDP and UNPP, who also hailed from the Northern Province, had passed away, giving the APC the opportunity to mobilize its ethnic base in the North. Also, there could have been a perception that Mr. John Karefa-Smart, who placed second in the 1996 presidential election under the banner of the UNPP was incapable of beating the SLPP, hence the need to coalesce around the party that had traditionally dominated elections in the region. Although that possibility cannot be adequately justified based on election results, it cannot be totally dismissed either. One thing that is apparent is that the regionalization of the electorate
due to increased district magnitudes in 2002 (DM≤8) led to the consolidation of the APC’s traditional base.

In the 2007 general elections, the APC made a big comeback by winning 36 out of the 39 seats in the Northern Province, with the SLPP winning the remaining 3 seats. Even though the APC did not win all seats in the Northern Province, its share of the votes in that region increased astronomically while the SLPP’s decreased dramatically. In 2012, the APC won all the 39 seats contested in the Northern Province, which was demonstrative of the solidification of the Northern ethnic coalition. The consolidation of power by the ruling party, as well as the unification of Northern elites, coupled with change in the electoral system from PR to SMD, led the APC to increase its total share of seats won in Parliament during the period under review. Moreover, the change in electoral system from PR to SMD, along with increase in the constituencies and the mechanical and psychological effects of winning in a region traditionally dominated by the APC made it difficult for small, under-funded, non-incumbent parties, to compete in a region where they were less likely to win, and where the traditionally dominant party was likely to increase its strength.
In the 2002 parliamentary elections in the Western Area, which comprises the capital, Freetown and its immediate environs, the votes were split between the APC which won 5 seats, the SLPP with 9 seats and the Peace and Liberation Party (PLP) with two seats. The Western Area, unlike the provinces which may be dominated by the prevalent ethnic groups and parties in certain regions, is more urbane and cosmopolitan with residents who tend to be comparatively independent regarding their political affiliation. It is credible to argue that APC’s victory in the 2007 general election is attributable to its crushing defeat of the SLPP in Western Area earning all 23 contested seats. Again, it is noteworthy, as stated earlier, that Freetown is a region that tends to be uncommitted to either of the major parties, therefore making it a true battleground - one that accounts for approximately 20% of the total number of contested seats nationwide and therefore capable of deciding the national electoral outlook. As an illustration, it is worth
reiterating that the APC’s dominance of the Western Area in the 2007 and 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections may have given it the edge over the SLPP in those elections.

**Figure 3.7: Trend in Party representation in the Western Area from 2002 - 2012**

![Graph showing trend in party representation in the Western Area from 2002 to 2012.](http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html)

Source: [http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html](http://africanelections.tripod.com/sl.html)

Over all, the analyses of the regional election results show that ethnicity remains a salient feature of democratic politics in Sierra Leone through the regionalization of party support at the parliamentary level and ethnic voting at the presidential level. Moreover, it shows that ethnicity can be execrated under the SMD system, as well as the ethnically bifurcated two-party system that ultimately results from it. Clearly, the two large parties have regional dominance in the South-East and the Northern regions respectively. Even though that dominance may not be sustained election after election, it is significant and even robust, as the district magnitudes increase and force smaller parties out of competition.
As noted earlier, the 1991 Constitution stipulates that Sierra Leone is a “multi-party state.” Based on that constitutional provision, there has been a plethora of parties but as the analysis of the election results from 1996 to 2012 show, there are theoretically two strong parties in Sierra Leone at the moment. Upon the return to multi-partyism in 1996, the Temne-led, Northern party, the APC, which was in power for more than two decades was fragmented, causing key party leaders to break away and form their own parties. The fact that two of those parties, PDP and UNPP, came second and third in the 1996 general elections alone cannot explain the poor performance of the APC in the Northern region, although it is safe to say that their presence helped diminish the APC’s chances of winning or dominating its regional base that election year. The same is true for the SLPP, which in the 2007 elections lost seats in its stronghold due to the splintering of the party after Mr. Charles F. Margai, along with loyalists who were mostly young intellectuals from the South and Eastern Provinces, broke away formed the PMDC and won 10 seats in the Southern Province. The splintering of the SLPP, and dismantling of the Mende ethnic coalition, is also reason for the diminished strength of the party, even in the region that it dominates historically.

From the ongoing analyses, it is evident that there is a regional political fault-line that divides Sierra Leone between the North and the South-Eastern regions, with the Temne-led APC exercising dominance in the North, and the Mende-led SLPP dominating in the South and Eastern regions (Kandeh, 2002). The ethnic fault-line becomes even more visible under a SMD electoral system, with differentiated district magnitudes (DM>1) due to the reductive effect it exercises on small parties, as well as the associated mechanical and psychological effects of districting. It is also evident from the data analyzed, that the minimal presidential threshold provision increases the coalition and/or blackmail potentials of smaller parties, especially in
cases where ethnic fragmentation exits like in 2007 among the Mende’s. At the same time, a party’s choice of a presidential candidate may increase its prospects in the parliamentary election through coattail effects. It is safe to say that all of these factors converged to influence party system outcomes in Sierra Leone from 1996 to 2012.

The findings therefore confirm the first three hypotheses tested in this section: Firstly, increased district magnitudes under SMD electoral system leads to ethnic voting, and reduction in the number of small parties, which results from the mechanical and psychological effects of districting. Secondly, super-majority and minimum threshold requirements in presidential elections increase the blackmail and/or coalition potentials of smaller parties. Finally, presidential candidate choices influence parliamentary election outcomes through personal characteristics and the associated coattail effects.

Overall, the findings suggest patterns that do not deviate too far from the Western-based theories about the relationship between electoral systems, cleavage structures, and party systems put forward by Western scholars like Duverger (1954), Lijphart (1999) and others. However, the finding by Mozaffar et.al. (2003) stated earlier must not be totally dismissed. Western-based theories about the impact of cleavage structures on party systems are broad in their definition of cleavages which focus on socio-economic variables. Generally, economic calculations tend to be rational, whereas cultural and ethnic favoritism tend to be sentimental. Therefore studies that deal exclusively with Africa should define ethnicity to capture sentimental and altruistic elements, which may not necessarily be the case in those dealing broadly with socio-economic variables. For example, socio-economic calculation often leads voters to vote liberal or conservative because they prefer candidates that represent their economic interest or social status. On the other hand, ethnic-driven voters often believe that their interests, including
economic interests, are best maximized under a government run by members of their ethnic
group. Against this background, it is safe to argue that ethnicity is salient in its interpretation
and application to the electoral process in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Chapter 4

Democratization and Governance in Sierra Leone

In the previous chapter, I used election results to analyze the evolution of party systems under various electoral systems, as well as the influence of ethnicity on both processes in Sierra Leone from 1996-2012. I also did an extensive analysis of the role of ethnicity in the determination of party affiliation, and even though ethnicity was found not to be the sole driving force behind partisanship and party system outcomes, ethno-regional influences were found to be significant voter consideration in deciding which party to support. After election and government formation, states typically tend to focus more attention on democratization, which is perceived in terms of the quality of representation; and governance, which deals with the effective, efficient and equitable management of public goods and services. Both democracy and governance therefore give meaning to elections by translating competitive electoral outcomes into policies that are representative of the people’s mandate.

While the relationship between party systems and democratization has been thoroughly explored by Duverger (1954), Lipset and Rokkan, and more recently by Lipjhart (1999), that between party systems and governance has not received as much attention as it deserves. In a recent work, Janda and Kwak (2011) found that party systems influence the quality of governance in a country. Although they used extensive data and included 212 countries in their analysis, their findings should be seen only as a first step in establishing such a link due to obvious limitations caused by their concentration on differences between countries without parties, those with partisan and those with non-partisan parliaments. They found that countries with non-partisan parliaments had better governance outcomes that those with partisan
parliaments, while those with partisan parliaments had better governance outcomes than those without party systems (Janda and Kwak, 2011: 99 and 175). As noted above, they set countries apart based on the relationship between partisanship and governance not on the number of strong, effective or relevant parties. It therefore leaves unanswered the question of whether it make a difference in governance if a country has a two or multi-party system. I will answer this question by analyzing the governance indicators for Sierra Leone from 1996-2012, a period during which changes were recorded in party systems.

Flowing from the largely normative arguments advanced for the adoption of multiparty democracy as a panacea for good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and systematic studies that have been done to better understand the relationship between those variables, I develop the following hypotheses to be tasted later in this chapter:

H3: Multi-party systems lead to better governance outcomes than two party systems

H2: Super majority presidential systems produce to better governance outcomes

H1: PR systems lead to better governance outcomes than SMD.

In order to test these hypotheses, I intend to first examine the application of the concept of democracy as it relates to Sierra Leone, and then locate its place on the democratic axis. Specifically, I used Lipjhart’s classification to determine which category of democracy Sierra Leone falls into, and whether such categorizations changed along with institutional characteristics such as the party and electoral systems. I will also use Polity IV dataset to analyze democratic trends and changes in regime types as party systems changed in Sierra Leone. Moreover, I will assess changes in key variables of democracy in the Polity IV dataset
for Sierra Leone from 1996-2012, and advance explanations for variations and deviations over time.

Finally, I will use governance data on Sierra Leone contained in the Worldwide Governance Indicators to evaluate the quality of governance in Sierra Leone during the period under review. In particular, I will focus on the key variables of Voice and Accountability (VA), Control of Corruption (CC), Government Effectiveness (GE), and Political Stability (PS). I used these four variables rather than all six identified and operationalized in the Worldwide Governance Index because of their relevance to the political context in Sierra Leone and other Sub-Saharan African context. After a decade-long civil war, which was preceded by military take-overs and one-party rule, political Stability has become extremely important in Sierra Leone due to voter preoccupation with national security and personal safety, as well as disdain for the uncertainty in the conduct of governmental affairs.

Under previous authoritarian governments (one party and military regimes) political participation was constricted and government was rendered ineffective. As a result, Voice and Accountability as well as Government Effectiveness are now considered key independent variables used to measure democracy due to the weak system of checks and balances and lack of voter participation in governance in Sierra Leone. Since corruption tends to be pervasive in democratizing states such as Sierra Leone, I will use Control of Corruption as one of the variables of interest in this study. All of these variables combine to paint a glaring picture of how governance has evolved in Sierra Leone and lay the foundation for theory formulation in the next chapter.
a) Democracy and Democratization in Sierra Leone

Although the concept of democracy is not new to Sierra Leone, its practice is historically and theoretically firmly rooted in Western democratic traditions. As noted in the previous chapter, there was a dual governmental structure, in which people from the colony of Freetown and its immediate surroundings practiced Western representative democracy almost from its inception, while the vast majority of the people were governed by traditional authorities, which were at often at variance with fundamental concepts that underpin western democratic theory and practice. Democratic principles such as separation of powers, free and fair elections with universal adult suffrage, and “representative” governments as understood in the Western sense, are not the principles upon which traditional authority is typically based. Conceivably, variations in practice between the amalgamated two systems produced misunderstanding which often resulted in tension between traditional authorities and their Western over-lords (Kandeh, 1992).

Upon the attainment of independence from Great Britain, the country was unified for administrative purposes, compelling the two political blocks to live under Western democratic system of government, which was fashioned mainly on the British model of political organization. Under the 1961 Constitution, there was a parliament, an executive authority headed by the Prime Minister but answerable to the Governor-General and ultimately the British crown, an independent judiciary, universal adult suffrage, as well as the rule of law, at least in theory. Notwithstanding efforts by the British to experiment with novel political systems and demographic arrangements, in Sierra Leone like most other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the developing world, cultural attributes such as ethnicity remain potent political forces due to the fact that the majority of the population still lived under direct control of their
traditional rulers. It is one of the reasons why ethnicity remains salient in Sierra Leone politics today.

As emphasized earlier, Sierra Leone has been in constant political transition since the attainment of independence, morphing from multi-party democracy to military rule, one party system, the anarchy of a civil war, and finally back to multi-party democracy in 2001. Along the way, there were notable transformations in some of the major political institutions such as the party and electoral systems. There were also changes which included going from a parliamentary system to a presidential system, with serious implications for how key institutions interact. The aim of this section is to assess the overall impact of democratic transformation and governance in Sierra Leone. In order to accomplish that, I will do a time series analysis Sierra Leone’s total, as well as composite scores of the Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV dataset from 1996-2012. I will analyze the national democratic scores, as well as variations in the composite variables of the polity data ranging from Executive Recruitment (EXREC) to Executive Constraints (EXCONST). Using Polity IV dataset for this analysis allows me to evaluate account for Sierra Leone’s transformation on the democratic spectrum, which is important because it theoretically answers the question how strong a democracy is Sierra Leone.

As argued throughout this project, even though Sierra Leone has a “democratic” system of government, there are still elements of undemocratic practices that exist to warrant its categorization, like most countries in the developing world, as an “anocracy” (Center for Systemic Peace). Since the ultimate goal of this dissertation is to develop a theory that couples party systems and electoral systems with ethnicity in order to produce strong democracies and good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to first analyze the level of democratization Sierra Leone.
As noted in the methodology section, Polity IV assesses the “concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic regimes,” and treats them as continuous rather than dichotomous variables, which is appropriate in light of the “third wave” of democracy and the Arab Spring which have led to the “democratization” of states that were notably autocratic. The data uses a 21 point scale to rank countries into “fully institutionalized autocracies” (Autocracies), “mixed” or “incoherent” authority regimes (Anocracies), and “fully institutionalized democracies” (Democracies). States that are categorized as Autocracies have scores ranging from -10 to -6, Anocracies from -5 to +5, and democracies from +6 to +10 (Polity IV Codebook). The data measures the general democratic trends in various states by using six regime characteristics (used in the charts that follow) based on these three concept variables: 1) Executive Recruitment Concept (EXREC), 2) Executive Constraint Concept (EXCONST), and 3) Political Competition Concept (POLCOMP).

The Civil War that ranged from 1992 – 2002 made it impossible to obtain accurate data on democracy for that period, but missing data for that time does not weaken the findings in this study because very little changed in terms of the quality of governance. In fact, as shown in figure 4.1, after the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1996, there were sudden drops in both the Polity and Democracy scores from 5 and 1 respectively to -7 and -8 in 2001. Figure 4.2 shows that there was a correspondingly sharp drop in the scores of the composite variables of democracy in 1997, which can be attributed to the overthrow the government and the anarchy that ensued. As demonstrated in figure 4.1, there were sharp increases in Sierra Leone’s Polity scores from -8 in 2001 to +1 in 2002, and 1.5 in 2007. Similar changes were recorded in the Democracy scores from -8 in 2001 to +5 in 2002 and +8 in 2007. Even though these changes were dramatic, they should not lead to the conclusion that Sierra Leone is a full-fledged
democracy. In fact, the actual Democracy score (+1) firmly puts Sierra Leone in the Anocracy category based on its regime characteristics which are “mixed” or “incoherent.”

Even a decade and three elections following the civil war, key regime characteristics such as Executive Recruitment earn high scores, while the skewed nature of inter-party competition in favor of the main political parties undermine the openness, fairness, and accountability of the executive recruitment process (Cater Center Election Monitoring Report for Sierra Leone, 2002 and 2012). Moreover, executive authority in Sierra Leone is still largely unconstrained. Even though the Constitution vests the oversight responsibility in Parliament, the low wages and morale of Parliamentarians and opposition party leaders often prevent them from being vocal advocates of the people. That was the case recently when reports surfaced, and were later substantiated, that opposition party leaders accepted without reporting to their parties, the sum of $2,000.00 each as “transport” from the President during an official visit to the State House (http://www.globaltimes-sl.com/political-bribery- jj-saffa-lashes-out/).

Domestic and foreign NGOs have coalesced around certain policy issues ranging from rural development, human rights, public health etc., and have been effective in partnering with the government to ensure the smooth delivery of much needed public services to local communities in Sierra Leone (http://awoko.org/2012/08/17/government-relies-on-ngos-to-mitigate-cholera-outbreak/). There has also been an increase popular participation in the electoral process, as evident from turnout data reported by the National Election Commission. Since 1996, over 70% of voters have turned out for all elections held in Sierra Leone (National Electoral Commission). However, notwithstanding the two transfers of power between the major parties, the total share of seats won by the small parties had shrunk to zero in 2012. Also, participation in the process of governance seems to be reserved for the political elites and
bureaucrats, although it is fair to say that both parties are guilty of cronyism and other corrupt and undemocratic practices, like using power to enrich their supporters and shield them from prosecution, thereby making it difficult for citizens to hold government accountable.

Figure 4.1: Polity trend in Sierra Leone (1996-2012)

![Polity trend in Sierra Leone (1996-2012)](http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)

Source: [http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)

Figure 4.2: Trend in composite variables of democracy in Sierra Leone (1996-2012)

![Trend in composite variables of democracy in Sierra Leone (1996-2012)](http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)

Source: [http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)
After carefully analyzing the democratic trend in Sierra Leone from the data contained in the Polity IV dataset, two observations become obvious. First, peace and political stability are preconditions for democracy. While it may sound trite, and regardless of the fact that peace and political (in)stability are not the focus of this dissertation it is worth noting, especially in the case of Sierra Leone, which was embroiled in a civil war from 1991 to 2001. It is also noteworthy that, although peace and political stability go hand-in-hand, they should not be construed to mean the same thing. Whereas peace can be defined in terms of the absence of war or violence, political instability often manifests itself in a myriad of ways including weak institutions, and tension in the interactions among the various groups and actors in society that may boil over into conflict or war if not regularized. The data makes clear that major democratic institutions in Sierra Leone are not as robust as those in fully institutionalized democracies. In fact, the country hovers on the margins of democracy, with weak institutions, poor distribution of public goods and services, and rampant corruption by public officials. Although this is a cause for concern, it should also be seen as an opportunity to craft policies that are grounded in theory so as to inform Sierra Leone and other democratizing countries about the ways in which alternative institutions may be coupled in order to produce more representative and responsive governments.

Secondly, the analysis also underscores the relevance of elections in the democratic process. The data shows that apart from conflict, war and peace, the most dramatic shifts in the composite variables of democracy occurred during election years. Notwithstanding the fact that the war had been going on for at least five years, in 1996 Sierra Leone’s democracy score stood at +1, which was an Anocracy but better than -7 in 1997, and -8 (autocracy) in 2001. Immediately after the war and the post-war election in 2002, Sierra Leone became an Anocracy, again, moving from -8 to 0. In 2007, it added another point that took it to +1, which is the
highest democracy score recorded for the period under review, comparable only to that attained in 1996. The conclusion one can draw is that while events and institutions changed, the country remained an *Anocracy*, with only marginal changes in the overall democratization process.

It is necessary to examine the process of governance in order to determine how public goods and services are delivered to individuals and groups, and whether benefits are equal or comparable across groups in the state. The focus of governance therefore goes beyond regime characteristics and typologies, as well as elections and the formation of government. It focuses on the actual quality of the relationships between the individuals, groups, and societies on the one hand, and the state and its institutions on the other. In short, governance is about the dynamic processes through which the goals of a democratic society are realized. It is to the analysis of governance in Sierra Leone that I devote the next section of this chapter.

**b) Governance in Sierra Leone: Evidence from 1999 – 2012**

In this section, I will analyze the trend in governance in Sierra Leone from 1999, which is the year the Worldwide Governance Indicators date back to, to 2012. Although governance involves the fashioning institutional arrangements to ensure that government is responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people, it ascertains that by subordinating government to them through decentralized administrative structures, maintenance of the rule of law, as well as the facilitation of collaborative relationships among key stakeholders in and out of government, in efforts to generate ideas and implement policies that effectively, efficiently, and equitably address societal problems.

Unlike democracy which is often measured in terms of annual progress (Polity IV), analyzing changes in governance outcomes annually can be misleading, due to the fact that
governance focuses more on the actual performance of governments, which is difficult to track annually (Worldwide Governance Indicators). Cognizant of this, the analysis will make conclusions about governance in Sierra Leone based on longer time horizons, while accounting for major annual variations, which may be the result of continuities and discontinuities in policies, or changes in the wider political or policy environments. This approach will allow me to do a comprehensive analysis of governance across all the four component variables that I will use in this section.

The Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset addresses the problem referenced above by aggregating data from multiple sources, including surveys of perceptions of governance from public and private sector employees, NGOs, and individual citizens and firms from thirty one existing data sources and across thirty five variables which are then aggregated into six broad governance indicators (Worldwide Governance Indicators Codebook). Although aggregating data from such disparate sources could pose methodological problems, it helps unify the perceptions of governance which could minimize researcher or organizational bias. Moreover, since the dataset includes data from 215 countries, it allows for meaningful comparison across time and space. In this case, the data will be analyzed from a time series perspective in order to better capture trends in governance in Sierra Leone.

The dataset uses six aggregate indicators to measure governance, which are: Voice and Accountability (VA), Political Stability and the Absence of Violence (PS), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), and Control of Corruption (CC). Among the six composite indicators of governance, I intend to analyze following four: Voice and Accountability (VA), Government Effectiveness (GE), Political Stability and the Absence of Violence (PS) and Control of Corruption (CC). I believe these four indicators
cumulatively shed light on the strength of the governmental institutions, and institutional vibrancy often shapes perceptions about the level of governance in that society. Also those variables are most reflective of the issues that plague governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Generally, strong institutions are seen as indicators of good governance, whereas weaker institutions are seen as indicators of bad governance. The same may also be true in terms of causation i.e. good governance may help strengthen the institutions of the state, whereas bad governance may undermine the strength of governing institutions. The usefulness of this logic can be fully appreciated when applied to Government Effectiveness, which should not be confused with governance, even though it is a key component of it. Whereas governance is an all-encompassing concept that involves other variables as we have, and will discuss in this chapter, Government Effectiveness refers to the perceptions about the effectiveness of delivery of public goods and services. Overall, effective governments often lay the foundation for good governance, while ineffective governments undermine good governance.

Another critical indicator of governance that will be analyzed in this dissertation is Political Stability and the Absence of violence (PS). To say that political stability remains a major preoccupation of the citizens as well as their leaders is not a stretch given Sierra Leone’s recent history of a decade-long civil war. Although peace has been restored, it is safe to say that concerns about political stability remain high on the minds of the people as well as the systemic agendas of government. I will therefore analyze the data on Political Stability and the Absence of Violence as key indicators of governance in Sierra Leone.

One central tenet of democratic societies is that they must be representative of the wishes and aspirations of the people, demonstrated by the extent of citizen involvement in government
formation, policy formulation, and public accountability. Given the importance of participation in the democratic process, therefore, I will use Voice and Accountability (VA) as a key indicator in analyzing governance in Sierra Leone. Also, I will analyze Control of Corruption as another key indicator of governance due to the fact that corruption remains an intractable problem in Sierra Leone. Moreover, corruption, which refers to the extent to which “public power can be exercised for private gain,” does not only lead to the depletion of state resources, it also erodes public confidence in institutions and officials, thereby undermining the foundations of democracy.

The four variables selected for analysis of governance in Sierra Leone reinforce, or are reinforced by, the analyses of the institutional variations and democratic trends in Sierra Leone. The analysis revealed that, despite institutional variations i.e. change from multi-party to two party system as well as from PR to majoritarian electoral system, Sierra Leone remained an anocracy over the period studied. Characteristic of anocracies is the fact that their institutions are ‘mixed,” or “incoherent,” i.e., they exhibit varying combinations of both authoritarian and democratic regime characteristics. For that reason, when analyzing governance in Sierra Leone and other developing countries, we should be mindful in the way we use the variables because some may be more or less meaningful depending on the level of democracy.

I decided to use VA, PS, GE, and CC, here for analytical purposes not because the other two variables i.e. Regulatory Quality (RQ) and the Rule of Law (RL) - are not important, but because rule of law has been a vibrant part of Sierra Leone’s constitutional and democratic process since the end of the civil war, and arguably even before. The Constitution recognizes fundamental liberties and due process, which are mostly upheld by the courts. It also maintains separation of powers between the main branches of government, along with guarantees of an
independent judiciary. It is also accurate to say that the Regulatory Quality (RQ) is fair in Sierra Leone but the lack of political will to vigorously enforce policies and regulations undermine their effectiveness. One of the greatest obstacles to regulatory enforcement in Sierra Leone is corruption, but since I will be analyzing Control of Corruption it will be superfluous to RQ as well.

The graphs in figures 4.3 and 4.4 below are derived from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. They show the trend in governance in Sierra Leone across these four variables: Voice and Accountability (VA), Political Stability and the Absence of Violence (PS), Government Effectiveness (GE) and Control of Corruption (CC) from 1996 - 2012, as well as Sierra Leone’s percentile rankings over the same time period. In figure 4.3, it is clear that the scores for all four variables were below zero (0) the entire period, which indicates that while the country may have experienced modest gains in democratization, it remained plagued by bad governance. Further evidence of that can be found in figure 4.4, which shows Sierra Leone’s percentile rankings for the four governance indicators selected in this study. Sierra Leone remained below the 45th percentile in all of the indicators for the entire time. Even worse, the rankings were below the 25th and 15th percentiles for Government Effectiveness (GE) and Control of Corruption (CC) respectively.

Also clear from these charts (figures 4.3 and 4.4), as revealed in the previous chapter, is that fact that 2002 was the year of transformation in Sierra Leone. In that year, there was a noticeable increase in the scores across all but one of the indicators. There was also a slight increase in the percentile rankings (globally) for Voice and Accountability (VA) and Government Effectiveness (GE). However, there was a slight decline in Political Stability and the Absence of Violence (PS), and an even sharper decline in Control of Corruption (CC), which
go to show, that while the end of the war and the conduction of “free and fair” elections were good for democracy, the state of governance remained poor due to pervasive corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude. In fact, corruption had become so pervasive that in 2013, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) ended its partnership with Sierra Leone for that very reason, in spite of the fact that other indicators of governance remained promising (Millennium Challenge Corporation Report 2013).

**Figure 4.3: Worldwide Governance Indicators for Sierra Leone from 1996-2012**

It is important at this stage to analyze each of the variables separately, in order to account for changes that will inform my conclusions about governance in Sierra Leone. Based on the analysis, the indicator that experienced the most variation is Voice and Accountability (VA). Beginning in 1996, it was at -0.7, but it dove suddenly in 1997 until it bottomed out at -1.6 in 2001. Following that, it rose sharply in 2003 and 2004 to -0.4 to -0.3 respectively, although still in negative territory. It then fluctuated between -0.5 in 2005 and -0.3 in 2008 and 2010 respectively. The trend is reinforced by the percentile rankings attained during the same period. In 1996, Sierra Leone was in the 27th percentile for Voice and Accountability (VA), but it fell to the 9th and 6th percentiles in 1998 and 2000 respectively. Also, since in 2002, there was steady increase in the percentile rankings for Voice and Accountability from the 28th percentile that year to the 35th in 2006 and 44th in 2008 respectively.
The almost total muting of Voice and Accountability (VA) in 1997 corresponds with the rebel Revolutionary Patriotic Front (RUF) overthrow of the government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabba, while the sharpest increase was in 2002, which corresponds the period immediately following the truce between the warring factions and the government in 2001, as well as the ensuing elections. The most sustained increase in Voice and Accountability was between 2002 and 2007 which is attributable the sustained peace, as well as good feelings about democracy marked by two presidential and parliamentary elections. Over all, the sudden and dramatic changes in perceptions of the levels at which Sierra Leoneans participated in the formation and monitoring of their government occurred mostly during election years. From that, we can surmise that, even though Sierra Leoneans participate in the election of their leaders, they have very little measure of control over the extent of their actions once they are in office. That should not be interpreted to mean they do not participate in civic discourse during ordinary times, it means their participation during non-election times are not as valued by their leaders, and therefore may not necessarily constitute the basis of policy.

It has been emphasized elsewhere in this dissertation that in the 1990s Sierra Leone was embroiled in a civil war, which undermined its civic and political institutions, and rendered life insecure. After the restoration of peace by truce, and its consolidation through the confidence-building measure such as the formation of the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Sierra Leone has gradually regained political stability, which explains why along with Voice and Accountability (VA), it has experienced the most sustained positive variation, as well as the steepest decline during certain crucial moments. For example, in 1996 Sierra Leone’s Political Stability and Absence of Violence score was -1.82, which put it in the 5th percentile ranking. That figure declined sharply in 1998 to -2.28 and into the 3rd percentile
ranking, but it experienced a modest improvement to -1.97 in 2000, followed by an astronomical increase to -0.86 and into the 21st percentile in 2002. From thereon, the scores varied between -1.12 to -0.02 (30th to 43rd percentile), with the highest scores and rankings obtained in 2007.

The dramatic shifts in Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS) scores both on the lower and upper end, as with Voice and Accountability (VA), can be linked to issues of war, peace, and representation. The sharpest decline in Political Stability occurred in 1997 when the RUF overthrew the government and established a state of anarchy in its place. Needless to say that under unstable political circumstances, one would expect the indicator for Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS) to decrease just as it should be expected to increase in times of peace. What is important in this case is that the sharp increase in 1997 should not necessarily be attributed to positive institutional reform or policy innovation, but to the peaceful, as well as “free and fair” election which took place that year, thus signaling that the political system is stable and capable of handling a smooth transfer of power. Be that as it may, it is worth emphasizing that both composite scores and corresponding percentile rankings remained in negative territory during the entire period of the study, suggesting that even though there was an absence of violence leading some to argue that Sierra Leone is stable, the threat of instability looms due to the fact that institutions such as the bureaucracy remain steeped in inertia, proving to be incapable of handling the loads placed upon it.

The main mechanism through which governance is carried out in a society is government, although the concept of governance entails more than government and should not be confused with it. Perceptions about Government Effectiveness (GE) capture the views about the nature and quality of service delivery by government, and the extent to which policies reflect the views, sentiments, and interests of the citizens. It is therefore a measure of governance used in this
analysis because of its applicability to Sub Saharan African countries, as well as its universal appeal, since it a measure that determines the actual performance of governments, regardless of the level of development and extent of democratization.

Like Government Effectiveness (GE), Control of Corruption (CC) has universal applicability, although it tends to be more pervasive in developing countries, and now democratizing states, due to the weakness of their institutions which woefully fail to effectively discourage it. As emphasized earlier, the cumulative effect of pervasive corruption is that it leads to the erosion of the citizen confidence in the institutions of governance. According to the Freedom House, “decades of grievous official mismanagement of the country's economy and the subordination of government institutions led to a deeply corrupt system of rule. These problems helped to create the conditions that led to the war, in which more than 60,000 people were killed” [http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2010/sierra-leone](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2010/sierra-leone). Corruption is therefore a major hindrance to governance in Sierra Leone, and as shown by the data in figure 4.4 there was very little variation in the CC scores and corresponding percentile rankings for Sierra Leone from 1996 to present, indicating the extent of its entrenchment in the society.

In 1996, there was very little Control of Corruption in Sierra Leone. Its score (-0.77) on the corruption index placed it in the 26th percentile ranking, while the composite score varied from -1.09 to -0.75, fluctuating between 12th percentile in 2007 and 39th percentile in 2002. What is interesting to note about Control of Corruption (CC) in Sierra Leone is that the greatest variation which occurred between 1996 and 2002, though significant, does not amount to fundamental change in public perceptions about corruption as an intractable problem in Sierra Leone. In fact, the entire time efforts were made by governments to rein in corruption, but those
efforts often fell short either because they were politically driven, or narrowly focused in order to silence opposition.

The creation of the Anti-Corruption Commission, which was the most tangible effort undertaken by government by the SLPP, and continued by the current government under by the APC, has failed to make a dent in the problem. It is fair to say that efforts to control corruption have primarily targeted bureaucrats and political officials who have control over government resources that could potentially be used for personal gain. While that is one way of stopping corruption, it is clear more effort needs to be directed at public service reform which stress meritocratic principles that adequately rewards performance rather loyalty. As well, citizens need to be held equally accountable for providing incentives to, and conspiring with, public officials in their effort to fleece the state.

Looking at the data, it is difficult to make an association between ethnicity and Control of Corruption (CC) in Sierra Leone because of the obvious reason that it is not one of the composite indicators of governance. However, as noted by Mazrui (quoted earlier in this dissertation), public servants in African are oriented towards the compulsion of providing favorable treatment to those that share their “ethnic womb” (Mazrui, 1972). Sierra Leone is no exception because the literature on corruption in Sierra Leone is replete with evidence that suggest public servants, whether political or technocratic, tend to accord preferential treatment to their own kith and kin (Kandeh, 1992, Kpundeh, 1999), while trying to convey a sense of fairness through the distribution of pork, as well as making tenous ties to opposing communities to give them a sense of association and belonging. For example, the APC government has embarked on a highway project from Kenema to Kailahun (both SLPP strongholds) in order to facilitate much needed development, but also in the long run, to garner the support of the people
in those districts by calling their attention during elections to the “tangible developmental” efforts it has undertaken in the region. Similarly, when the SLPP was in power, like all previous governments, it made the completion of the Bumbuna Hydroelectric project, located in the North, one of its major priorities, so that it can demonstrate to the people of the North that it cares about the entire country, not only its base in the South and Eastern regions. It can therefore be argued that the leaders of both parties and governments strengthen their base by positioning their supporters well within the system and providing preferential treatment to them whenever possible, while trying to convey a sense of fairness and balance at times by disproportionately locating pet projects in areas other than their bases. In return for doing so, they expect to chip away at the strength of the opposition within its own base by posing as well-balanced parties that care about the entire country. While this strategy has proven ineffective over time, it is fair to say it has not prevented politicians from using ethnicity as a way of rallying the support of their kinsmen.

In dealing with corruption, governments tend to target public servants from regions other than the base of their party for prosecution and persecution. Under the SLPP, it was not uncommon for public servants from the North to complain that they were refused promotion and passed over for lucrative postings in the civil service, as much as being unduly targeted for prosecution before the Anti-Corruption Commission. The same is true under the APC government, which seems to be targeting bureaucrats from the South and Eastern regions, unfairly treating them in the service and disproportionately targeting for prosecution before the ACC. In order to address this problem, the independence of the Public Service Commission needs to be guaranteed under the Constitution. Also, it must be “manifestly and undoubtedly”
seen to be free from political control, relying only on meritocratic principles for recruitment, tenure, promotion and posting of public servants.

Governance, which has to do with the management of a political system to ensure that the goals of a democratic society-effective representation, collaborative decision making, prudent management and equitable distribution of public goods and services-has lagged far behind the pace of democratization in Sierra Leone. The data shows that regardless of the type of party system, the quality of governance has remained poor, often characterized by inadequate provision of public goods and services, as well as inadequate distributive mechanisms to ensure that those resources get to the targeted population, which tend to favor certain groups over others based on their access to power. Admittedly, shortage of resources coupled with the incompetence of the bureaucracy, and unabated corruption, are among the major impediments to good governance in Sierra Leone. On the positive side, the country has remained largely peaceful, although still unstable, which opens a window of opportunity to leverage and institute meaningful reforms that enhance good governance, while advancing the ideals of a truly democratic society in Sierra Leone.

Based on the extensive analysis of governance undertaken here, I reject all three hypotheses above. First, there were no significant shifts in governance, even as electoral systems changed from PR to SMD with varying district magnitudes. In fact, the worst scores in governance were earned during the civil war, but since government was not functional at that time, those scores need to be discounted as variations induced by the war, causing dips in key indicators like Voice and Accountability (VA), as well as Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS). Furthermore, Super-majority presidential governments fared no better than those that were coalition-led or otherwise not popularly elected. The data makes clear that there was
no significant difference between the periods 2002 – 2007 when the SLPP had an absolute majority in both parliamentary and presidential elections, and 2007 – 2012 when the government was under APC led “coalition” with the PMDC. The indicators that saw improvement between 2002 and 2007 were Voice and Accountability (VA) and Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS), which can be associated with the growing sense of personal security and national political stability, as well as increased civic participation after the decade-long civil war. There were modest gains in Government Effectiveness (GE) and Control Corruption (CC) between 2007 and 2009, but both indicators were back to 2007 levels by 2012. Improvements during that period may be associated with a growing public perception that the APC was making positive changes after replacing the SLPP, which by 2007 was regarded as aloof, if not out rightly incompetent and corrupt. Two years later, and with no dramatic improvements in the socio-economic conditions, Sierra Leoneans started feeling disillusioned about the possibility of the APC making the desired changes in the quality of their lives, as demonstrated by drops in the governance indicators to pre-2007 levels.

Finally, there is no significant difference in governance between the periods of multi-party and two-party governance. From 1996 – 2002, and 2007 to 2012, Sierra Leone had a multi-party system however there were no significant variations in governance during those times, as shown by the indicators in figures 4.3 and 4.4. Clearly, it did not matter much whether there was a two party or multi-party system, or a super-majority or coalition-led presidential government, or even a PR or SMD system in place, the overall quality of governance remained abysmal, indicating that institutional variation is not the cause of bad governance in Sierra Leone. For governance to improve there needs to be greater bureaucratic innovation, corruption.
abatement, popular involvement in policy making and implementation, and consistent parliamentary oversight over the use of executive authority.
Chapter 5

Theory and Conclusion

The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to develop a theory that meaningfully configures party systems and electoral systems with Africa’s diverse, multi-ethnic, socio-cultural structures to produce robust democracies that deliver good governance. In order to do so, I first did an extensive review of the literature on party systems, electoral systems, democracy and democratization, as well as ethnicity, and governance. I relied on the work of Mozaffar et.al, (2003), which focused exclusively on ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa and found that higher as well as moderate degrees of ethnic fragmentation had reductive effect on smaller parties but variations in district magnitudes exercised moderating effects on both ethno-political cleavages and party systems. Although it has been dismissed for promoting “African exceptionalism,” it is an important point of departure from the largely European dominated literature and theoretical approaches to studying the relationship between electoral systems, ethnicity, and party systems. While this dissertation does not seek to resolve that debate, its findings show that both ethno-political cleavage structures and electoral systems influence party systems in Africa, although the debate continues at the scholarly level, data analysis help us figure out ways to simultaneously maximize party systems outcomes and minimize ethnicity, in order to institute good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.

After analyzing the relationship between party systems and electoral systems, and their interaction with ethnicity, I proceeded to analyze that between party system, democratization, and governance, in order to account for any noticeable changes in the variables during the period under review. Needless to say the relationship between party systems and governance has received scant scholarly attention except for Janda and Kwak (2011), who attempted to establish
a theoretical relationship between “party systems and country governance”. Although they made interesting findings by showing that countries with less partisan parliaments performed better at governance than those with partisan parliaments, whereas those with partisan parliaments fared better than those without parties, it does not resolve the question whether countries with multi-party systems govern better than those with two-party systems. By analyzing the same data using case study methodology, the findings in this dissertation shows no significant difference in governance between periods of multi-partyism and those of two-party governance. It is an interesting finding which leads to the conclusion that both multi-partyism and two-party governance are capable of delivering good governance as long as the accompanying institutions are in place.

The theory that follows is a framework based on Lipjhart’s typology, which I extend to include ethnicity as a key independent variable, and governance as the ultimate goal. It is derived from facts and observations, as well as the data analyzed with the goal of building upon, and/or modifying existing theories or sets of theories underlying the topics being studied. Accordingly, I will couple alternative party systems with electoral systems, as well as theories of democracy, governance and ethnicity that are suited to the African condition. Specifically, I will make a dichotomy of institutional arrangements to produce alternative models that address the lapses in the governance infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa.

a) Key Findings

At this stage, it is necessary to summarize the main theories that underlie these topics, as well as the key findings derived from the analyses in order to lay the foundation for theory development. Some of these findings may have been highlighted and discussed elsewhere in the
dissertation, but summarizing them here gives me the opportunity to streamline the information that underlies the theory that I will put forward. The main findings are as follows:

(a) The main theoretical underpinnings of party systems, electoral systems, theories of democracy, and governance were all developed in the west. Although this is not a new finding, it is worth noting because it points to the so-called “travelling problem,” which arises when concepts and theories developed elsewhere are transported to other places, and in the process undergo some metamorphosis either because they have been misunderstood, misapplied, or implemented with too much modification to suit the realities of the new environment. It clear that some aspects of theory have been either ignored or misapplied in this case, especially that involving two or more topics. The most notable example is the theory regarding the coupling between party systems and electoral systems, which holds that two-party systems tend to go with majoritarian electoral systems, whereas multi-party systems go with proportional systems (Duverger, 1954, Lijphart, 1999). In fact, this theory is clearly confirmed by analysis of the electoral data and voting patterns in Sierra Leone. Notwithstanding the fact that theoretical basis for that relationship has long been established and confirmed in the works referenced here, as well as other studies, the country has retained a multi-party (even if in aspiration only) system, along with a majoritarian electoral system, which exaggerates the disproportionality between the percentage of votes won and seats allocated, as well as exercise a reductive effect on smaller parties as shown by the analysis.

(b) The institutionalization of party systems must go beyond aspiration and constitutional prescription, and instead rest upon sound theoretical foundation, which will ensure that the intended system are designed and instituted. Consequently, party system design must
be based on theories of party “strength,” (Rae, 1968), since there needs to be three or more medium to strong parties, or two large and one small to medium party, as was the case in Sierra Leone after the 2007 elections, for a country to be truly categorized to as a multi-party state. Also, party system design must consider the “relevance” of parties based on their “coalition” or “blackmail” potentials (Sartori, 1976), and “effectiveness” (Taagepera and Schuggart, 1999).

In 2007, the PMDC presidential candidate, Mr. Charles Margai and his party, won about 14 % of the total votes in both the presidential and parliamentary elections, however due to a constitutional requirement of a 55 % threshold to avert a run-off, the PMDC and its presidential candidate suddenly became “relevant” during the the run-off, with the main parties vying to coalesce with it, due to the fact that their candidates failed to meet that requirement. Simply put, the PMDC’s “coalition” and/ or “blackmail” potential escalated after the first round of votes resulted in a stalemate between the APC and the SLPP. It is therefore absolutely necessary to use these operational criteria, which are consistent and complimentary, rather that inconsistent and contradictory, to categorize systems, as well as design institutions that are based on underlying theories. That way, we will get multi-partyism (if that is the desired goal), as long as it is coupled with a PR electoral system.

(c) The prevailing theory of party system and democratization predict that “two party systems tend to go with majoritarian electoral systems, whereas multi-party systems go with proportional systems (Duverger, 1954, and Lijhpart, 1999). This theoretical distinction must be kept in mind because it is the bedrock upon which the theory developed in the next section rest. Moreover, the analyses in previous chapters confirm this theory, and therefore make it the basis for party system/ electoral system design.
(d) Though constitutionally a multi-party state, Sierra Leone had a de-facto two-party system for most of the period under review. Both major parties gained “dominance” through super-majority in presidential and parliamentary elections (SLPP in 2007, and APC in 2012) by earning more than 55% of the votes, which gave them absolute majority (Taagepra, 1999). Although the parties were able to forestall run-off presidential elections, neither has shown sustained dominance presidentially or in parliament. The SLPP lost the presidential election as well as the majority in Parliament in 2007 after dominating the 2002 elections while the APC attained power through the formation of a coalition with the PMDC in 2007 before going on to dominate the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections. Sierra Leone therefore hovers on the margins of a two party, with the goal of multi-partyism undermined by the SMD/first-past-the-post, majoritarian electoral system, which exerts reductive effects on smaller parties, especially when district magnitudes are decreased. That said, it should be borne in mind that under the PR system in 1996 and 2002, there were more small parties represented in Parliament than in 2007 when there were only three “relevant” parties. In 2012, the two main parties won all the seats in parliament, with the APC winning a clear majority.

(e) Although Sierra Leone is democratizing, there are two main types of democracy—“majoritarian” and “consensual,” that it can opt for based on Lipjhart’s typologies. It can be recalled that Lipjhart’s typologies are based on 10 variables, which are broadly categorized into two main groups: the Executives-Parties dimension and the Federal-Unitary dimension (Lipjhart 1999). However, not all of those variables are used here while ethnicity and governance have been added. I focused on the ones that are of direct relevance to this study, which are party system and electoral systems, as well as
governance and democracy broadly defined. Ultimately, my goal is not to choose between the systems—both are types are democracies, and African countries can evolve into full-fledged democracies either way they choose. However, it is necessary to underscore the fact that each type be paired with a certain party and electoral system combination for it to function effectively. Majoritarian democracies are akin to majoritarian electoral systems and two party systems, whereas consensual democracies typically work better with proportional electoral systems as well as multi-party systems (Lipjhart, 1999).

(f) Since Sierra Leone is a plural society, one of its main elements of cultural identity and party affiliation is ethnicity. Not surprisingly people identify themselves with their ethnic groups, over which the major parties exercise regional dominance, thereby making ethnicity a salient feature in electoral politics in Sierra Leone. Occasionally, it gets diluted by pragmatic political considerations, which make it possible for some groups to coalesce. Such pragmatism was demonstrated in the 1996 presidential election, which the SLPP won nationally, as well as in the Northern Province. Similarly, the PMDC’s influence in the 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections, and its ultimate coalition with APC led to its victory in the 2007 presidential elections, demonstrating the capability of the people to sometimes look beyond the “veil” of ethnicity in making realistic political choices. On the whole, it is fair to say that ethnicity exerts more influence under two-party systems with smaller district magnitudes, which enables larger ethnic-based parties to consolidate their membership in order to win elections.

(g) I discussed two main theories of pluralism earlier in this project. “Melting pot” theories stress the dominance of one culture in multicultural environment, as was the case in the
US in the late 19th and early 20th century, while the so called “salad bowl” theories underscore the need to maintain cultural/ethnic diversity, even as different societies grapple with living in a unified state or community. Melting pot policies include the promotion and provision of universalized education, access to information, expansion of economic opportunities to enhance the growth of a viable middle class, as well as the promotion of the allegiance to the state in order to instill a sense of patriotism, which puts the state above all group or societies.

On the other hand, salad bowl policies decentralize authority in order to allow communities to pursue their own distinct policies and identities, even if they belong to wider society. Again, the challenge is to figure out which policies go with what party system, electoral system, type of democracy and governance structure, so as to diffuse the negative effects of ethnicity, and prevent it from undermining the democratic process, as well as diminishing the governance capacity of the state.

(h) Finally, in terms of governance, modest improvements have been made since the end of the war, especially in terms of the maintenance of political stability and the abatement of violence, increased participation in the election of leaders, as well as allowing citizens to voice their opinions and hold leaders accountable. However, the overall quality of governance remains poor, undermined mainly by bureaucratic inertia, weak institutional arrangements, unresponsive leadership and pervasive corruption. Other variables such as Government Effectiveness (GE) and Control of Corruption (CC) remained virtually unaffected by changes in other institutional arrangements. In the end, the stasis in governance undermines the democratic process, due to the fact that the governing institutions are incapable of transforming the dreams and aspirations of the people into
b) Reconfiguring Party System, Democratization and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa

After thirteen years of one party rule, the courage and sacrifice of ordinary Sierra Leoneans forced the entrenched one-party APC regime to open the political space and allow other parties to compete for power in free and fair elections. In keeping with the trend in most Sub-Saharan African countries, as well as other developing countries, the government capitulated, formed a Constitutional Review Commission to draft a new constitution that reflects the wishes and sentiments expressed by the people for multi-partyism. The 1991 Multi-Party Constitution was adopted by parliament, thereby officially returning the country to multi-partyism. Along with the provision for a multi-party system, the drafters honored the style of representation typical of Westminster, and opted for a Single Member District (SMD)/ first-past-the-post electoral system, which gives the winner all the votes, thereby accentuating the disparity between the percentage of votes won and the number of seats awarded to a party in parliament (Katz, 2012). Even before the scheduled elections in 1992, there was a military takeover, which ushered in the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).

The military takeover was characterized by chaos, which led to the intensification of the war, although the military handed power back to a civilian regime after the general elections in 1996. Civilian rule was punctuated by overthrows and rebel take-overs until the signing of the 2001 peace accord, which was consolidated by the elections that followed in 2002, and subsequently in 2007 and 2012. During that time, power shifted from the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) to the All Peoples Congress (APC), while the electoral system changed from PR to...
a majoritarian system, along with notable variations in district magnitudes, which led to the reduction of small parties represented in parliament.

So, why was there a decline in the number of parties in parliament, even though the country remained a multi-party state? As argued throughout this dissertation, and supported by theories and the data analyzed, Single Member District (SMD)/ first-past-the-post electoral systems exaggerate the number of votes won by majority parties in single districts, due to the fact that the winner takes all the votes, which benefits large parties that have resources to compete effectively across the country. Over time, the large parties entrench their position and consolidate their gains, while the smaller parties consistently lose and gradually fade away. If that trend is allowed to continue, it will weaken the foundation of the multi-party state itself, especially if one of the parties establishes total dominance in the electoral arena. This point is very important to underscore because the purpose of establishing a multi-party system is to enhance competition among parties representing various interests, in a way that allows the majority to “get its way and the minority get its say.” However, there needs to be strong institutions to ascertain that the system works as predicted by turning wishes and aspirations into tangible outcomes.

In Sierra Leone, like most other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, democracy was granted to a people who demanded it, without much respect for the of institutional design process. Analysis of the data points to the fact irrespective of the theoretical knowledge that links party systems with electoral systems (Duverger, 1954, and Lipjhart, and 1999), drafters of the constitution opted for Single Member District/ first-past-the-post electoral system, while expecting a robust multi-party system, which works best under a PR system. However, clamoring for a multi-party system does not mean two party systems are undemocratic. On the
contrary, they can be just as democratic as multi-party systems, as long as the accompanying institutions are put in place. Nonetheless, for both systems to function optimally, they need to be configured in line with prevailing theories, as well as the objective realities of the political system in question.

Accordingly, a theory can be developed to configure alternative party systems (two and multi-party) with electoral systems, and ethnic configurations to produce democracies that enhance good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The theory that follows uses the taxonomic approach, which organizes the variables from the smallest to the largest, in order to show their interconnectedness, and how they reinforce each other.

Table 5.1: Extension of Lipjhart’s typologies to include ethnicity and Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Configuration I Majoritarian</th>
<th>Configuration 11 Consensual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party system</td>
<td>Two Party system Eases the process of government formation and narrows electoral contest to two main parties</td>
<td>Multi-Party System Encourages the formation of broad based coalition governments that represent the national character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>Majoritarian/ SMD Reduces political contest to strong and relevant parties by exaggerating the disparity between the percentage of votes earned and the number of seats awarded.</td>
<td>Proportional Seats awarded reflect actual percentage of votes earned, thus facilitating the survival and participation of smaller parties in the political process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic configuration</td>
<td>Melting pot Policies are focused on integrating the groups and societies within the state in order to unite them around a national purpose.</td>
<td>Salad bowl Policies encourage devolution of authority and the “uniqueness” of societies while recognizing the overarching authority of the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (type)</td>
<td>Majoritarian Concentrates executive power in party in governance and makes Cabinet dominant through the doctrine of collective responsibility</td>
<td>Consensual Usually encourages balance of power between the executive, legislative and the public. It weakens the executive through</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Governance | Good governance  
Political institutions create stable and responsive governments that encourage the participation of citizens in crafting and implementing policies based on simple majority. | Good governance  
Political institutions are flexible and responsive to societal changes, and encourage broad participation in the formation of governments and policies.

The table above captures an appropriate configuration of variables grouped under alternate systems with each reinforcing the other and ultimately leading to good governance. They reinforce through purposeful institutional design rather than mere wish or aspiration. Once properly configured, two party systems ease the process of government formation due to the fact that they gradually restrict contest for power between two parties, which makes it easier for one or the other to win a clear majority and form a government. The ease with which governments are formed under two party systems is also attributable to the choice of electoral systems. Single Member District (SMD)/ first-past-the-post systems make it onerous for small parties to meaningfully compete in the long run due to their incapability to win under the winner-takes-all rubric, which leaves them with proportionally less seats in parliament in relationship to the percentage of votes earned in elections.

In the alternate column, it is clear that government formation under multi-party systems may require coalition-building because close competition among three or more medium, or medium to large parties, often fail to produce the clear majority required to form a government. Nonetheless, it encourages parties to span ideological lines and other parochial sentiments in order to form coalitions that reflect societal diversity. That process is often aided by the PR system which ensures that the number of seats allocated to parties in parliament reflect the actual
percentage of votes earned in elections. Again, the goal is not to choose between the two configurations because each configuration will produce optimal results if situated within the appropriate democratic paradigm. Although it may sound problematic to talk about democratic paradigms in relation to states or categories of states that are democratizing, it is not irrelevant, due to the fact that democratizing states need road maps to make their quest for democracy more realistic and predictable.

Lijphart offered two models of democracy that states may aspire to achieve through careful institutional design. His typology makes a dichotomy which undergirds the configurations I have put forward at the level of party and electoral systems. Two party systems and SMD majoritarian electoral systems yield a majoritarian or Westminster model of democracy, which relies on strong executive authority backed by clear governing majority in Parliament. It can be argued that the stability guaranteed by such a system based on the ease of transfer of power is an added advantage in plural societies where there is always a danger a danger for such society to be divided based on ethnic or other parochial sentiments. However, the multi-party and PR electoral system configuration produces consensual democracies wherein the executive relies on consultation and coalitions, which may be facilitated the party system and electoral systems design. Moreover, the latter balances power between the executive and the legislature, which is an added advantage because it curbs authoritarianism by imposing legislative checks on executive power.

Both configurations therefore lead to good governance, although the nature of governance will be different institutionally. The majoritarian configuration often yields governance structures that rely on stable institutions which facilitate smooth transition of power and maximum participation of citizens in the political process. Decision-making under this
configuration is based on simple majority, which is eases the process and makes accountability certain. On the other hand, the consensual configuration relies on governance structures that value diversity in decision-making and autonomy of local institutions, which leads to healthy multi-patyism. The configurations above can be expressed as follows:

Model I (Majoritarian): TPS + SMD + MP ------------------------> MD ----------------------> GG

Model II (Consensual): MPS + PR + SB --------------------------> CD-----------------------> GG

Based on the models above, we can expect to have good governance (GG) under a two party system (TPS) and a single member district/first-past-the-post electoral system (SMD) with a “melting pot” (MPS) ethnic configuration and a majoritarian view of democracy (MD). Similarly, good governance (GG) can be achieved with a multi-party system (MP) and a proportional representation (PR) electoral system, along with a “salad bowl” (SB) ethnic configuration which promotes consensual democracy (CD).

From the analysis and theoretical distinction, it is evident that Sierra Leone and other Sub-Saharan African Countries have the potential to attain good governance whether they have two party or multi-party systems. However, given the diverse, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural character of those countries and the need for each group to feel represented, it is recommended that Sierra Leone and others in the region adopt Model II because it allows them to have PR systems, which maximize citizen participation within “salad bowls” that value ethnic diversity with sacrificing national unity. Under this configuration, smaller parties will thrive and serve as countervailing forces that balance the power to of larger and more established parties, thereby there by mitigating the negative effects of political competition in plural societies.
Discussion

After decades of bad governance under authoritarian rule, the 1990s started as one of hope for people in the developing world, especially in sub Saharan Africa where neo-patrimonial dictatorships of various sorts ranging from strongman to one party dominated governments occupied the political and leadership space. The so-called “third wave of democratization” which swept across the political landscape of the developing world ushered in an era of representation and people-centered governments based on multi-partyism. It is fair to say the results of two decades of multi-party democracy in sub Saharan Africa are mixed. The Sierra Leonean case shows that although the political space remains open for competitive party politics, the number of strong, relevant and/or significant parties has been in constant decline since 1996. While two party systems may be just as democratic as multi-party systems, it is multi-partyism that people typically aspire to and attempt to realize by enshrining provisions in their Constitutions to guarantee its institutionalization. However, genuine multi-partyism is proving difficult to attain in those states because they often aspire to its ideals without creating the necessary institutions to ensure its realization.

As the data shows, and as I have argued throughout this paper, it is not enough to aspire to a certain political ideal. In order for ideals to be realized, they have to be carefully calibrated into political institutions that produce tangible results. In most Sub-Saharan African countries like in Sierra Leone multi-partyism is on the decline due to constricting effects of electoral systems. As theories developed in the west and firmly established in the discipline predict, “majoritarian systems tend to favor two party systems whereas proportional electoral systems tend to favor multi-party systems.” Failure to deign institutions that link party systems with electoral systems is a major bottleneck in institutionalization of democracies in sub Saharan
Africa. In Sierra Leone, the SMD electoral system has been in place since Independence with brief periods of experimentation with proportional electoral system. Even though the data shows that SMD electoral system undermine rather than facilitate multi-partyism, the country reverted to SMD in 2007. So, while elections remain “free and fair,” the number of strong, relevant, and/or significant parties continues to decline due to the reductive effect it has on small parties.

This work reinforces the notion that ethnicity is salient Africa countries, especially in the process of governance because of the premium placed on ethnic group preservation rather ethnic diversity. Although the parties do their best to foster equity in the distribution of public goods and services, ethnic preferences almost always manifest itself at the individual level causing public officials to be obsessed with the idea of promoting the interest of their kith and kin at the expense of others. Political institution designers must therefore recognize salience of ethnicity in the governance as well as democratic processes in sub Saharan Africa. They must design institutions that neutralize the effects of ethnicity by integrating the society into a “melting pot” which encompasses all but privileges none. Alternatively, they can create “salad bowls,” which decentralizes authority and grants regional or local autonomy in order to ensure that diversity is preserved. These theories must in turn be aligned with the accompanying party and electoral system configuration, and situated within the proper democratic paradigm, in order to lead to produce good governance, which is the ultimate realization of the ideals of a democratic society.

The models that I have advanced in this dissertation although derived from a single case study are also rooted in the prevailing theories, which although developed in the west remain the dominant theories in the field. The project is useful for the study of democratization and good governance, especially from and institutionalist as well as comparative perspectives because it underscores the value of aligning institutions in order to realize the ideals and aspirations of
people all over the developing world for democratic societies that deliver the promise of good governance. Sierra Leone is the ideal case because it is a microcosm of the realities of political life in sub Saharan Africa, and it captures the extent to which ethnicity affects the democratic and governance processes in developing countries.
Appendix

Appendix 1: Result of the Parliamentary elections held in Sierra Leone - February 26-26, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats *(68 seats)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP)</td>
<td>269,486</td>
<td>36.09 %</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 United National People’s Party (UNPP)</td>
<td>161,618</td>
<td>21.64 %</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 People’s Democratic Party (PDP)</td>
<td>114,409</td>
<td>15.32 %</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 All People’s Congress (APC)</td>
<td>42,443</td>
<td>5.68 %</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 National Unity Party (NUP)</td>
<td>39,280</td>
<td>5.26 %</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Democratic Center Party (DCP)</td>
<td>35,624</td>
<td>4.77 %</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 People’s Progressive Party (PPP)</td>
<td>21,354</td>
<td>2.86 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 National Democratic Alliance (NDA)</td>
<td>20,105</td>
<td>2.69 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 People’s National Convention (PNC)</td>
<td>19,019</td>
<td>2.55 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 National Unity Movement (NUM)</td>
<td>8,884</td>
<td>1.19 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>0.79 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 National Alliance Democratic Party (NADP)</td>
<td>4,653</td>
<td>0.62 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 National People’s Party (NPP)</td>
<td>3,989</td>
<td>0.53 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*68 Members of Parliament were directly elected, and 12 Paramount Chiefs were indirectly elected.

Appendix 2: Result of the Presidential Elections held in Sierra Leone – February/March 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate (Party)</th>
<th>First Round</th>
<th>Second Round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of votes</td>
<td>Percentage of votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Tejan-Kabba (SLPP)</td>
<td>266,893</td>
<td>35.80 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Karefa-Smart (UNPP)</td>
<td>168,666</td>
<td>22.62 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate (Party)</td>
<td>Number of votes</td>
<td>Percentage of votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP)</td>
<td>1,352,206</td>
<td>69.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All People’s Congress (APC)</td>
<td>409,022</td>
<td>19.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Liberation Party (PLP)</td>
<td>69,788</td>
<td>3.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Alliance Party (GAP)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United National People’s Party (UNPP)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Democratic Party (PDP)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*112 Members were directly elected to Parliament, and additional 12 Paramount Chiefs were indirectly elected.

**Appendix 4: Result of the Parliamentary elections (by district/province) held in Sierra Leone – May 14, 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total seats*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>All People’s</td>
<td>Peace and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

138
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>People’s Party (SLPP)</th>
<th>Congress (APC)</th>
<th>Liberation Party (PLP)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kailahun</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenema</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kono</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombali</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koinadugu</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Loko</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonkolili</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonthe</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moyamba</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pujehun</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Area (Rural)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Area (urban)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Area</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Total</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*112 Members were directly elected to Parliament, and an additional 12 Paramount Chiefs were indirectly elected.

**Appendix 5: Result of the Presidential elections held in Sierra Leone – May 14, 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate (Party)</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Tejan Kabba (SLPP)</td>
<td>1,336,423</td>
<td>70.06 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Bai Koroma (APC)</td>
<td>426,405</td>
<td>22.35 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 6: Results of the Parliamentary elections (percentage) held in Sierra Leone – August 11, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All People’s Congress (APC)</td>
<td>728,898</td>
<td>40.73</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP)</td>
<td>707,608</td>
<td>39.54</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC)</td>
<td>275,435</td>
<td>15.39</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Alliance (NDA)</td>
<td>31,388</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention People’s Party (CPP)</td>
<td>15,303</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United National People’s Party (UNPP)</td>
<td>14,078</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Liberation Party (PLP)</td>
<td>6,752</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>10,127</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix 7: Result of the Parliamentary elections (by district) held in Sierra Leone – August 11, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total seats*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All People’s Congress (APC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

140
Appendix 8: Result of the first and second round of the 2007 Presidential Elections held in Sierra Leone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate (Party)</th>
<th>First Round</th>
<th>Second Round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of votes</td>
<td>% of votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Bai Koroma (APC)</td>
<td>815,523</td>
<td>44.34 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*112 Members of Parliament were directly elected, and 12 Paramount Chiefs were indirectly elected.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All People’s Congress (APC)</td>
<td>1,149,234</td>
<td>53.67 %</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP)</td>
<td>819,185</td>
<td>38.25 %</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC)</td>
<td>69,202</td>
<td>3.23 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Alliance (NDA)</td>
<td>27,706</td>
<td>1.29 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary United Front (RUF)</td>
<td>12,573</td>
<td>0.59 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement (UDM)</td>
<td>11,771</td>
<td>0.55 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Democratic Party (PDP)</td>
<td>8,387</td>
<td>0.39 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens Democratic Party (CDP)</td>
<td>7,446</td>
<td>0.35 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United National People’s Party</td>
<td>4,734</td>
<td>0.22 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Liberation Party (PLP)</td>
<td>2,330</td>
<td>0.11 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix 9: Result of the Parliamentary elections held in Sierra Leone in 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Berewa (SLPP)</td>
<td>704,012</td>
<td>38.28 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles F. Margai (PMDC)</td>
<td>255,499</td>
<td>13.89 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Turay (CPP)</td>
<td>28,610</td>
<td>1.56 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amadu Jalloh (NDA)</td>
<td>17,748</td>
<td>0.96 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandeh Bab Conteh (PLP)</td>
<td>10,556</td>
<td>0.57 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Kady Karim (UNPP)</td>
<td>7,260</td>
<td>0.39 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix 10: Result of the Presidential elections held in Sierra Leone – November 17, 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate (Party)</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Ernest Bai Koroma (APC)</td>
<td>1,314,881</td>
<td>58.65 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Julius Maada Bio (SLPP)</td>
<td>837,517</td>
<td>37.36 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Charles Margai (PMDC)</td>
<td>28,944</td>
<td>1.29 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Joshua Albert Carew ((CDP)</td>
<td>22,863</td>
<td>1.02 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Eldred Collins (RUF)</td>
<td>12,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gibrilla Kamara (PDP)</td>
<td>8,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kandeh Baba Conteh (PLP)</td>
<td>6,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mohamed Bangura (UDM)</td>
<td>5,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>James Obai Fullah (UNPP)</td>
<td>5,044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Afrobarometer: http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/data-by-country-n-z/sierra-leone


Awoko. (March 6, 2014). “Government Relies on NGOs to Mitigate Cholera.”
http://awoko.org/2012/08/17/government-relies-on-ngos-to-mitigate-cholera-outbreak/


BBC News. 2007). *Sierra Leone’s opposition unites for rerun.*

BBC News. 2007). *Sierra Leone’s opposition wins poll.*


Center for Systemic Peace: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html


Nations online: countries of the world: Administrative Map of Sierra Leone: [http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/sierra_leone_map.htm](http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/sierra_leone_map.htm)


West Virginia University Electronic
Thesis and Dissertation Signature
Form

Student Name: Hamin Mohamed Saffa
(Last) (First) (Middle)

Student ID #: 70691415
Non-WVU Email Account: msaaffahamin@yahoo.com

Degree: Master’s Doctorate

Document Type: Thesis Dissertation

Document Title: Party Systems, Democratization and Governance in Africa: Shaping theory and practice using Sierra Leone as a case

Student Agreement:

I hereby certify that, if appropriate, I have obtained and attached hereto a written permission statement from the owners of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis, dissertation, project report, or other research material, allowing distribution as specified upon deposit.

I hereby grant to West Virginia University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible, under the conditions selected upon deposit, my above mentioned document in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain ownership rights as specified in the WVU copyright policy to the copyright of the abovementioned document. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this abovementioned document.

Review and Acceptance:

The above mentioned document has been reviewed and accepted by the student's advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements above, and agree that this Signature Form updates any and all previous Signature Forms submitted heretofore.

Signed: 5/27/13

Committee: May 27, 2014

(date) (date)

(date) (date)

(date) (date)

(date) (date)

(date) (date)