Intellectualism is the view that knowing how to do something amounts to knowing that something is the case. Anti-intellectualism is the view that knowing how consists in certain sorts of abilities or dispositions. In this paper I offer arguments against two versions of intellectualism. Stanley and Williamson (2001) hold that propositional knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for know-how. Against their view, I argue that there are cases in which such knowledge is insufficient. Bengson and Moffett (2012) argue that propositional knowledge is necessary, but not sufficient for knowhow. Rather, they hold that knowing how requires meeting a further condition, namely, standing in a non-propositional knowledge-of relation to a way of doing something. Against this view, I argue that if propositional knowledge is necessary for know-how, then we must deny that many clear instances of know-how are in fact such instances. Taken together, my cases against Stanley and Williamson and Bengson and Moffett show that propositional knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for know-how.
Digital Commons Citation
Harmon, Ian, "Knowing how without knowing that" (2018). Faculty Scholarship. 919.