Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
12-10-2014
College/Unit
Chambers College of Business and Economics
Document Number
15-25
Department/Program/Center
Economics
Abstract
This paper analyzes the formation, refinement, and evolution of organizational decisionmaking processes, e.g. organizational governments. In doing so, it develops a framework for analyzing a broad cross section of private and non-private formal organizations. Formal organizations are all founded, e.g. they have a beginning. As a consequence, decisionmaking authority within an organization is often initially distributed in a manner that provides their founders (formeteurs) with substantial control over their organizations. However, that control is rarely, if ever, complete, because formeteurs have interests that can often be advanced by trading and/or delegating authority to others in exchange for services and other resources that increase organizational surplus. The result tends to be divided, rule-based, governance based on the king and council template.
Digital Commons Citation
Congleton, Roger D., "On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run" (2014). Economics Faculty Working Papers Series. 158.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/econ_working-papers/158