Date of Graduation
There is a substantial body of literature examining the role of interest groups and their influence in the policy process. What is less clear is the decision-making process of groups in selecting strategies to advance their goals and how the choice of tactics impacts the behavior of other groups within the policy area. This dissertation examines what influences the choice of lobbying strategies in an attempt to understand whether certain types of groups favor particular strategies, how they use the policy process to influence policy decisions, and how successful they are in their choice of strategy. This study examines the choice of strategies employed by opposing groups, utilizing the issue of regulatory takings in a series of state-level case studies. The prevalence of takings legislation during the past four years provides a timely topic for examining similar groups in a variety of states. The research design combines an analysis of written records and interviews with interest group officials, inquiring into organizational goals, methods of decision making, the use of particular lobbying strategies, the extent of involvement with other organizations, and perceptions of success or failure in meeting their goals. Interviews followed a questionnaire designed to elicit open-ended responses about the ways in which a particular group lobbies and the reasons for choosing that strategy. This study reaches three conclusions: (1) The way in which an issue is framed by competing groups subsequently impacts the types of groups which become involved in a policy debate; (2) The lack of resources merely reduces the scope of a group's lobbying efforts but does not prohibit any group from making its views known; and (3) Groups are unconcerned with the need to create policy issue niches and freely join into coalitions to enhance advocacy success. The study also provides evidence suggesting that while certain groups do possess greater political power, traditionally weaker groups are able to compete and given the appropriate political climate, prevail in the political process.
Moffett, Randolph Rutherford, "Regulatory takings: Lobbying, coalitions, and influence." (1996). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 9438.