Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2015

College/Unit

Eberly College of Arts and Sciences

Department/Program/Center

Philosophy and Humanities

Abstract

This paper is a defense of moral evidentialism, the view that we have a moral obligation to form the doxastic attitude that is best supported by our evidence. I will argue that two popular arguments against moral evidentialism are weak. I will also argue that our commitments to the moral evaluation of actions require us to take doxastic obligations seriously.

Source Citation

Ryan, Sharon (2015). In Defense of Moral Evidentialism. Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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