Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-2014
College/Unit
WVU College of Law
Abstract
A debate about whether all children are entitled to an "equal" or an "adequate" education has been waged at the forefront of school finance policy for decades. In an era of budget deficits and harsh cuts in public education, I submit that it is time to move on.
Equality of educational opportunity has been thought to require equal spending per pupil or spending adjusted to the needs of differently situated children. Adequacy has been understood to require a level of spending sufficient to satisfy some absolute, rather than relative, educational threshold In practice, however, many courts interpreting their states' constitutional obligations have fused the equality and adequacy theories. Certain federal laws express principles of both doctrines. And gradually, more advocates and scholars have come to endorse hybrid equality-adequacy approaches. Still, the debate persists over seemingly intractable conceptual precepts and their political and legal ramifications. Tracking the philosophical origins and evolution of equality and adequacy as legal doctrines, I explain the significance of their points of convergence and argue that the few points of divergence are untenable in practice. Equality of educational opportunity should not be interpreted as pursuing equal chances for educational achievement for all children, because that ideal is infeasible. Nor should educational adequacy be interpreted as completely indifferent to objectionable inequalities that can be feasibly curtailed. Properly conceived, equality and adequacy are not merely congruent but reciprocal. That is, children are owed an education that is adequately equal and equally adequate.
Original Publication Title
Stanford Law Review
Digital Commons Citation
Weishart, Joshua, "Transcending Equality versus Adequacy" (2014). Law Faculty Scholarship. 9.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/law_faculty/9
Source Citation
Joshua Weishart, Transcending Equality versus Adequacy, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 477 (2014).
Comments
This article is included in the Research Repository @WVU with the permission of the Stanford Law Review.