Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
8-6-2014
College/Unit
Chambers College of Business and Economics
Document Number
14-24
Department/Program/Center
Economics
Abstract
Organizing employees into teams increases productivity but also generates incentives to shirk. Recent research suggests that peer enforcement plays an important role in deterring shirking in teams. We analyze 10 years of performance and compensation data for NFL offensive linemen, a high-skill, high-salary and repeatedly interacting team, using the Hausman-Taylor estimator to control for unobservable individual-specific heterogeneity. We find evidence that teammates' effort signals reduce the salaries of individual offensive linemen, providing an optimal, low powered sanctioning mechanism for individual workers in this setting, and that a separate, independently monitored individual effort signal also reduces salaries.
Digital Commons Citation
Humphreys, Brad and Yang, Jie, "Peer Enforcement in Teams: Evidence from High-Skill Professional Workers with Repeated Interactions" (2014). Economics Faculty Working Papers Series. 117.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/econ_working-papers/117