Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
2014
College/Unit
Chambers College of Business and Economics
Document Number
14-28
Department/Program/Center
Economics
Abstract
The 17th Amendment disturbed the existing electoral system in the United States by requiring direct elections for state Senators. Scholars have argued this made the Senate more populist and contributed to the growth of government in the US post-1913. We employ econometric tools to investigate whether the mean ideology of the Senate and its winning policies experienced a structural change around the time of the enactment. We find no compelling evidence of a structural break at that time but do find some evidence for a change in the mid-to-late 1890s.
Digital Commons Citation
Tarabar, Danko and Hall, Joshua C., "The Seventeenth Amendment, Senate Ideology, and the Growth of Government" (2014). Economics Faculty Working Papers Series. 121.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/econ_working-papers/121