Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
2014
College/Unit
Chambers College of Business and Economics
Document Number
14-33
Department/Program/Center
Economics
Abstract
Vedder and Gallaway (1991) develop and test a unique theory about the interactions between the levels of spending captured by rent-seeking interest groups. They hypothesize that initially rent seekers cooperate in ways that expand government spending and rents. At some point, however, groups can only expand their rents at the expense of other rent-seekers and that this relationship will strengthen over time. In this brief note, we update their empirical model 20 years into the future and find their prediction was accurate. The relationship is now stronger and more states have moved into the negative range.
Digital Commons Citation
Sobel, Russell S. and Hall, Joshua C., "Has the War between the Rent Seekers Escalated?" (2014). Economics Faculty Working Papers Series. 126.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/econ_working-papers/126