Author ORCID Identifier

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3080-6569

Semester

Summer

Date of Graduation

2025

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Type

PhD

College

Eberly College of Arts and Sciences

Department

Political Science

Committee Chair

Erik Herron

Committee Co-Chair

Matthew Jacobsmeier

Committee Member

Mason Moseley

Committee Member

Henry Hale

Abstract

Street-level election bureaucracy (SLEB) remains one of the least studied aspects of authoritarian elections. Our current understanding of micro-level election administration in autocracies is fragmented and unsystematic. In this dissertation, I develop and test a theory of authoritarian SLEB that comprehensively addresses key elements of election administration: the incentivization and mobilization of election commissioners, the establishment of control over election commissions, the monitoring of their performance, and the post-election reshaping of their personnel composition. Drawing on rational choice theory, I propose a framework in which autocrats are seen as outcome-maximizers who strategically design SLEB to achieve their electoral goals. The empirical tests and their results support the idea that autocrats act strategically in shaping SLEB and consolidating control over it. To illustrate this, I examine both modern Russian elections and elections in the Soviet Union, showing how authoritarian regimes adapt their SLEB strategies to varying structural conditions and constraints. The analysis is based on several sources: polling data from Russian election experts and members of precinct election commissions (PECs); occupational and socio-demographic data on PEC members in selected regions of modern Russia and the USSR; archival materials on Soviet election administration practices; and data on PEC compositions before and after the 2018 Russian presidential election, combined with precinct-level election results. The key findings demonstrate that the Russian authoritarian regime relies more on positive than negative incentives in its design of SLEB. It mobilizes diverse professional and social groups, adapts its strategies based on the availability of personnel, and strategically reshapes PEC compositions according to their electoral utility. Overall, this dissertation offers a comprehensive and alternative perspective on street-level election bureaucracy in authoritarian regimes – one in which autocrats are viewed as clients seeking contractors – the election commissioners – who voluntarily participate in election administration and contribute to the regime’s electoral success in exchange for positive incentives.

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